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Anyone have a better name for the subsection "Ancient Period"? Sanjat312, 06:15, 12 December 2006 (UTC)
I changed the diambiguation page. As such I think both articles are wrong headed. I suggest leading out the arguments page until someone reads something written by someone with some qualifications ;) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 18.104.22.168 (talk) 11:01, 7 January 2007 (UTC)
Ricard Carrier has written this entry AND recommended his book/work in it! I think it needs to be rewrtten for thsi reason alone! Also, I don't think the arguments against section is neutral: most end in claims that the argument is incorrect, surely there is some academic disagreement as to whether e.g. the existence of qualia undermines naturalism? And why demand scientific evidence for supernatural causes, surely this is impossible as what was considered supernatural would then be natural? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 22.214.171.124 (talk) 20:59, 12 January 2007 (UTC)
". . .only nature is real, i.e. Atheism." Metaphysical naturalism is not equivalent to atheism. Atheism is the lack of belief in God or gods. It is possible to lack belief in God but still believe in supernatural entities such as ghosts, demons, angels, etc. 126.96.36.199 (talk) 03:25, 25 July 2012 (UTC)
Mind as Brain
This is not necessarily true. I (the relatively high functioning "conscious" organic deterministic state machine typing this) am the result of ongoing chemically based computation occurring within my body and in reaction to the inputs I come across, and as such, am no more than a series of "memories" (currently existing sets of atoms and related interactions) and processes (sets of atoms and interactions existing since I was "born" [a state which I shall define as that when these such processes exist]). There is no reason to assume that we cannot deduce these processes and memories and replicate them in another substrate. While my mind is wholly material, if it were executing on a different substrate I would still say I exist and interacting with me you may not be able to say I am not the me that is/was my brain. Indeed my brain 30 years from now will have largely replaced its constituent atoms while the interactions occurring among the atoms today will still cause me to be me.
Perhaps these sections as a whole are largely missing something. The current scientific understanding of the mind / body problem has significantly changed since prior to 1960 (although had I the chance to discuss this with Mr. Stace I am certain I could have convinced him both that the mind is material and that it is not only the static brain). --188.8.131.52 (talk) 00:11, 21 September 2012 (UTC)
Evolution of definition
I didn't find Reference Desk Humanities or Science to be appropriate places for this question, although this comment does not suggest a precise change, sorry about that; but it pertains to this article.
When verifying various definitions (including Webster 1913 and this article's), I see the use of belief, doctrine and denial, to describe the naturalist point of view. Which made me question if there has ever been evolution of the definition over time in certain sources.
I may be mistaken, but describing naturalism as a doctrine or belief, reminds me the common fallacy presented to athiests: "how can you prove that a diety doesn't exist?", when of course, athiests respond that it's simply non-belief in a diety, because of the lack of evidence; we cannot produce non-evidence, but acknowledge the observable.
Similarily, as someone who considers to hold a naturalist view, I don't find that faith is required to hold this view, which would only be altered if evidence of non-physical, non-naturalistic processes at work were demonstrated. Therefore, I'm not convinced that belief or doctrine are technically adequate terms to define naturalism.
If the definition indeed evolved in this direction in the work of some authors (a point of view, acknowlegement, or assertion, versus a belief or doctrine), we probably should have mention of this in the article, and possibly even alter the definition in the lead? But do such works even exist making the distinction? Thanks, 184.108.40.206 (talk) 15:12, 1 April 2014 (UTC)
I added this section, and I would prefer it to stay up. If there is something needing modification, or attention, please do assert it. But if metaphysical naturalism is true, it ought to be able to better other metaphysical explanations, such as realism, and other things cited in the subsection I added. 220.127.116.11 (talk) 22:02, 19 May 2015 (UTC)
Pre-Modern Philosophy Section is seriously flawed
This section reads like an advertisement for someone trying to sell Ed Feser's book. Despite the fact that Feser is arguing for a classical position in philosophy which is not held by the majority of philosophers, it reads as though he personally has concluded and won the argument . Another huge problem is that it reads as though classical philosophy offers the only variants of realism and that naturalism is tied to either nominalism or eleminative materialism. Neither one of these claims is true. There are many more variants of realism that are either naturalistic or compatible with naturalism. There are also other options for the naturalist besides eleminativism or nominalism.
If this section stays up on the article, then it needs to be completely rewritten. This rewritting needs to include the fact that (1) the naturalist position is taken by the majority of philosophers to be best explanation for these things (probably citing David Chalmer's massive survey "What Do Philosophers Believe?" that outlines this which I referenced above), (2) making it not a biased advertisement for Feser's book (don't make it about Feser and do not treat it as though his popular level book written from his side is the end of the discussion), and (3) citing a list of the schools of philosophy that are taken as better answers by professional philosophers.