Talk:Military strategy

strategy or its lack of use

I'm not entirely sure that the claim of a lack of strategy on the western front is correct. A lack of manuever doesn't necessarily imply a lack of strategy (despite what Hart might think :P ). I'm going to see if I can reword some of this to a more pleasing form. Stargoat 15:28, 8 Jun 2004 (UTC)

Another point is that there is a difference between no strategy and a bad strategy.

Roadrunner 16:37, 8 Jun 2004 (UTC)

Development of Stategy

Do you think this might need its own article? Stargoat 16:32, 8 Jun 2004 (UTC)

stratagem

Should we add something about a stratagem as being an execution of a strategic campaign to achieve a strategic goal? (Okay, I admit it, that sentence made my brain hurt.) I'm not sure about the best way to accomplish that. Anyone have any thoughts? Stargoat 17:08, 17 Jun 2004 (UTC)

rubbish

the section on Communist China's strategy is almost all rubbish, they didn't fight the Japanese several nationalist generals were communist & each turned over 500,000 man armies to Mao and the rest sounds like it was written by the chinese gov — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.9.22.214 (talk) 19:10, 7 May 2018 (UTC)

Principles and the Maginot Line example

The current text says (wrongly, IMO)

France entered World War II with a purely defensive doctrine, epitomized by the "impregnable" Maginot Line, but only to be completely circumvented by the German blitzkrieg in the Fall of France.

Background: Their doctrine wasn't purely defensive, and it wasn't "circumvented by the German blitzkrieg". The Maginot Line wasn't described as 'impregnable' except by the newspapers and by politicians in public speeches. The French strategy was reactive, i.e. they wanted to fight in the Low Countries but had to wait until the Germans entered Belgian territory before they went on the offensive, which they duly did with maximum speed and force, which meant that they stepped into the trap that the Germans had set for them. If they had had a purely defensive strategy and kept their own army and the BEF behind the "soft Maginot Line" in the north, they might have been able to hold the Germans off and avoided defeat.

In any case, I think that text would be better formulated as

France attempted to use its Maginot Line to apply the principles Mass and Economy of force (troops could be concentrated in the north for an offensive there while the Line acted as force multiplier in the south), Maneuver and Security (the Germans couldn't go directly from Alsace to Paris).

Possibly adding

The Germans used Surprise with their assault through the Ardennes.

Rationale: how the French made their strategy based on these principles is of historical interest as it represents two of the most prominent (out of a very short list) attempts to deal with modern, mechanised war. Common wisdom held that the combat aircraft and the armoured vehicles would, mostly penetrate any defences. The British set up a radar network along their shores to attempt to keep aircraft out, and the French built the Maginot Line to deal with, specifically, armoured vehicles. Infantry could, slowly and with great losses, penetrate the Line (but not reliably roll it up), but vehicles would, by and large, be stopped.

Hoodiecrow (talk) 16:00, 17 August 2021 (UTC)