|WikiProject Cryptography / Computer science||(Rated C-class, High-importance)|
Cryptography without/before PKC
Distinct from the research into public-key crypto, there's history and research about the practicalities of living *without* the mathematical/complexity assumptions that underlie most PKC: key negotiation including via multiple third parties, hash signatures, etc. Don't have the round tuits quite yet (and it doesn't really belong in this specific article), but throwing it out there if it piques anyone else's interest.
I'm unfamiliar with how to mention some user such as 126.96.36.199, someone please modify this and help me out with a link on my user talk page.
Post-quantum cryptography (and anything with the word "quantum" in it) are at the frontier of technological advancement. Any mention to an entity who claim to specialize in such field would be strongly misleading and biased endorsement.
post-quantum.com may indeed be a PQ company, but Security Innovation and its subsidiaries (if I'm not mistaken) had specialized in NTRU for perhaps far longer than most other people, yet we still do not give them mention on this page. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dannyniu (talk • contribs) 02:09, 11 September 2016 (UTC)
i suggest to create a section about the ongoing efforts to collect, select and/or standardize PQ primitives. there is an european group led by tanja lange: https://pqcrypto.eu.org/ https://www.tue.nl/en/university/news-and-press/news/23-04-2015-tanja-lange-leads-multi-million-euro-project-to-protect-data-against-quantum-computers and there is the NIST QC project http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/post-quantum-crypto/ maybe i can put in some work, but not anytime soon Krisztián Pintér (talk) 22:19, 10 April 2017 (UTC)
Code-Based Cryptography variant McEliece-QC-MDPC Codes insecure
The variant of the McEliece cryptosystem using Quasi-Cyclic Moderate-Density Parity-Checks is mentioned in this article, therefore stating that this is (still) a viable candidate for Post-Quantum Cryptography. However, a key-breaking attack has been developed by Qian Guo, Thomas Johansson and Paul Stankovski (from Lund University in Lund, Sweden). They discuss their attack in their paper named: A Key Recovery Attack on MDPC with CCA Security Using Decoding Errors. This variant is therefore not anymore a viable candidate for Post-Quantum Cryptography. Markovisch (talk) 05:09, 20 April 2017 (UTC)