Talk:Praxeology

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Synthethic a priori?[edit]

Differentiations such as synthetic a priori have long been dismissed by wittgenstein. Not even Mises clearly uses that definition to the contents of praxeology (sometimes referring to it as analytical, or whatever), since he mostly dismissed the question as irrevelant. So, what i mean is, i don't think it's proper to state praxeology as synthetic a priori. For a better view on the basis of the logic of action see this: http://mises.org/journals/scholar/long.pdf I will erase that part now, if that's ok.

By the way, about the criticisms i read here regarding if praxeology is science or not. It is, of course. Even using criterials from Popper, a well-known neo-positivist (or almost that, anyway), praxeology passes the test. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 187.26.15.167 (talk) 07:52, 16 January 2010 (UTC)

Praise[edit]

Quite an excellent article! --ShaunMacPherson 07:05, 3 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Criticisms[edit]

What about any criticisms of von Mises and his praxeology? --Kiwibird 13:14, 25 August 2005 (UTC)

http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard38.html footnote 5: For a typical criticism of praxeology for not using mathematical logic, see George. J. Schuller, "Rejoinder," American Economic Review 41 (March 1951): 188. enjoy. 128.128.98.46 (talk) 18:23, 11 July 2008 (UTC)
It says in the article that people exchange goods or services that they both appraise to be of equal value. If this is true, then why would they exchange them at all? If a newspaper sells for 50 cents, does this mean that I hold the value of this newspaper at 50 cents? If so, why would I buy it? Inversely, if the printer values the paper at 50 cents, why would THEY sell it? They wouldn't. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.4.24.181 (talk) 20:36, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

Delete recent additions?[edit]

Some of the recent additions like those referring to the "PostKantian base" don't seem to add anything. Consider deleting? Rjljr2 01:42, 10 February 2007 (UTC)

Missing something?[edit]

It seems to me that the biggest thing missing in this article is the reason why neoclassical economics has become mainstream instead of this method. Until that information is added this article isn't of very much use. --Jayson Virissimo 05:40, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

Lacking objectivity[edit]

I think objectivity is missing from this article. Even the introduction is extremely dubious stating it is the "science of human action". Clearly this page is very pro-Austrian. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 121.79.65.97 (talk) 09:27, 23 October 2007 (UTC)

Err, Praxeology is a big part of Austrian economics isn't it? (and vice versa) Rjljr2 (talk) 04:57, 28 November 2007 (UTC)
  • Articles about a part of an economic belief shouldn't be pro- that belief Rowan9 (talk) 17:01, 3 May 2014 (UTC)

Can praxeology be considered a science?[edit]

I have edited the definition to avoid defining it as a science. The subject is highly academic in nature and it is therefore proper that it be subjected to the academic definition of a science, which it does not meet. "Framework" is a more appropriate title. Nyopallo (talk) 17:30, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

  • You may have touched a nerve. As I understand it, there has been a controversy raging for decades about whether or not the study of human action requires empirical testability to be considered legitimate or "scientific". After all, no legitimate or truly meaningful testing can be conducted on human behavior in markets, etc. Some hints of this controversy are found in the discussions of positivism and scientism. While the term "framework" sounds ok to me, others more versed in Austrian praxeology may wish to weigh in here. --RayBirks (talk) 00:32, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
    • My justification here is outlined in the article and is more compelling when you consider the need for consistency between articles. Praxeology does not use data as an empirical science, and is therefore not one. Formal sciences, like mathematics and statistics, begin with very rigid and rigorous frameworks that are wholly predictable and can be broken down into their component parts. Praxeology, on the other hand, states in its very foundation that human action is too complex to be broken down into its component parts. I think that it would be acceptable to include the controversy in the article if there is someone who feels that is important enough, however I still feel that making any outright statement that praxeology is a science would be incorrect. Being a framework does not prevent it from also being a science, which is while I feel that it's a good term to use. Nyopallo (talk) 00:50, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
    • I'd also like to point out that this deals with a previous issue raised on this talk page, namely that defining it as a science violates NPOV. Nyopallo (talk) 00:51, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

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  • I have slightly changed the "misnomer" sentence to leave room for judgment about the use of the term "science". Separately, there is a further wiki page about the positivism controversy at Positivism dispute. At this writing, it is rather brief. --RayBirks (talk) 20:57, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Looks more like a meme than a science. It is something you will hear from well edjucated libertarians when you present them an argument about the objectivity of economics. To my eyes looks more like the "scientific" and existentialistic arguments of young-earth creationists.--92.118.191.48 (talk) 18:13, 11 September 2009 (UTC)

In mathematics, one is guided by real-world observation and adopts axioms and uses symbolic manipulations to develop theorems. In von Mises' praxeology, one is guided by real-world observation and adopts axioms (for example, "people value leisure") and uses verbal argumentation to develop theorems. Assuming the axioms in use at the time apply to the real world problem in question (say, the operation of a market economy, or perhaps criminals engaging in coercion), then the theorems will also apply. In this sense, praxeology is formally a science just as mathematics is a science (in fact, the "queen of the sciences" according to Gauss). These fields remain sciences even if you don't agree with the axioms; e.g. the axiom of choice remains a contentious axiom.
I don't know about other styles of praxeology ("or "praxiology"?) though, only von Mises'.
Doubledork (talk) 18:55, 15 September 2011 (UTC)
See the edit I made under the pseudoscience heading. Praxeology is not, and will never be, a science, unless praxeology changes or science does.
does NOT follow the scientific method; nothing is proven empirically. Instead, a load of assumption are made, and passed off as fact. Of course, many argue that science makes assumptions all the time (praxeologists and fans like to aim this criticism at maths in particular). This is false. Every theory in every science (including maths) can be traced back to stuff you can repeatedly prove for yourself, with your own eyes, time and time again, stuff that has been proven in the real world. Praxeology, instead, just starts with a load of statements, and goes from there. Nothing is proven, and there isn't even an attempt at falsification. Maths isn't like this at all: If something mathamtical fails in the real world, maths changes.
Another reason is because the "science of human action" is already covered by psychology. And don't even think about giving me that BS that I've heard before, about "psychology studies the mind, not human action". Human action is governed by the mind.
So yeah. That is why praxeology is most definitely not a science, and until people stop selling it as such, it will only be a pseudoscience at best.
P. S. And don't try to handwave any of this by claiming it only applies to some styles of praxeology, in case anyone was thinking it. Until praxeology starts its own, scientific journal, it can even begin to be a science. And that goes for all of it.The Talking Toaster (talk) 21:53, 18 October 2012 (UTC)

Lacking objectivity 2[edit]

The sentence "It is commonly referred to as a science, however this may be a misnomer because it does not appear to meet the guidelines for either empirical or formal sciences." should either be removed, or moved from the ingress to a separate section (Criticism?) and should be discussed seriously, and not used as mockery. They argue that it is a science because... Critics argue that... and so on.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.165.67.8 (talk) 07:14, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

Classical economists and observation[edit]

The article says, "Like other Austrian and classical economists, he rejected the use of observation...". I'm not aware of classical economists rejecting observation. Of course, I'm not aware of lots of things. Anyway, I'd like a reference for that. CRETOG8(t/c) 04:19, 10 September 2008 (UTC)

What about Alfred Espinas[edit]

The article acknowledges that the term was first coined by Alfred Espinas, but doesn't even mention him in the main thrust of the article, let alone go into any details of his coining. I don't know anything about Espinas, so maybe he just coined the term and never did anything with it. Even if this is the case, it should be noted the context and intent of his coining. —Memotype::T 16:07, 17 November 2008 (UTC)

What is Praxeology?[edit]

That's the one question this page doesn't answer. Oh, I know it's "a framework for modeling human action", and "The science of human action". Does this mean that Praxeology involves throwing balls (scientifically, of course)? I can also infer that it has something to do with economics. Maybe throwing money then? Yes, that's sarcasm, but I still have no idea what Praxeology is. If someone who knows that would amend the article, that would be useful. -- TimNelson (talk) 12:41, 19 November 2008 (UTC)

No one knows, not even the self-professed praxeologists. This is evidenced by the fact that there does not exist a proper, academic summary of praxeology. Trust me, I've searched high and low. Go ahead, ask your friendly neighborhood praxeologist to provide you with such a summary; even if you offer to pay for it (even in gold!), there will be no summary forthcoming. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.241.218.107 (talk) 00:55, 23 June 2009 (UTC)
praxeology basically means that there are statements that 1, tells relevant things about the world, and 2, are self evident, and needs no proof. for example: "men make choices". it is obviously not a tautological statement, it is a real statement about the real world. on the other hand, one can say that it needs no evidence, it is obvious. positivist philosophy excplicitely denies such statements, claiming that any statement is either merely a consequence of the definitions, or it is about the world. the latter kind must be falsifiable, that is, it must proven true or false with observations. i would like to see that in the article some way. more details in this lecture: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hiXcO3pcR8I Krisztián Pintér (talk) 18:45, 25 January 2010 (UTC)
"there does not exist a proper, academic summary of praxeology"
IMHO the best-known praxeology "bible" is von Mises's Human Action. It's available free online. There are some other people that have used the term "praxeology" though, who aren't connected with von Mises. I don't know much about them though.
"positivist philosophy excplicitely denies such statements, claiming that any statement is either merely a consequence of the definitions, or it is about the world. the latter kind must be falsifiable, that is, it must proven true or false with observations"
Unfortunately, the metaphysical statement you gave is either not about the world, or it's self-contradictory because it is itself not falsifiable. This point is noted in von Mises's "The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science". I would like to see this kind of thing in a critcisms & rebuttals section in the article.
Doubledork (talk) 19:10, 15 September 2011 (UTC)
Good question, since most "praxeologists" don't seem to know either. That's the short answer. The long answer?
Praxeology is whatever it wants to be. It is said, by it's founder (and many leading "praxeologists"), to be based on the action axiom, "human action is purposeful behavior", which reduces to "humans act". From this, you can go nowhere, unless you add in a load of unproven assumptions. Praxeologists like to call these "deductions" instead, because that implies they're necessarily based on tied & tested principles, which they aren't.
So basically, as long as you can rationalise a connection to something praxeological (like the action axiom, at the most basic level), praxeology can technically be a anything you want it to be, and you don't have to prove a damn thing--as long as it sounds convincing. Of course, the catch with this blind faith approach is that people have to believe you (at least, the majority, anyway. And since the majority of "praxeologists" seem to be libertarians, any praxeological breakthroughs need to be vetted by them.
So, in short: Praxeology is a libertarian mouth-piece.The Talking Toaster (talk) 21:53, 18 October 2012 (UTC)
To the first poster: Good question, since most "praxeologists" don't seem to know either. That's the short answer. The long answer?
To Doubledork:
"Unfortunately, the metaphysical statement you gave is either not about the world, or it's self-contradictory because it is itself not falsifiable."
What are you talking about? I saw no metaphysical statement in his reply, and there was no element of unfalsifiability to it.The Talking Toaster (talk) 22:03, 18 October 2012 (UTC)

"That's the one question this page doesn't answer. Oh, I know it's "a framework for modeling human action", and "The science of human action". "

You're right, praxeology is the science of human action but not any action, only the purposeful action, what it really tries to do is to understand WHY people behaves the way they do, this is important since economics is not a natural science but a social science, it depends on human behavior, therefore its crucial to the study of economics to understand why the economic agents move the way they do using logic and reasoning. 201.241.227.67 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 17:28, 20 March 2013 (UTC)

Praxeology in sociology[edit]

I'm not sure the terminology translates well into English language, but at least in Germany "praxeology" would also refer to a sociologial school of thought oriented along social practices (reaching maybe from Garfinkel to Bourdieu). This should be disambiguated. -- 132.230.104.57 (talk) 16:23, 28 January 2009 (UTC)

It looks like the difference may be that in Germany (and elsewhere in Europe?), praxeology just refers to the sociology of social practices, but in the English-speaking world, it only refers to Misesian praxeology, with all its unique assumptions. Mporter (talk) 08:45, 12 September 2009 (UTC)

rank transform[edit]

I scrapped the sentence about rank transform as it was still redlinked. Don't know what he was talking about (maybe Friedman test?). kostmo (talk) 19:10, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

Hoppe[edit]

@BigK HeX

What is now POV? Of course, you are right about OR. But it needs hunderts of scienists in the same field to write a well summary about such a topic. Hoppe's resource is only an important one. But "Primary sources that have been reliably published may be used in Wikipedia, but only with care, because it is easy to misuse them." What you are calling POV now, is not clear for me. --Haberecht137 (talk) 13:45, 23 November 2010 (UTC)

While Hoppe is respected in Austrian circles, so that his Austrian work can be considered worthy of note, I'm not so sure about using Hoppe's opinions on mainstream economics. Discussion of mainstream economic history is pretty abundant in the common academic venues, so I'm fairly skeptical of using Hoppe's opinion in describing the work of Say, et al., when a more noted authority almost certainly can be found easily and would likely be more appropriate. BigK HeX (talk) 14:04, 23 November 2010 (UTC)
You have changed the sentence to: "Austrian economist Hans-Hermann Hoppe describes Mises's position on economic methodology as "essentially in full agreement" with earlier mainstream economists such as Jean Baptiste Say, Nassau Senior, and John E. Cairnes though these economists did not use the term "a priori".[neutrality is disputed]"
I take the issue with you, but why do you change it from OR to POV?
The other point is that we are speaking about very old common academics which is out of the scope of modern academics. It is no wonder when there is no reception about it by today mainstream economics. When it is OR then there is always the danger that it could be wrong. When you can't believe it, then you must delete it. But Hoppe is a systematic scientist and gives citations of Say, Senior, and Cairnes. He doesn't make many errors in his area. --Haberecht138 (talk) 14:50, 23 November 2010 (UTC)
I changed it from "OR" to "POV" because there wasn't a citation on the paragraph and the weasel words made it look like WP:OR. However, apparently, the weasel wording is quoted from Hoppe [i.e., "essentially in full agreement"].
I tagged it as POV because Hoppe's opinion on Say is probably not among the most notable. BigK HeX (talk) 15:28, 23 November 2010 (UTC)
probably? How do you know? Even if so, why should it be wrong? You are rather questining the relevance now. --Haberecht138 (talk) 15:46, 23 November 2010 (UTC)
"Probably", because the source given is not from a widely peer-reviewed venue. BigK HeX (talk) 15:51, 23 November 2010 (UTC)
Of course not. I had already admited that it is a primary source. --Haberecht138 (talk) 16:08, 23 November 2010 (UTC)

"pseudoscience"[edit]

Removed the term from the headline as it's obviously biased. Calling Praxeology a pseudoscience would make psychology and sociology pseudosciences as well; something I think anyone will find it hard to argue in favor of. I suggest calling it a Social science as seems to be the result of the argument on the Sociology article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Wikipedianamepolicysucks (talkcontribs) 03:05, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

Psychology and Sociology are indeed pseudo-sciences. In the same way, Praxeology, as it is conveyed in von Mises and others, is not a science. Every practitioner of these pseudo-sciences has a different theory, a different terminology, and a different politico-economic world view. How could these purely mental concepts be Sciences? They fail to explain history and have no predictive power. The Vienna Circle, of which Ludwig was not a member, although his brother Dick was, have been very clear about this. In order to maintain Science as a viable method of discovery and aggregation of knowledge, and to keep Science from sliding back into the darkness of metaphysics, we must fight diligently to keep its enunciation clinical, experiential, and intersubjectively confirmable by discreet measurement. If it cannot be measured more than once and by reasonable means, then it is not science. What are the yardsticks we use to measure Human Action? Economics, politics, morality, ethics, religion, cosmology, and rational self-interest are humanitarian metaphysics, not Science. Chemistry, Physics, Biology, Electronics, Mechanics, and a small part of Astronomy not dominated by cosmological imperception are examples of Sciences. The test tube, the wave tank, the microscope, multi-meter, fulcrum and telescope are the tools of observation and measurement that make these studies scientific. Medicine is a psuedo-science. Think about it. Medicine is taught in liberal arts colleges. That is reason enough to declare it unscientific. My reasoning is that we still live in the Dark Ages. Medicine is no more effective than bloodletting by the Barbers. Our technologies are vastly successful, as long as we do not apply them to human action. Human action is currently the exclusive domain of the pseudo-sciences. We cannot raise our heads above our religious, political, and institutionalized cultural brainwashing and obediences.
I must also say a few words about mathematics and theoretical physics. The Vienna Circle came the closest to unshackling Science toward the development of a theory of human interaction, but they ran off the track in development of theoretical physics and mathematics. These constructs are not scientific, they involve no measurement, and make up incredibly wacky concepts like space-time and dark energy. One of the tip-offs to a metaphysic is that it is concentric in its construction and is always true regardless of any new knowledge (like the atmosphere of the Sun does not affect the relativistic perturbations of the orbit of Mercury; inter-galactic gas and dust does not affect redshift, etc.).
Mathematics is a language. It does not convey any reality whatsoever and can be used to describe totally irrational and unreal concepts. Reality is not accurately described by mathematics. In reality, 2 + 2 is usually 3.99842... or 4.00519.. In reality, things tend to bleed, smear and cross-contaminate. This makes Science difficult, but not impossible.
I have been trying to advance a scientific theory of human action for decades, but I must invent a new vocabulary. The advancement of computers and the internet should now make this new Science possible and practical. Engineers and scientists must be given the keys to the development of civilization and replace the brutal and ignorant control by elite militarists. Would anyone be interested in helping me in this endeavor? Danarothrock (talk) 05:09, 10 September 2012 (UTC)
No.
Psychology and sociology are NOT pseudosciences, and medicine definitely isn't. The definition of a science is something about which can make testable predictions and explanations about the universe. Science is the postulation of hypotheses, and the confirmation of falsification of these hypostheses via experimentation. All of these things can be accomplished in psychology, sociology and medicine. You can't just declare something "unscientific" because it's sometimes taught in somewhere that specialises in something else (i.e. liberal arts colleges), that's irrelevant. Of course, this is assuming I believe that claim, since you've provided no source to back it up.
Oh, and for the record, You say there're no instruments of measurements for sociology & psychology? You're wrong. Lots of different means of testing have been employed in these disciplines, otherwise they wouldn't be able to test any of their hypotheses (generating theories), and hence would not be science. Examples include the EEG and MRI (both used in psychology and medicine), and questionnaires/surveys, used in sociology (and the other two, along with maths) as part of statistical-quantitative research.
Theoretical physics can also, naturally, be tested and proven (and falsified, obv.) to prodice valid theories. Some more famous examples include Conservation of Energy, the Standard Model, and electromagnetism, all of which are products of the science of theoretical physics. Maths, however, is a strange case. Still, it does can adhere to the scientific method, and the general consensus amongst mathematicians is that, whilst not entirely the same as the rest of science, it is still a part of it, and hence can be considered a science.
Praxeology, though, absolutely refutes the scientific method, and hence one can't even claim it to be a science. However, it proposes to have theories and is otherwise presented as science. Therefore, it is pseudoscience.The Talking Toaster (talk) 13:22, 21 September 2012 (UTC)
P. S. With regards to 2+2 = 3.whatever, I fail to see your point. Are you trying to say that a quantity of value "2" often does not equal 2 exactly? Because this depends on your definition of "2". Two oranges are always two oranges (at least, in base ten) if you define 1 orange simply by virtue of it being an orange. If you define one orange as a very specific mass, however (such as the average mass of an orange i.e. an "ideal" orange) then yes, you will often have two real oranges that add up to slightly more or less than 2 ideal oranges, hence making two real oranges plus two more real oranges add up to slightly more or less than 4 ideal oranges.The Talking Toaster (talk) 13:22, 21 September 2012 (UTC)
P. P. S. Oh, and stop capitalising "science", like it's this big, mysterious thing.
P. P. P. S. The term "liberal arts" is a complicated term associated with a number of sciences, including medicine, sociology and maths, making it somewhat misleading. Originally, it referred to the following subjects considered essential for citizens to engage in civic life & public debate. This initially comprised only grammar, rhetoric & logic (the Trivium), but later came to include the Quadrivium: geometry, musics, maths and astronomy (the latter also covering astrology). Altogether, these consisted of seven liberal arts. Nowadays, however, many subjects related to these may be termed liberal arts, including medicine, law and architecture. So, not all liberal arts are arts in the modern sense.The Talking Toaster (talk) 14:10, 21 September 2012 (UTC)

Actually psychiatry doesnt use testable analysis (lab data) to reach its conclusions (EEG is required for epylepsy but that IS NOT A PSYCHIATRIC CONDITION)in turn it uses statistical data to determine the "mean" of human behaviour, thats it.

By the way medicine and physisc belong to the natural sciences, its absurd to critize praxeology under that terms because praxeology doesnt belong to the natural sciences but to the social sciences, since it pretends to study and analyze the basis of human behaviour. 201.241.227.67 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 17:16, 20 March 2013 (UTC)

The science of human action?[edit]

If praxeology treats the ends as neutral and applies analysis to the effect which the means have towards the ends then it isn't the full picture and psychology is another part of human action. Is the science of physics about the effects of physics (Like the effect of action) or does it also include the reasons behind physics (reasons behind actions)? This is where "the science of human action" could confuse. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 90.218.116.95 (talk) 23:17, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

Unsourced Text relocated from article. Please find WP:RS secondary sources.[edit]

Austrian School approach[edit]

Von Mises writes that action axiom is the basis of all praxeology, and it is the basic proposition that all specimens of the species Homo sapiens, the homo agens, purposefully utilize means over a period of time in order to achieve desired ends. In his magnum opus Human Action, Von Mises defined “action” in the sense of the action axiom by elucidating:[1]

Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life. Such paraphrases may clarify the definition given and prevent possible misinterpretations. But the definition itself is adequate and does not need complement of commentary.

Von Mises argues that praxeology is not concerned with the individual's definition of end satisfaction, just the way he sought that satisfaction and that individual's increase of their satisfaction by removing sources of dissatisfaction or "uneasiness". In his theory, an acting man is defined as one capable of voluntary and conscious behaviour—to be otherwise would be to make one a mere creature who simply reacts to stimuli by instinct. Similarly, an acting man must have a source of dissatisfaction which he believes can be changed, otherwise he cannot act.

Von Mises writes that economics, the study of human choice under conditions of scarcity, can be treated as a specialization of praxeology, the study of all human action. Like other members of the Austrian School, von Mises rejected the standard scientific approach of relying upon empirical observation in the study of economics, and instead, favored the use of logical analysis, a logic which is influenced by Immanuel Kant's analytic–synthetic distinction. Von Mises writes that the empirical methods used in the natural sciences cannot be applied to the social sciences because the principle of induction does not apply. In essence, he believed that a theory constructed to predict how humans will act (what ends they will seek) in a "complex" situation could not arise from studying how they acted in "simple" situations. Furthermore, there are limits to how much can be learned from even a "simple situation". As a criticism to empirical studies seeking to find justification in the economic action of individuals, von Mises proposed that only the human actor knows the ends toward which he acts.

Another conclusion that von Mises reached was that decisions are made on an ordinal basis. That is, it is impossible to carry out more than one action at once, the conscious mind being capable of only one decision at a time—even if those decisions can be made in rapid order. Thus man will act to remove the most pressing source of dissatisfaction first and then move to the next most pressing source of dissatisfaction. Additionally, von Mises dismissed the notion that subjective values could be calculated mathematically; man can not treat his values with cardinal numbers, e.g., "I prefer owning a television 2.5 times as much as owning a DVD player." As a person satisfies his first most important goal and after that his second most important goal, then his second most important goal is always less important than his first most important goal. Thus, the satisfaction, or utility, that he derives from every further goal attained is less than that from the preceding goal. This assumes, of course, that the goals are independent, which is not always the case—for example, acquiring the television may enable one to pursue the goal of watching a documentary on biology, which may make one decide to study biology, which opens the goal of writing a research paper, and so on. In human society, many actions will be trading activities where one person regards a possession of another person as more desirable than one of his own possessions, and the other person has a similar higher regard for his colleague's possession than he does for his own. This assertion modifies the classical economic view about exchange, which posits that individuals exchange goods and services that they both appraise as being equal in value. This subject of praxeology is known as catallactics.

  1. ^ Ludwig von Mises. Human Action, p. 11, "r. Purposeful Action and Animal Reaction". Referenced 2011-11-23.

Pseudoscience Accusation[edit]

Seems enough to justify link, without stating praxeology is pseudoscience: [1].— Preceding unsigned comment added by SPECIFICO (talkcontribs)

List of topics characterized as pseudoscience. Not listed. Would need RS to be listed. – S. Rich (talk) 01:47, 28 April 2013 (UTC)

Lack of objectivity 3[edit]

I'm pretty sure the sentence "Praxeology also provides insights for the field of ethics" is incredibly non-neutral; as I understand the term, it can't be an "insight" unless it's true, and claiming that true moral beliefs come from a particular place is about as far from a neutral point of view as you can get.

Current text

  "Praxeology...is the deductive study of human action...

What is the source of this definition? Praxeology is usually presented as a philosophy that seeks to explain the past and future evolution of society, never to my knowledge as an explanation of human action. Human action in praxeology is as far as I know never something to be discovered for its own sake, but rather something to be observed in order to discover something more general.

Mark.camp (talk) 00:57, 23 March 2015 (UTC)