Talk:Raids on Boulogne

   	 This article refers to a British naval action which occurred in the 16th August, 1801, led by Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson and relates one of Nelson’s lesser known and markedly less successful actions, although the overall strategic importance of the failure is debatable. The historical background hinges around the French Revolutionary Wars. 

Background.

At the time, Great Britain was singularly aware of the potential for invasion by revolutionary France under Napoleon Bonaparte. Britain was in a difficult state with few European allies and the partial loss of colonial interests in the Americas stemming from the War of Independence.1 With Bonaparte’s armies sitting idle after the Treaty of Luneville2 on the 9th of February 1801 at which the Austrian Empire had conceded territory to France, and with the latter still smarting after the defeat of the Seven Years War, an invasion of Britain was a salient prospect. Britain had initially sued for a peace treaty with Bonaparte3 but, as the article refers, British fortunes had improved upon the death of Paul I of Russia, (who had harboured ambitions to strip Britain of India, amongst other things)4, and by French undoings in Portugal and Egypt which denied Bonaparte the vital troops and naval forces that he would require in order to launch an invasion against Britain which delayed his intent and obligated an alliance with Spain5. As a result, the potential for invasion ominously lumbered on through the summer of 1801, although Bonaparte’s intent may have by this time, according to the article in question, only to have been to bow Britain to highly favourable peace terms, at least for France.

The Article.

    	 The article in itself is largely well constructed and informative and written in a style that is objective. It includes a nice background section that indicates the psychological war that France was additionally waging against Britain by placing articles of misinformation in the French media, inflating the threat of an invasion which seem to have been taken seriously by the British who took the necessary defensive measures against an amphibious assault alluded to in the article. It highlights several points of obscure components of the action, for example, the poor state of French gunpowder and artillery which reduced the effectiveness of Bonaparte’s  forces during the confrontation which may have been decisive factors to French advantage if the arsenal had been of the requisite standard.

Critique.

      	Where the article may require a little tweaking, as it were, is in the details and citations. Additionally, there is the probability that the content could use extra context. For example, the threat of invasion was taken very seriously by the British public6, hence Nelson’s appointment to the role of defence of the Realm, a move designed by the Admiralty to quell jittery nerves by placing England’s greatest hero, the victor of the Nile and Copenhagen, in command. In confirmation of inflated French media reports, the Times newspaper of  the first and third of August  1801 reported that, ” the greatest activity prevails in the different French ports.The gun boats and flat - bottomed boats are numerous.”7 Clearly, the propaganda war was working, precipitating the raid on Boulogne, and it is postulated that this could have been better indicated in the body of the article. 

The article indicates that the invasion threat was only a feint by Bonaparte to intimidate the British. Although doubtlessly a militarily sound ploy based on the degree of difficulty presented by the sheer logistics, there is no citation to back this up. David Cordingly states in his biography of Lord Thomas Cochrane, reportedly the original lupe de mer, that Napoleon was indeed massing an army in Boulogne with the express purpose of invading the British mainland8. Here resides an historical difference of opinion. There is cogent argument either way to debate this issue which transcends this paper, but would need ample illustrative resources from either side of the conversation. Although the article includes much fascinating detail, it’s references seem scant with only volume of work listed and one would have to rely on more than one account of the action for improved accuracy. Admiralty records, official ships logs and archives may well be cited in the original source. The citations to the notes are ambiguous and at times non-existent, making reference difficult if not impossible. An example of this is, “After the first attack Nelson was conscious that the French flotilla did not suppose any serious risk.” This bold statement is enigmatic and unsupported, leaving the reader to wonder why Nelson saw fit to launch another indecisive attack later. It would be advantageous to know the source of this information, not to imply that it doesn’t exist.

          In due deference to balance, at least one French source, “ Batailles navale de la France, Volumen 3” by O. Troude, is  properly cited and given the magnitude of the subject, it would be entertaining to research out of how many volumes is this the third. It is  both important and intriguing to study an event from both perspectives of the antagonists and this article succeeds in this manner. 

Conclusion.

    	This is a good article which could be improved in this humble opinion by better attention to detail in citing and historical context, perhaps including a wider discussion of the contemporary issues. The raids themselves have been relegated into the obscurity of tumultuous time but symbolise a pivotal period in British and French history. This critique is not definitively comprehensive and is intended to merely seek to add to an already well written article which remains germane and authoritative . Where ambiguity exists, a modicum of research and additional identification of sources would be obviously of great use as this article could be positively expanded to the benefit of any individual with interest in this momentous era.
       	

Sources

1 Washington: A Life, Ron Chernow, Penguin Books, 2010� 2 1805: Austerlitz, Robert Goetz, Greenhill books 2005� 3 The Illustrious Dead, Stephen Talty, Crown, 2009�4 Tsar Paul I ,Wikipedia article, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsar_Paul_I_of_Russia �5 Portugal, A Companion History Jose Hermano Saraiva, Carcanet 1997 pg 88 6,7,8 Cochrane The Real Master and Commander, David Cordingly, Bloomsbury 2007,pg 69

Markbreth (talk) 05:10, 27 September 2012 (UTC)Markbreth