Talk:Six-Day War

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Former good article nominee Six-Day War was a good articles nominee, but did not meet the good article criteria at the time. There are suggestions below for improving the article. Once these issues have been addressed, the article can be renominated. Editors may also seek a reassessment of the decision if they believe there was a mistake.
Article milestones
Date Process Result
September 28, 2006 Good article nominee Not listed
March 12, 2008 Good article nominee Not listed
Current status: Former good article nominee

I edited part of the section about the events leading to war[edit]

The article was missing an important confrontation that occurred on April 7, 1967 between Israel and Syria, so I added it. -- Wiki Khalil (talk) October 13 2012

Sources for the Egyptians side:[edit]

Senior Egyptian officials:[edit]

"the testimony of Egyptian Chief of Staff General Mahmoud Fawzi to the effect that an Egyptian air attack was scheduled for 27 May, and that the relevant orders had already been signed by Abdel Hakim Amer when Nasser ordered its cancellation on 26 May" (Gluska 2007 , p. 168)

"According to then Egyptian Vice-President Hussein el-Shafei, as soon as Nasser knew what Amer planned, he cancelled the operation" ( Bowen 2003, p. 57 (author interview, Cairo, 15 December 2002). I have not verified)

the testimony of Bassiouny, who recalls that when the Washington Embassy reported that Secretary of State Dean Rusk had information that Egypt was going to start the war, Amer wrote on the cable, “Shams, it seems there is a leak.” (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Egyptian military steps[edit]

on May 26, two Egyptian Air Force MiG-21s overflew the reactor (at 52,000 feet) on a photographic reconnaissance mission, and interceptors and missiles failed to bring them down. The Israelis linked the mission to a possible preemptive strike on the plant (Morris, victims, p. 308)

In the Sinai, there was deep confusion; as late as 5 June officers were still not sure whether their goal was offensive or defensive. Nasser is said by some officers to have added to the chaos by his constant interference in military plans (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p66 )

On approximately 20 May, Saad alDin Shazly, commander of a Special Forces unit in the Sinai, was given an offensive mission plan involving an advance through Israel.(Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p67 )

As late as 25 May, therefore, everything was set for an attack at daybreak on 27 May.(Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p67 )

It was only one hour before the planned strike on 27 May that Said’s army liaison officer told him the attack had been aborted after a U.S. request to the Soviets. Shazly was not informed of the shift to a defensive posture until about 1 june. Although Nasser reiterated that Egypt would not strike first, tanks and planes in the Sinai were fully fuelled and not concealed, as if they were going to attack (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Nasser intentions[edit]

On 13 May 1967 Nasser received a Soviet intelligence report which claimed that Israel was massing troops on Syria's border. Nasser responded by taking three successive steps which made war virtually inevitable (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p 7 )

He was subsequently to imply- as during his speech of May 26 to Arab trade union leaders-that the whole sequence of moves, culminating in the closure of the straits, had been planned to trigger war with Israel, with the ultimate aim of “liberating Palestine." (Morris, victims, p. 306)

In 1966 Nasser himself had declared that if Israel developed an atomic bomb, Egypt’s response would be a “preemptive war’ directed in the first instance against the nuclear production facilities.27 On May 21, Eshkol had told the cabinet Defense Committee that Egypt wanted to close the straits and “to bomb the reactor in Dimona. (Morris, victims, p. 307)

He was subsequently to imply- as during his speech of May 26 to Arab trade union leaders-that the whole sequence of moves, culminating in the closure of the straits, had been planned to trigger war with Israel, with the ultimate aim of “liberating Palestine." (Morris, victims, p. 308)

Abdel Magid Farid, however, suggests that Nasser did actually consider the first strike option until early on 27 May, when he was hauled out of bed at 3 by the ambassador from the Soviet Union (his only source of arms and spare parts) and warned not to precipitate a confrontation (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Sources for the Israeli side:[edit]

Israeli military considerations[edit]

In the first days of June ... as did the sense that the Arab states might launch an attack within days There was particular fear of a limited Jordanian or Jordanian-Egyptian offensive against Eilat. (Morris, victims, p. 310)

Israeli diplomatic and political steps[edit]

"In private, Eshkol had sent Nasser secret messages urging deescalation. In public, he continued to assert Israel’s peaceful intentions, call for international mediation, and avoid criticism of Egypt. This reinforced the existing image of Egyptian military superiority — if Israel wanted to avoid war, it was presumably because Israel thought it would lose" (Shlaim, Louis, 2012,The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences, p66 )

Nasser seems to have been encouraged by the fact that Israeli rhetoric condemning the Tiran blockade and subsequent developments was relatively mild. Even the fact that the United States counselled restraint was interpreted as an attempt to protect Israel from Arab wrath — and therefore as further evidence of her need for protection. (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Although Eshkol denounced the Egyptians, his response to this development was a model of moderation (Mutawi p. 93)

the leaders of the confrontational states were caught by complete surprise when Israel took their threats at face value (Shlaim; Louis2012, p. 63 )

Nasser appeared to challenge Israel to a duel (Shlaim; Louis2012, p. 7 )

Semi-protected edit request on 30 October 2016[edit]

In Conclusion the sentence "Overall, Israel's territory grew by a factor of three, including about one million Arabs placed under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories." is incorrect.

  1. First - the territories are not Israels - they were never recognized by UN or USA or any other state as Israel territory. So it cannot be said that "Israel's territory grew".
  2. Second - only the Sinai Peninsula has 60000 square km. Israel has 20000. It is incorrect to write that the territory grew by factor of three. Factor of three is that you multiply by three which will give 60000 total. It is mathematically incorrect.

Therefore I suggest to Cut the first half of the sentence and make it:
"About one million Arabs were placed under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories."

Hraju (talk) 20:15, 30 October 2016 (UTC)

Redacted previous response Actually, done. Folks are welcome to dispute, but the request lingered for about 5 days already — Andy W. (talk) 00:33, 4 November 2016 (UTC)