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I am reading Quine at the moment (quintessence, extensionalism, Reference and Modality. From this I would like to add to this article:
Universal Instantiation and Existential generalization are two aspects of a single principle, for instead of saying that '(x(x=x)' implies 'Socrates is Socrates', we could as well say that the denial 'Socrates≠Socrates' implies '(∃x(x≠x)'. The principle embodied in these two operations is the link between quantifications and the singular statements that are related to them as instances. Yet it is a principle only by courtesy. It holds only in the case where a term names and, furthermore, occurs referentially.
I see no reason for the addition. Inasmuch as it an expression of Quine's philosophical views, it is irrelevant to the article at hand, and inasmuch as it a statement of the logical rules of inference of UI and EG, it is simply superfluous. In short, it would be more appropriately included in the article on Quine.