Territorial disputes in the South China Sea

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Territorial claims in the South China Sea
Map of various countries occupying the Spratly Islands

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims among several sovereign states within the region, namely the Nation of Brunei, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Non-claimants want the South China Sea to remain as international waters, with the United States of America conducting "freedom of navigation" operations.[1]

There are disputes concerning both the Spratly and the Paracel islands, as well as maritime, areas near to sea, boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin and elsewhere. There is a further dispute in the waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands.[2] The interests of different nations include acquiring fishing areas around the two archipelagos; the potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gas under the waters of various parts of the South China Sea, and the strategic control of important shipping lanes.

The Shangri-La Dialogue serves as the "Track One" exchange forum on security issues surrounding the Asia-Pacific region, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea.[3] The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific is the "Track Two" forum for dialogue on security issues.[4][5]

In February 2016, President Obama initiated the US-ASEAN Summit at Sunnylands for closer engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea were a major topic, but its joint statement, the "Sunnylands Declaration", did not name the South China Sea, instead calling for "respect of each nation's sovereignty and for international law". Analysts believe it indicates divisions within the group on how to respond to China's maritime strategy.[6][7]

In July 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled against China's territorial claims in Philippines v. China.[8] Although it is not enforceable China does not acknowledge the tribunal nor abide by its ruling, insisting that any resolution should be through bilateral negotiations with other claimants.[9]

Specific disputes[edit]

Summary of disputes
Area of dispute
Brunei
Cambodia
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Vietnam
The nine-dash line area
Vietnamese coast
Sea area north of Borneo
South China Sea islands
Sea area north of the Natuna Islands
Sea area west of Palawan and Luzon
Sabah area
Luzon Strait
Pedra Branca area

The disputes involve both maritime boundaries and islands.[10] There are several disputes, each of which involved a different collection of countries:

  1. The nine-dash line area claimed by the Republic of China, later People's Republic of China which covers most of the South China sea and overlaps exclusive economic zone claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Singapore has reiterated that it is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute and therefore allows Singapore to play a neutral role in being a constructive conduit for dialogue among the claimant states.[11]
  2. Maritime boundary along the Vietnamese coast between Brunei, Cambodia, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
  3. Maritime boundary north of Borneo between Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
  4. Islands in the South China Sea, including the Paracels Islands, the Pratas Islands, Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands between Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
  5. Maritime boundary in the waters north of the Natuna Islands between Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam.[12]
  6. Maritime boundary off the coast of Palawan and Luzon between Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
  7. Maritime boundary, land territory, and the islands of Sabah, including Ambalat, between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
  8. Maritime boundary and islands in the Luzon Strait between the China, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
  9. Maritime boundary and islands in the Pedra Branca (and Middle Rocks) between Singapore and Malaysia.

Background[edit]

The area may be rich in oil and natural gas deposits; however, the estimates are highly varied. The Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining of the People's Republic of China estimate that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion tons of crude oil (compared to Kuwait with 13 billion tons). In the years following the announcement by the ministry, the claims regarding the South China Sea islands intensified.[13] However, other sources claim that the proven reserve of oil in the South China Sea may only be 7.5 billion barrels, or about 1.1 billion tons.[14] According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s profile of the South China Sea region, a US Geological Survey estimate puts the region's discovered and undiscovered oil reserves at 11 billion barrels, as opposed to a Chinese figure of 125 billion barrels.[15] The same EIA report also points to the wide variety of natural gas resource estimations, ranging from 190 trillion cubic feet to 500 trillion cubic feet, likely located in the contested Reed Bank".[15]

The South China Sea is dubbed by China as the "second Persian Sea."[16] The state-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to spend 200 billion RMB (United States dollar30 billion) in the next 20 years to exploit oil in the region, with the estimated production of 25 million metric tons of crude oil and natural gas per annum, at a depth of 2000 meters within the next five years.[17]

The Philippines began exploring the areas west of Palawan for oil in 1970. Exploration in the area began in Reed Bank/Tablemount.[18] in 1976, gas was discovered following the drilling of a well.[19] However, China's complaints halted the exploration.

On 27 March 1984, the first Philippine oil company discovered an oil field off Palawan, which is an island province bordering the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea.[20] These oil fields supply 15% of annual oil consumption in the Philippines.[citation needed]

The nine-dotted line was originally an "eleven-dotted-line," first indicated by the then Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947, for its claims to the South China Sea. After, the Communist Party of China took over mainland China and formed the People's Republic of China in 1949. The line was adopted and revised to nine as endorsed by Zhou Enlai.[21]

The legacy of the nine-dotted line is viewed by some Chinese government officials, and by the Chinese military, as providing historical support for their claims to the South China Sea.[22]

In the 1970s, however, the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries began referring to the Spratly Islands as included in their own territory. On 11 June 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines issued Presidential decree No. 1596, declaring the Spratly Islands (referred to therein as the Kalayaan Island Group) as Philippine territory.[23]

The abundant fishing opportunities within the region are another motivation for the claim. In 1988, the South China Sea is believed to have accounted for 8% of world fishing catches, a figure that has grown since then.[citation needed] There have been many clashes in the Philippines with foreign fishing vessels (including China) in disputed areas. China believes that the value in fishing and oil from the sea has risen to a trillion dollars.[citation needed]

The area is also one of the busiest shipping routes in the world. In the 1980s, at least 270 merchant ships used the route[clarification needed] each day. Currently[timeframe?], more than half the tonnage of oil transported by sea passes through it, a figure rising steadily with the growth of Chinese consumption of oil. This traffic is three times greater than that passing through the Suez Canal and five times more than the Panama Canal.

As of 1996, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and other countries asserted claims within the Chinese nine-dotted line[24] The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into effect on 16 November 1994, resulted in more intense territorial disputes between the parties.

As of 2012, all of the Paracel Islands are under Chinese control.

Eight of the Spratly Islands are under Chinese control; Vietnamese troops control the greatest number of Spratly islands, 29.[citation needed][timeframe?] Eight islands are controlled by the Philippines, five by Malaysia, two by Brunei and one by Taiwan.[citation needed][timeframe?] In 2012 the Indian Ambassador to Vietnam, while expressing concern over rising tension in the area, said that 50 per cent of its trade passes through the area and called for peaceful resolution of the disputes in accordance with international law.[25]

On 17 March 2016, in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 94 s. 2016, President Aquino created the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea, to secure the State's sovereignty and national territory and preserve marine wealth in its waters and exclusive economic zone, reserving use and enjoyment of the West Philippine Sea exclusively for Filipino citizens.[26]

Incidents[edit]

Foreign ships which illegally fished in Indonesian waters were destroyed by the Indonesian government,[27][28][29][30] many of them were Vietnamese ships.[31][32][33][34][35][36][37] The Vietnamese government objected to the destruction of its own ships.[38]

660 Vietnamese were apprehended in 2015 by Indonesia.[39]

Indonesian waters were violated by Filipino fishermen.[40]

On 19 March 2016, China coast guards prevented Indonesian authorities from detaining a Chinese fishing boat near the Natunas, although China accepts that the Natuna islands and seas around them belong to Indonesia. The crew were detained by Indonesia earlier, but their fishing boat was rammed free by a Chinese guards vessel while been towed. Indonesia summoned the Chinese ambassador in protest and China in turn demanded the release of the crew as they were in "traditional Chinese fishing grounds".[41][42] However, Indonesia refused to release the crew and accused China of sharply raising tensions in the region.[43]

After they breached waters belonging to Thailand Vietnamese ships were snatched by Thailand.[44]

Chinese and Vietnamese ships were detained by the Philippines.[45]

For breaching waters of Malaysia, a Vietnamese ship was snatched by Malaysia.[46]

Papua province waters belonging to Indonesia were breached by Vietnamese and Filipino fishermen who were arrested.[47][48] In Riau's vicinity in Indonesian waters Vietnamese ships were snatched by Indonesia.[49]

2011 agreement[edit]

On 20 July 2011, the PRC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed to a set of preliminary guidelines which would help resolve the dispute.[50] The agreement was described by the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Zhenmin, as "an important milestone document for cooperation among China and ASEAN countries".[50] Some of the early drafts acknowledged aspects such as "marine environmental protection, scientific research, safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue and combating transnational crime," although the issue of oil and natural gas drilling remains unresolved.

Chinese objection to Indian naval presence and oil exploration[edit]

On 22 July 2011, the INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault vessel on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China Sea by a party identifying itself as the Chinese Navy and stating that the ship was entering Chinese waters.[51][52] A spokesperson for the Indian Navy explained that as no ship or aircraft was visible, the INS Airavat proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all."[51]

In September 2011, shortly after China and Vietnam signed an agreement seeking to contain a dispute over the South China Sea, India's state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) said that its overseas investment arm, ONGC Videsh Limited, had signed a three-year agreement with PetroVietnam for developing long-term co-operation in the oil sector, and that it had accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea[53] In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, without referring to India by name, stated as follows:

"China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the island. China's stand is based on historical facts and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed in the course of history and this position has been held by Chinese Government for long. On the basis of this China is ready to engage in peaceful negotiations and friendly consultations to peacefully solve the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights so as to positively contribute to peace and tranquillity in the South China Sea area. We hope that the relevant countries respect China's position and refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue. We hope they will respect and support countries in the region to solve the bilateral disputes through bilateral channels. As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute."[54][55]

An Indian foreign ministry spokesman responded, "The Chinese had concerns, but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and [we] have conveyed this to the Chinese."[54] The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times.[53][55]

Retrenchment[edit]

In Spring 2010, Chinese officials reportedly communicated to US officials that the South China Sea is "an area of 'core interest' that is as non-negotiable" and on par with Taiwan and Tibet on the national agenda.[56] but may have backed away from that assertion in 2011.[57][58][59]

In October 2011, China's Global Times newspaper, published by the Communist Party, People's Daily, editorialised on South China Sea territorial disputes under the banner "Don't take peaceful approach for granted". The article referenced recent incidents involving Philippines and South Korea detaining Chinese fishing boats in the region:[60]

"If these countries don't want to change their ways with China, they will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved." Global Times (China), 25 October 2011 Responding to questions about whether this reflected official policy, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated the country's commitment "to resolving the maritime dispute through peaceful means."[61]

Alan Dupont of the University of New South Wales has said that the Chinese government appears to be directing its fishing fleet into disputed waters as a matter of policy.[62]

Oil development[edit]

Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement early in 1978 on the development of oil in the South China Sea. As of 2012, Vietnam had concluded some 60 oil and gas exploration and production contracts with various foreign companies.[63] In 1986, the "White Tiger" oil field in the South China Sea came into operation, producing over 2,000 tons of crude oil per year, followed by the "The Bear" and "Dragon" oil fields.[64] As of 2011, Vietnam was the sixth-largest oil producer in the Asia-Pacific region although the country is now a net oil importer; in 2009 while petroleum accounted for 14 percent of government income, this was down from 24 percent in 2004.[65]

China's first independently designed and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China Sea is the Ocean Oil 981 (海洋石油981). The major shareholders are J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (19%), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (14%), T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and affiliates (6%), and BlackRock, Inc. (5%).[66] It began operation on 9 May 2012 in the South China Sea, 320 kilometres (200 mi) southeast of Hong Kong, at a depth of 1,500 m and employing 160 people.[67] On 2 May 2014, the platform was moved near to the Paracel islands,[68] a move Vietnam stated violated their territorial claims[69] while Chinese officials said was legal[70] as it falls within surrounding waters of the Paracel Islands which China militarily controls.

Non-claimant views[edit]

United States[edit]

The United States and China are currently in disagreement over the South China Sea.[71] This disagreement is exacerbated by the fact that the US is not a member of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Nevertheless, the US has stood by its manoeuvres, claiming that "peaceful surveillance activities and other military activities without permission in a country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),"[72] is allowed under the convention. Additionally, a South China Sea free to access is in the US's economic and geopolitical interests.[73] In relation to the dispute, Secretary Clinton voiced her support for fair access by reiterating that freedom of navigation and respect of international law is a matter of national interest to the United States.[74] Her comments were countered by China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as "in effect an attack on China," who warned the United States against making the South China Sea an international issue or multilateral issue.[75]

Clinton testified in support of congressional approval of the Law of the Sea Convention, which would strengthen US ability to support countries that oppose Chinese claims to certain islands in the area.[76] On 29 May 2012, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed concern over this development, stating that "non-claimant Association of South East Asian Nations countries and countries outside the region have adopted a position of not getting involved into territorial disputes."[77] In July 2012, the United States Senate passed resolution 524, initially sponsored by Senator John Kerry, stating (among other things) the United States' strong support for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, reaffirms the United States' commitment to assist the nations of Southeast Asia to remain strong and independent, and supports enhanced operations by the United States armed forces in the Western Pacific.[78]

In 2014, the United States responded to China's claims over the fishing grounds of other nations by saying that "China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law for these extensive maritime claims."[79] USN CNO Jonathan Greenert then pledged American support to the Philippines in its territorial conflicts with the PRC.[80] The Chinese Foreign Ministry asked the United States to maintain a neutral position on the issue.[81] In 2014 and 2015, the United States continued freedom of navigation operations, including in the South China Sea.[82] Sources closer to the Pentagon have also said that the US administration is planning to deploy some naval assets within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands. In response to this announcement, Beijing issued a strict warning and said that she would not allow any country to violate China's territorial waters in the name of "Freedom of Navigation".[83] On 27 October 2015, the US destroyer USS Lassen navigated within 12 nautical miles of reclaimed land in the Subi Reef as the first in a series of "Freedom of Navigation Operations".[84] This is the first time since 2012 that the US has directly challenged China's claims of the island's territorial limit.[85] On 8–9 November 2015, two US B-52 strategic bombers flew near artificial Chinese-built islands in the area of the Spratly Islands and were contacted by Chinese ground controllers but continued their mission undeterred.[86]

The United States itself has not signed UNCLOS, but has accepted all but Part XI as customary international law.[87]

Indonesia[edit]

Since early of the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia has repeatedly reiterated its position as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute,[88] and often positioned itself as a "honest broker".[89] However, parts of China's unilateraly claimed nine-dash line is intersecting with Indonesia's exclusive economic zone near Natuna islands. Although China has acknowledged Indonesia's sovereignty over Natuna islands, China argues that the waters around Natuna islands are Chinese "traditional fishing grounds". Indonesia quickly dismiss China's claim and believes China's nine-dash line claim over parts of the Natuna islands has no legal basis.[90] In November 2015, Indonesia's security chief Luhut Panjaitan said Indonesia could take China before an international court.[91]

Chinese fishing vessels — often escorted by Chinese coast guard ship, has been reported repeatedly breached Indonesian waters near Natuna islands. On 19 March 2016, Indonesian authorities tried to capture a Chinese trawler accused for illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, and arrest the Chinese crew. But they were prevented by a Chinese coast guard boat that reportedly "rammed" the trawler and set it free. Indonesia still has the Chinese crew in custody.[92] On March 21, 2016, minister for fisheries and maritime affairs Susi Pudjiastuti, summoned the Chinese ambassador, Xie Feng, and discussed about this matter.[92] Indonesia insists to prosecute Chinese trawler crew, despite Beijing's demand to release their eight fishermen. Arif Havas Oegroseno, the government official of maritime security said that the "traditional fishing grounds" was not recognised under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This incident prompted security minister Luhut Pandjaitan to deploys more troops and patrol boats, also strengthen the Ranai naval base in the area.[93]

Following the clashes, on 23 June 2016, Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited Natuna islands on a warship to demonstrate Indonesia's authority. He led a high-level delegation, which includes the armed forces chief and state ministers. Security Minister Luhut Panjaitan said it was meant to send a "clear message" that Indonesia was "very serious in its effort to protect its sovereignty".[94]

Following the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on 12 July 2016, Indonesia called on all parties involved in the territorial dispute to exercise self-restraint and to respect applicable international laws.[95]

Ethnic minorities[edit]

Cham people and Montagnards[edit]

Former Cham states were originated in South China Sea and were annexed by Vietnam in 1832;[96] The Vietnamese government fears that using the evidence of Champa's historical connection to the disputed islands in South China Sea would expose the human rights violations and killings of ethnic minorities in Vietnam such as in the 2001 and 2004 uprisings, and lead to the issue of Cham autonomy being brought to attention, since the Vietnamese conquered the Hindu and Muslim Cham people in a war in 1832, and the Vietnamese continue to destroy evidence of Cham culture and artefacts left behind, plundering or building on top of Cham temples, building farms over them, banning Cham religious practices, and omitting references to the destroyed Cham capital of Song Luy in the 1832 invasion in history books and tourist guides. The situation of Cham compared to the ethnic Vietnamese is substandard, lacking water and electricity and living in houses made out of mud.[97]

The Hindu and Muslim Chams, the Khmer Krom, and the Montagnards founded the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO) to fight for independence against both South Vietnam and against the Communist government of unified Vietnam during the FULRO insurgency against Vietnam. The Vietnamese government is still persecuting Montagnards and accusing them of being FULRO members as late as 2012 and blaming FULRO for the 2004 and 2001 riots against Vietnamese rule in the Central Highlands, even though FULRO has not existed for decades. The United States under President Obama, because of its anti-China policy and trying to lure Vietnam as an ally to the USA against China, is deliberately ignoring the persecution of Montagnards, instead only criticising Vietnam for cracking down on a Vietnamese blogger.[98][99]

Moro Conflict[edit]

Main article: Moro Conflict

The Moro Conflict[100] is an ongoing insurgency in Mindanao. In 1969, political tensions and open hostilities developed between the Government of the Philippines and Moro Muslim rebel groups.[101] Nur Misuari, a political science lecturer, established the Moro National Liberation Front in 1972,[102][103][104] which fought against the Philippines government in a conflict that lasted over four decades.[105] The Peace process with the Bangsamoro in the Philippines led to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, a peace deal that was signed with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a splinter group from the MNLF.[105][106] The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has declared its support for China against the Philippines government in the South China Sea dispute.[107] calling both China and the Moro people as victims of Philippine colonialism, and noting China's history of friendly relation with the Sultanate of Sulu in the region.[108] The MNLF also denounced America's assistance to the Philippines in their colonisation of the Moro people in addition to denouncing the Philippines' claims to the islands disputed with China, and denouncing America for siding with the Philippines in the dispute, noting that in 1988 China "punished" Vietnam for attempting to set up a military presence on the disputed islands, noting that the Moros and China maintained peaceful relations, while on the other hand the Moros had to resist other colonial powers (having to fight the Spanish, fight the Americans, and fight the Japanese, in addition to fighting the Philippines).[109]

American and Filipino forces launched a joint operation against the Moros in the Mamasapano clash, in which Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighters manage to kill 44 Filipino police commandos and caused massive blow back for the botched raid, putting a decisive halt to American plans for its Asia military "pivot" in the Philippines.[110] Moros have reported that "4 caucasian-looking (American) soldiers" were killed in the Mamasapano clash along with the 44 Filipinos.[111]

Due to the both the Moro conflict and the South China Sea disputes there has been a fall in the Global Peace Index grade for the Philippines.[112]

Independent analysis[edit]

The position of China on its maritime claims based on UNCLOS and history has been ambiguous, particularly with the nine dash line map.[113][114] For example, in its notes verbales in 2011, the first phrase stated that China has undisputed sovereignty over the islands and the adjacent waters, suggesting China is claiming sovereignty over its territorial waters, a position consistent with UNCLOS.[113] However, the second phrase in its notes verbales stated that China enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters along with the seabed and subsoil contained in this region, suggesting that China is claiming sovereignty over all of the maritime space (includes all the geographic features and the waters within the nine dash line).[113] The third phrase indicates support for basing their claims on historical basis as well.[113] Recently in its notes verbales in 2011, China has explicitly stated that it claims the territorial waters and all of the islands in which each island has its own exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.[114] A major problem with this claim is that it fails to distinguish between geographic features considered as "islands" or "rocks" under UNCLOS.[114] The vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China's claims based on historical claims are invalid.[115] Many ambiguities arise from the notion of historical claims as a basis for claiming sovereignty and is inherently ambiguous.[114][115][116]

Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji criticised Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for trying to falsely portray China as a threat to Japan and that it was invading its neighbours like the Philippines. He pointed out that the Spratly islands were not part of the Philippines when the US acquired the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris in 1898, and the Japanese-ruled Taiwan itself had annexed the Spratly islands in 1938, a move that was never challenged by the US-ruled Philippines, which never asserted that it was their territory. He also pointed out that other countries did not need to do full land reclamation since they already controlled islands and that the reason China engaged in extensive land reclamation is because they needed it to build airfields since China only has control over reefs.[117]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

Citations[edit]

  1. ^ U.S. protests Chinese action in South China Sea – CNNPolitics.com, CNN
  2. ^ Keck, Zachary (20 March 2014). "China's Newest Maritime Dispute". The Diplomat. Retrieved 12 February 2015. 
    Vaswani, Karishma (19 October 2014). "The sleepy island Indonesia is guarding from China". Retrieved 19 October 2014. 
    R.C. Marshall, Andrew (25 August 2014). "Remote, gas-rich islands on Indonesia's South China Sea frontline". Reuters. Retrieved 12 February 2015. 
  3. ^ "Keynote Address: Lee Hsien Loong". Retrieved 30 July 2015. 
  4. ^ "Regional Security Outlook 2014" (PDF). CSCAP. Retrieved 26 November 2015. 
  5. ^ "Regional Security Outlook" (PDF). CSCAP. Retrieved 26 November 2015. 
  6. ^ Obama Unveils New ASEAN Economic Initiative at Sunnylands Summit | The Diplomat, 18 February 2016
  7. ^ US seeking stronger trade ties with Asean | Inquirer Global Nation, 17 February 2016
  8. ^ PCA Press Release 12 juli 2016, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China).
  9. ^ http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-12/china-no-historic-right-to-south-china-sea-resources-court-says
  10. ^ "An interactive look at claims on the South China Sea". The Straits Times. Retrieved 29 February 2016. 
  11. ^ "Singapore suggests interim solution to South China Sea dispute". Channel News Asia. Retrieved 1 March 2016. 
  12. ^ John Pike. "Natuna Islands". Retrieved 30 July 2015. 
  13. ^ "CHINA'S MULTILATERALISM AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: QUEST FOR HEGEMONIC STABILITY?" (PDF). Retrieved 4 October 2014. 
  14. ^ John Pike. "South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas". Retrieved 4 October 2014. 
  15. ^ a b "South China Sea – International – Analysis – U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)". 
  16. ^ "南海经济国防意义皆重要 誉称"第二个波斯湾"". Tencent News. Retrieved 30 July 2015. 
  17. ^ "http://special.globaltimes.cn/2011-04/645909.html".  External link in |title= (help)
  18. ^ C. Michael Hogan (2011) South China Sea Topic ed. P. Saundry. Ed.-in-chief C.J.Cleveland. Encyclopedia of Earth. National Council for Science and the Environment. Washington DC
  19. ^ "CMOL – Camago-Malampaya Oil Leg Project". Archived from the original on 19 March 2008. Retrieved 15 March 2008. 
  20. ^ Map of the Philippines showing the location of Palawan
  21. ^ "Uncertainty And Insecurity Generated By Claimants in South China Sea – OpEd". Eurasia Review. 22 August 2012. 
  22. ^ Hille, Kathrin, "Chinese boats fish in dangerous waters", Financial Times, 24 April 2012.
  23. ^ "Presidential Decree no. 1596 – Declaring Certain Area Part of the Philippine Territory and Providing for their Government and Administration". Chan Robles Law Library. 11 June 1978. Retrieved 5 February 2014. 
  24. ^ Daniel J. Dzurek (1996). The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who's on First?. IBRU. pp. 44–47. ISBN 978-1-897643-23-5. 
  25. ^ "India for peaceful resolution of South China sea dispute". The Hindu (Chennai, India). 6 July 2012. 
  26. ^ "Memorandum Circular No. 94, s. 2016". Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. Retrieved 15 May 2016. 
  27. ^ The Jakarta Post. "Indonesia sinks 106 foreign boats". The Jakarta Post. Retrieved 15 May 2016. 
  28. ^ "Indonesia sinks 27 foreign boats to stop illegal fishing – Regional – The Star Online". Retrieved 15 May 2016. 
  29. ^ F_100662. "Indonesia sank 6 Vietnamese boats for illegal fishing". Retrieved 15 May 2016. 
  30. ^ Prashanth Parameswaran, The Diplomat. "Indonesia Could Sink 57 More Vessels in War on Illegal Fishing". The Diplomat. Retrieved 15 May 2016. 
  31. ^ Mathias Hariyadi (4 December 2014). "Jakarta sinks three Vietnamese fishing boats caught in its territorial waters". AsiaNews.it. 
  32. ^ "Indonesia sinks Vietnam fishing boats". Bankok Post. 5 December 2014. 
  33. ^ Paul Bischoff (21 August 2015). "Indonesia sinks 34 of its neighbors' boats to celebrate Independence Day, and Vietnam isn't happy". Mashable. 
  34. ^ "Indonesia sinks Vietnamese boats to stop illegal fishing". Yahoo News. 15 December 2014. 
  35. ^ David Rider (15 December 2014). "Indonesia sinks 3 Vietnamese boats". Maritime Security Review. 
  36. ^ http://www.ocregister.com/articles/fishing-710883-boats-indonesia.html
  37. ^ http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesia-sinks-vietnamese-fishing-vessel-raja-ampat/
  38. ^ Prashanth Parameswaran, The Diplomat. "Vietnam 'Deeply Concerned' by Indonesia's War on Illegal Fishing". The Diplomat. Retrieved 15 May 2016. 
  39. ^ http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/indonesia-releases-33-vietnamese-caught-for-illegal-fishing-62659.html
  40. ^ "DFA confirms arrest of 200 Filipino fishermen". Retrieved 15 May 2016. 
  41. ^ "China's Coast Guard Rams Fishing Boat to Free It From Indonesian Authorities". The New York Times. 22 March 2016. Retrieved 15 May 2016. 
  42. ^ "Indonesia protests against Chinese 'breach of sovereignty'". BBC News. Retrieved 15 May 2016. 
  43. ^ "Indonesia vows to prosecute Chinese trawler crew in South China Sea dispute". The Guardian. Retrieved 24 March 2016. 
  44. ^ http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/more-vietnamese-fishing-boats-seized-in-thai-waters-60887.html
  45. ^ http://www.thanhniennews.com/world/philippines-arrests-dozens-of-vietnamese-chinese-fishermen-62314.html
  46. ^ http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/malaysia-detains-14-vietnamese-allegedly-for-illegal-fishing-61362.html
  47. ^ http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesia-seizes-philippines-vietnam-illegal-fishing-boats-papua-waters/
  48. ^ http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/indonesia-detains/2834266.html
  49. ^ http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/indonesia-seizes-7-vietnamese-boats-for-illegal-fishing-report-63135.html
  50. ^ a b Martina, Michael (20 July 2011). "RPT-China, ASEAN set 'guidelines' on sea row, but no deal expected". Reuters, 20 July 2011. Retrieved 20 July 2011. 
  51. ^ a b "China face-off in South China Sea" DNA India report
  52. ^ "http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers47/paper4677.html".  External link in |title= (help)
  53. ^ a b "China paper warns India off Vietnam oil deal" Reuters article, 16 October 2011
  54. ^ a b "http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers48%5Cpaper4702.html".  External link in |title= (help)
  55. ^ a b "China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects" in The Hindu, 15 September 2011
  56. ^ "U.S., China Relations: Policy Issues Congressional Research Service, 12 January 2011
  57. ^ Edward Wong (30 March 2011). "China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea Is a 'Core Interest' Worth War". New York Times. Retrieved 1 September 2012. 
  58. ^ Bonnie S. Glaser (April 2012). "Armed Clash in the South China Sea". East Asia. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 1 September 2012. For example, China may explicitly refer to the South China Sea as a core interest; in 2010 Beijing hinted this was the case but subsequently backed away from the assertion. 
  59. ^ Phil Stewart; John Ruwitch (12 October 2010). "U.S. sees crisis fears easing over South China Sea". Reuters (Hanoi). Retrieved 1 September 2012. 
  60. ^ "Don't take peaceful approach for granted". Global Times (China). 25 October 2011. Retrieved 25 October 2011. 
  61. ^ Wadhams, Nicholas (25 October 2011). "China May Resort to Force in Sea Disputes, Global Times Says". Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved 25 October 2011. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu told reporters today in Beijing that China "adheres to the strategy of peaceful development. … Sowing discord and hostility will only complicate" the issue, Jiang said. 
  62. ^ Pasick, Adam (29 July 2014). "How China's Enormous Fishing Fleet Is Being Used As a Surrogate Navy". www.defenseone.com (Quartz). Retrieved 29 July 2014. 
  63. ^ Leszek Buszynski (Spring 2012). "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.—China Strategic Rivalry" (PDF). THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY. 
  64. ^ "Joint Venture "Vietsovpetro"". Retrieved 2 March 2014. 
  65. ^ "Vietnam". RevenueWatch.org. Retrieved 2 March 2014. 
  66. ^ "chiefgroup.com.hk 02883 CHINA OILFIELD SERVICES LIMITED Company Profile". Retrieved 4 October 2014. 
  67. ^ 11 May 2012, 南海钻井平台上工人直升机上下班, NetEase News (Chinese)
  68. ^ "Not the usual drill". Singapore: The Economist. 10 May 2014. Retrieved 14 May 2014. 
  69. ^ "Vietnam says China's oil rig movement into Sth China Sea is "illegal"". Reuters. 
  70. ^ Zhu, Ningzhu (7 May 2014). "China urges against Vietnamese interference in territorial water exploration". Xinhuanet. Retrieved 16 May 2014. 
  71. ^ Jing Huang; Andrew Billo (10 December 2014). Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Navigating Rough Waters. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 192–196. ISBN 978-1-137-46368-5. 
    Robert G. Sutter (8 August 2013). U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 170–172. ISBN 978-1-4422-1807-9. 
    McDevitt, Michael (25 November 2014). "The South China Sea: Navigating the Most Dangerous Place in the World". War on the Rocks. Retrieved 14 March 2015. 
    Diola, Camille (5 November 2014). "US won't 'agree to disagree' with China on sea row". Philippine Star. Retrieved 14 March 2015. 
  72. ^ Lawrence, Susan V.; Thomas Lum (11 March 2011). U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues. CRS Report for Congress R41108. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. p. 26. Retrieved 25 October 2013. 
  73. ^ Bouchat, Clarence J. (June 2014). "The Parcel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. United States Army. Retrieved 13 March 2015. 
    Yujuico, Emmanuel. "The real story behind the South China Sea dispute" (PDF). London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved 13 March 2015. 
  74. ^ Landler, Mark (23 July 2010). "Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands". New York Times. Retrieved 15 March 2015. 
  75. ^ David Martin Jones; Michael Lawrence Rowan Smith; Nicholas Khoo (1 January 2013). Asian Security and the Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility. Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 57. ISBN 978-1-78100-462-3. 
    Denny Roy (20 August 2013). Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security. Columbia University Press. p. 219. ISBN 978-0-231-52815-3. 
  76. ^ Hachigian, Nina (12 June 2012). "China's Rise Is A Big Reason to Ratify the Law of the Sea Convention". Issues. Center for American Progress. Retrieved 13 March 2015. 
    "Written Testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary U.S. Department of State" (PDF). Center for Oceans Law and Policy. University of Virginia. 23 May 2012. Retrieved 13 March 2015. 
  77. ^ "China, U.S. square off on South China Sea". UPI. 29 May 2012. Retrieved 30 May 2012. 
  78. ^ John Kerry (23 July 2012). "S.Res. 524: A resolution reaffirming the strong support of the United States for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties ...". govtrack.us. Civic Impulse, LLC. Retrieved 3 September 2012. 
  79. ^ Williams, Carol J. (10 January 2014). "China asserts control over vast sea area, angering neighbors, U.S.". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 12 January 2014. 
  80. ^ Mogato, Manuel (13 February 2014). "U.S. admiral assures Philippines of help in disputed sea". Reuters. Retrieved 13 February 2014. 
  81. ^ "Beijing slams US Navy official for 'aiding Philippines' remarks". Want China Times. 16 February 2014. Retrieved 15 February 2014. 
  82. ^ "Dragon Breathes Fire Over S. China Sea, Worries US". Free Press Journal (Mumbai, India). 28 February 2015. Retrieved 27 March 2015. 
    "US freedom of navigation operations challenge China's maritime security". Want China Times (Taiwan). 28 March 2015. Retrieved 27 March 2015. 
    Alexander, David (25 March 2015). "U.S. military challenged maritime claims of 19 countries in 2014". United States: Reuters. Retrieved 27 March 2015. 
  83. ^ "Beijing Slams Washington's Plans for 'Incursion' Into South China Sea". sputniknews.com. Retrieved 10 October 2015. 
  84. ^ "After Months of Waiting, US Finally Begins Freedom of Navigation Patrols Near China's Man-Made Islands". The Diplomat. 27 October 2015. 
  85. ^ Blanchard, Ben; Shalal, Andrea (28 October 2015). "Angry China shadows U.S. warship near man-made islands". Reuters. Retrieved 26 November 2015. 
  86. ^ "US B-52 bombers flew near disputed islands in South China Sea, says Pentagon". The Guardian. 12 November 2015. 
  87. ^ See United States and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea#History
  88. ^ Liza Yosephine (21 June 2016). "Minister echoes Indonesia’s stance on South China Sea". The Jakarta Post (Jakarta). 
  89. ^ Prashanth Parameswaran (26 March 2015). "No, Indonesia’s South China Sea Approach Has Not Changed - Jokowi’s recent comments need to be put in perspective". The Diplomat. 
  90. ^ Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Researching China’s recent behavior and strategy in the South China Sea for his PhD at the University of Sydney (18 July 2016). "Indonesia 'speaks Chinese' in South China Sea". The Jakarta Post. 
  91. ^ "Indonesia says could also take China to court over South China Sea". Reuters. 11 November 2015. 
  92. ^ a b "South China Sea: Indonesia summons Chinese ambassador as fishing dispute escalates". The Guardian. 21 March 2016. 
  93. ^ "Indonesia vows to prosecute Chinese trawler crew in South China Sea dispute". The Guardian. 24 March 2016. 
  94. ^ "South China Sea: Indonesian leader visits Natuna Islands amid growing tensions". ABC News. 23 June 2016. 
  95. ^ Liza Yosephine (13 July 2016). "Indonesia's statement on South China Sea dissatisfying: China's experts". The Jakarta Post (Jakarta). 
  96. ^ Ian Glover (2004). Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History. Psychology Press. p. 209. ISBN 978-0-415-29777-6. 
    Bill Hayton (11 September 2014). The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia. Yale University Press. pp. 14–16. ISBN 978-0-300-18954-4. 
    Robert D. Kaplan (25 March 2014). Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. Random House Publishing Group. pp. 12–16. ISBN 978-0-8129-9433-9. 
    Anthony Reid (1 August 2000). Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia. Silkworm Books. pp. 34–38. ISBN 978-1-63041-481-8. 
  97. ^ Bray, Adam (16 June 2014). "The Cham: Descendants of Ancient Rulers of South China Sea Watch Maritime Dispute From Sidelines". National Geographic News (National Geographic). Archived from the original on 2014. Retrieved 3 September 2014. 
  98. ^ BBT Champaka.info (20 May 2012). "Fulro trở lại trên bàn cờ Tây Nguyên". Champaka.info. IOC-Champaka.info. 
  99. ^ BBT Champaka.info (20 May 2012). "Fulro trở lại trên bàn cờ Tây Nguyên" (PDF). Tin Paris: Accueil. IOC-Champaka.info. 
  100. ^ "Amazon.com: Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies (Policy Studies) (9781932728149): Eric Gutierrez, Saturnino Jr. Borras: Books". 
  101. ^ "The CenSEI Report (Vol. 2, No. 13, April 2–8, 2012)". Retrieved 26 January 2015. 
  102. ^ Daniel Cassman (14 August 2015). "Moro National Liberation Front". Mapping Militant Organizations – Stanford university. 
  103. ^ "The Moro National Liberation Front". Religious Literacy Project. Harvard Divinity School. 
  104. ^ "Moro National Liberation Front". Resources on Faith, Ethics & Public Life. Georgetown University Berkley Center. 
  105. ^ a b "Philippines, Muslim rebels sign final peace deal to end conflict". tribunedigital-chicagotribune. 
  106. ^ "Philippine peace breakthrough". Bangkok Post. 25 January 2014. 
  107. ^ "The Long Struggle for Moro Autonomy in the Philippines". Foreign Policy in Focus. 
  108. ^ RRayhanR (8 October 2012). "HISTORICAL AND "HUMAN WRONG" OF PHILIPPINE COLONIALISM: HOW NOT TO RESPECT HISTORIC-HUMAN RIGHTS OF BANGSAMORO AND CHINA?". mnlfnet.com. Moro National Liberation Front (Misuari faction). Retrieved 16 May 2014. 
  109. ^ RRayhanR (11 August 2012). "IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHINA-PHILIPPINES WAR WITHIN FILIPINO-MORO WAR IN MINDANAO". mnlfnet.com. Moro National Liberation Front (Misuari faction). Retrieved 16 May 2014. 
  110. ^ Cloud, David S.; Leon, Sunshine de (10 September 2015 <!- – 3:36 am -->). "A heavy price paid for botched terrorist raid by Philippines and U.S.". Los Angeles Times (MANILA).  Check date values in: |date= (help)
  111. ^ ""BEWARE OF AQUINO GOVERNMENT'S CONSPIRACY TO FOOL THE MNLF, OIC, MOROS AND HUMANITY." – MNLF VICE-CHAIRMAN OLAMIT". mnlfnet.com. Moro National Liberation Front (Misuari faction). 28 September 2015. Retrieved 28 September 2015. 
  112. ^ "Most Filipinos Fear 'Armed Conflict' With China Over South China Sea Dispute: Survey". 19 June 2015. 
  113. ^ a b c d Beckman, Robert (2013). "The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea". The American Journal of International Law (American Society of International Law) 107 (1): 142–163. Retrieved 24 February 2016. 
  114. ^ a b c d Dupuy, Florian; Dupuy, Pierre-Marie (2013). "A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea". The American Journal of International Law (American Society of International Law) 107 (1): 124–141. Retrieved 24 February 2016. 
  115. ^ a b Malik, Mohan. "Historical Fiction: China's South China Sea Claims". World Affairs. Retrieved 24 February 2016. 
  116. ^ Feith, David. "What Lies in the South China Sea". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 24 February 2016. 
  117. ^ Taoka, Shunji (21 September 2015). Translated by Rumi Sakamoto. "'China Threat Theory' Drives Japanese War Legislation". The Asia-Pacific Journal (Japan Focus) 13 (38-5). Retrieved 26 September 2015. 

Sources[edit]

Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]