Please use the talkpage to discuss concerns. There is a thread where you may respond at Talk:RT_(TV_network)#Morgan Piers interviews Martin, Wahl and Kristof. - Sidelight12 Talk 23:53, 18 March 2014 (UTC)
People are complaining about you're edits
Read Wikipedia:Citation needed; it says delete unreliable information in living biographies (because they can come back to sue WP), but not anywhere else. Wikipedia:Verifiability clearly states "When tagging or removing material for lacking an inline citation, please state your concern that there may not be a published reliable source for the content, and therefore it may not be verifiable." Nowhere on WP does it say delete information, nowhere, so stop doing so. Instead of bulling you're way through WP, learn actual how WP works. This information is not wrong, see. This information is not fake, but true. Read the source. So instead of deleting things, instead maybe check if they are true or not... --TIAYN (talk) 12:55, 26 April 2014 (UTC)
-  Here, another source, which discusses the mentioned coup attempt by Umar al-Muhayshi (called Umar Mihayshi in the article, spelling error)... --TIAYN (talk) 13:09, 26 April 2014 (UTC)
- Did you read WP:Citation needed and WP:Verifiability, don't remove them? --TIAYN (talk) 13:55, 26 April 2014 (UTC)
- This is getting pathetic, you're breaching WP policy and you're removing info I just proved to you was true with reliable sources. The whole reason for removing the text has disappeared, and considering that WP policy does not support removing unsourced material, these edits of yours are increasingly stupid. --TIAYN (talk) 16:01, 26 April 2014 (UTC)
- Are you know saying a book published by Cornell University Press is unreliable? I know you're an idiot, but really? I'm giving up one you, I'm nominating you for WP noticeboard (I'll probably be blocked because I believed I could talk come on sense to you, but hey, I'm at least following WP policy...) --TIAYN (talk) 17:58, 26 April 2014 (UTC)
- I didn't say that it is unreliable, I haven't looked for that. I just say that if you believe it is reliable than you can add it.--LibDutch (talk) 18:13, 26 April 2014 (UTC)
Assad turned the presidency, which had been known simply as "head of state" under Jadid, into a position of power during his rule. In many ways, the presidential authority replaced the Ba'ath Party's failed experiment with organized, military Leninism; Syria became a hybrid of Leninism and Gaullist constitutionalism. According to Raymond Hinnebusch, "as the president became the main source of initiative in the regime, his personality, values, strengths and weaknesses became decisive for its direction and stability. Arguably Assad's leadership gave the regime an enhanced combination of consistency and flexibility which it hitherto lacked."
Assad institutionalized a system where he had the final say, which weakened the powers of the collegial institutions of the state and party. As fidelity to the leader replaced ideological conviction later in his presidency, corruption became widespread. The state-sponsored cult of personality became pervasive; as Assad's authority strengthened at his colleagues' expense, he became the sole symbol of the regime'. Because Assad wanted to become an Arab leader, he considered himself a successor to Nasser since he rose to power in November 1970 (a few weeks after Nasser's death). He modeled his presidential system on Nasser's, hailed Nasser for his pan-Arabic leadership and publicly displayed photographs of Nasser with posters of himself. Pictures of Assad—often engaged in heroic activities—were placed in public places. He named a number of places and institutions after himself and family members. In schools, children were taught songs praising Assad. Teachers began each lesson with the song "Our Eternal Leader, Hafez al-Assad", and he was sometimes portrayed with seemingly divine attributes. Sculptures and portraits depicted him with the prophet Mohammad, and after his mother's death the government produced portraits of her with a halo. Syrian officials were compelled to call Assad "the sanctified one" ("al-Muqaddas"). This strategy was also pursued by his son, Bashar al-Assad.
While Assad did not rule alone, he increasingly had the last word; those with whom he worked eventually became lieutenants, rather than colleagues. None of the political elite would question a decision of his, since those who did had been dismissed. General Naji Jamil is an example, being dismissed after he disagreed with Assad's handling of the Islamic uprising. The two highest decision-making bodies were the Regional Command and the National Command, both part of the Ba'ath Party. Joint sessions of these bodies resembled politburos in socialist states which espoused communism. Assad headed the National Command and the Regional Command as Secretary General and Regional Secretary, respectively. The Regional Command was the highest decision-making body in Syria, appointing the president and (through him) the cabinet. As presidential authority strengthened, the power of the Regional Command and its members evaporated. The Regional and National Commands were (in theory) responsible to the Regional Congress and the National Congress—with the National Congress the de jure superior body—but the Regional Congress had de facto authority. The National Congress, which included delegates from Ba'athist Regional Branches in other countries, has been compared to the Comintern. It functioned as a session of the Regional Congress focusing on Syria's foreign policy and party ideology. The Regional Congress had limited accountability until the 1985 Eighth Regional Congress, the last under Assad. In 1985, responsibility for leadership accountability was transferred from the Regional Congress to the weaker National Progressive Front.
Sectarianism Four men in suits
Assad with Sunni members of the political elite: (L–R) Ahmad al-Khatib, Assad, Abdullah al-Ahmar and Mustafa Tlass When Assad came to power, he increased Alawite dominance of the security and intelligence sectors to a near-monopoly. The coercive framework was under his control, weakening the state and party. According to Hinnebusch, the Alawite officers around Assad "were pivotal because as personal kinsmen or clients of the president, they combined privileged access to him with positions in the party and control of the levers of coercion. They were, therefore, in an unrivalled position to act as political brokers and, especially in times of crisis, were uniquely placed to shape outcomes". The leading figures in the Alawite-dominated security system had family connections; Rifaat al-Assad controlled the Struggle Companies, and Assad's son-in-law Adnan Makhluf was his second-in-command as Commander of the Presidential Guard. Other prominent figures were Ali Haydar (special-forces head), Ibrahim al-Ali (Popular Army head), Muhammad al-Khuli (head of Assad's intelligence-coordination committee) and Military Intelligence head Ali Duba. Assad controlled the military through Alawites such as Generals Shafiq Fayyad (commander of the 3rd Division), Ibrahim Safi (commander of the 1st Division) and Adnan Badr Hasan (commander of the 9th Division). During the 1990s, Assad further strengthened Alawite dominance by replacing Sunni General Hikmat al-Shihabi with General Ali Aslan as chief of staff. The Alawites, with their high status, appointed and promoted based on kinship and favor rather than professional respect. Therefore, an Alawite elite emerged from these policies. Assad's elite was non-sectarian; prominent Sunni figures at the beginning of his rule were Abdul Halim Khaddam, Shihabi, Naji Jamil, Abdullah al-Ahmar and Mustafa Tlass.
However, none of these people had a distinct power base from that of Assad. Although Sunnis held the positions of Air Force Commander from 1971 to 1994 (Jamil, Subhi Haddad and Ali Malahafji), General Intelligence head from 1970 to 2000 (Adnan Dabbagh, Ali al-Madani, Nazih Zuhayr, Fuad al-Absi and Bashir an-Najjar), Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army from 1974 to 1998 (Shihabi) and defense minister from 1972 until after Assad's death (Tlass), none had power separate from Assad or the Alawite-dominated security system. When Jamil headed the Air Force, he could not issue orders without the knowledge of Khuli (the Alawite head of Air Force Intelligence). After the failed Islamic uprising, Assad's reliance on his relatives intensified; before that, his Sunni colleagues had some autonomy. A defector from Assad's regime said, "Tlass is in the army but at the same time seems as if he is not of the army; he neither binds nor loosens and has no role other than that of the tail in the beast." Another example was Shihabi, who occasionally represented Assad. However, he had no control in the Syrian military; Ali Aslan, First Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations during most of his tenure, was responsible for troop maneuvers. Although the Sunnis were in the forefront, the Alawites had the power.
Be polite, don’t make edit wars
LibDutch, I’ve asked you before to politely give a reason by your edits, here you again gave no motivation. Why not, you can talk, you can write, can’t you? We’re trying to make Wikipedia a polite, collegial project. You prefer edit warring over politely, cooperatively talking, discussing, arguing? Corriebertus (talk) 09:16, 25 May 2014 (UTC)
Warning about involvement in an edit war
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To avoid being blocked, instead of reverting please consider using the article's talk page to work toward making a version that represents consensus among editors. See BRD for how this is done. You can post a request for help at a relevant noticeboard or seek dispute resolution. In some cases, you may wish to request temporary page protection. PhilKnight (talk) 14:08, 7 June 2014 (UTC)
LibDutch Sockpuppet Investigation
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Blocked for sockpuppetry
|This account has been blocked from editing for a period of 1 week for sock puppetry per evidence presented at Wikipedia:Sockpuppet investigations/LibDutch. Note that multiple accounts are allowed, but using them for illegitimate reasons is not, and that any contributions made while evading blocks or bans may be reverted or deleted. Once the block has expired, you're welcome to make useful contributions. If you believe that this block was in error, and you would like to be unblocked, you may appeal this block by adding the text
I despise of your edit summary here. There's no need to use language such as "bullshit", especially for someone who was editing in good faith. Consider this to be a polite but firm message to change your behavior. --k6ka (talk | contribs) 16:35, 30 June 2014 (UTC)