In ethics, value pluralism (also known as ethical pluralism or moral pluralism) is the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other. In addition, value-pluralism postulates that in many cases, such incompatible values may be incommensurable, in the sense that there is no objective ordering of them in terms of importance. Value pluralism is opposed to value monism.
Value-pluralism is a theory in metaethics, rather than a theory of normative ethics, or a set of values in itself. Oxford philosopher and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin is credited with being the first to popularize a substantial work describing the theory of objective value-pluralism, bringing it to the attention of academia. (cf. the Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library). The related idea that fundamental values can and, in some cases, do conflict with each other is prominent in the thought of Max Weber, captured in his notion of 'polytheism'.
Value-pluralism is an alternative to both moral relativism and moral absolutism (which Berlin called monism). An example of value-pluralism is the idea that the moral life of a nun is incompatible with that of a mother, yet there is no purely rational measure of which is preferable. Hence, moral decisions often require radical preferences with no rational calculus to determine which alternative is to be selected.
Value-pluralism differs from value-relativism in that pluralism accepts limits to differences, such as when vital human needs are violated.
"There are innumerable differences which obviously add to the interest of life, and without which it would be unendurably dull. Again, there are differences which can neither be left unsettled nor be settled without a struggle, and a real one, but in regard to which the struggle is rather between inconsistent forms of good than between good and evil. In cases of this sort no one need see an occasion for anything more than a good-tempered trial of strength and skill, except those narrow-minded fanatics whose minds are incapable of taking in more than one idea at a time, or of having a taste for more things than one, which one thing is generally a trifle. There is no surer mark of a poor, contemptible, cowardly character than the inability to conduct disputes of this sort with fairness, temper, humanity, goodwill to antagonists, and a determination to accept a fair defeat in good part and to make the best of it."
William James, influenced by Fitzjames Stephen, endorsed value-pluralism in an essay on "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life", which he first delivered as a lecture in 1891. He wrote that none "of the measures [of goodness] that have been actually proposed has, however, given general satisfaction (...) The various ideals have no common character apart from the fact that they are ideals. No single abstract principle can be so used as to yield to the philosopher anything like a scientifically accurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale."
Joseph Raz and many others have done further work clarifying and defending value-pluralism. For instance, political philosopher William Galston, former policy advisor to President Bill Clinton, has defended a Berlinian approach to value pluralism in books like Liberal Pluralism.
An important critique of Berlin's value-pluralism and its applications to Marx, the Russian intelligentsia, Judaism, his early political thought, as well as his conceptions of liberty, the Enlightenment vs the Counter-Enlightenment, and history has been advanced by the philosopher Charles Blattberg, who was his student.
Another notable critic of value-pluralism in recent times is Ronald Dworkin, the second most-cited American legal scholar, who attempts to forge a liberal theory of equality from a monist starting-point, citing its (what's?) failure to adequately address the equality of what debate .
Alan Brown suggests that Berlin ignores the fact that values are indeed commensurable as they can be compared by their varying contributions towards the human good. Regarding the ends of freedom, equality, efficiency, creativity etc., Brown maintains that none of these are ends in themselves but are valued for their consequences. Brown concludes that Berlin has failed to show that the problem of conflicting values is insoluble in principle. The deliberative democrat Robert Talisse has published several articles criticizing the pluralism of Isaiah Berlin, William Galston, Richard Flathman, and John Gray, alleging informal logic and internal epistemological contradictions.
- Berlin, Isaiah (1991). The Crooked Timber of Humanity. London: Fontana Press. ISBN 0-00-686221-7.
- Berlin, Isaiah (1969). Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-500272-5.
- Blattberg, Charles (2000). From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-829688-6. Blattberg has recently criticized value pluralists for taking politics "too seriously."
- Dworkin, Ronald (2000). Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-00219-9.
- James, William (1960). The Will to Believe. New York: Dover Publications. ISBN 0-486-20291-7.
- Raz, Joseph (2003). The Practice of Value. Oxford Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-926147-4.
- Raz, Joseph (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-824772-9.
- Cherniss, Joshua; Hardy, Henry (2013-11-29). "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Isaiah Berlin". Retrieved 2015-01-16.
- Crowder, George (2002). Liberalism and Value Pluralism. London: Continuum. ISBN 0-8264-5048-2.
- Blattberg, Charles (1996). "An Exchange with Professor Sir Isaiah Berlin" (PDF). The Isaiah Berlin Literary Trust.
- Stephen, James Fitzjames (1874). Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.
- Brown, A. (1986) Modern Political Philosophy; Theories of the Just Society, Middlesex, Penguin Books pp. 157–158