VeraCrypt 1.17 on Windows 10
|Developer(s)||IDRIX (based in Paris, France)|
|Initial release||June 22, 2013|
|Stable release||1.22 (March 30, 2018) [±]|
|Written in||C, C++, Assembly|
|Platform||IA-32 and x64|
|Available in||37 languages|
|Type||Disk encryption software|
|License||Apache License 2.0 but with portions subject to TrueCrypt License version 3.0|
VeraCrypt is an open-source utility used for on-the-fly encryption (OTFE). It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file or encrypt a partition or (in Windows) the entire storage device with pre-boot authentication.
VeraCrypt is a fork of the discontinued TrueCrypt project. It was initially released on 22 June 2013 and has produced its latest release (version 1.22) on 30 March 2018. Many security improvements have been implemented and issues raised by TrueCrypt code audits have been fixed (see below). VeraCrypt features optimized implementations of cryptographic hash functions and ciphers which boost performance on modern CPUs (see Performance).
- 1 License and source model
- 2 Encryption scheme
- 3 Plausible deniability
- 4 Performance
- 5 Security improvements
- 6 Security precautions
- 7 Planned features
- 8 See also
- 9 References
- 10 External links
License and source model
VeraCrypt has been licensed under the Apache License 2.0 since 28 June 2015. Prior to that, it was released under the Microsoft Public License. VeraCrypt inherited a substantial amount of code from its TrueCrypt predecessor and thus is also subject to the terms of version 3.0 of the "TrueCrypt License" which is unique to the TrueCrypt software. It is not one of many widely used open-source licenses and is not a free software license according to the Free Software Foundation (FSF) license list, as it contains distribution and copyright-liability restrictions.
Individual ciphers supported by VeraCrypt are AES, Serpent, Twofish, Camellia, and Kuznyechik. The Magma cipher was removed in version 1.19 in response to a security audit. Additionally, ten different combinations of cascaded algorithms are available: AES–Twofish, AES–Twofish–Serpent, Camellia–Kuznyechik, Camellia–Serpent, Kuznyechik–AES, Kuznyechik–Serpent–Camellia, Kuznyechik–Twofish, Serpent–AES, Serpent–Twofish–AES, and Twofish–Serpent. The cryptographic hash functions available for use in VeraCrypt are RIPEMD-160, SHA-256, SHA-512, Streebog and Whirlpool.
Modes of operation
As with its predecessor TrueCrypt, VeraCrypt supports plausible deniability by allowing a single "hidden volume" to be created within another volume. In addition, the Windows versions of VeraCrypt have the ability to create and run a hidden encrypted operating system whose existence may be denied.
The VeraCrypt documentation lists many ways in which VeraCrypt's hidden volume deniability features may be compromised (e.g. by third-party software which may leak information through temporary files, thumbnails, etc., to unencrypted disks) and possible ways to avoid this.
VeraCrypt supports parallelized:63 encryption for multi-core systems and, under Microsoft Windows, pipelined read and write operations (a form of asynchronous processing):63 to reduce the performance hit of encryption and decryption. On newer processors supporting the AES-NI instruction set, VeraCrypt supports hardware-accelerated AES to further improve performance.:64 On 64-bit CPUs VeraCrypt uses optimized assembly implementation of Twofish and Camellia.
- The VeraCrypt development team considered the TrueCrypt storage format too vulnerable to a National Security Agency (NSA) attack, so it created a new format incompatible with that of TrueCrypt. This is one of the main differences between VeraCrypt and its competitor CipherShed, which continues to use the TrueCrypt format. VeraCrypt is still capable of opening and converting volumes in the TrueCrypt format.
- An independent security audit of TrueCrypt released 29 September 2015 found TrueCrypt includes two vulnerabilities in the Windows installation driver allowing an attacker arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation via DLL hijacking. This was fixed in VeraCrypt in January 2016.
- While TrueCrypt uses 1000 iterations of the PBKDF2-RIPEMD160 algorithm for system partitions, VeraCrypt uses 327,661 iterations. For standard containers and other partitions, VeraCrypt uses 655,331 iterations of RIPEMD160 and 500,000 iterations of SHA-2 and Whirlpool. While this makes VeraCrypt slower at opening encrypted partitions, it also makes password guessing attacks slower.
- Additionally, since version 1.12 a new feature called "Personal Iterations Multiplier" (PIM) provides a parameter whose value is used to control the number of iterations used by the header key derivation function, thereby making brute-force attacks potentially even more difficult. Veracrypt out of the box uses a reasonable PIM value to improve security, but users can provide higher value to enhance security. The primary downside of this feature is that it makes the process of opening encrypted archives even slower.
- A vulnerability in the bootloader was fixed on Windows and various optimizations were made as well. The developers added support for SHA-256 to the system boot encryption option and also fixed a ShellExecute security issue. Linux and macOS users benefit from support for hard drives with sector sizes larger than 512. Linux also received support for the NTFS formatting of volumes.
- VeraCrypt added the capability to encrypt GPT system partitions and boot them using UEFI in version 1.18a.
- Option to enable/disable support for TRIM command for both system and non-system drives is added in version 1.22.
An audit of VeraCrypt 1.18 was conducted by QuarksLab on behalf of the Open Source Technology Improvement Fund, taking 32 man-days and published on 17 October 2016. The major vulnerabilities identified in this audit were resolved in VeraCrypt 1.19, released the same day.
There are several kinds of attacks that all software-based disk encryption is vulnerable to. As with TrueCrypt, the VeraCrypt documentation instructs users to follow various security precautions to mitigate these attacks, several of which are detailed below.
Encryption keys stored in memory
VeraCrypt stores its keys in RAM; on an ordinary personal computer DRAM will maintain its contents for several seconds after power is cut (or longer if the temperature is lowered). Even if there is some degradation in the memory contents, various algorithms can intelligently recover the keys. This method, known as a cold boot attack (which would apply in particular to a notebook computer obtained while in power-on, suspended, or screen-locked mode), has been successfully used to attack a file system protected by TrueCrypt.
VeraCrypt documentation states that VeraCrypt is unable to secure data on a computer if an attacker physically accessed it and VeraCrypt is then used on the compromised computer by the user again. This does not affect the common case of a stolen, lost, or confiscated computer. The attacker having physical access to a computer can, for example, install a hardware or a software keylogger, a bus-mastering device capturing memory or install any other malicious hardware or software, allowing the attacker to capture unencrypted data (including encryption keys and passwords) or to decrypt encrypted data using captured passwords or encryption keys. Therefore, physical security is a basic premise of a secure system. Attacks such as this are often called "evil maid attacks".
Some kinds of malware are designed to log keystrokes, including typed passwords, that may then be sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when they gain physical access to the computer.
Trusted Platform Module
The FAQ section of the VeraCrypt website states that the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) cannot be relied upon for security, because if the attacker has physical or administrative access to the computer and you use it afterwards, the computer could have been modified by the attacker e.g. a malicious component—such as a hardware keystroke logger—could have been used to capture the password or other sensitive information. Since the TPM does not prevent an attacker from maliciously modifying the computer, VeraCrypt will not support TPM.
- "Contact Us – IDRIX". Retrieved 16 November 2016.
- "Release Notes". 2018-03-30. Retrieved 2018-03-31.
- "VeraCrypt 1.0f Bundle (All files and their signatures)". IDRIX. Retrieved 2015-01-04.
- "VeraCrypt License". Retrieved 2016-01-28.
- "VeraCrypt Official Site"
- "VeraCrypt Volume". VeraCrypt Official Website. Retrieved February 16, 2015.
- "Operating Systems Supported for System Encryption". VeraCrypt Official Website. Retrieved February 16, 2015.
- Rubens, Paul (October 13, 2014). "VeraCrypt a Worthy TrueCrypt Alternative". eSecurity Planet. Quinstreet Enterprise. Retrieved February 16, 2015.
- "VeraCrypt Downloads"
- "Apache License 2.0 (Apache)". Retrieved 2015-07-01.
- "Microsoft Public License (Ms-PL)". Retrieved 2015-07-01.
- TrueCrypt License. Accessed on: May 21, 2012 Archived May 30, 2012, at Archive.is
- TrueCrypt Collective License. Accessed on: June 4, 2014
- Phipps, Simon (2013-11-15), TrueCrypt or false? Would-be open source project must clean up its act, InfoWorld, retrieved 2014-05-20
- "Encryption Algorithms". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. Retrieved 2018-03-31.
- "Hash Algorithms". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. Retrieved 2018-03-31.
- "Modes of Operation". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. Retrieved 2018-03-31.
- "Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. Retrieved 2018-03-31.
- "Plausible Deniability". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. Retrieved 2018-03-31.
- "Hidden Volume". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. Retrieved 2018-03-31.
- "Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. Retrieved 2018-03-31.
- "VeraCrypt User Guide" (1.0f ed.). IDRIX. 2015-01-04.
- "VeraCrypt Release Notes"
- Castle, Alex (March, 2015). "Where Are We At With TrueCrypt?". MaximumPC, p. 59.
- CVE-2016-1281: TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt Windows installers allow arbitrary code execution with elevation of privilege
- Paul Rubens (June 30, 2016). "VeraCrypt a worthy Truecrypt Alternative". esecurityplanet.com.
- "PIM". veracrypt.fr. Retrieved 7 June 2017.
- "Encryption Software VeraCrypt 1.12 Adds New PIM Feature To Boost Password Security". thehackernews.com. Retrieved 5 June 2017.
- "TrueCrypt alternative VeraCrypt 1.12 ships with interesting PIM feature". ghacks.net. Retrieved 5 June 2017.
- "Transcript of Episode #582". GRC.com. Retrieved 5 June 2017.
- OSTIF (October 17, 2016). "VeraCrypt Audit". Retrieved October 18, 2016.
- QuarksLab (October 17, 2016). "VeraCrypt Audit Results" (PDF). Retrieved October 18, 2016.
- QuarkLabs (October 17, 2016). "VeraCrypt Audit Outcome". Retrieved October 18, 2016.
- VeraCrypt (October 17, 2016). "VeraCrypt 1.19 Release Notes". Retrieved October 18, 2016.
- "Security Requirements and Precautions". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. Retrieved February 16, 2015.
- Alex Halderman; et al. "Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys".
- "Physical Security". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. 2015-01-04. Retrieved 2015-01-04.
- Schneier, Bruce (2009-10-23). ""Evil Maid" Attacks on Encrypted Hard Drives". Schneier on Security. Retrieved 2014-05-24.
- "Malware". VeraCrypt Documentation. IDRIX. 2015-01-04. Retrieved 2015-01-04.
- "FAQ". Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- "Issues – UniCode 8.0 basis for VeraCrypt". Retrieved 2015-05-15.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to VeraCrypt.|