War of the Pacific
|War of the Pacific|
Map showing changes of territory caused by the War of the Pacific. Earlier maps (1879) show different lines of the border between Bolivia-Peru and Bolivia-Argentina.
|Commanders and leaders|
Presidents of Bolivia|
H. Daza (1876–1879)
P.J.D. de Guerra (1879)
N. Campero (1879–1884)
Presidents of Peru
M.I. Prado (1876–1879)
L. La Puerta (1879)
N. de Piérola (1879–1881)
F. García C. (1881)
L. Montero F. (1881–1883)
M. Iglesias (1882–1885)
Presidents of Chile|
A. Pinto (1876–1881)
D. Santa María (1881–1886)
(Army of Lima)
7 wooden ships
2 torpedo boats
27,000 (Ante Lima)
8,000 (Occupation Force)
8 wooden ships
10 torpedo boats
|Casualties and losses|
Killed and wounded:|
The War of the Pacific (Spanish: Guerra del Pacífico), also known as the Saltpeter War (Spanish: Guerra del salitre) and by multiple other names, was a war between Chile and a Bolivian–Peruvian alliance from 1879 to 1884. Fought over Chilean claims on coastal Bolivian territory in the Atacama Desert, the war ended with a Chilean victory, which gained for the country a significant amount of resource-rich territory from Peru and Bolivia. The Chilean Army took Bolivia's nitrate-rich coastal region, and Peru was defeated by the Chilean Navy.
The war began over a nitrate taxation dispute between Bolivia and Chile, with Peru being drawn in due to its alliance with Bolivia. But historians have pointed to deeper origins of the war, such as the interest of Chile and Peru in the nitrate business, the long-standing rivalry between Chile and Peru, as well as political and economical disparities between Chile and Peru and Bolivia.[A] On February 14, 1879, Chile's armed forces occupied the Bolivian port city of Antofagasta, subsequently war between Bolivia and Chile was declared on March 1, 1879, and between Chile and Peru on April 5, 1879.
Battles were fought in the Pacific Ocean, the Atacama Desert, the Peruvian deserts, and the mountainous regions in the Andes. For the first five months, the war played out in a naval campaign, as Chile struggled to establish a marine resupply corridor for its forces in the world's driest desert. Afterwards, Chile's land campaign bested the Bolivian and Peruvian armies. Bolivia withdrew after the Battle of Tacna, on May 26, 1880. Chile's forces occupied Lima in January 1881. Remnants and irregulars of the Peruvian army waged a guerrilla war but could not prevent war-weary Peruvian factions from reaching a peace deal with Chile involving territorial concessions.
Chile and Peru signed the Treaty of Ancón on October 20, 1883. Bolivia signed a truce with Chile in 1884. Chile acquired the Peruvian territory of Tarapacá, the disputed Bolivian department of Litoral (turning Bolivia into a landlocked country), and the temporary control over the Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica. In 1904, Chile and Bolivia signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which established definite boundaries. The 1929 Tacna–Arica compromise gave Arica to Chile and Tacna to Peru.
The conflict is also known as the "Saltpeter War", the "Ten Cents War" (in reference to the controversial ten-centavo tax imposed by the Bolivian government), and the "Second Pacific War". It should not to be confused with the pre-Columbian Saltpeter War, in what is now Mexico, nor the "Guano War" as the Chincha Islands War is sometimes named. The war largely settled (or set up, depending on one's point of view) the "Tacna-Arica dispute", and is sometimes known by that name as well, although the details took decades to resolve.
Wanu (Spanish: guano) is a Quechua word for fertilizer. Potassium nitrate (ordinary saltpeter) and sodium nitrate (Chile saltpeter) are nitrogen-containing compounds collectively referred to as salpeter, saltpetre, salitre, caliche, or nitrate. They are used as fertilizer, but have other important uses.
The Atacama border dispute between Bolivia and Chile on sovereignty in the coastal territories between approximately the parallels 23° and 24° South was just one of several longstanding border conflicts in South America as the area gained independence in the 19th century since uncertainty characterized the demarcation of frontiers according to uti possidetis in 1810, particularly in remote, thinly populated portions of newly independent nations.
The dry climate of the Peruvian and Bolivian coasts had permitted the accumulation and preservation of vast amounts of high-quality guano deposits and sodium nitrate. In the 1840s, Europeans knew the value of guano and nitrate as fertilizer and the role of saltpeter in explosives. The Atacama Desert became economically important. Bolivia, Chile, and Peru were in the area of the largest reserves of a resource demanded by the world. During the Chincha Islands War (1864–1866), Spain, under Queen Isabella II, attempted to exploit an incident involving Spanish citizens in Peru to re-establish its influence over the guano-rich Chincha Islands.
Starting from the Chilean silver rush in the 1830s, the Atacama was prospected and populated by Chileans. Chilean and foreign enterprises in the region eventually extended their control to the Peruvian saltpeter works. In the Peruvian region of Tarapacá, Peruvians were a minority, behind both Chileans and Bolivians.
Boundary Treaty of 1866
Bolivia and Chile negotiated the Boundary Treaty of 1866," or the "Treaty of Mutual Benefits," which established 24° S "from the littoral of the Pacific to the eastern limits of Chile" as the mutual boundary. Both countries also agreed to share the tax revenue from mineral exports from the territory between 23° and 25° S. The bipartite tax collecting caused discontent, and the treaty lasted for only eight years.
Secret Treaty of Alliance of 1873
In February 1873, Peru and Bolivia signed a secret treaty of alliance against Chile. The last clause kept it secret as long as both parties considered its publication unnecessary, until it was revealed in 1879. Argentina, long involved in a dispute with Chile over the Strait of Magellan and Patagonia, was secretly invited to join the pact, and in September 1873, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies approved the treaty and 6,000,000 Argentine peso for war preparations. Eventually, Argentina and Bolivia did not agree on the territories of Tarija and Chaco, and Argentina also feared an alliance of Chile with Brazil. The Argentine Senate postponed and then rejected the approval, but in 1875 and 1877, after border disputes with Chile flared up anew, Argentina sought to join the treaty. At the onset of the war, in a renewed attempt, Peru offered Argentina the Chilean territories from 24° to 27° S if Argentina adhered to the pact and fought in the war.
Historians including G. Bulnes, Basadre, and Yrigoyen agree that the real intention of the treaty was to compel Chile to modify its borders according to the geopolitical interests of Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia, as Chile was militarily weak before the arrival of the Chilean ironclads Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada.
Chile was not informed about the pact until it learned of it, at first cursorily by a leak in the Argentine Congress in September 1873, when the Argentine Senate discussed the invitation to join the Peru-Bolivia alliance. The Peruvian mediator Antonio de Lavalle stated in his memoirs that he did not learn of it until March 1879, and Hilarion Daza was not informed of the pact until December 1878.
The Peruvian historian Basadre states that one of Peru's reasons for signing the treaty was to impede a Chilean-Bolivian alliance against Peru that would have given to Bolivia the region of Arica (almost all Bolivian commerce went through Peruvian ports of Arica before the war) and transferred Antofagasta to Chile. The Chilean offers to Bolivia to change allegiance were made several times even during the war and also from the Bolivian side at least six times.
On December 26, 1874, the recently built ironclad Cochrane arrived in Valparaíso and remained in Chile until the completion of the Blanco Encalada. That threw the balance of power in the South Pacific toward Chile.
Historians disagree on how to interpret the treaty. Some Peruvian and Bolivian historians assess it as rightful, defensive, circumstantial, and known by Chile from the very onset. Conversely, some Chileans historians assess the treaty as aggressive against Chile, causing the war, designed to take control by Peru of the Bolivian salitreras and hidden from Chile. The reasons for its secrecy, its invitation to Argentina to join the pact, and Peru's refusal to remain neutral are still discussed.
Boundary Treaty of 1874
In 1874, Chile and Bolivia replaced the 1866 boundary treaty by keeping the boundary at 24° S but granting Bolivia the authority to collect all tax revenue between 23° and 24° S. To compensate for the relinquishment of its rights, Chile received a 25-year guarantee against tax increases on Chilean commercial interests and their exports.
Article 4 explicitly forbade tax increases on Chilean enterprises for 25 years:
The duties of exportation that may be levied on minerals exploited in the zone referred to in the preceding articles shall not exceed those now in force, and Chilean citizens, industry, and capital shall not be subjected to any other contributions what ever except those now existing. The stipulations in this article shall last for twenty-five years.— Article 4, Chile-Bolivia Boundary Treaty of 1874
All disputes arising under the treaty would be settled by arbitration.
Causes of war
This article possibly contains original research. (January 2016)
The American historian William F. Sater gives several possible and compatible reasons for the war. He considers the causes to be domestic, economic, and geopolitical. Several authors agree with them, but others only partially support his arguments.
Some historians argue that Chile was devastated by the economic crisis of the 1870s and was looking for a replacement for its silver, copper and wheat exports. It has been argued that the economic situation and the view of new wealth in nitrate were the true reasons for the Chilean elite to go to war against Peru and Bolivia. The holder of the Chilean nitrate companies, according to Sater, "bulldozed" Chilean President Aníbal Pinto into declaring war to protect the owner of the Compañía de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta (CSFA) and then to seize Bolivia's and Peru's salitreras. Several members of the Chilean government were shareholders of CSFA, and they are believed to have hired the services of one of the country's newspapers to push their case.
Another American historian, David Healy, rejects that thesis, and Fredrick B. Pike calls the allegation "absurd." The economic development that accompanied and followed the war was so remarkable that Marxist writers feel justified in alleging that Chile's great military adventure was instigated by self-seeking capitalists to bring their country out of the business stagnation that had begun in 1878 since the war provided Chile with the economic means to come of age. Sater states that that interpretation overlooks certain important facts. The Chilean investors in Bolivia correctly feared that Daza, the Bolivian dictator, would use the war as an excuse to expropriate their investments. Among them were Melchor de Concha y Toro, the politically powerful president of Chile's Camara de Diputados, Jerónimo Urmeneta,: 105 and Lorenzo Claro, a Chilean founder of the Banco de Bolivia and a prominent member of the National Party. A Santiago newspaper claimed that Melchor de Concha y Toro offered President Pinto 2,000,000 Chilean pesos to end the dispute and to return to the 1874 border. "In other words," writes W. Sater, "there were as many powerful interests opposed to helping the Compañía de Salitres as there were those seeking to aid the corporation." Also, B. Farcau objects to the argument: "On the other hand, the sorry state of the Chilean armed forces at the outbreak of the war, as will be discussed in the following chapter, hardly supports a theory of conscious, premeditated aggression."
Sater cites other sources that state that the true causes of the conflict were not economic but geopolitical, a struggle for control of the southeastern portion of the Pacific Ocean. In 1836 the Peruvian government tried to monopolize commerce in the South Pacific by rewarding ships that sailed directly to Callao, to the detriment of Valparaíso. Peru tried to impede the agreement that had been reached between Spain and Chile to free its new warships built and embargoed in Britain during the Chincha Islands War. Sater cites Germany's minister in Chile, who argued that the war with Peru and Bolivia would "have erupted sooner or later, [and] on any pretext." He considered that Bolivia and Peru had developed a "bitter envy" against Chile and its material progress and good government. Frederik B. Pike states: "The fundamental cause for the eruption of hostilities was the mounting power and prestige and the economic and political stability of Chile, on one hand, and the weakness and the political and economic deterioration of Bolivia, on the other.... The war—and its outcome—was as inevitable as the 1846—1848 conflict between the United States and Mexico. In both instances, a relatively well-governed, energetic, and economically expanding nation had been irresistibly tempted by neighboring territories that were underdeveloped, malgoverned, and sparsely occupied.": 128
Another reason, according to Sater, was Peru's desire to monopolize and appropriate the nitrate works to strengthen its nitrate monopoly, which required the Bolivian and Chilean salitreras to be controlled by Peru. As unenviable as Chile’s situation was in the 1870s, that of Peru was much worse. The 1870s was for Peru's economy "a decade of crisis and change". Nitrate extraction rose while guano exports, the source of substantial revenue for Peru, declined from 575,000 tons in 1869 to less than 350,000 tons in 1873, and the Chincha Islands and other guano islands were depleted or nearly so.
William Edmundson writes in A History of the British Presence in Chile, "Peru has its own reasons to enter the dispute. Rory Miller (1993) argues that the depletion of guano resources and poor management of the economy in Peru had provoked a crisis. This has caused Peru to default on its external debt in 1876.... In that year  the Peruvian government decided to procure a loan of seven millions pounds of which four millions pounds were earmarked to purchase privately owned oficinas [salitreras]... and Peru defaulted again in 1877."
To increase guano revenue, Peru created a monopoly on nitrate commerce in 1875. Its aims were to increase prices, curb exports and to impede competition, but most larger nitrate firms opposed the monopoly on sales of nitrate. When they were unsuccessful, Peru in 1876 began to expropriate nitrate producers and to buy nitrate concessions such as that of Henry Meiggs in Bolivia ("Toco", south of the Loa River). However, the CSFA was too expensive to be purchased. As Peruvian historian Alejandro Reyes states, the Bolivian salitreras needed to be controlled, which resulted in the internationalization of the conflict since they were owned by Chilean and European merchants. As the Chilean company was to be auctioned on February 14, 1879, in Antofagasta, it was considered that the Peruvian consul would be the highest bidder.
However, some sources, according to Sater, see the declarations of war between Chile and Peru as a product of popular domestic forces. The Peruvian President had to declare war to keep his position. Sater cites the British minister in Lima, Spencer St. John: "the rival parties may try to make political capital out of jealousy for the national honor, and His Excellency [Peruvian President Prado] may be forced to give way to the popular sentiment." Chilean President Pinto was under similar pressures. Bruce Farcau considers that to be the main cause for the war outbreak: "The argument that the attitude of the peoples of the region was just ripe for war seems best to fit the bill."
Ten Cents' Tax
- The license of November 27, 1873
From 1866, the Chilean entrepreneurs José Santos Ossa and Francisco Puelma had exploited deposits of sodium nitrate in Bolivian territories (salitreras "Las Salinas" and "Carmen Alto" 122 kilometres (76 mi) and 128 kilometres (80 mi) from Antofagasta, respectively) and secured concessions from Bolivian President Mariano Melgarejo.
In 1868, a company named Compañía Melbourne Clark was established in Valparaíso, Chile, with 34% British capital provided by Antony Gibbs & Sons of London, which also held shares of salitreras in Peru. Its shareholders included a number of leading Chilean politicians. The company obtained a license from the Melgarejo administration to construct a railroad from Antofagasta to Salinas, and was renamed Compañía de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta (CSFA).
In 1871, a new Bolivian government canceled all contracts signed by Melgarejo, but on November 22, 1872, a Bolivian decree allowed the government to renegotiate the contracts.
On November 27, 1873, CSFA obtained a license to exploit saltpeter without duty for 15 years from the new administration in Bolivia, but a dispute arose regarding whether the original 1872 decree, under which the 1873 license was issued, required the authorization of the Bolivian Congress.[B] Some lawyers placed emphasis on con cargo a dar cuenta a la próxima legislatura (Spanish for: "to be considered during the next legislative session [of the parliament]"), but others on sólo en los casos de no avenimiento (Spanish for "only in cases that no settlement [is reached]").
- Peruvian monopoly of saltpeter
In 1873, the Peruvian government dictated the Ley del estanco del salitre, which limited the salitre production and authorized the government to purchase the whole production to a fixed price. However, the plan failed, and the law was withdrawn. In 1875, the Peruvian government expropriated the salitreras of Tarapacá to secure revenue from guano and nitrate by means of a monopoly, and in 1876, Antony Gibbs & Sons became the consignee of the nitrate trade for the Peruvian government. President Mariano Ignacio Prado was "determined to complete the monopoly," and in 1876, Peru bought the nitrate licenses for "El Toco" auctioned by a Bolivian decree of January 13, 1876. However, the Chilean company remained the most serious competitor and clearly weakened Peru's monopoly. President Pardo, Prado's predecessor, had urged Gibbs to secure the monopoly by limiting the CSFA's output, and Henry Gibbs had warned the CSFA's board of directors in a letter on April 16, 1878, that its refusal to limit its output would bring administrative trouble with Peru and Bolivia "as it is made more and more to the interest of a neighboring Government that they should be so."
The historian Ronald Bruce St. John in Foreign Policy of Peru states, "Although persuasive evidence linking Peru to either the ten-centavo tax or Bolivia's decision to confiscate Chilean holdings in Antofagasta never surfaced, it must be recognized that Peruvian interests had deep-seated economical and political reasons for going to war."
- Tax and Chilean refusal
In 1875, the city of Antofagasta had attempted to impose a 3 cents tax on the CSFA, but the Bolivian State Council (Consejo de Estado), headed by Serapio Reyes Ortiz, who would be Minister of Foreign Affairs during the crisis, rejected the tax because it violated the license of 1873 and the Boundary Treaty of 1874.
On February 14, 1878, the National Congress of Bolivia and the National Constituent Assembly approved the 1873 license if the company paid a 10 cents per quintal tax, but the company objected by citing the 1874 treaty that the increased payments were illegal and demanded an intervention from the Chilean government.
The CSFA's directory board perceived the tax as a Peruvian move to displace Chileans from the nitrate production, as had occurred in Tarapacá in 1875 when the Peruvian government expropriated the salitreras.
Having surrendered its claim to the disputed territories in return for a Bolivian promise to avoid increasing the tax, Chile claimed that the treaty did not allow for such a tax hike. Bolivia suspended the tax in April 1878. In November, Chile proposed mediation and cautioned that Daza's refusal to cancel the tax would force Chile to declare null the 1874 treaty. In December 1878, Bolivia, counting on its military alliance with Peru, challenged Chile, stated the tax was unrelated to the treaty and that the claim of the CSFA should be addressed in Bolivian courts, and revived the tax. When the company refused to pay the tax, Bolivia confiscated its property on February 11 and threatened to sell it on February 14 to liquidate the company's debt.
Chilean Invasion of Antofagasta
In December 1878, Chile dispatched a warship to the area. On February 6, the Bolivian government nullified the CSFA's exploitation license and confiscated the property. The news reached Valparaíso on February 11 and so the Chilean government decided on the occupation of the region of Antofagasta south of 23° South. On the day of the planned auction, 200 Chilean soldiers arrived by ship at the port city of Antofagasta and seized it without resistance. The occupying forces received widespread support from the local population, 93–95% of which was Chilean.
The Bolivian territory between 23° South and the Loa River, the border with Peru, remained unoccupied by Chilean forces almost one month after the Bolivian declaration of war. On March 21, Cobija and then Calama, Tocopilla, and other hamlets were occupied. The Chilean government asked the Bolivian office-holders to remain in office, but they refused.
Peruvian mediation and Bolivian declaration of war
This section needs additional citations for verification. (March 2017)
On February 22, Peru sent a diplomatic team headed by José Antonio de Lavalle to Santiago to act as a mediator between the Chilean and the Bolivian governments. Peru meanwhile ordered its fleet and army to prepare for war. De Lavalle arrived in Valparaíso on March 4. On February 27, Daza had made a public manifesto to inform the Bolivians on the occupation of Antofagasta and to call.for patriotic support. The same day, the Bolivian legislature authorized a formal declaration of war upon Chile although it was not immediately announced. On March 1, Daza issued instead a decree to prohibit all commerce and communications with Chile "while the state-of-war provoked upon Bolivia lasts." It provided Chileans ten days to leave Bolivian territory unless they were gravely ill or handicapped and embargoed Chilean furniture, property, and mining produce; allowed Chilean mining companies to continue operating under a government-appointed administrator; and provided all embargoes as temporary "unless the hostilities exercised by Chilean forces requires an energetic retaliation from Bolivia."
In Santiago, Lavalle asked for Chile's withdrawal from Antofagasta to transfer the province to a tripartite administration of (Bolivia, Chile, and Peru without a Bolivian guarantee to end the embargo or to cancel the new tax.
On March 14, in a meeting with foreign powers in Lima, Bolivia announced that a state of war existed with Chile. The declaration was aimed to impede further Chilean arms purchases in Europe and to scuttle the Peruvian mediation in Chile. Bolivia called on Peru to activate the treaty of alliance arguing that Chile's invasion was a casus foederis.
Also on March 14, Alejandro Fierro, Chile's minister of foreign affairs, sent a telegram to Chile's representative in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, to request the immediate neutrality of the Peruvian government. On March 17, Godoy formally presented the Chilean proposal in a meeting with Peruvian President Prado.: 147ff
On March 21, Godoy telegraphed the Chilean government on the secret treaty between Peru and Bolivia, which had been revealed to him by Peruvian President Prado.: 154ff
On March 23, on their way to occupy Calama, 554 Chilean troops and cavalry defeated 135 Bolivian soldiers and civilians, who were dug in at two destroyed bridges next to the Topáter ford. The Battle of Topáter was the first battle of the war.
When the Chilean government asked Lavalle directly and officially whether a defensive alliance existed that committed Peru to assist Bolivia in a war with Chile and whether Lima planned to honor the agreement, Lavalle could prevaricate no longer and answered yes to both. Chilean President Pinto sought and received legislative approval to declare war, which he did on 5. April 1879. Peru responded on April 6, when Prado declared the casus foederis.
|January 1879, before the war|
|2,440[n 1]||5,557[n 2]||1,687[n 3]|
|January 1881, before occupation of Lima|
|ante Lima: 27,000[n 4]||Army of Lima: 25–35,000[n 5]||In Bolivia:|
|Tarapacá & Antofagasta: 8,000[n 4]||In Arequipa: 13,000[n 6]|
|In Chile: 6,000[n 4]||Army of the North: (Added to Lima)|
|Krupp Mountain Gun M1873 L/21||12–16||60||107||2500||2.14|
|Krupp Field Gun M1867 L/25||?||78.5||?||3000||4.3|
|Krupp Mountain Gun M1879 L/13||38||75||100||3000||4.5|
|Krupp Mountain Gun M1879-80 L/24||24||87||305||4600||1.5|
|Krupp Field Gun M1880 L/27||29||75||100||4800||4.3|
|Krupp Field Gun M1873 L/24||12||88||450||4800||6.8|
|Armstrong Bronze M1880||6||66||250||4500||4.1|
|Model 59 Emperador||12||87||?||323||11.5|
|La Hitte Field Gun M1858||4||84||?||342||4.035|
|La Hitte Mountain Gun M1858||8||86.5||?||225||4035|
|White Gun (Mountain)[F 2]||31||55||?||2500||2.09|
|White Gun (Field)||49||55||?||3800||2.09|
|Grieve Steel[F 1]||42||60||107||2500||2.14|
|Krupp Mountain Gun M1872 L/21||6||60||107||2500||2.14|
Historians agree that the belligerents were not prepared for the war financially or militarily. None of the three nations had a General Staff, medical corps, or military logistics and their warships were in a deplorable state. In Chile, for example, the military contingent had been reduced continuously from 3,776 (by 1867) to 2,400 (by 1879) men,: 140 and no military unit was deployed north of Valparaíso, 1700 km south of Iquique.: 143 By the end of the war, 53% of chief engineers serving in Chilean warships were foreigners. The government of Peru was again in default of payment, and in Bolivia, famine spread over the country.
According to William Sater, Chile and Peru enlisted temporarily 2% of the male population but Bolivia only 1%. After the Battle of Tacna, both of the Allied armies were disbanded and had to be formed again.
The Allied forces, at first glance, had some advantages over the Chilean forces. Their population and armies doubled the Chileans in numbers, and the Peruvian port of Callao's powerful artillery was impregnable for the Chilean navy and a secure haven for the Peruvian navy. In Callao, an English company offered the service of a floating dock for ships up to 3000 tonnes, and the Peruvian government used it to repair their ships at the outset of the war.: 119 Those are some reasons that led the international press to expect a Chilean defeat as the war started. Moreover, the ambivalent Argentine position and the ongoing Mapuche conflict overshadowed the Chilean perspective.: 109 J. Basadre commented on the public opinion in Peru and Bolivia: "They ignored the real power of Chile and the horrors of war, and simple minded people believed that the Allied would win the war because they together were bigger than Chile."
However, other observers made a more in-depth analysis, which showed Chilean political and military advantages. Chile had a stable political system since 1833 that had developed and strengthened its institutions. The Chilean army and the navy had educated officers, soldiers with professional experience in the Mapuche conflict,: 43 and uniformly modern arms. Almost all Chilean soldiers were armed with Comblain or Gras rifles. The Chilean navy also possessed two new ironclads, which were invincible against the older Peruvian warships. Although there was interference between military and government over policy during the war, the primacy of the government was never questioned. The Chilean supply line from Europe through the Magellan Strait was only once threatened unsuccessfully by the Peruvian navy.
The Allied armies were heavily involved in domestic politics and neglected their military duties, and poor planning and administration caused them to buy different rifles with different calibers. That hampered the instruction of conscripts, the maintenance of arms, and the supply of ammunition. The Peruvian navy warships manned before the war by Chilean sailors had to be replaced by foreign crews when the war began. Bolivia had no navy. The Allied armies had nothing comparable to the Chilean cavalry and artillery.
Struggle for sea control
Its few roads and railroad lines made the nearly waterless and largely unpopulated Atacama Desert difficult to occupy. From the beginning, naval superiority was critical. Bolivia had no navy and so on March 26, 1879, Hilarión Daza formally offered letters of marque to any ships willing to fight for Bolivia. The Armada de Chile and the Marina de Guerra del Perú fought the naval battles.
Early on, Chile blockaded the Peruvian port of Iquique on April 5. In the Battle of Iquique, on May 21, 1879, the Peruvian ironclad Huáscar engaged and sank the wooden Esmeralda; Meanwhile, during the Battle of Punta Gruesa, the Peruvian Independencia struck a submerged rock and sank in the shallow waters near Punta Gruesa while chasing the schooner Covadonga. In total, Peru stopped the blockade of Iquique, and Chile lost the old Esmeralda. Nevertheless, the loss of the Independencia cost Peru 40% of its naval offensive power and made a strong impression upon military leaders in Argentina and so, the possibility of Argentina's intervention in the war became far more remote.
Despite being outnumbered, the Peruvian monitor Huáscar held off the Chilean Navy for six months and upheld Peru's morale during the early stages of the conflict.: 108
The capture of the steamship Rímac on July 23, 1879, carrying a cavalry regiment (the Carabineros de Yungay) was the Chilean Army's largest loss until then. That led to the resignation of Contraalmirante (Rear Admiral) Juan Williams Rebolledo, the chief of the Chilean Navy, on August 17. Commodore Galvarino Riveros Cárdenas replaced him and devised a plan to catch the Huáscar.
Meanwhile, the Peruvian navy had some other actions, particularly in August 1879 during the unsuccessful raid of the Unión to Punta Arenas, at the Strait of Magellan, in an attempt to capture the British merchant ship Gleneg, which transported weapons and supplies to Chile.
|Main Artillery||Built |
|Cochrane||3,560||3,000||9–12.8||up to 9||6x9 Inch||1874|
|Blanco Encalada||3,560||3,000||9–12.8||up to 9||6x9 Inch||1874|
The Battle of Angamos proved decisive on October 8, 1879, and Peru was reduced almost exclusively to land forces. In the battle, the Chilean Navy managed to capture the Huáscar after several hours of fierce battle, even though her surviving crewmen sought to scuttle her. The Chilean Navy was from then on required to carry troops for the invasion of Peru and to provide fire support for amphibious assault and other troops operating within its range. Chilean warships also had to impose a naval blockade of Peruvian ports and end the smuggling of arms from Panama into Peru via the Pacific.
After the Battle, despite the loss of both of their main ships, the Peruvians used simple and ingenious ruses to sink two important Chilean ships, the Loa (July 1880) and the Covadonga (August 1880), but its remaining units were locked in its main port during the long blockade of Callao.
On the other hand, the Chilean Navy captured the ship Pilcomayo in November 1879 and the torpedo boat Alay in December 1880.
During the Sierra campaign, Chilean ships were dedicated to guarding the Peruvian coast, and also transporting military detachments and war material for land operations.
In November 1883, during the final phase of the war, the Chilean military command sent the Chilean torpedo boat Colo Colo to Lake Titicaca, via railroad, from Mollendo to Puno to control that lake. The presence of the torpedo boat prevented communications through this route and its use for military purposes, and the Peruvian vessels that had taken refuge in the vicinity surrendered to the Chileans. The deployment of the torpedo boat also induced the Bolivian government to agree to a peace treaty with Chile in 1884.
After the Battle of Angamos, once Chile achieved naval supremacy, the government had to decide where to strike. The options were Tarapacá, Moquegua or directly Lima. Because of its proximity to Chile and the capture of the Peruvian Salitreras, Chile decided to occupy the Peruvian province of Tarapacá first.
Arica and Iquique were isolated and separated by the Atacama Desert; since the capture of the Huáscar in October 1879, neither port had naval protection needed to be adequately supplied by sea. Without any communication or withdrawal lines, the area was essentially cut off from the rest of Peru. After the loss of its naval capabilities, Peru had the option to withdraw to central Peru to strengthen its army around Lima until the re-establishment of a naval balance or to build up new alliances, as hinted by the Chilean historian Wilhelm Ekdahl. However, Jorge Basadre assumes that it would have been "striking and humiliating" to abandon Tarapacá, the source of Peru's wealth.
On April 30, 1879, after 13 days of marching, 4,500 Bolivian soldiers, commanded by Daza, arrived in Tacna, a town 100 km (60 mi) north of Arica. The Bolivians had come to join the Peruvian forces, commanded by Juan Buendia. The Allied forces were deployed to the places that a Chilean landing could be expected; the Iquique-Pisagua or Arica-Tacna regions. There were reserves stationed at Arequipa, farther north in Peru, under Lizardo Montero, as well as in southern Bolivia, under Narciso Campero[C] The reserves were to be deployed to the coast after a landing but failed to arrive.
The land war can be seen as four Chilean military campaigns that successively occupied Tarapacá, Arica-Tacna, and Lima and a final campaign that ended the Peruvian resistance in the sierra. The occupation of Arequipa and Puno at the end of the war saw little military action.
The Campaign of Tarapacá began on November 2, 1879, when nine steam transporters escorted by half of the Chilean Navy transported 9,500 men and more than 850 animals to Pisagua, some 500 kilometres (310 mi) north of Antofagasta. After neutralizing the coastal batteries, the Chileans landed and attacked beach defenses in Pisagua.
In the event of a Chilean landing, the Allied forces planned to counterattack the Chilean forces in a pincer movement involving advances from the north (Daza's forces coming from Arica) and from the south (Buendia's forces coming from Iquique). Although Peruvian forces marched northwards as planned after the fall of Pisagua, Daza, coming from Arica, decided in Camarones (44 km from Pisagua) to give up his part of the counterattack and return to Arica.
The Chileans meanwhile marched towards Iquique and, on November 19, 1879, defeated the Allied troops without Daza's men gathered in Agua Santa in the Battle of San Francisco and Dolores. Disbanded Bolivian forces there and the southern force retreated to Oruro, and the Peruvians fell back to Tiliviche. The Chilean army captured Iquique (80 km/50 mi south of Pisagua) without resistance. Some of the Peruvian forces that had been defeated at San Francisco retreated on Tarapacá, a little town with same name as the province, where they combined with Peruvian troops who withdrew to Tarapacá directly from Iquique.
A detachment of Chilean soldiers, with cavalry and artillery, was sent to face the Peruvian forces in Tarapacá. Both sides clashed on November 27 in the Battle of Tarapacá, and the Chilean forces were defeated, but the Peruvian forces, without lines of communication with their supply bases in Peru or Bolivia, could not maintain their occupation of the territory. Consequently, the Peruvians retreated north through harsh desert terrain to Arica and lost many troops during their withdrawal. Bruce W. Farcau comments that, "The province of Tarapacá was lost along with a population of 200,000, nearly one tenth of the Peruvian total, and an annual gross income of £28 million in nitrate production, virtually all of the country's export earnings." The victory afforded Santiago an economic boon and a potential diplomatic asset.
Domestic policies until the fall of Iquique
The Rimac’s capture, the sinking of the Esmeralda, and the passiveness of the Chilean fleet showed that the command of the navy was unprepared for the war, and the army also had trouble with the logistics, medical service, and command. Public discontent with poor decisions led to riots, and the government had to replace the "sclerotics" chief of the navy Juan Williams Rebolledo (by Galvarino Riveros), and the Chief of the army Justo Arteaga (by Erasmo Escala). After Tarapacá, the army was reorganized into divisions. Chile's foreign policy tried to separate Bolivia from Peru. Gonzalo Bulnes writes: "The target of the política boliviana was the same as before, to seize Tacna and Arica for Bolivia and put Bolivia as a buffer state between Peru and Chile, on the assumption that Peru would accept the Chilean peace conditions. The initiated called such policy 'to clear up Bolivia.'" Moreover, the Chilean government had to find a border agreement with Argentina to avoid war.
After the occupation of the salpeter and guano deposits, the Chilean government restituted the oficinas salitreras, which had been nationalized by Peru, to the owner of the certificate of debt. The alternative of a Chilean State Company of Salpeter was discarded as too onerous for a government waging war and lacking experienced personnel, and the creditors pressed the issue. In 1879, Chile began to exact a tax of 40 cents per "quintal métrico" (100 kg), increasing to $1.60 in 1880.
As provided by the secret treaty, the allies agreed in the Protocol of Subsidies for Bolivia to bear the costs of the war. The agreement, which regulated the tax income for many years, caused resentments and fears in Bolivia, whose deployment of forces to Tacna was seen as helping Peru. Also, Bolivia knew that its army would be sent not to free the occupied region of Bolivia but to protect Peru. As Daza and his officers came to Tacna and Arica, they failed to see the expected Peruvian military strength and understood that their position of power in Bolivia was threatened by a defeat of the Allies. The Bolivian historian Querejazu suggests that Daza successfully used the Chilean offer of Tacna and Arica for Bolivia to exert pressure on Peru to get a more favorable Protocol of Subsidies.
The reason that Daza abandoned the Peruvian forces in Iquique and turned back to Arica just before the Battle of San Francisco is uncertain. Some historians say that he wanted to keep the "Regimiento Colorados" untouched since the force secured his political power in Bolivia. Daza later stated that his officers refused to continue the march through the desert, but his shameful withdrawal accelerated his downfall, and he was succeeded by Narciso Campero. In the new government, there was a strong tendency to accept the Chilean offer of Tacna and Arica, but it was eventually refused. Bolivia signed the creation of the United States of Peru and Bolivia, a political fantasy without any practical consequences. Bolivia helped Peru with money and weapons, but the Bolivian army never again intervened in the war.
In Peru, the political situation was complicated. President Prado had declared war on Chile for longstanding economical and political reasons but without the funds or international credit to finance the war. He turned over the administration of the state to Vice President Luis La Puerta de Mendoza to assume for himself the command of the army. Because of the Chilean blockade, Peru could not export revenuemaking goods via its ports. As a consequence, public revenue was half of what had been expected, and spending tripled. The Peruvian government in 1879 experienced several political crises and seven ministers of finance. General Buendía, who led the defeated allied troops in Iquique, and More, chief of the sunken warship Independence, were both put on trial but were eventually acquitted.
The Peruvian government was confronted with widespread rioting in Lima because of its failures. On December 18, 1879, as the fall of Iquique became known in Peru, Prado went from Callao to Panama, allegedly with the duty to oversee the purchase of new arms and warships for the nation. In a statement for the Peruvian newspaper El Comercio, he turned over the command of the country to Vice President Luis La Puerta de Mendoza. History has condemned his departure as a desertion.: 27 Nicolás de Piérola overthrew Puerta's government and took power on December 23, 1879.
Piérola has been criticised because of his sectarianism, frivolous investment, bombastic decrees, and lack of control in the budget, but it must be said that he put forth an enormous effort to obtain new funds and to mobilize the country for the war. Basadre considered his work an act of heroism, abnegation in a country invaded, politically divided, militarily battered, and economically bloodless.
Campaign of Tacna and Arica
Meanwhile, Chile continued its advances in the Tacna and Arica Campaign. On November 28, ten days after the Battle of San Francisco, Chile declared the formal blockade of Arica. On December 31, a Chilean force of 600 men carried out an amphibious raid at Ilo as a reconnaissance in force, to the north of Tacna and withdrew the same day.
On February 24, 1880, approximately 11,000 men in 19 ships, protected by Blanco Encalada, Toro, and Magallanes and two torpedo boats, sailed from Pisagua. Two days later, on February 26, the Chileans arrived off Punta Coles, near Pacocha, Ilo. The landing took several days to conclude but faced no resistance. The Peruvian commander, Lizardo Montero, refused to try to drive the Chileans from the beachhead, as the Chileans had expected. On March 22, 3,642 Chilean troops defeated 1,300 Peruvian troops in the Battle of Los Ángeles, cutting any direct Peruvian supply from Lima to Arica or Tacna (supply was possible only through the long way, via Bolivia). After the Battle of Los Ángeles, only three allied positions remained in southern Peru: General Leyva's 2nd Army at Arequipa (including some survivors from Los Ángeles), Bolognesi's 7th and 8th Divisions at Arica, and at Tacna the 1st Army. These forces were under Campero's direct command. However, the numbers proved meaningless, as the Peruvians were unable to concentrate troops or even to move from their garrisons. After crossing 40 miles (64 km) of desert, on May 26 the Chilean army (14,147 men) destroyed the allied army of 5,150 Bolivians and 8,500 Peruvians in the Battle of Tacna. The need for a port near the army to supply and reinforce the troops and to evacuate the wounded compelled the Chilean command to concentrate on the remaining Peruvian stronghold of Arica. On June 7, after the Battle of Arica, the last Peruvian bastion in the Tacna Department fell. After the campaign of Tacna and Arica, the Peruvian and Bolivian regular armies largely ceased to exist, and Bolivia effectively left the war.
On October 22, 1880, delegates of Peru, Chile, and Bolivia held a 5-day conference aboard the USS Lackawanna in Arica. The meeting had been arranged by the United States Ministers Plenipotentiary in the belligerent countries. The Lackawanna Conference, also called the Arica Conference, attempted to develop a peace settlement.
Chile demanded Peruvian Tarapacá Province and the Bolivian Atacama, an indemnity of 20,000,000 gold pesos, the restoration of property taken from Chilean citizens, the return of the Rimac, the abrogation of the treaty between Peru and Bolivia, and a formal commitment by not to mount artillery batteries in Arica's harbor. Arica, as a settlement, was to be limited to commercial use. Chile planned to retain the territories of Moquegua, Tacna, and Arica until all peace treaty conditions were satisfied. Although willing to accept the negotiated settlement, Peru and Bolivia insisted for Chile to withdraw its forces from all occupied lands as a precondition for discussing peace. Having captured the territory at great expense, Chile declined, and the negotiations failed. Bruce St. John states in Foreign Policy of Peru (page 116), "Peru attended only out of deference to the [US government] latter, hoping a failure of the talks might lead to more aggressive US involvement."
Campaign of Lima
The occupation of the southern departments of Peru (Tacna, Arica, and Tarapacá) and the Lynch expedition showed that the army of Peru no longer possessed the skilled military manpower to defend the country. However, nothing could convince the Peruvian government to sue for peace. The defeated allies failed to realize their situation and, despite the empty Bolivian treasury, on June 16, 1880, the Bolivian National Assembly voted to continue the war. On June 11, 1880, a document was signed in Peru declaring the creation of the United States of Peru-Bolivia, but Piérola continued the struggle. W. Sater states, "Had Piérola sued for peace in June 1880, he would have saved countless Peruvian lives and the nation's treasure."
The Chilean government struggled to satisfy the public demands to end the war and to secure the peace. The situation forced the Chilean government to plan the occupation of Lima.
- Landings on Pisco, Chilca, Curayaco, and Lurín
Once the size of the Chilean army had been increased by 20,000 men to reach a strength of 41,000 soldiers, deployed from the forts of the Chile–Mapuche frontier to the outskirts of Lima, the Chilean army began the campaign of Lima. Lacking the ships to transport all the troops at once from Arica, the Chileans decided to land a division and then the rest of the army in stages. Their shortage of shipping also precluded an immediate landing at Lima. Instead, Pisco, approximately 320 kilometres (200 mi) south of Lima, was the first landing point.
On November 19, 8,800 men, twenty cannons and their supplies reached Pisco. A party of 400 men was landed near the port and they learned that a garrison of 3,000 men defended Pisco. Bypassing it required a landing to be made directly into the port and so a Chilean vanguard was landed in Paracas, ten miles to the south. The force managed to capture Pisco and on November 20 the rest of the Chilean troops landed, later occupying various other nearby coastal cities, securing for the Chileans de facto control of the Peruvian province of Ica.
On December 2, 3,500 additional men and 416 horses disembarked in Pisco. Some two weeks later, on December 15, 14,000 Chilean men, 2,400 horses and mules, and supplies left Arica for the north. Baquedano, the Chilean commander, decided that only one brigade in the Pisco region, Lynch's brigade, would march the 55 miles (89 km) north to the coastal town of Chilca, a town only 45 kilometres (28 mi) from Lima. All other Chilean forces would be re-embarked in Pisco for naval transport to Chilca. The Chilean troops disembarked in Curayaco, slightly north of Chilca, on December 22, 1880. The artillery was later disembarked at Lurín, on the southern outskirts of Lima, as the Chilean army was able to advance quickly after landing.
Piérola, who had expected a landing north of Lima, ordered the construction of two parallel lines of Peruvian defences, one at Chorrillos and one at Miraflores. It was hoped that the Peruvian professional Army would defeat the Chileans in Chorrillos. If that measure failed, a reserve army, increased with remnants of Chorrillos and the Callao troops, were expected to hold the Chilean advance at Miraflores. The Peruvian forces numbered approximately 25,000 to 32,000 men and were titled the Army of Lima.
The main Peruvian defense line ran from the seaside resort of Chorrillos through Morro Solar, Santa Teresa, San Juan, the Pamplona (hills) until Monterrico Chico, a line of defence approximately 15 km long. Gatling guns, artillery, covering forts and trenches located along the top of the steeply natural hills (280 m in Morro Solar, 170 m in Sta. Teresa and San Juan: 253 ) and minefields around the roads to Lima crossing the hamlets of San Juan and Santa Teresa, settlements that the Peruvians anticipated would be important targets of the Chilean attack, all of which were used by the Peruvian military.
The second line of defense was less strong, consisting of 7 redoubts (one every 800 meters) for infantry and artillery, which the Peruvians hoped would stop any Chilean offensive.
The Chilean General Staff had two plans for the attack. Baquedano, the army chief, advocated a direct and frontal advance through the Tablada de Lurín. The area was known, with large areas of relatively flat terrain against the line of Chorrillos. The advantages of that path of advance were the shorter distances to be covered, a withdrawal line, the possibility of support from the Chilean navy, water supply from Lurín, and less need to train troops and the complex Chilean discipline to control any advance and subsequent attack. The alternative plan of War Minister José Francisco Vergara laid down a turning movement that would bypass the Peruvian line by attacking from further to the east: through the Lurín valley, moving via Chantay and reaching Lima at Ate. Using that approach meant that Lima could be seized without resistance or both defense lines could be attacked from the rear.
Vergara's plan avoided the bloody frontal attack, circumvented all defense works, cut any Peruvian withdrawal line to the east into the formidable Andes, and demoralized the Peruvians. However, there were no steady roads for movement of Chilean artillery and baggage, no water to allow navy support, and many bottlenecks in which a small force might stop the whole Chilean army on the way to Lima or if it had to withdraw. In addition, Vergara's plan required a well-trained and disciplined army. Baquedano pushed and eventually succeeded in having his plan adopted.
- Battle of Chorrillos and Miraflores
In the afternoon of January 12, 1881, three Chilean formations (referred to as divisions) stepped off from Lurín toward Chorrillos at about 4:00, reaching their attack positions at around 3:00 the next morning. At 5:00 a.m. an assault was begun on the Peruvian forts. Lynch's division charged Iglesias's positions (Morro Solar to Santa Teresa), Sotomayor's men against Caceres's sector (Santa Teresa to San Juan) and Lagos's division charged Davila's sector (San Juan to Monterrico Chico). Chilean and Peruvian soldiers locked in hand-to-hand combat and attacked one another with rifles, bayonets, rocks and even their bare hands. At the beginning, Sotomayor was unable to deploy in time, and Lynch's advance was repulsed. Baquedano was forced to throw in reserve brigades to salvage Lynch's flank. At 8:00 a.m., the Peruvian defenders were forced to withdraw from San Juan and Santa Teresa to Morro Solar and Chorrillos (town). At noon, Morro Solar was captured and the battle continued into Chorrillos, which fell at 14:00 (2 p.m.). During the Battle of Chorrillos, the Chileans inflicted a harsh defeat on the regular Peruvian forces, eliminating Lima's first defensive line. Two days later, the second line of defense was also penetrated in the Battle of Miraflores.
Piérola's division of forces in two lines has been criticised by Chilean analyst Francisco Machuca.: 361 Whether such criticism is justified is debatable. According to Gonzalo Bulnes the battles of Chorrillos and Miraflores have been some of the largest in South America regarding the number of combatants, 45,000 in Chorrillos and 25,000 in Miraflores. The estimated death toll was 11,000 to 14,000 personnel, with a further 10,144 injured.
Domestic policies until the fall of Lima
Argentina had declared itself neutral at the onset of the war but allowed the transport of weapons to the Allies over Argentine territories, exerted influence on the US and European powers to stop the Chilean advance in the war, and pleaded for monetary indemnification instead of cession of territories to Chile. There was a strong drift in its public opinion in favor of Peru and Bolivia. Moreover, there were Peruvian and Bolivian hopes that Argentina could change its stance and enter a war against Chile.
Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros state that the treaty was a true victory for Argentina, but Michael Morris believes, "Rearguard Argentine efforts had been made to gain recognition for some kind of shared management regime for the Strait [of Magellan], in order to mitigate what was perceived as the striking diplomatic defeat for Argentina in the 1881 treaty granting Chile control over the strait."
The situation in Bolivia stayed the same after the fall of Lima. The Bolivian government lacked the money, men, weapons, and means to transport an army to Peru.: 115
War in the Peruvian Sierra
After the confrontations in Chorrillos and Miraflores, the Peruvian dictator Piérola refused to negotiate with the Chileans and escaped to the central Andes to try governing from the rear but soon lost the representation of the Peruvian state.(He left Peru in December 1881).
The occupation commanders, Manuel Baquedano, Pedro Lagos, and then Patricio Lynch, had their respective military headquarters in the Government Palace, Lima. The new Chilean administration continued to push for an end to the costly war, but contrary to expectations, neither Lima's capture nor the imposition of heavy taxes led Peru to sue for peace. Conversely, Peruvian caudillos advocated to wage a defensive war of attrition that consumed Chile's power so much that it renounced their demand for the territory.
On February 22, 1881, the Piérola Congress, allowed by Chile, reinstated the 1860 constitution and chose Francisco García Calderón as the provisional president but he was assisted by the US minister in Lima in refusing the cession of territories to Chile. He was overthrown by the Chileans in September 1881, but before his relegation to Chile, he had appointed Lizardo Montero Flores as successor.
The Peruvian caudillos organized a resistance, which would be known as the Campaign of the Breña or Sierra, a widespread, prolonged, brutal, and eventually futile guerrilla campaign. They harassed the Chilean troops and their logistics to such a point that Lynch had to send expeditions to the valleys in the Andes.
The resistance was organised by Andrés Avelino Cáceres in the regions Cajamarca (north), Arequipa (south) and the Sierra Central (Cerro Pasco to Ayacucho) However, the collapse of national order in Peru brought on also domestic chaos and violence, most of which was motivated by class or racial divisions. Chinese and black laborers took the opportunity to assault haciendas and the property of the rich to protest their mistreatment suffered in previous years. Lima's masses attacked Chinese grocery stores, and Indian peasants took over highland haciendas.: 390- For the occupation forces, the region was an unknown, difficult terrain, force inhibitor, insalubrious (tunga penetrans, dysentery), inaccessible, and Chilean military supplies had to be transported from Lima or other points on the coast, purchased from locals, or confiscated, each option being either very expensive or politically hazardous.
An additional problem for the Chileans was collecting information in support of their expeditionary force. While Cáceres was informed about the dispositions and moves of his foes, Chileans often did not know the whereabouts of the guerrillas.
In February 1881, Chilean forces, under Lieutenant Colonel Ambrosio Letelier started the first expedition into the Sierra, with 700 men, to defeat the last guerrilla bands from Huánuco (April 30) to Junín. After many losses, the expedition achieved very little and returned to Lima in early July, where Letelier and his officers were courts-martialed for diverting money into their own pockets.
1882 Sierra Campaign
To annihilate the guerrillas in the Mantaro Valley, in January 1882, Lynch ordered an offensive with 5,000 men under the command of Gana and Del Canto, first towards Tarma and then southeast towards Huancayo, reaching Izcuchaca. Lynch's army suffered enormous hardships including cold temperatures, snow and mountain sickness. On July 9, 1882, they fought the emblematic Battle of La Concepción. The Chileans had to pull back with a loss of 534 soldiers: 154 in combat, 277 of disease and 103 deserters.
García Calderón refused to relinquish Peruvian control over the Tarapacá Region and so was arrested. Before García Calderón left Peru for Chile, he named Admiral Lizardo Montero as his successor. At the same time, Piérola stepped back and supported Cáceres for the presidency. Cáceres refused to serve but supported Lizardo Montero. Montero moved to Arequipa and so García Calderón's arrest unified the forces of Piérola and Cáceres.
1883 Sierra Campaign
On April 1, 1882 Miguel Iglesias, Defence Minister under Piérola, became convinced that the war had to be brought to an end or Peru would be completely devastated. He issued a manifesto, es:Grito de Montán, calling for peace and in December 1882 convened a convention of representatives of the seven northern departments, where he was elected "Regenerating President" To support Iglesias against Montero, on April 6, 1883, Patricio Lynch started a new offensive to drive the guerrillas from central Peru and to destroy Caceres's army. The Chilean troops pursued Caceres northwest through narrow mountain passes until July 10, 1883, winning the definitive Battle of Huamachuco, the final Peruvian defeat.
Chile and Iglesias's government signed the Peace Treaty of Ancón on October 20, 1883, which ended the war and ceded Tarapacá to Chile.
Lizardo Montero tried to resist in Arequipa with a force of 4,000 men, but when Chile's 3,000 fighters arrived from Mollendo, Moquegua, and Ayacucho and began the assault to Arequipa, the Peruvian troops mutinied against Montero and allowed the Chileans to occupy the city on October 29, 1883. Montero opted for a Bolivian asylum. The occupation of Ayacucho by Chilean Colonel Urriola on October 1 lasted only 40 days, as Urriola withdrew to Lima. Ayacucho was occupied by Cáceres's new army of 500 men. Caceres continued to refuse the cession of territories to Chile.
The basis of Cáceres's war was the increasingly powerful Indian insurrection against the Chileans, which had changed the nature of the war. Indian guerrillas fought "white men from all parties," looted towns, and seized land of the white owners. In June 1884, Cáceres accepted Treaty of Ancón "as an accomplished fact" but continued to fight Iglesias.
On Cáceres's true reasons for his change of mind, Florencia Mallon wrote:
- Yet long before the civil war was over, it became clear to the hero of la Breña that, in order to build an alliance that would carry him to the presidential palace, he had to mend fences with the "hacendados" as a class, included those who had collaborated with the Chileans. The only way to do so was to give the "hacendados" what they wanted and repress the very guerrillas who had made the Breña campaign possible in the first place.
On October 29, 1883, the Chilean occupation of Lima ended, and on August 4, 1884, Lynch and the rest of the Chilean Expeditionary Forces embarked in Callao for Chile.: 473
Peace treaty between Chile and Peru
On October 20, 1883, hostilities between Chile and Peru formally came to an end under the Treaty of Ancón, whose terms had Peru formally cede Tarapacá Province to Chile, and the use of the guano and nitrate resources to repay Peru's debts were regulated. Chile was also to occupy the provinces of Tacna and Arica for 10 years, when a plebiscite was to be held to determine nationality. For decades thereafter, the two countries failed to agree on the terms of the plebiscite. Finally, in 1929, mediation under US President Herbert Hoover caused the Treaty of Lima to be signed by which Chile kept Arica, and Peru reacquired Tacna.
Peace treaty between Bolivia and Chile
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In 1884, Bolivia signed a truce, the Treaty of Valparaiso and accepted the military occupation of the entire Bolivian coast. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1904) ceded the complete region of Antofagasta to Chile. In return, Chile agreed to build the Arica–La Paz railway to connect the capital city of La Paz, Bolivia, with the port of Arica, and Chile guaranteed freedom of transit for Bolivian commerce through Chilean ports and territory.
As the war began, the Peruvian Army numbered 5,241 men of all ranks, organized in seven infantry battalions, three squadrons of cavalry and two regiments of artillery. The most common rifles in the army were the French Chassepot and the Minié rifles. The artillery, with a total of 28 pieces, was composed mostly of British-made Blakely cannons and counted four machine guns. Much of the artillery dated from 1866 and had been bought for the Chincha Islands War against Spain. The mounts used by the cavalry were small and inferior to those used by the Chileans.
The Bolivian Army numbered no more than 2,175 soldiers and was divided into three infantry regiments, two cavalry squadrons, and two sections of artillery. The Colorados Battalion, President Daza's personal guard, was armed with Remington Rolling Block rifles, but the remainder carried odds and ends including flintlock muskets. The artillery had rifled three pounders and four machine guns, and the cavalry rode mules given a shortage of good horses.
The regular Chilean Army was well equipped, with 2,694 soldiers. The regular infantry was armed with the modern Belgian Comblain rifle, of which Chile had a stock of some 13,000. Chile also had Gras, Minie, Remington and Beaumont rifles, most of which fired the same caliber cartridge (11 mm). The artillery had 75 artillery pieces, most of which were of Krupp and Limache manufacture, and six machine guns. The cavalry used French sabers and Spencer and Winchester carbines.
Control of the sea was Chile's key to an inevitably difficult desert war: supply by sea, including water, food, ammunition, horses, fodder, and reinforcements, was quicker and easier than marching supplies through the desert or across the Bolivian high plateau. While the Chilean Navy started an economic and military blockade of the Allies' ports, Peru took the initiative and used its smaller navy as a raiding force. The raids delayed the ground invasion for six months and forced Chile to shift its fleet from blockading to hunting and capturing the Huáscar. After achieving naval supremacy, sea-mobile forces proved to be an advantage for desert warfare on the long coastline. Peruvian and Bolivian defenders found themselves hundreds of kilometers from home, but the Chilean forces were usually just a few kilometers from the sea.
The Chileans employed an early form of amphibious warfare, which saw the co-ordination of army, navy, and specialized units. The first amphibious assault of the war took place when 2,100 Chilean troops took Pisagua on November 2, 1879. Chilean Navy ships bombarded beach defenses for several hours at dawn, followed by open, oared boats landing army infantry and sapper units into waist-deep water under enemy fire. An outnumbered first landing wave fought at the beach; the second and third waves in the following hours were able to overcome resistance and move inland. By the end of the day, an expeditionary army of 10,000 had disembarked at the captured port. In 1881 Chilean ships transported approximately 30,000 men, along with their mounts and equipment, 500 miles (800 km) in order to attack Lima. Chilean commanders were using purpose-built, flat-bottomed landing craft that would deliver troops in shallow water closer to the beach, possibly the first purpose-built amphibious landing craft in history: "These 36 shallow draft, flat-bottomed boats would be able to land three thousand men and twelve guns in a single wave."
Chile's military strategy emphasized preemption, offensive action, and combined arms. It was the first to mobilize and deploy its forces and took the war immediately to Bolivian and Peruvian territories. It adopted combined arms strategy that used naval and ground forces to rout its allied foes and capture enemy territory.: 163 It landed ground forces in enemy territory to raid in strength to split and to drive out defenders, and it then garrisoned the territory as the fighting moved north. Chileans received the support of the Chinese coolies immigrants, who had been enslaved by Peruvians and joined the Chilean Army during the campaign of Lima and in the raids to the north Peruvian cities.
Peru and Bolivia fought a defensive war, maneuvering through long overland distances and relied when possible on land or coastal fortifications with gun batteries and minefields. Coastal railways reached to central Peru, and telegraph lines provided a direct line to the government in Lima.
The occupation of Peru from 1881 and 1884 took a different form. The theater was the Peruvian Sierra, where the remains of the Peruvian Army had easy access to the population, resource, and supply centers far from the sea, which supported indefinite attrition warfare. The occupying Chilean force was split into small garrisons across the theater and could devote only part of its strength to hunting down dispersed pockets of resistance and the last Peruvian forces in the Sierra. After a costly occupation and prolonged counterinsurgency campaign, Chile sought a diplomatic exit. Rifts within Peruvian society and Peruvian defeat in the Battle of Huamachuco resulted in the peace treaty that ended the occupation.
Both sides used late 19th-century military technology, such as breech-loading rifles and cannons, remote-controlled land mines, armor-piercing shells, naval torpedoes, torpedo boats, and purpose-built landing craft. The second generation of ironclads, designed after the Battle of Hampton Roads, were used in battle for the first time. That was significant for a conflict in which no major power was involved and attracted British, French, and US observers. During the war, Peru developed the Toro Submarino ("Submarine Bull"), which never saw action and was scuttled at the end to prevent capture.
The USS Wachusett (1861) commanded by Alfred Thayer Mahan, was stationed at Callao, Peru, to protect American interests during the war's final stages. Mahan formulated his concept of sea power while he was reading history in a British gentlemen's club in Lima, Peru. The concept became the foundation for his celebrated The Influence of Sea Power upon History.
Flow of information
Since 1876, a submarine cable connected Valparaíso and Lima.: 72 At the beginning of the war, Antofagasta and Iquique were connected to the cable. Both navies tried to take control of the cable or severed it according to its military and naval interests.
Lima was not connected by cable to Panama, the southernmost post of the North American cable network. Valparaíso had been connected to Buenos Aires by a cable over the Andes since July 26, 1872. Buenos Aires was connected via Uruguay and Brazil, to Portugal and Britain and, from there, to the US over a submarine cable. It must be emphasized that La Paz, Bolivia's capital, was not connected by telegraph to the rest of the world. News coming from Tacna, Arica, and Antofagasta to La Paz had to be brought by foot or horse. The alternative way was from Peruvian port Mollendo (Querejazu: Moliendo) by railroad to Puno and then by boat service to Chichilaya, at the Bolivian shore of Lake Titicaca. The last route to La Paz was by horse or foot. The only telegraph in Bolivia was in Tupiza, 606 kilometres (377 mi) south from La Paz, as the crow flies. Tupiza is at the border to Argentina and was connected to Buenos Aires via telegraph.
The traditional transport for long distances were the steamships that connected Valparaíso, Caldera, Antofagasta, Iquique, Arica, and Lima to the rest of the world.
The disruption of maritime trade routes and the unavailability of submarine telegraph cables from and in the war zone presented special problems for the press coverage of the war. On the other hand, the west coast was important for investors, farmers, manufacturers, and government officials because of their financial commitments. Hence, The Times of London and The New York Times covered the events of the war as much as possible, in spite of the absence of their own correspondents. Information was culled from government representatives in Europe and the US, merchant houses and Lloyd's of London, articles printed in the Panama Star and Herald, and Reuters.
The result was a mix of brief telegraphic dispatches a few days' old from cities with cable stations, along with lengthier but older reports carried by steamships to London or New York. For example, the Battle of Iquique occurred on May 21, but its first mention appeared in the May 30 edition of both The Times and The New York Times with an incorrect message. It was only on June 17 that The Times could provide a reasonably accurate version of the battle.: 72–74
At the onset of the war, 30,000 Chileans were expelled from Peru (within 8 days) and Bolivia (within 10 days) and their property confiscated, most of them having to shelter in the camps, boats, and pontoons of the Peruvian ports until they were transported by ship to Antofagasta. It is calculated that 7,000 of the refugees from Peru enlisted in the Chilean battalions, and their resentfulness would later influence the war. Peruvian and Bolivian residents in Chile were not expelled.
Besides the Peruvian-Chilean slaughter in the irregular war after the occupation of Lima, an ethnic and social conflict was simmering in Peru between the indigenous peoples and (Chinese) coolies who had been enslaved by Peru's white criollo and mestizo upper class. On July 2, 1884, the guerrillero Tomás Laymes and three of his men were executed in Huancayo by Caceres's forces because of the atrocities and crimes committed by the guerrillas against the Peruvian inhabitants of the cities and hamlets. In Ayacucho, indigenous peoples stood up against "the whites," and in Chincha, the Afro-Peruvians banded together against their owners in the Haciendas of "Larán," "San José," and "Hoja Redonda". Only the Peruvian army could forcibly suppress the revolt.
Chinese coolies formed the battalion "Vulcano" within the Chilean Army. There were also interethnic tensions under blacks and coolies. For example, in Cañete, 2000 coolies from the Haciendas "Montalbán" and "Juan de Arona" were massacred by blacks.
The British historian B. Farcau stated: "Contrary to the concept of the 'merchants of death,' the arms manufacturers of Europe and the United States conniving to keep alive the conflict, from which they had earned some welcome sales of their merchandise, the most influential foreign businessmen and their respective consuls and ambassadors were the traders in nitrate and the holders of the growing stacks of debts of all the belligerents. They were all aware that the only way they could hope to receive payment on their loans and earn the profits from the nitrate business was to see the war ended and trade resumed on a normal footing without legal disputes over ownership of the resources of the region hanging over their heads."
Nonethelesses, belligerents were able to purchase torpedo boats, arms, and munitions abroad and to circumvent ambiguous neutrality laws, and firms like Baring Brothers in London were not averse to dealing with both Chile and Peru.: 129 Arms were sold freely to any side that could pay for them but the British abstained from selling warships. For example, in 1879 to 1880, Peru acquired weapons from the United States, Europe, Costa Rica, and Panama. Weapons offloaded on the Caribbean coast of Panama were sent overland to the Pacific coast by the isthmus railway. In the Pacific, a number of ships, including the Talismán, Chalaco, Limeña, Estrella, Enriqueta and Guadiana, transported the cargo to Peru. The trade was done with the consent of the president of the Sovereign State of Panamá, then part of Colombia. The Chilean consul in Panama persistently protested the trade by citing a Chile–Colombia agreement of 1844 that prohibited Colombia from providing war supplies to Chile's enemies.
After the Chilean occupation of Arica, Tarapacá, and Antofagasta, the governments of Peru and Bolivia turned as their last hope to the United States to block the Chilean annexation of the occupied territories.: 41 American diplomats were worried that European powers might be tempted to intervene in the Pacific. The Bolivian Minister in Washington offered US Secretary of State William Maxwell Evarts the prospects of lucrative guano and nitrate concessions to American investors in return for official protection of Bolivia's territorial integrity.: 131 : 42 Isaac P. Christiancy, US Minister in Peru, organized the USS Lackwanna Conference, which ultimately failed, as none of the belligerents was ready to negotiate. Earlier, Christiancy had written to the US that Peru should be annexed for ten years and then admitted in the Union to provide the United States with access to the rich markets of South America.: 42
In 1881, US President James Garfield took the oath of office, and the Anglophobic Secretary of State James G. Blaine supported an assertive role for the US in the war,: 43 ostensibly regarding the interests of promoting US ownership of nitrate and guano concessions.: 132 Blaine argued that the South American republics "are young sisters of this government" and so he would not tolerate European intervention in South America. The groups "Credit Industriel" and "Peruvian Company," representing European and American creditors, had guaranteed to the Peruvian provisional government of Francisco García Calderón to pay the Peruvian external debt and the reparations to Chile, but in return, the Peruvian government had to grant mining concessions in Tarapacá to these corporations. With the acquiescence of García Calderón, both companies began to lobby in the United States for the territories to remain under Peruvian sovereignty. For example, the US "Levi P. Morton, Bliss and Company" would get a monopoly on the sales of Peruvian nitrate in the US.
Beside the economic plans, Stephen A. Hurlbut, Christiancy's successor, had negotiated with García Calderón the cession to the US of a naval base in Chimbote and the railroads to the coal mines upcountry. When it became known that Blaine's representative in Peru, Hurlbut, would personally profit from the settlement, it was clear he was complicating the peace process The American attempts reinforced Garcia Calderon's refusal to discuss the matter of territorial cession. Blaine then dispatched William H. Trescot in a mission to Chile to establish that problems would be resolved through arbitration and that acts of war would not justify territorial seizures.: 132 After the assassination of Garfield (July 2, 1881) and the accession of Chester A. Arthur to the US presidency, Blaine was replaced by Frederick Theodore Frelinghuysen as Secretary of State. Frelinghuysen thought that the US was in no position to back Blaine's policy and recalled the Trescot mission. Kenneth D. Lehmann commented the US policy:
- Washington had interjected itself into the middle of the controversy without developing a realistic position: the moralizing of the United States had an air of hypocrisy in light of his own history, and veiled threats carried no weight.: 45
Regarding a British intervention in the war, the British historian Victor Kiernan had stated: "It should be emphasized that the Foreign Office never at any time contemplated any kind of active intervention.... It was especially scrupulous in seeing to it that no warships were smuggled out for sale to either side, for it was in mortal dread of another Alabama Award." During the war, the British government embargoed four warships sold to Chile and Perú.[D]
Looting, damages, and war reparations
The case of looting and war reparations done by Chilean occupation forces in Peru has caused controversy between historians. It is overlooked in Chile and a source of anti-Chilean sentiment in Peru. The Chilean historian Milton Godoy Orellana distinguishes the looting after the battle of Chorrillos y Miraflores; the looting by Peruvians in Lima before the Chilean troops entered the city; and the Chilean destruction of locomotives, rails, printing machines, weapons, etc. The Chilean government tried to control it through the "Oficina Recaudadora de las Contribuciones de Guerra," whose tasks were to inventory and realize the confiscation and to record and to confirm transport to Chile, the destination, and the sender. Allegedly, the strategic purposes were to obtain the peace. There is no general list of the looted goods, but many of the shipments were registered in private and official letters, newspaper articles, manifests, etc. Also, looting of cultural assets of Peru by the Chileans and Peruvians occurred; the development of international law regarding the protection of cultural objects evolved over the 19th and 20th centuries, but the idea of protecting cultural assets first emerged in Europe in the 18th century.
The Lieber Code of 1863 unconditionally protected works of art during an armed conflict (Art. 35) but expressly consented to the use of cultural property as war reparations (Art. 36). In fact, Sergio Villalobos states that in 1817, the US accepted the confiscation of art works but the 1874 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War asserted that the cultural assets were to be considered as protected.
In March 1881, the Chilean government began to seize the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, and 45,000 books were seized, but some of the books were sold in Lima by Peruvians, and so it is contested how much of the booty was taken by the Chilean forces. In any case, in late March 1881, some of the books arrived to Chile, and the press began to inform and discuss about the legitimacy of looting oil paintings, books, statues, etc., or "international robbery", as a journalist of "La Epoca" described it.
On January 4, 1883, in a session of the Chilean Congress, the deputy Augusto Matte Pérez questioned Minister of the Interior José Manuel Balmaceda on the "opprobrious and humiliating" shipments of Peruvian cultural assets. Montt asked the devolution of the assets and was supported by deputies McClure and Puelma. The minister vowed to impede further exactions and to repatriate the objects mentioned in the discussion. Apparently, he did so since the shipments stopped, and the mentioned statues are not there anymore, but it was not until November 2007 that Chile returned 3,778 stolen books to the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú. S. Villalobos asserted, "There was no justification for the theft."
Another issue was the damage from acts of war on properties owned by citizens of neutral countries. In 1884, the Tribunales Arbitrales were constituted with a Chilean judge, who was named by the country of the claimant, as well as a Brazilian judge to deal with the claims of citizens from Britain (118 claims), Italy (440 claims), and France (89 claims). A tribunal was established in 1886 for German citizens. The "Italian" tribunal also dealt with Belgian citizens, and the "German" tribunal acted for Austrian and Swiss citizens. Spaniards accepted the decision of the Chilean state without the tribunal's assistance and the US did not agree at the time.
According to international law, animus manendi claims by foreign citizens could not be made unless the damaged property had been in an actual battleground (such as Arica, Chorrillos, and Miraflores, with Pisagua and Tacna being in a similar situation), but damages caused by individual or scattered soldiers were dismissed. Only 3.6% (1,080,562 Chilean pesos) of the value that was claimed was recognized by the tribunals. According to Villalobos, the verdicts proved that the accusations against the Chilean forces had been exaggerated by Peruvians because of their wounded pride and by foreign citizens because of monetary interests.
The war had a profound and longlasting effect on the societies of all countries involved. The negotiations concerning territorial cessions continued until 1929, but the war ended in 1884 for all practical purposes.
Día del Mar is celebrated in Bolivia on March 23, at the conclusion of the weeklong Semana del Mar with a ceremony at La Paz's Plaza Abaroa, in homage to war hero Eduardo Abaroa, and in parallel ceremonies nationwide.
Naval Glories Day is a Chilean anniversary that commemorates two naval battles that occurred on Wednesday, May 21, 1879: that of Iquique, where the captain of the frigate Arturo Prat died along with the entire staff of the corvette Esmeralda, sunk by the Peruvian monitor Huáscar (It was built in the United Kingdom in 1864 by order of the Peruvian government and served in the Peruvian Navy until October 8, 1879, when it was captured by the Chilean squad in the naval combat of Angamos. he actively served in the Chilean Navy until 1897, when he was discharged. Currently, it serves as a floating maritime museum in the Chilean port of Talcahuano, Biobío Region.) under the command of Captain Miguel Grau; and that of Punta Gruesa, where the schooner Covadonga, under the command of Carlos Condell, ran aground the Peruvian armored frigate Independencia, under the command of Juan Guillermo Moore, in the rocks of Punta Gruesa.
- Anti-Chilean sentiment
- Bolivia–Chile relations
- Bolivia–Peru relations
- Chile–Peru relations
- Chilean–Peruvian maritime dispute
- Caliche sangriento, 1969 Chilean film directed by Helvio Soto
- Ronald Bruce St. John states in The Bolivia–Chile–Peru Dispute in the Atacama Desert:
Even though the 1873 treaty and the imposition of the 10 centavos tax proved to be the casus belli, there were deeper, more fundamental reasons for the outbreak of hostilities in 1879. On the one hand, there was the power, prestige, and relative stability of Chile compared to the economic deterioration and political discontinuity which characterised both Peru and Bolivia after independence. On the other, there was the ongoing competition for economic and political hegemony in the region, complicated by a deep antipathy between Peru and Chile. In this milieu, the vagueness of the boundaries between the three states, coupled with the discovery of valuable guano and nitrate deposits in the disputed territories, combined to produce a diplomatic conundrum of insurmountable proportions.
- The Bolivian law of November 22 said (Querejazu 1979, pp. 181–182 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFQuerejazu1979 (help)): Se autoriza al Ejecutivo para transar sobre indemnización y otros reclamos pendientes en la actualidad, y para acordar con las partes interesadas la forma más conveniente en que habrán de llenarse sus obligaciones respectivas; defiriéndose estos asuntos, sólo en los casos de no avenimiento, a la decisión de la Corte Suprema, con cargo a dar cuenta a la próxima legislatura.
- The Bolivian 5th Division started on October 11, 1879 from Cotagaita bound for Antofagasta and was reordered to Iquique, next to Tacna, then to repress any rebellion against Daza in South Bolivia, and finally arrived at Oruro 19 Januar 1880. It never entered the Bolivian Litoral but later fought in the Battle of Tacna. Querejazu states that its wandering in Potosi and Oruro showed that Daza had been bribed by Chile. See also commons:File:Ruta 5. division de Camacho, en 1879-80.svg.
- The cruisers Arturo Prat and Esmeralda built in England for Chile and the es:BAP Lima (Sócrates) and the USS Topeka (PG-35) (Diógenes) built in Germany but armed in Britain for Perú. The Greek names were a device to conceal their real destination.
- Sater 2007, p. 51 Table 2
- Sater 2007, p. 45 Table 1
- Sater 2007, p. 274
- Sater 2007, p. 58 Table 3
- Sater 2007, p. 263
- Sater 2007, p. 349 Table 23.
- Sater 2007, p. 348 Table 22. The statistics on battlefield deaths are inaccurate because they do not provide follow-up information on those who later died of their wounds.
- William F. Sater, "War of the Pacific" in Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture, vol. 5, pp. 438–441. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1996.
- Vincent Peloso, "History of Peru" in Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture, vol. 4, p.367. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1996.
- St. John, Ronald Bruce; Schofield, Clive (1994). The Bolivia–Chile–Peru Dispute in the Atacama Desert. University of Durham, International Boundaries Research Unit. pp. 12–13. ISBN 1897643144.
- Joao Resende-Santos (July 23, 2007). Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-46633-2.
- The Guano War of 1865–1866, retrieved on December 22, 2014
- Teofilo Laime Ajacopa (2007). Diccionario Bilingüe Iskay simipi yuyayk’anch [Quechua-English dictionary] (PDF). La Paz, Bolivia. 0
- Arie Marcelo Kacowicz (1998). Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective. SUNY Press. pp. 105–. ISBN 978-0-7914-3957-9.
- Bethell, Leslie. 1993. Chile Since Independence. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13–14.
- Vergara, Jorge Iván; Gundermann, Hans (2012). "Constitution and internal dynamics of the regional identitary in Tarapacá and Los Lagos, Chile". Chungara (in Spanish). University of Tarapacá. 44 (1): 121. doi:10.4067/s0717-73562012000100009.
- Farcau 2000, p. 37
- Escudé, Carlos; Cisneros, Andrés. "Sarmiento y Tejedor proponen al Congreso la adhesión al tratado secreto peruano-boliviano del 6 de febrero de 1873". Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores Argentinas (in Spanish). Archived from the original on November 13, 2013.
- R.Querejazu 1995 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFR.Querejazu1995 (help) Cap. XXVII La Alianza secreta de Bolivia y el Peru
- http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-081.htm Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores Argentinas, La misión Balmaceda: asegurar la neutralidad argentina en la guerra del Pacífico, Carlos Escudé y Andrés Cisneros
- Emilio Ruiz-Tagle Orrego (1992). Bolivia y Chile: el conflicto del Pacífico. Andres Bello. pp. 149–. ISBN 978-956-13-0954-8.
- Bulnes 1920, p. 57
- The synthesis of the Secret Treaty was this: opportunity: the disarmed condition of Chile; the pretext to produce conflict: Bolivia; the profit of the business: Patagonia and the salitre; (Traducción: La síntesis del tratado secreto es: oportunidad: la condición desarmada de Chile; el pretexto para producir el conflicto: Bolivia; la ganancia del negocio: Patagonia y el salitre;)
- Basadre 1964, p. Cap.1, pág.12, La transacción de 1873 y el tratado de 1874 entre Chile y Bolivia
- La gestión diplomática peruana en 1873 ante la Cancillería de Bolivia fue en el sentido de que aprovechara los momentos anteriores a la llegada de los blindados chilenos para terminar las fatigosas disputas sobre el tratado de 1866 y de que lo denunciase para sustituirlo por un arreglo más conveniente, o bien para dar lugar, con la ruptura de las negociaciones, a la mediación del Perú y la Argentina. o en
- La alianza al crear el eje Lima-La Paz con ánimo de convertirlo en un eje Lima-La Paz-Buenos Aires, pretendió forjar un instrumento para garantizar la paz y la estabilidad en las fronteras americanas buscando la defensa del equilibrio continental como había propugnado "La Patria" de Lima.(Ch. 1, p. 8) anteriormente Basadre expuso lo explicado por "La Patria":
- El Perú, según este articulista, tenía derecho para pedir la reconsideración del tratado de 1866. La anexión de Atacama a Chile (así como también la de Patagonia) envolvía una trascendencia muy vasta y conducía a complicaciones muy graves contra la familia hispanoamericana. El Perú defendiendo a Bolivia, a sí mismo y al Derecho, debía presidir la coalición de todos los Estados interesados para reducir a Chile al límite que quería sobrepasar, en agravio general del uti possidetis en el Pacífico. La paz continental debía basarse en el equilibrio continental. ... Se publicaron estas palabras en vísperas de que fuese suscrito el tratado secreto peruano-boliviano.(Ch. 1, p. 6)
- Yrigoyen 1921, p. 129
- Tan profundamente convencido estaba el gobierno peruano de la necesidad que había de perfeccionar la adhesión de la Argentina al Tratado de alianza Peru-boliviano, antes de que recibiera Chile sus blindados, a fin de poderle exigir a este país pacíficamente el sometimiento al arbitraje de sus pretensiones territoriales, que, apenas fueron recibidas en Lima las observaciones formuladas por el Canciller Tejedor, se correspondió a ellas en los siguientes términos... (p. 129)
- R.Querejazu 1995 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFR.Querejazu1995 (help) Cap. XXVII, La maniobra leguleyesca
- Basadre, 1964 & Chapter 1, "Significado del tratado de la alianza" harvnb error: no target: CITEREFBasadre1964Chapter_1,_"Significado_del_tratado_de_la_alianza" (help)
- Jefferson Dennis 1927, p. 80 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFJefferson_Dennis1927 (help), Sotomayor letter urging Bolivia to break its alliance with Peru
- Basadre 1964, p. 2282 "The beginning of the Peruvian naval inferiority and lack of initiative for preventive war"
- Nicolás Cruz; Ascanio Cavallo (1981). Las guerras de la guerra: Perú, Bolivia y Chile frente al conflicto de 1879. Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanísticos.
- Sater 2007, p. 37
- Historia contemporánea de Chile III. La economía: mercados empresarios y trabajadores. 2002. Gabriel Salazar and Julio Pinto. pp. 25–29.
- Salazar & Pinto 2002, pp. 25–29.
- Pinto Rodríguez, Jorge (1992), "Crisis económica y expansión territorial : la ocupación de la Araucanía en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX", Estudios Sociales, 72
- David Healy (January 1, 2001). James G. Blaine and Latin America. University of Missouri Press. ISBN 978-0-8262-6329-2.
- Fredrick B. Pike, "Chile and the United States, 1880–1962", University of Notre Dame Press 1963, p. 33
- Rubilar Luengo, Mauricio (2012). La política exterior de Chile durante la guerra y la posguerra del Pacífico (1879–1891): las relaciones con Estados Unidos y Colombia: diplomacia, opinión pública y poder naval (Thesis). doi:10.35376/10324/925.
- Sater 2007, p. 38
- Farcau 2000, p. 45
- Leslie Bethell, The Cambridge History of Latin America, 2009, p. 541
- Sater 2007, pp. 38, 39
- Fredrick B. Pike (January 1, 1977). The United States and the Andean Republics: Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-92300-3.
- Peruvian historian Alejandro Reyes Flores, Relaciones Internacionales en el Pacífico Sur, in La Guerra del Pacífico, Volumen 1, Wilson Reategui, Alejandro Reyes et al.
, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima 1979, p. 110:
- Jorge Basadre respecto a este problema económico crucial dice Al realizar el estado peruano con la ley del 28 de marzo de 1875, la expropiación y monopolio de las salitreras de Tarapacá, era necesario evitar la competencia de las salitreras del Toco [in Bolivia].... Aquí es donde se internacionalizaba el conflicto, pues estas salitreras, económicamente estaban en poder de chilenos y británicos
- Greenhill, Robert G.; Miller, Rory M. (May 1973). "The Peruvian Government and the Nitrate Trade, 1873–1879". Journal of Latin American Studies. 5 (1): 107–131. doi:10.1017/S0022216X00002236. JSTOR 156003. S2CID 145462958.
- A History of the British Presence in Chile: From Bloody Mary to Charles Darwin and the Decline of British Influence, William Edmundson, 2009, ISBN 0230101216, 9780230101210, 288 pages, page 160
- Harold Blackmore, The Politics of Nitrate in Chile, Pressure Groups and Policies, 1870–1896, Some Unanswered Questions
- Querejazu 1979, p. 175 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFQuerejazu1979 (help)
- Querejazu 1979, p. 211 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFQuerejazu1979 (help)
- Sater 2007, p. 39
- Sater 2007, p. 40
- Sater 2007, p. 31
- Luis Ortega, "Los Empresarios, la política y los orígenes de la Guerra del Pacífico", Flacso, Santiago de Chile, 1984, p. 17
- Collier, Simon (1996). A History of Chile, 1808–1994. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-56827-2.
- Greenhill 1973, pp. 117–120 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGreenhill1973 (help)
- Ravest Mora, Manuel (June 2008). "La Casa Gibbs y el monopolio salitrero peruano: 1876–1878" [The Gibbs House and the Peruvian nitrate monopoly: 1876–1878]. Historia (in Spanish). 41 (1): 63–77. doi:10.4067/S0717-71942008000100003. ProQuest 221161317.
- Greenhill 1973, pp. 123–124 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGreenhill1973 (help)
- O'Brien 1980, p. 13
- Greenhill 1973, p. 124 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGreenhill1973 (help)
- O'Brien 1980, p. 14
- St. John, Ronald Bruce (1992). Foreign Policy of Peru. Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. p. 105. ISBN 1-55587-304-9.
- Querejazu 1979, p. 177 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFQuerejazu1979 (help)
- Farcau 2000, p. 40
- Sater 2007, p. 28
- R.Querejazu 1995 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFR.Querejazu1995 (help)
- Sater 2007, p. 29
- Sater 2007, p. 32
- Manuel Ravest Mora (1983). La Compañía Salitrera y la Ocupación de Antofagasta 1878–1879. Andres Bello. GGKEY:BNK53LBKGDQ.
- Edmundson, William (2011). The Nitrate King: A Biography of "Colonel" John Thomas North. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 59. ISBN 978-0230112803.
- Barros Arana 1881a, p. 59
- Bulnes 1920, p. 42
- Bulnes 1911, p. 162 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFBulnes1911 (help)
- Bulnes 1911, p. 170 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFBulnes1911 (help)
- Basadre, 1964 & Chapter 1, Los tres obstáculos para el éxito de la mediación harvnb error: no target: CITEREFBasadre1964Chapter_1,_Los_tres_obstáculos_para_el_éxito_de_la_mediación (help):
- la condición impuesta por el gobierno peruano en sus instrucciones para que Chile fuese a la desocupación previa del litoral ocupado sin prometer la suspensión del decreto boliviano sobre expropiación de los bienes de la Compañía de Antofagasta o la modificación del impuesto de los 10 centavos
- Farcau 2000, p. 42
- Basadre, 1964 & Chapter 1, La declaratoria de guerra de Bolivia a Chile como recurso para hacer fracasar a Lavalle harvnb error: no target: CITEREFBasadre1964Chapter_1,_La_declaratoria_de_guerra_de_Bolivia_a_Chile_como_recurso_para_hacer_fracasar_a_Lavalle (help):
- La versión chilena fue que Bolivia quiso impedir que Chile se armara. En realidad, Daza buscó la forma de malograr la misión Lavalle.
- Bulnes 1920
- Jefferson Dennis 1927, pp. 79–80 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFJefferson_Dennis1927 (help)
- Sater 2007, p. 7
- Sater 2007, p. 24
- Sater 2007, p. 89
- Sater 2007, p. 106
- Stockmeyer, Valentina Verbal (2014). "El ejército de Chile en vísperas de la Guerra del Pacífico: Una visión de las tropas (1866–1879)" [The Chilean army on the eve of the War of the Pacific: A vision of the troops (1866–1879)]. Historia 396 (in Spanish). 4 (1): 135–165.
- Sater 2007, pp. 21–22
- Estado Mayor del Ejército de Chile, Historia del Ejército de Chile, Tomo 5
- Mellington, Herbert (1948). American Diplomacy and the War of the Pacific. Colunbia University Press. p. 31.
The press in the United States was also almost unanimous in predicting the sound defeat of Chile.
- St John, Ronald Bruce (1992). Foreign policy of Peru. Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 109. ISBN 978-1-55587-304-2.
... the fact that a Chilean victory at the outset was far from certain.
- Kiernan 1955, p. 16
- Basadre 1964, p. 39 Cap.I "La actitud de la opinión pública peruana"
- Basadre 1964, pp. 52–53 Cap.I "El Perú y Chile en su evolución republicana"
- Sater 2007, p. 44
- Bulnes 1919, p. 616 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFBulnes1919 (help)
- Sater 2007, p. 111
- Farcau 2000, p. 65
- As the earlier discussion of the geography of the Atacama region illustrates, control of the sea lanes along the coast would be absolutely vital to the success of a land campaign there
- Farcau 2000, p. 57
- Sater 2007, p. 102 and ff
- "...to anyone willing to sail under Bolivia's colors ..."
- Sater 2007, p. 119
- Sater 2007, p. 137
- Robert N. Burr (1967). By Reason Or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905. University of California Press. pp. 145–146. ISBN 978-0-520-02629-2.
- Lawrence A. Clayton (1985). Grace: W.R. Grace & Co., the Formative Years, 1850–1930. Lawrence Clayton. ISBN 978-0-915463-25-1.
- Farcau 2000, p. 214
- Sater 2007, pp. 151–152
- Sater 2007, p. 150
- Sater 2007, pp. 113–114
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Cited works and further reading
- Barros Arana, Diego (1881a). Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879–1880) (History of the War of the Pacific (1879–1880)) (in Spanish). 1. Santiago, Chile: Librería Central de Servat i Ca.
- Barros Arana, Diego (1881b). Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879–1880) (in Spanish). 2. Santiago, Chile: Librería Central de Servat i Ca.
- Basadre, Jorge (1964). Historia de la Republica del Peru, La guerra con Chile (in Spanish). Lima, Peru: Peruamerica S.A. Archived from the original on December 11, 2007.
- Boyd. Robert N. Chili: Sketches of Chili and the Chilians During the War 1879–1880. (1881)
- Bulnes, Gonzalo (1920). Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879. Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Universitaria.
- Dennis, William Jefferson (1927). "Documentary history of the Tacna-Arica dispute from University of Iowa studies in the social sciences". 8. Iowa: University Iowa City. Cite journal requires
- English, Adrian J. (1985). Armed forces of Latin America: their histories, development, present strength, and military potential. Jane's Information Group, Incorporated. ISBN 978-0-7106-0321-0.
- Farcau, Bruce W. (2000). The Ten Cents War, Chile, Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Publishers. ISBN 978-0-275-96925-7. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- Kiernan, V. G. (February 1, 1955). "Foreign Interests in the War of the Pacific". Hispanic American Historical Review. 35 (1): 14–36. doi:10.1215/00182168-35.1.14. JSTOR 2509249.
- O'Brien, Thomas F. (February 1, 1980). "The Antofagasta Company: A Case Study of Peripheral Capitalism". Hispanic American Historical Review. 60 (1): 1–31. doi:10.1215/00182168-60.1.1.
- Paz Soldan, Mariano Felipe (1884). Narracion Historica de la Guerra de Chile contra Peru y Bolivia (Historical narration of the Chile's War against Peru and Bolivia) (in Spanish). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprenta y Libreria de Mayo, calle Peru 115.
- Querejazu Calvo, Roberto (1979). Guano, Salitre y Sangre (in Spanish). La Paz-Cochabamba, Bolivia: Editorial los amigos del Libro.
- Querejazu Calvo, Roberto (1995). Aclaraciones históricas sobre la Guerra del Pacífico (in Spanish). La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial los amigos del Libro.
- Sater, William F. (2007). Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-4334-7.
- Sater, William F. (1986). Chile and the War of the Pacific. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-4155-8.
- Scheina, Robert L. (2003). Latin America's Wars: The age of the caudillo, 1791–1899. Potomac Books, Inc. ISBN 978-1-57488-450-0.
- Villalobos, Sergio (2004). Chile y Perú, la historia que nos une y nos separa, 1535–1883 (in Spanish) (2nd ed.). Chile: Editorial Universitaria. ISBN 9789561116016.
- Yrigoyen, Pedro (1921). La alianza perú-boliviano-argentina y la declaratoria de guerra de Chile (in Spanish). Lima: San Marti & Cía. Impresores. OCLC 692069503.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to War of the Pacific.|
- Chilean caricatures during the war in Tesis of Patricio Ibarra Cifuentes, Universidad de Chile, 2009.
- "Caliche: The Conflict Mineral That Fuelled the First World War" in The Guardian by Daniel A. Gross, June 2, 2014.