||This article needs attention from an expert in the Paraguayan War. The specific problem is: This article shows insufficient awareness of the actual course of the war and its phases, including the strategic difficulties, the terrain, the weaponry available, and the manpower difficulties. The main battles are scarcely mentioned or are given eccentric priorities. (July 2015)|
Scenes of the war
|Commanders and leaders|
|Casualties and losses|
||c. 300,000 soldiers and civilians|
Part of a series on the
|History of Paraguay|
The Paraguayan War,[a] also known as the War of the Triple Alliance,[b] was an international military conflict in South America fought from 1864 to 1870 between Paraguay and the Triple Alliance of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. It is said to have caused approximately 400,000 deaths, one of the highest ratios of fatalities to combatants of any war in South America in modern history. It was the longest and bloodiest inter-state war in Latin American history. It particularly devastated Paraguay, which suffered catastrophic losses in population—some claim that almost 70% of its adult male population died—and was forced to cede territory to Argentina and Brazil.
There are several theories regarding the origins of the war. The traditional view emphasizes the aggressive policy of Paraguayan president Francisco Solano López to gain control in the Platine basin. See also Fortress of Humaitá. Conversely, popular belief in Paraguay, and Argentine revisionism since the 1960s, blames the influence of the British Empire (though the academic consensus shows little or no evidence for this theory). The war has also been attributed to the after-effects of colonialism in South America; the struggle for physical power among neighboring nations over the strategic Río de la Plata region; Brazilian and Argentine meddling in internal Uruguayan politics; Solano López's efforts to help allies in Uruguay (previously defeated by Brazilians), as well as his presumed expansionist ambitions. Paraguay had recurring boundary disputes and tariff issues with Argentina and Brazil for many years.
The war began in late 1864, at the aftermath of the "Cruzada Libertadora" in Uruguay, followed by combat operations between Brazil and Paraguay. Argentina and Uruguay entered in 1865, and it became the "War of the Triple Alliance".
The outcome of the war was the utter defeat of Paraguay. After it lost in conventional warfare, Paraguay conducted a drawn-out guerrilla-style resistance, a disaster that resulted in the destruction of the Paraguayan military and much of the civilian population. The guerrilla war lasted until López was killed by Brazilian forces on 1 March 1870. Estimates of total Paraguayan losses range from 21,000 to 1,200,000. It took decades for Paraguay to recover from the chaos and demographic imbalance.
In Brazil, the war helped bring about the end of slavery, moved the military into a key role in the public sphere and caused a ruinous increase of public debt, which took a decade to pay off, severely reducing the country's growth. It has been argued the war played a key role in the consolidation of Argentina as a nation-state. That country became South America's wealthiest nation, and one of the wealthiest in the world, by the early 20th century. It was the last time that Brazil and Argentina took such an interventionist role in Uruguay's internal politics.
- 1 Background
- 2 The Uruguayan conflict
- 3 The war begins
- 4 Secret treaty of the Triple Alliance
- 5 Allied counterattack
- 6 Allies gain momentum
- 7 End of the war
- 8 Women in the Paraguayan War
- 9 Casualties
- 10 Consequences of the war
- 11 Endnotes
- 12 References
- 13 Bibliography
Paraguay under Francia and López
Paraguay under José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia (1813–1840) and Carlos Antonio López (1841–1862) developed quite differently from other South American nations. These two leaders encouraged self-sufficient economic development, imposing a high level of isolation from neighboring countries.
The regime of the López family was characterized by pervasive and rigid centralism in production and distribution. There was no distinction between the public and the private sphere, and the López family ruled the country as it would a large estate.
The government exerted control on all exports. The export of yerba mate and valuable wood products maintained the balance of trade between Paraguay and the outside world. The Paraguayan government was extremely protectionist, never accepted loans from abroad and levied high tariffs against imported foreign products. This protectionism made the society self-sufficient, and it also avoided the debt suffered by Argentina and Brazil. Francisco Solano López, the son of Carlos Antonio López, replaced his father as the President-Dictator in 1862, and he generally continued the political policies of his father.
Militarily, Carlos Antonio López modernized and expanded industry and the Paraguayan Army and greatly strengthened the strategic defences of Paraguay by developing the Fortress of Humaitá. The government hired more than 200 foreign technicians, who installed telegraph lines and railroads to aid the expanding steel, textile, paper and ink, naval construction, weapons and gunpowder industries. The Ybycuí foundry, completed in 1850, manufactured cannons, mortars and bullets of all calibers. River warships were built in the shipyards of Asunción. Fortifications were built, especially along the Apa River and in Gran Chaco.:22 The work was continued by his son Francisco Solano.
According to George Thompson, C.E. who was under service of the paraguayan government prior and during the war:
[Lopez's] government was comparatively a good one for Paraguay. Probably in no other country in the world life and property has been so secure as all over Paraguay during his reign. Crime was almost unknown, and when comitted, inmediately detected and punished. The mass of the people was, perhaps, the happiest in existence. Each family had its house or hut in its own ground. They planted, in a few days, enough tobacco, maize and mandioca for their own consumption [...]. Having at every hut a grove of oranges [...] and also a few cows, they were almost throughout the year under little necessity [...]. The higher classes, of course, lived more in an European way.— George Thompson, C.E.
On 6 February 1862, gathered in Asunción, Solano López, Minister of War, and the military chiefs coming from different parts of the country. On that occasion an "expenditure budget for the war" was elaborated and military mobilization was started, calling up all citizens between seventeen and forty years for military service. Major Pedro Duarte was appointed to command the military camp with Cerro León, about ninety kilometers from the capital and center of that mobilization, which already had between 4000 and 5000 recruits. On April 15, Duarte received orders from Solano López to return to his old post of military commander of the village of Encarnación, on the eastern border, to organize a military force of 10,000 soldiers.
Argentina and Brazil
Brazil, under the rule of the Portuguese, was the first country to recognize the independence of Paraguay, in 1811. While Argentina was ruled by Juan Manuel Rosas (1829–1852), a common enemy of both Brazil and Paraguay, Brazil contributed to the improvement of the fortifications and development of the Paraguayan army, sending officials and technical help to Asunción. As no roads linked the province of Mato Grosso to Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian ships needed to travel through Paraguayan territory, going up the Río Paraguay to arrive at Cuiabá. Many times, however, Brazil had difficulty obtaining permission from the government in Asunción to sail those waterways.
Brazil carried out three political and military interventions in Uruguay: in 1851, against Manuel Oribe to fight Argentine influence in the country; in 1855, at the request of the Uruguayan government and Venancio Flores, leader of the Colorados, who were traditionally supported by the Brazilian empire; and in 1864, against Atanasio Aguirre. This last intervention would light the fuse for the Paraguayan War.
On 19 April 1863 former Colorado President of Uruguay Venancio Flores returned from his refuge in Argentina at the head of an army in the Cruzada Libertadora, intending to depose the Blanco President of Uruguay, Bernardo Berro.:24 In April 1864 Brazil sent a diplomatic mission to Uruguay, led by José Antônio Saraiva, to demand payment for damages caused to gaucho farmers in border conflicts with Uruguayan farmers. Uruguayan President Atanasio Aguirre, of the National Party (Blanco Party), refused the Brazilian demands.
According to some historians, Paraguay began the war with over 60,000 well-trained men—38,000 of whom were currently under arms—400 cannons, a naval squadron of 23 steamboats (vapores) and five river-navigating ships (among them the Tacuarí gunboat). However, recent studies suggest many problems. Although the Paraguayan army had between 70,000 and 100,000 men at the beginning of the conflict, they were badly equipped. Most infantry armaments consisted of inaccurate smooth-bore muskets and carbines, slow to reload and short-ranged. The artillery was similarly poor. Military officers had no training or experience, and there was no command system, as all decisions were made by López. Food, ammunition and armaments were scarce, with logistics and hospital care deficient or nonexistent.
At the beginning of the war the military forces of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay were far smaller than Paraguay's. Argentina had approximately 8,500 regular troops and a naval squadron of four vapores and one goleta. Uruguay entered the war with fewer than 2,000 men and no navy. Many of Brazil's 16,000 troops were located in its southern garrisons. The Brazilian advantage, though, was in its navy, comprising 42 ships with 239 cannons and about 4,000 well-trained crew. A great part of the squadron had already met in the Rio de la Plata basin, where it had acted under the Marquis of Tamandaré in the intervention against Aguirre.
Brazil, however, was unprepared to fight a war. Its army was disorganized. The troops it used in Uruguay were mostly armed contingents of gauchos and National Guard. While some Brazilian accounts of the war described their infantry as volunteers (Voluntários da Pátria), other Argentinian revisionist and Paraguayan accounts disparaged the Brazilian infantry as mainly recruited from slaves and the landless (largely black) underclass, promised free land for enlisting. The cavalry was formed from the National Guard of Rio Grande do Sul. (Ultimately, a total of about 146,000 Brazilians fought from 1864 to 1870, consisting of 10,025 army soldiers stationed in Uruguayan territory in 1864, 2,047 that were in the province of Mato Grosso, 55,985 Fatherland Volunteers, 60,009 National Guards, 8,570 ex-slaves who had been freed to be sent to war, and 9,177 navy personnel. Another 18,000 National Guard troops stayed behind to defend Brazilian territory.)
The Uruguayan conflict
On April 19, 1863, uruguayan Gen. Venancio Flores, who was at the time an officer of the argentine army and leader of the Colorado Party of Uruguay, invaded his country, starting the Cruzada Libertadora, with open support of the government of Buenos Aires (despite their denial), that supplied the rebels with arms, ammunition and even 2,000 men . The objective of Flores's military expedition was to dethrone the Blanco Government of Uruguay, which was allied with Paraguay and, therefore, enemy of Buenos Aires.:24 López sent a demand on 6 Sept. 1863 to the Argentine government asking for an explanation, but Buenos Aires denied all the claims.:24 From that moment, mandatory military service was effect in Paraguay and, in Feb. 1864, an additional 64,000 men were drafted into the army.:24
One year after the beginning of the "Cruzada Libertadora", in April, 1864, Brazilian minister José Antônio Saraiva arrived in Uruguayan waters with the Imperial Fleet, to demand payment for damages caused to gaucho farmers in border conflicts with Uruguayan farmers. Uruguayan President Atanasio Aguirre, of the National Party (Blanco Party), refused to accomplish the brazilian demands, presenting instead their own reclamations while asking for help to the paraguayan government. To settle the growing crisis, Solano López offered himself as mediator of the Uruguayan crisis, as he was a political and diplomatic ally of the uruguayan blancos, but the offer was turned down by Brazil.
Brazilian soldiers in the northern boundaries of Uruguay started to provide help to Flores' troops, and hostilizing uruguayan officers, while the Imperial Fleet pressed hard on Montevideo.  During those months (June–August, 1864), a Treaty was signed between Brasil and the argentine government at Buenos Aires, for mutual assistance in the Plate Basin Crisis. 
About this, the french minister at Uruguay during the crisis, M. Martin de Maillefer, wrote to his government this curious report:
Paraguay, the scarecrow of his enemies, is the last hope for the Blanco Government, the real objective of the Brazil-Buenos Aires alliance, and the arbiter of the current situation.
Minister Saraiva, on August 4, 1864, sent an ultimatum to the uruguayan government: either they comply to the brazilian demands, or the brazilian army would take retalliations. The paraguayan government was informed of all this and sent to Brazil another ultimatum, which stated in its most important fragment:
The government of the Republic of Paraguay will consider any occupation of the Oriental territory [i.e. Uruguay] as an attempt against the equilibrium of the states of the Plate which interests the Republic of Paraguay as a guarantee for its security, peace, and prosperity; and that it protests in the most solemn manner against the act, freeing itself for the future of every responsibility that may arise from the present declaration.— José Berges, Paraguayan chancellor, to Vianna de Lima, Brazilian minister to the Paraguayan government. August 30th, 1864.
The Brazilian government, probably believing that the Paraguayan threat would not surpass the diplomatic sphere, answered the ultimatum in September 1, 1864, stating that "they will never abandon the duty of protecting the lives and interests of Brazilian subjects". But the Paraguayan government, two days later, insisted with its answer that "if Brazil takes the measures protested against in the note of August 30th, 1864, Paraguay will be under the painful necessity of making its protest effective."
Despite the Paraguayan notes and ultimatums, on October 12, 1864, Brazilian troops under the command of Gen. João Propício Mena Barreto invaded Uruguay.,:24 thus marking the beginning of the hostilities.  One month later, on 12 November 1864, the Paraguayan ship Tacuarí captured the Brazilian ship Marquês de Olinda, which had sailed up the Río Paraguay to the province of Mato Grosso,  making its protests effective. The followers of Colorado party leader Venancio Flores, who had the support of Argentina and Brazil, deposed Aguirre and the Blanco Government of Uruguay  and on 28 Jan. 1865, Flores signed a formal alliance with Brazil against Paraguay.:30
Months later, on 18 March 1865, Paraguay declared war on Argentina. By then the Uruguayan War was over, with Venancio Flores ruling and Uruguay now aligned with Brazil and Argentina. The war had begun.
The war begins
Paraguayan offensive: expedition to Matto Grosso
Paraguay took the initiative during the first phase of the war, invading Mato Grosso in the north on 14 December 1864,:25 Rio Grande do Sul in the south in early 1865 and the Argentine province of Corrientes.
Two separate Paraguayan forces invaded Mato Grosso simultaneously. An expedition of 3,248 troops, commanded by Col. Vicente Barrios, was transported by a naval squadron under the command of Capitan de Fragata Pedro Ignacio Meza, up the Río Paraguay to the town of Concepcion.:25 They attacked the Nova Coimbra fort on 27 Dec.:26 The Brazilian garrison of 154 men resisted for three days, under the command of Lt. Col. Hermenegildo de Albuquerque Porto Carrero (later Baron of Fort Coimbra). When their munitions were exhausted, the defenders abandoned the fort and withdrew up the river towards Corumbá on board the gunship Anhambaí.:26 After occupying the fort, the Paraguayans advanced north, taking the cities of Albuquerque, Tage and Corumbá in January 1865.:26 Solano López then sent a detachment to attack the military frontier post of Dourados. This detachment, led by Maj. Martín Urbieta, encountered tough resistance on 29 December 1864 from Lt. Antonio João Ribeiro and his 16 men, who were all eventually killed. The Paraguayans continued to Nioaque and Miranda, defeating the troops of Col. José Dias da Silva. Coxim was taken in April 1865. The second Paraguayan column, formed from some of the 4,650 men led by Col. Francisco Isidoro Resquín at Concepcion, penetrated into Mato Grosso with 1500 troops.:26
Despite these victories, the Paraguayan forces did not continue to Cuiabá, the capital of the province, where Augusto Leverger had fortified the camp of Melgaço to protect Cuiabá. Their main objective was the capture of the gold and diamond mines, disrupting the flow into Brazil until 1869.:27
Paraguayan invasion of Corrientes and Río Grande do Sul
The invasion of Corrientes and Rio Grande do Sul was the second phase of the Paraguayan offensive. To raise the support of the Uruguayan Blancos, the Paraguayans had to travel through Argentine territory. In Jan. 1865 Solano López asked the Argentine government's permission for an army of 20,000 men (led by Gen. Wenceslao Robles) to travel through the province of Corrientes.:29–30 Argentine President—Bartolomé Mitre refused Paraguay's request and a similar one from Brazil.:29
On 13 April 1865 a Paraguayan squadron sailed down the Río Paraná and attacked two Argentine ships in the port of Corrientes. Immediately Gen. Robles' troops took the city with 3,000 men, and a cavalry force of 800 arrived the same day. Leaving a force of 1,500 men in the city, Robles advanced southwards along the eastern bank.:30
By invading Corrientes, Solano López had hoped to gain the support of the powerful Argentine caudillo Justo José de Urquiza, governor of the provinces of Corrientes and Entre Ríos, who was known to be the chief federalist hostile to Mitre and the government in Buenos Aires. However, Urquiza gave his full support to an Argentine offensive.:31 The forces advanced approximately 200 kilometres (120 mi) south before ultimately ending the offensive in failure.
Along with Robles' troops, a force of 12,000 soldiers under Col. Antonio de la Cruz Estigarriba crossed the Argentine border south of Encarnación in May 1865, driving for Rio Grande do Sul. They traveled down Río Uruguay and took the town of São Borja on June 12. Uruguaiana, to the south, was taken on 6 August with little resistance. The Brazilian reaction was yet to come.:36–37
Siege of Uruguaiana
While Solano López ordered the retreat of the forces that occupied Corrientes, the Paraguayan troops that invaded São Borja advanced, taking Itaqui and Uruguaiana. The situation in Rio Grande do Sul was chaotic, and the local military commanders were incapable of mounting an effective resistance to the Paraguayan army. A separate division (3,200 men) that continued towards Uruguay, under the command of Maj. Pedro Duarte, was defeated by Flores in the bloody Battle of Jataí on the banks of the Río Uruguay. The baron of Porto Alegre set out for Uruguaiana, a small town in the province's west, where the Paraguayan army was besieged by a combined force of Brazilian, Argentine and Uruguayan units. Porto Alegre assumed the command of the Brazilian army in Uruguaiana on 21 August 1865.
From the very beginning, the Brazilian commanders had an acrimonious relationship with Brazil's allies Bartolomé Mitre, president of Argentina, and Venancio Flores, president of Uruguay, each of whom led the army of their respective nation. The years had not lessened Porto Alegre's prejudice against Hispanic-Americans; on the contrary, his antagonism had increased. On 2 September, Flores suggested an immediate attack on Uruguaiana, an option rejected by Porto Alegre and Joaquim Marques Lisboa (then-Viscount and later Marquis of Tamandaré), the commander-in-chief of the Brazilian navy. When Flores claimed that he could defeat the Paraguayan army alone, he was mocked by both Brazilian officers. Field Marshal Manuel Luís Osório was at the front of the Brazilian troops. Some of the troops, commanded by Lt. Gen. Manuel Marques de Sousa, baron of Porto Alegre, left to reinforce Uruguaiana.
The allied troops united under Pedro II of Brazil, the Count d'Eu and President Mitre in the camp of Concordia, in the Argentine province of Entre Ríos.:39 Since his arrival in Uruguaiana, Mitre had claimed the position of commander-in-chief of all allied forces participating in the siege—a precedence which Porto Alegre vehemently refused to recognize. He reminded the Argentine president that, according to the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, the imperial army would be led by a Brazilian officer while on Brazilian soil. The dispute was temporarily forgotten when Pedro II arrived at the front. The Brazilian monarch settled the dispute when, at his suggestion, the allied army was divided into three forces, one led by Porto Alegre and the other two by Mitre and Flores. On 18 September, the Paraguayan garrison surrendered without further bloodshed. The Paraguayans yielded and the Siege of Uruguaiana ended on September 18, 1865.:40
Secret treaty of the Triple Alliance
The alliance against Paraguay
It is discussed, even nowadays, when was the real start of the Alliance against Paraguay. A very remarkable document, found in Argentina, was made public in 2009. It was entitled "Protocolo de Entendimiento para la Guerra contra Paraguay" (Protocol of Understanding for a War Against Paraguay), signed in 1857 by Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos and Santiago Derqui, and ratified by the same Silva Paranhos and the argentine minister of foreign affairs, Rufino de Elizalde, in January, 1865. The Brazilian minister gave a remarkable speech in Buenos Aires, which was shared to all foreign delegations, that made clear there was a prior agreement between Buenos Aires and Brazil. 
In a very famous public debate held among high officers and personalities of Argentine politics, in 1868-1869, there was an inquire about when did the Alliance start to work together. The Argentine minister José Mármol, who was in Rio de Janeiro months before the outbreak of the conflict, claimed that:
"The Alliance (of Argentina) with Brazil didn't come after the Paraguayan agression in Corrientes, in April, 1865, but in May and June, 1864, when the Brazilian fleet was docked at Buenos Aires. Both the Argentine and the Brazilian governments started their alliance since that dreadful moment, under the inspirations of a coward and criminal doctrine. That's the real moment of the Alliance".
Years after the final outcome of the war, José António Saraiva, who was the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs in 1864-1865, wrote a letter where he admitted that:
"My mission in Montevideo was (...) to prepare the alliances of Brazil against Paraguay, (objective) that I accomplished, as those alliances were made the day when the Brazilian minister (Saraiva) and the Argentine minister (Elizalde) had a conference with Venancio Flores in Puntas del Rosario, and not the day when (minister) Octaviano and I myself, signed the treaty (of the Triple Alliance)".— José António Saraiva, former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs. December, 1890.
Sir Edward Thornton was present in both, the Secret Meeting at Puntas del Rosario (June 18, 1864) and at the signing of the Secret Treaty of the Triple Alliance (May 1, 1865).
Views on the British influence behind the scenes
Some left-wing historians (of the 1960s and 1970s, most notably Eric Hobsbawn in his work "The Age of Capital: 1848–1875") claim that the Paraguayan War was caused by the pseudo-colonial influence of the British, who needed a new source of cotton during the United States Civil War (as the blockaded southern states had been their main cotton supplier). Right wing and even, far-right wing historians, specially from Argentina  and Paraguay, share the opinion that the British Empire had much to do with the war.
A famous document which supports the claim is a letter from Edward Thornton (Minister of Great Britain in the Plate Basin) to Lord John Russell, which says:
"The ignorant and barbaric people of Paraguay believe that it is under the protection of the most illustrious of the governments (...) and only with foreign intervention, or a war, they will be relieved from their error".— Edward Thornton to Lord Russell. Asunción, September 6th, 1864.
Charles Washburn, who was the Minister of the United States to Paraguay and Argentina, also claims that Edward Thornton represented Paraguay, months before the outbreak of the conflict, as:
"... Worst than Abyssinia, and López (is) worst than King Tewodros II. The extinction (of Paraguay) as a nation will be benefit, to all the world".
Another relevant primary-source is from Richard Francis Burton, officer of the Royal Navy, British diplomat and spy. In his famous book "Letters from the Battlefields of Paraguay", he states:
"My sympathies are with the Brazil, as far at least, as her 'mission' is literally, to unlock the great Southern Mississippi (sic), to keep open and develop the magnificent water system of the Paraguay-Parana-Plate, and to sweep away from the shores of its main arteries, the 'guardias and piquetes', the batteries and ridiculous little stockades which served to keep its waters comparatively desert, and to convert a highway belonging to the world into a mere monopoly of Paraguay".— Sir Richard Francis Burton KCMG FRGS.
Other historians dispute this claim of British influence, pointing out that there is no documentary evidence for it. They note that, although the British economy and commercial interests benefited from the war, the UK government opposed it from the start. It believed that war damaged international commerce, and disapproved of the secret clauses in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. Britain already was increasing imports of Egyptian cotton and did not need Paraguayan products.
William Doria (the UK Chargé d'Affaires in Paraguay who briefly acted for Thornton) joined French and Italian diplomats in condemning Argentina's President Bartolomé Mitre's involvement in Uruguay. But when Thornton returned to the job in December 1863, he threw his full backing behind Mitre.
The Triple Alliance: Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
When war first broke out between Paraguay and Brazil, Argentina stayed neutral. Solano López doubted Argentina's neutrality, because it gave Brazilian ships permission to navigate in the Argentine rivers of the Plate region, despite Paraguay being at war with Brazil. When Lopez asked to move his troops through Argentine territory, to fight in Uruguay against Brazil, Argentina rejected the request. The Paraguayan Congress gathered at an emergency meeting in March 5, 1865. After several days of discussion, in March 23 the Congress decided to declare war to the Argentine Confederation for its policies, hostile to Paraguay and favourable to Brazil, and then they conferred to Gen. Francisco Solano López Carrillo the degree of Field Marshal of the Republic of Paraguay. The declaration of war was sent in March 29, 1864, to Buenos Aires. 
After the invasion of the Corrientes Province by Paraguay on 13 April 1865, a great reaction stirred at Buenos Aires when the people knew about the declaration of war by the paraguayans. In May 4, 1865, President Bartolomé Mitre made a famous speech to inflame the crowds:
"... My fellow countrymen, I promise you: in three days we shall be at the barracks. In three weeks, at the frontiers. And in three months in Asunción".— Gen. Bartolomé Mitre, president of the Argentine Confederation.
That same day, Argentina declares war on Paraguay,:30–31 but days before that, on 1 May 1865 Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay signed the Secret Treaty of the Triple Alliance in Buenos Aires. They named Bartolomé Mitre, president of Argentina, as supreme commander of the allied forces. The signataries of the treaty were Rufino de Elizalde (Argentina), Octaviano de Almeida (Brazil) and Carlos de Castro (Uruguay). The Treaty states, in some of the most remarkable clauses in it, that Paraguay is to be blamed on all the consequences of the conflict and has to pay all the debt of war,Paraguay has to remain without any fortress and military force. Large portions of paraguayan territories were to be taken by Argentina and Brazil at the end of the conflict, and the independence of Paraguay was supposed to be respected only for five years. The Treaty sparkled international outrage and voices favourable to Paraguay.
Invasion of Paraguay
Brazil sent an expedition to fight the invaders in Mato Grosso. A column of 2,780 men led by Col. Manuel Pedro Drago left Uberaba in Minas Gerais in April 1865 and arrived at Coxim in December after a difficult march of more than 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) through four provinces. However, Paraguay had abandoned Coxim by December. Drago arrived at Miranda in September 1866, and Paraguay had left once again. In January 1867 Col. Carlos de Morais Camisão assumed command of the column, now with only 1,680 men, and decided to invade Paraguayan territory, which he penetrated as far as Laguna. Paraguayan cavalry forced the expedition to retreat.
Despite the efforts of Camisão's troops and the resistance in the region, which succeeded in liberating Corumbá in June 1867, Mato Grosso remained under Paraguayan control. The Brazilians withdrew in April 1868, moving their troops to the main theatre of operations, in the south of Paraguay. Communications in the Río de la Plata basin were solely by river; few roads existed. Whoever controlled the rivers would win the war, so Paraguay had built fortifications on the banks of the lower end of Río Paraguay.
The naval Battle of Riachuelo occurred on June 11, 1865. The Brazilian fleet commanded by Adm. Francisco Manoel Barroso da Silva won, destroying the powerful Paraguayan navy and preventing the Paraguayans from permanently occupying Argentine territory. For all practical purposes, the battle decided the outcome of the war in favor of the Triple Alliance; from that point on it controlled the waters of the Río de la Plata basin up to the entrance to Paraguay.
In subsequent months the Paraguayans were driven out of the cities of Corrientes and San Cosme, the only Argentine territory still in Paraguayan possession. By the end of 1865 the Triple Alliance was on the offensive. Its armies numbered 42,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry as they invaded Paraguay in April.:51–52
On September 12, 1866, Solano López invited Mitre and Flores to a conference in Yatayty Cora, which resulted in a "heated argument".:62 He had realized that the war was lost and was ready to sign a peace treaty with the Allies. No agreement was reached, though, since Mitre's conditions for signing the treaty were that every article of the secret Treaty of the Triple Alliance was to be carried out, a condition that Solano López refused. Article 6 of the treaty made truce or peace nearly impossible, as it stipulated that the war was to continue until the then government ceased to be, which meant the death or removal of Solano López.
The allies invaded Paraguay in April 1866, but after initial success, their advance was blocked by the need to capture the formidable fortress of Humaitá. Porto Alegre had remained behind, leading the 2nd corps and guarding Rio Grande do Sul. Mitre, no longer on Brazilian territory and acknowledged as the allied commander-in-chief, planned to use Porto Alegre's army to march through Paraguayan territory from the rear to surround Humaitá. As a result of a suggestion by Tamandaré, and though Mitre had not issued orders for the move, Porto Alegre boarded his army onto Brazilian ships and instead brought them up to the positions occupied by the other allied troops. Mitre tolerated his insubordination, hoping to avoid further trouble. On 18 August, Porto Alegre received instructions from a new War Council to attack the Paraguayan fort at Curuzú. Mitre gave instructions to Porto Alegre operate under the command of Tamandaré. Porto Alegre not only refused to defer to his cousin, arguing that both held the same rank, but also warned that he could operate under Mitre or by himself at Curuzú. Porto Alegre resisted of submitting his forces to Mitre's direction, and was unwilling to comply with orders issued by the allied commander.
After the conference the allies marched into Paraguayan territory, reaching the defensive line of Curupayty. Trusting in their numerical superiority and the possibility of attacking the flank of the defensive line through the Paraguay River by using the Brazilian ships, the Allies made a frontal assault on the defensive line, supported by the flank fire of the battleships. However, the Paraguayans, commanded by Gen. José E. Díaz, stood strong in their positions, set up for a defensive battle. They inflicted tremendous damage on the Allied troops. The Battle of Curupayty resulted in an almost catastrophic defeat for the Allied forces, ending their offensive for ten months, until July 1867.:65 Nor was the situation among the allied forces improved once the main focus of Porto Alegre's denunciations was Mitre. He said: "Here is the result of the Brazilian government's lack of confidence in its generals and giving its Armies to foreign generals." The allied leaders blamed each other for disastrous failure at Curupayty, Porto Alegre and Tamandaré found common ground in their distaste for the Brazilian commander of the 1st corps, field marshal Polidoro Quintanilha Jordão (later the Viscount of Santa Teresa). Jordão was ostracized for supporting Mitre and for being a member of the Conservative Party, while Porto Alegre and Tamandaré were Progressives. Mitre had a harsh opinion of the Brazilian cousins and said that "Porto Alegre and Tamandaré, who are cousins, and cousins even in lack of judgement have made a family pact to monopolize, in practice, the command of war." He further criticized Porto Alegre: "It is impossible to imagine a greater military nullity than this general, to which it can be added Tamandaré's dominating bad influence over him and the negative spirit of both in relation to the allies, owning to passions and petty interests." Gen. Flores had left for Uruguay in September 1866.
The Progressive cabinet decided to create a unified command over Brazilian forces operating in Paraguay, and it turned to the 63-year-old Caxias as the new leader on 10 October 1866. Osório was sent to organize a 5,000-strong third corps of the Brazilian army in Rio Grande do Sul.:68 Caxias arrived in Itapiru on 17 November 1866. His first measure was to dismiss the Vice-Admiral Joaquim Marques Lisboa (later the Marquis of Tamandaré and also a member of the Progressive League), the government had appointed his fellow Conservative Vice-Admiral Joaquim José Inácio (later the Viscount of Inhaúma) to lead the navy.
Caxias in command
Caxias assumed command on 19 Nov. 1866 of the Brazilian Army in Paraguay. He had to end the internecine squabbling and enlarge his autonomy over the Brazilian government to assume the supreme command of land and naval forces in the war. With the departure of President Mitre in Feb. 1867, Caxias assumed overall command of the Allied force.:65 He found the Brazilian army practically paralyzed, devastated by disease. During this period, Caxias trained his soldiers, re-equipped the army with newer guns, improved the quality of the officer corps, and upgraded the health corps and overall hygiene of the troops, putting an end to epidemics. From October 1866 until July 1867, all offensive operations were suspended. Military operations were limited to skirmishing with the Paraguayans and bombarding Curupaity. Solano López took advantage of the disorganization of the enemy to reinforce his stronghold in Humaitá.:70
As the Brazilian army was ready for combat, Caxias sought to encircle Humaitá and force its capitulation by siege. To aid the war effort, Caxias employed observation balloons to gather information of the enemy lines. With the 3rd Corps ready for combat, on 22 July 1867 the allied army started its flanking march around Humaitá. The march to outflank the left wing of the Paraguayan fortifications constituted the basis of Caxias' tactics. He wanted to bypass the Paraguayan strongholds, cut the connections between Asunción and Humaitá and finally encircle the Paraguayans. The 2nd corps was stationed in Tuyutí, while the 1st corps and the newly created 3rd corps were used by Caxias to encircle Humaitá. President Mitre returned from Argentina and re-assumed overall command on 1 August. With the capture, by Brazilians troops, on November 2, of the Paraguayan position of Tahí, at the shores of the river, Humaitá would become isolated, by land, from the rest of the country.[c]
Allies gain momentum
Fall of Humaitá
The combined Brazilian–Argentine–Uruguayan army continued advancing north through hostile territory to surround Humaitá. The Allied force advanced to San Solano on the 29th and Tayi on 2 Nov., isolating Humaitá from Asunción. Definitely occupied this position, it was completed the Allied siege of the Paraguayan positions, and Humaitá became isolated by land. A little before dawn on 3 November, Solano López reacted by ordering the attack of the rearguard of the allies in the Battle of Tuyutí, but suffered further defeat.:73–78 The Paraguayans breached the Argentine lines and were only stopped when Porto Alegre and his troops, outnumbered three to one, counterattacked. During the Second Battle of Tuyutí, as it was called, he fought with his saber in hand-to-hand combat and lost two horses one after the other.
By December 1867 there were 45,791 Brazilians, 6,000 Argentinians and 500 Uruguayans at the front. After the death of Argentinian Vice-President Marcos Paz, Mitre relinquished his position a second, and final time on 14 January 1868, and retired definitely from Paraguay. On 19 February 1868, Brazilian ironclads successfully made a passage up the Paraguay River under heavy fire, gaining full control of the river and isolating Humaitá from resupply by water. Humaitá fell on 25 July 1868, after a long siege.:86
Fall of Asunción
En route to Asunción, the allied army went 200 kilometres (120 mi) north to Palmas, stopping at the Piquissiri River. There Solano López had concentrated 12,000 Paraguayans in a fortified line that exploited the terrain and supported the forts of Angostura and Itá-Ibaté. Meanwhile, the allied representants on Buenos Aires abolished the position of Commander-in-Chief on 3 October 1868, although Caxias continued to be fill the role of Brazilian supreme commander. Resigned to frontal combat, Caxias ordered the so-called Piquissiri maneuver. While a squadron attacked Angostura, Caxias made the army cross to the west side of the river. He ordered the construction of a road in the swamps of the Chaco along which the troops advanced to the northeast. At Villeta the army crossed the river again, between Asunción and Piquissiri, behind the fortified Paraguayan line. Instead of advancing to the capital, already evacuated and bombarded, Caxias went south and attacked the Paraguayans from the rear.:89–91
Caxias had won a series of victories in December 1868, capturing Itororó, Lomas Valentinas and Angostura. On 24 December he sent a note to Solano López asking for surrender, but Solano López refused and fled to Cerro Leon.:90–100 Asunción was occupied on January 1, 1869, by Gen. Juan da Souza da Fonseca Costa, father of the future Marshal Hermes da Fonseca. On January 5 Caxias entered the city with the rest of the army, and on the 12th asked to be relieved of his command.:99
End of the war
Command of Count d'Eu
The son-in-law of the Emperor Pedro II, Luís Filipe Gastão de Orléans, Count d'Eu, was nominated to direct the final phase of the military operations in Paraguay. He sought not just a total rout of Paraguay but also the strengthening of the Brazilian Empire. In August 1869 the Triple Alliance installed a provisional government in Asunción headed by Paraguayan Cirilo Antonio Rivarola.
President Solano López organized the resistance in the mountain range northeast of Asunción. At the head of 21,000 men, Count d'Eu led the campaign against the Paraguayan resistance, the Campaign of the Mountain Range, which lasted over a year. The most important battles were the battles of Piribebuy and of Acosta Ñu, in which more than 5,000 Paraguayans died.
Campaign of the Cordilleras
With Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano López on the run, the country lacked a government. Paranhos had to create a provisional government which could sign a peace accord and recognize the border claimed by Brazil between the two nations. The diplomatic mission arrived in Asunción on 20 February 1869. Asunción was then a small town of unpaved streets and many buildings constructed of little more than straw. Even with Paraguay devastated, the power vacuum resulting from Solano López's overthrow was quickly filled by emerging domestic factions which Paranhos had to accommodate. According to historian Francisco Doratioto, Paranhos, "the then-greatest Brazilian specialist on Platine affairs", had a "decisive" role in the installation of the Paraguayan provisional government.
Death of Solano López
While in Paraguay, Paranhos had to deal with another serious issue. Gaston d'Orléans, Count of Eu—grandson of King Louis Philippe I of France and husband of Emperor Pedro II's daughter and heir Dona Isabel—had succeeded Caxias as Commander-in-Chief of Brazilian forces. After a brilliant beginning which included victories over the remnants of Solano López's army, the Count fell into depression. Paranhos became the unacknowledged, de facto commander-in-chief.
Two detachments were sent in pursuit of Solano López, who was accompanied by 200 men in the forests in the north. On March 1, 1870, the troops of Gen. José Antônio Correia da Câmara surprised the last Paraguayan camp in Cerro Corá. During the ensuing battle, Solano López was wounded and separated from the remainder of his army. Too weak to walk, he was escorted by his aide and a pair of officers, who led him to the banks of the Aquidaban-nigui River. The officers left Solano López and his aide there while they looked for reinforcements. Before they returned, Gen. Câmara arrived with a small number of soldiers. Though he offered to permit Solano López to surrender and guaranteed his life, Solano López refused. Shouting "¡Muero con mi patria!" ("I die with my homeland!"), he tried to attack Câmara with his sword. He was quickly killed by Câmara's men, bringing an end to the long conflict.
Women in the Paraguayan War
Paraguayan women had a significant role in the Paraguayan War.
During the period just before the war began many Paraguayan women were the heads of their households, meaning they did have some power and authority. They received such positions by being widows, having children out of wedlock, or their husbands worked on peons. When the war began women started to venture out of the home becoming nurses, working with government, and stabilizing themselves into the public sphere. When the New York Times reported on the war in 1868 they considered Paraguayan women equal to their male counterparts.
Paraguayan women's support of the war effort can be divided into two stages. The first being from the time the war began in 1864 to the Paraguayan evacuation of Asunción in 1868. During the period of the war, peasant women became the number one producers of agricultural goods. The second stage begins when the war turned to a more guerrilla form. It started when the capital of Paraguay fell and ended with the assassination of Paraguay's president Francisco Solano López. At this stage the number of women becoming victims of war was increasing.
Women helped sustain Paraguayan society during a very unstable period. Though Paraguay did lose the war, the outcome may have been more disastrous without women performing specific tasks. They were farmers, soldiers, nurses, and government officials. They became the symbol for national unification, and at the end of the war, the traditions women maintained is part of what held the nation together.
At the end of the war, with Paraguay suffering severe shortages of weapons and supplies, Solano López reacted with draconian attempts to keep order, ordering troops to kill any of their colleagues, including officers, who talked of surrender. Paranoia prevailed in the army, and soldiers fought to the bitter end in a resistance movement, resulting in more destruction in the country.
Paraguay suffered massive casualties, and the war's disruption and disease also cost civilian lives. Some historians estimate the nation lost the majority of its population. The specific numbers are hotly disputed and range widely. A survey of 14 estimates of Paraguay's pre-war population varied between 300,000 and 1,337,000. Later academic work based on demographics produced a wide range of estimates, from a possible low of 21,000 (Reber, 1988) to as high as 69% of the total prewar population (Whigham, Potthast, 1999). Because of the local situation, all casualty figures are a very rough estimate; accurate casualty numbers may never be determined.
The worst reports are that up to 90% of the male population was killed, though this figure is without support. One estimate places total Paraguayan losses—through both war and disease—as high as 1.2 million people, or 90% of its pre-war population. A different estimate places Paraguayan deaths at approximately 300,000 people out of 500,000 to 525,000 pre-war inhabitants. During the war, many men and boys fled to the countryside and forests. After the war an 1871 census recorded 221,079 inhabitants, of which 106,254 were female, 28,746 were male, and 86,079 were children (with no indication of sex or upper age limit). In the estimation of Vera Blinn Reber, however, "The evidence demonstrates that the Paraguayan population casualties due to the war have been enormously exaggerated".
A 1999 study by Thomas Whigham from the University of Georgia and Barbara Potthast (published in the Latin American Research Review under the title "The Paraguayan Rosetta Stone: New Evidence on the Demographics of the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870", and later expanded in the 2002 essay titled "Refining the Numbers: A Response to Reber and Kleinpenning") has a methodology to yield more accurate figures. To establish the population before the war, Whigham used an 1846 census and calculated, based on a population growth rate of 1.7% to 2.5% annually (which was the standard rate at that time), that the immediately pre-war Paraguayan population in 1864 was approximately 420,000–450,000. Based on a census carried out after the war ended, in 1870-1871, Whigham concluded that 150,000–160,000 Paraguayan people had survived, of whom only 28,000 were adult males. In total, 60%-70% of the population died as a result of the war, leaving a woman/man ratio of 4 to 1 (as high as 20 to 1, in the most devastated areas). For academic criticism of the Whigham-Potthast methodology and estimates see the main article Paraguayan War casualties.
Of approximately 123,000 Brazilians who fought in the Paraguayan War, the best estimates are around 50,000 men died. Uruguay had about 5,600 men under arms (including some foreigners), of whom about 3,100 died.
The high rates of mortality were not all due to combat. As was common before antibiotics were developed, disease caused more deaths than war wounds. Bad food and poor sanitation contributed to disease among troops and civilians. Many deaths are believed to have been caused by cholera. Among the Brazilians, two-thirds of the dead died either in a hospital or on the march. At the beginning of the conflict, most Brazilian soldiers came from the north and northeast regions; the change from a hot to a colder climate, combined with restricted food rations, may have weakened their resistance. Entire battalions of Brazilians were recorded as dying after drinking water from rivers. Therefore, some historians believe cholera, transmitted in the water, was a leading cause of death during the war.
Consequences of the war
During the war the Brazilian army took complete control of Paraguayan territory and occupied the country for six years after the final defeat in 1870. In part this was to prevent the annexation of even more territory by Argentina, which had wanted to seize the entire Chaco region. During this time, Brazil and Argentina had strong tensions, with the threat of armed conflict between them.
During the wartime sacking of Asunción, Brazilian soldiers carried off war trophies. Among the spoils taken was a large calibre gun called Cristiano, named because it was cast from church bells of Asunción melted down for the war. '
- Paraguay suffered the downfall of its government, loss of territories and huge population losses and property damage. These resulted in an economic crisis. For years after the war, Paraguayan development was slow. Some sources claim it lost nearly 69% of the population.
- In Brazil the war exposed the fragility of the Empire, and dissociated the monarchy with the army. The Brazilian army became a new and influential force in national life. It developed as a strong national institution that, with the war, gained tradition and internal cohesion. The Army would take a significant role in the later development of the history of the country. Nearly 50,000 deaths resulted, most by sickness and the harsh climate.
As in other countries, "wartime recruitment of slaves in the Americas rarely implied a complete rejection of slavery and usually acknowledged masters' rights over their property."  Brazil compensated owners who freed slaves for the purpose of fighting in the war, on the condition that the freedmen immediately enlist. It also impressed slaves from owners when needing manpower, and paid compensation. In areas near the conflict, slaves took advantage of wartime conditions to escape, and some fugitive slaves volunteered for the army. Together these effects undermined the institution of slavery. But, the military also upheld owners' property rights, as it returned at least 36 fugitive slaves to owners who could satisfy its requirement for legal proof. Significantly, slavery was not officially ended until the early 1880s.
The economic depression and the strengthening of the army later played a large role in the deposition of the emperor Pedro II and the republican proclamation in 1889. Marshall Deodoro da Fonseca became the first Brazilian president.
Brazil spent close to 614 thousand réis (the Brazilian currency at the time), which were gained from the following sources:
Due to the war, Brazil ran a deficit between 1870 and 1880, which was finally paid off. At the time foreign loans were not significant sources of funds.
- Following the war, Argentina faced many federalist revolts against the national government. Economically it benefitted from having sold supplies to the Brazilian army, but the war overall decreased the national treasure. The national action contributed to the consolidation of the centralized government after revolutions were put down, and the growth in influence of Army leadership. It resulted in nearly 30,000 deaths.
- Uruguay had lesser effects, although it suffered the deaths of nearly 5,000 soldiers.
Interpretation of the causes of the war and its aftermath has been a controversial topic in the histories of participating countries, especially in Paraguay. There it has been considered either a fearless struggle for the rights of a smaller nation against the aggressions of more powerful neighbors, or a foolish attempt to fight an unwinnable war that almost destroyed the nation. People of Argentina have their own internal disputes over interpretations of the war: many Argentinians think the conflict was Mitre's war of conquest, and not a response to aggression. They note that Mitre used the Argentine Navy to deny access to the Río de la Plata to Brazilian ships in early 1865, thus starting the war. People in Argentina note that Solano López, mistakenly believing he would have Mitre's support, had seized the chance to attack Brazil at that time.
In Brazil some have mistakenly believed that the United Kingdom financed the allies against Paraguay, and that British imperialism was the catalyst for the war. The academic consensus is that no evidence supports this thesis. From 1863-65 Brazil and the UK had an extended diplomatic crisis and, five months after the war started, cut off relations. In 1864 a British diplomat sent a letter to Solano López asking him to avoid hostilities in the region. There is no evidence that Britain forced the allies to attack Paraguay.
In December 1975, after presidents Ernesto Geisel and Alfredo Stroessner signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation in Asunción, the Brazilian government returned some of its spoils of war to Paraguay, but has kept others. In April 2013 Paraguay renewed demands for the return of the "Christian" cannon. Brazil has had this on display at the former military garrison, now used as the National History Museum, and says that it is part of its history as well.
Territorial changes and treaties
Following Paraguay's defeat in 1870, Argentina sought to enforce one of the secret clauses of the Triple Alliance Treaty, which would have permitted it to annex a large portion of the Gran Chaco region. This area was rich in quebracho wood (a product used in the tanning of leather). The Argentine negotiators proposed to Brazil that Paraguay be divided in two, with each of the victors incorporating half into its territory. The Brazilian government, however, wanted to maintain Paraguay as a buffer with Argentina. Accordingly, it rejected the Argentine proposal to annex Paraguay in its entirety.
Eventually the post-war border between Paraguay and Argentina was resolved through long negotiations, completed February 3, 1876. This treaty granted Argentina roughly a third of the area it had originally desired. Argentina became the strongest of the River Plate countries. During the campaign, the provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes had supplied Brazilian troops with cattle, foodstuffs, and other products.
When the two parties could not reach consensus on the fate of the area between the Río Verde and the main branch of Río Pilcomayo, US President Rutherford B. Hayes was asked to arbitrate. He declared it should remain part of Paraguay, for which the Paraguayan department Presidente Hayes was named in his honour.
The final peace treaty accepting Brazilian claims was signed in January 1872. Brazil signed a separate peace treaty with Paraguay on January 9, 1872, in which it obtained freedom of navigation on the Río Paraguay. Brazil also retained the borders it had claimed before the war.
In total, Argentina and Brazil annexed about 140,000 square kilometers (54,054 sq mi) of Paraguayan territory: Argentina took much of the Misiones region and part of the Chaco between the Bermejo and Pilcomayo rivers, an area that today constitutes the province of Formosa. Brazil enlarged its Mato Grosso province by claiming territories whose control had been disputed with Paraguay before the war. Both demanded a large indemnity, which Paraguay paid for the next century. This hobbled its development. In 1943, after Paraguay had paid nearly all of the indemnity to Brazil, the latter's president Getúlio Vargas cancelled the remainder of the debt.
Meanwhile, the Colorados gained political control of Uruguay and retained it until 1958.
Effects on yerba mate industry
Since colonial times, yerba mate had been a major cash crop for Paraguay. Until the war, it had generated significant revenues for the country. The war caused a sharp drop in harvesting of yerba mate in Paraguay, reportedly by as much as 95% between 1865 and 1867. Soldiers from all sides used yerba mate to diminish hunger pains and alleviate combat anxiety.
After the war concluded in 1870, Paraguay was ruined economically and by population losses. Much of the 156,415 square kilometers (60,392 sq mi) lost by Paraguay to Argentina and Brazil was rich in yerba mate, so by the end of the 19th century, Brazil became the leading producer of the crop. Foreign entrepreneurs entered the Paraguayan market and took control of its remaining yerba mate production and industry.
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- Spanish: Guerra del Paraguay; Portuguese: Guerra do Paraguai. In Paraguay it is known as the "Great War" (Spanish: Guerra Grande, Guarani: Ñorairõ Guazú).
- Spanish: Guerra de la Triple Alianza; Portuguese: Guerra da Tríplice Aliança)
- Mitre systematized the exchange of correspondence with Caxias, in the previous month, about the Allied advance, in a document entitled Memoria Militar (65 pages written in Tuiu-Cuê), in which included his military plans and the planning of attack of Humaitá.
- Burton 1870, p. 76.
- Richard Francis Burton: "Letters from the Battlefields of Paraguay", p.76 - Tinsley Brothers Editors - London (1870) - Burton, as a witness of the conflict, marks this date as the real beginning of the war. He writes (and it's the most logic account, considering the facts): The Brazilian Army invades the Banda Oriental, despite the protestations of President López, who declared that such invasion would be held a "casus belli".
- Testimonios de la Guerra Grande y Muerte del Mariscal López by Julio César Frutos
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- Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1957. Page 55.
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