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Ultimately, it is important to remember that wider humanitarian work has occurred without the use force, like NGOs or [[:Category:Christian missionaries in Africa|missionaries]], meaning the strict definition of humanitarian intervention does not fully encompass all types of foreign interference for humanitarian reasons.
Ultimately, it is important to remember that wider humanitarian work has occurred without the use force, like NGOs or [[:Category:Christian missionaries in Africa|missionaries]], meaning the strict definition of humanitarian intervention does not fully encompass all types of foreign interference for humanitarian reasons.

== Brief History ==

=== Foreign Systemic Aid ===
Foreign aid in Africa can trace its origins to post World War II reconstruction and the Bretton Woods conference of 1944. At this conference three important development organizations were founded, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Trade Organization. Designed to promote the stability of the post-war world economy, these organizations shifted their focus to Africa after the success of the U.S. Marshall Plan in the 1950s to reconstruct war-torn western Europe.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moyo |first=Dambisa |url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1005015872 |title=Dead Aid : Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-241-95996-1 |pages=13 |oclc=1005015872}}</ref> Aid in the 1960s was focused on capital intensive infrastructure and industrial projects in Africa, because it was thought newly independent African countries were unlikely to invest in longer term pay off projects. By 1965, at least US$950 million in aid had been sent to Africa.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moyo |first=Dambisa |url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1005015872 |title=Dead Aid : Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-241-95996-1 |pages=15 |oclc=1005015872}}</ref>

However, the 1970s saw an important shift from infrastructure focused aid to poverty focused aid. The oil crisis of 1973 led to economic recession and high inflation marked by unsustainable fuel and food prices throughout Africa. To remedy this, the US and the World Bank reoriented their aid programs towards social services, literacy programs, food programs and agriculture in lieu of long term infrastructure. Importantly, the 1970s marked another shift in now most African aid was now coming from the World Bank instead of the U.S..<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moyo |first=Dambisa |url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1005015872 |title=Dead Aid : Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-241-95996-1 |pages=15-17 |oclc=1005015872}}</ref>

The rise of neoliberal economics in the 1980s facilitated yet another change towards stabilization then structural adjustment in the same decade. Increases in floating loan rates after the 1979 oil crisis left African countries with a lot of concessionary loans unable to pay their debt obligations. 11 African countries ensued to default on their debt, leading to IMF restructuring the debt. In an effort to make developing African countries more economically resilient, aid programs now emphasized less government spending and free-market solutions to development, a model that had been working in China.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moyo |first=Dambisa |url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1005015872 |title=Dead Aid : Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-241-95996-1 |pages=17-21 |oclc=1005015872}}</ref>

However, by 1990 economic growth in many African countries was either stagnating or in decline, with the cost to service debt higher than the actual aid going to countries. Blame for poor economic performance was placed on poor African governance, with aid now targeting pro-democratic government reforms such as improving civil service and election transparency. Importantly, during the Cold War western aid entities provided aid to corrupt African dictators, such as Zaire's [[Mobutu Sese Seko]] and Liberia's [[Samuel Doe]], to gain their allegiance to combat Soviet expansion. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, aid was no longer motivated by anti-Soviet sentiment, and could be better targeted or even withheld. In fact, Africa's net Official Development Assistance(ODA) declined from a 1992 high of US$17 billion to US$12 billion by 1999.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moyo |first=Dambisa |url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1005015872 |title=Dead Aid : Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-241-95996-1 |pages=22-26 |oclc=1005015872}}</ref>

Aid from 2000 onwards has continued to be characterized by pro-democratic government reforms as well as a rise in "glamour aid" where rich and popular influencers promote celebrity humanitarianism (see below). Although this aid advocacy has increased awareness and funding for humanitarian causes, it has stifled nuanced analytical debate about the benefits and consequences of foreign aid.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moyo |first=Dambisa |url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1040767112 |title=Dead aid : why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-374-53212-3 |pages=26-28 |oclc=1040767112}}</ref>

=== Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention ===
Since 1960, the UN has completed 25 peacekeeping missions in Africa.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Past peace operations |url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations |access-date=2022-03-31 |website=United Nations Peacekeeping |language=en}}</ref> These missions have had varying degrees of success. Below are a few examples of Peacekeeping missions in Africa to showcase their uniqueness and variability for success.

==== United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) ====
After Congo gained independence from Belgium in 1960, political instability and infighting ensued. Various political factions vied for control, with members of the Congolese army revolting against the Lumumba government, killing both locals and Europeans in the process. Subsequently, the southern state of Katanga declared its independence from the Congo under the leadership of [[Moïse Tshombe|Moise Tshombe]]. To restore law and order, the UN sent what would be up to 20,000 personnel to the Congo to engage in peaceful enforcement of the Congo's territorial integrity. By January of 1963, the Katanga rebellion has been stopped, and its territory reintegrated into the Congo. [[United Nations Operation in the Congo|ONUC]] left the Congo in 1964 partly in response to Soviet opposition that the US had been using UN forces to promote its interests in the Congo. This is one of the primary critiques levied against UN peacekeeping, that is simply serves as a cover for western imperialism.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Chomsky |first=Noam |date=2008-09-02 |title=Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.14452/mr-060-04-2008-08_2 |journal=Monthly Review |volume=60 |issue=4 |pages=22 |doi=10.14452/mr-060-04-2008-08_2 |issn=0027-0520}}</ref> The reintegration of Katanga, a state rich in minerals, by ONUC did directly benefit US controlled mineral companies in the Congo.<ref>{{Citation |last=Kabemba |first=Claude |title=The Democratic Republic of Congo: The Land of Humanitarian Interventions |date=2013 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137270023_7 |work=The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa |pages=143–148 |place=London |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |isbn=978-1-349-44419-9 |access-date=2022-03-28}}</ref> However on balance, preserving the territorial integrity of the Congo did save many lives compared to if ONUC had not happened at all, and therefore did accomplish its humanitarian mission.<ref>{{Citation |last=Saunders |first=Christopher |title=Humanitarian Aspects of Interventions by the United Nations in Southern Africa |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137270023.0012 |work=The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |access-date=2022-03-28}} pp.161-163.</ref>

==== United Nations Operation in Angola (UNAVEM II,III) ====
After Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975, a bloody civil-war ensued between competing independence parties, the ruling communist MPLA and the rebel anti-communist UNITA party. A second UN Mission to Angola in 1991 was tasked with verifying Angola's first election and seeing the implementation of the [[Bicesse Accords|Bicesse]] peace accords between the MPLA and UNITA. With only 350 military personal and 400 election observers, this small mission lacked the resources to justify the election's integrity when UNITA rejected unfavorable results, leading to conflict resuming. With more than 300,000 people dying in this new phase of conflict, a broader UN mission to Angola was mandated in 1994 to pacify UNITA and provide humanitarian aid. Although comprising 7000 troops, this larger force was still not equipped to provided the necessary amount of aid and deterrence to stabilize the country. Lacking the needed resources, [[United Nations Angola Verification Mission III|UNAVEM III]] left Angola in 1997, leaving behind an even more ineffective observation mission (MONUA) to replace it. It was only after the leader of the UNITA, [[Jonas Savimbi|Jonas Savimbi's]], death in 2002 that fighting ended.<ref>{{Citation |last=Saunders |first=Christopher |title=Humanitarian Aspects of Interventions by the United Nations in Southern Africa |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137270023.0012 |work=The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |access-date=2022-03-28}} pp.165-168</ref>

==== United Nations Operations in Rwanda (UNAMIR) ====
The 1993 [[United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda]] (UNAMIR) was mandated to help implement the Arusha Peace Accords, a ceasefire agreement designed to end the ethnic base [[Rwandan Civil War|civil war in Rwanda]]. UNAMIR was mandated with providing security around the capital of Kigali, providing security for refugees and displaced persons, demobilizing then integrating Hutu and Tutsi parties and eventually overseeing planned future elections. At the outset, the mission only received 2500 poorly trained and organized troops, many of whom lacked basic equipment.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Dallaire |first=R.A. |last2=Poulin |first2=B. |date=1995 |title=UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA423206.pdf |publisher=Center for Counterproliferation Research National Defense University Washington}}</ref> This under resourced force was unable and at times unwilling to protect Tutsi RPF forces from Hutu genocidaires. While some UNAMIR troops did use force to prevent conflict, many troops resisted the use of force due to a perception of a strict UN mandate for only allowing force in self-defense. Because of this there was a belief among Rwanda soldiers that UNAMIR troops would not fire under any circumstances.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Ignoring Genocide (HRW Report - Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, March 1999) |url=https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-01.htm |access-date=2022-03-29 |website=www.hrw.org}}</ref> Along with lacking resources and a stronger UN mandate, the humanitarian mission in Rwanda lacked strong continued support from powerful countries such as the US and Belgium. The US decided not to send troops into Rwanda out of fear of repeating the mistakes it had made two years earlier in Somalia where 19 US solders died. Similarly, once 10 UNAMIR soldiers from Belgium where killed, Belgium removed all its troops from Rwanda.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Power |first=Samantha |date=2001-09-01 |title=Bystanders to Genocide |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/ |access-date=2022-03-29 |website=The Atlantic |language=en}}</ref> Ultimately, lack of support from the international community lead to UNAMIR failing, a consequence of which contributed to the deaths of over 800,000 people in Rwanda within a 100 day period.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2019-04-04 |title=Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506 |access-date=2022-03-29}}</ref>

===== Overall Peacekeeping Efficacy =====
Although not all peacekeeping missions succeed, as the above examples illustrate, a majority of them have been found to succeed in accomplishing their humanitarian mandate. In analyzing peacekeeping missions after the Cold War, Dr. Lise Howard found that in at least 60% of cases peacekeeping made a positive difference, with around two thirds succeeding in fulfilling their mandate. More peacekeeping forces has been found to reduce civilian deaths and sexual assault in conflict areas, as well shorting the duration of conflict and preventing violence from reemerging after the conflict. It has also been found that more diverse peacekeeping forces result in less civilian and military casualties compared to less diverse forces. Peacekeeping missions also produce more stable post-conflict institutions and civil societies, through helping to reform legal, military, and government systems.<ref name=":42">Howard, Lise, "The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa" Webinar from the Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., February 11, 2021. pp. 3-8. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/fp_20210211_africa_peacekeeping_transcript.pdf</ref>


==Public Image of Africa==
==Public Image of Africa==

Revision as of 18:38, 24 April 2022

UN Peacekeeping in Africa has its origins in Humanitarian ideology

Humanitarianism in Africa refers to the intentions and actions of people, nations, and organizations to alleviate human suffering in Africa. Humanitarian policies have focused on improving problems in Africa such as poverty, poor-health, corruption, and ethnic/inter-state conflict. Prominent entities which engage in humanitarian action in Africa include but are not limited to: foreign nations like the United States (US), domestic nations like South Africa, international organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) like the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders, and even personal celebrities like Bono. Prominent methods of promoting humanitarianism in Africa have been foreign aid, humanitarian intervention, and UN sanctioned peacekeeping.

Starting in the 1960s, aid to Africa has evolved in focus from infrastructure to poverty to neoliberal stabilization and structural adjustment, to governance to glamour aid.[1] Broadly, foreign aid encompasses emergency aid, charity-based aid, and systematic aid. Emergency and charity-based aid are often shorter term aid aim at alleviating immediate suffering from events like natural disaster or famine. Conversely, systematic aid from foreign nations and development organizations is long term aid, via concessionary loans or grants, focused on solving foundational problems like poverty or institutional reform.[2] Although emergency aid had helped prevent short term suffering in Africa, systematic aid has harmed Africans by increasing corruption and poverty. Unconditional aid to Africa has been largely proliferated by corrupt officials who engage in private consumption instead of public investment. Aid motivated corruption reduces investment, which in the long-term has suppressed many countries' economic growth. This lower growth has lead to increased poverty in Africa, which causes donors to send more aid creating a vicious cycle of aid and poverty.[3]

Another method to promote humanitarianism has been through humanitarian intervention. This method involves foreign nations or multilateral organizations threatening or using force to prevent or stop violent conflicts. Humanitarian intervention does not require the consent of all parties and is more focused on stopping conflict and not long-term nation building.[4] A example of humanitarian intervention in Africa was the UN (UNOSOM) and US (UNITAF) missions to Somalia in 1993. However, the more prominent method of humanitarianism in Africa has been through UN sanctioned peacekeeping operations. These operations insert foreign troops into a post-conflict area in hopes of providing transitional stability. Their presence requires the consent of all parties and their ability to use force is usually restricted to self-defense.[5] Since 1960, the UN has completed 25 peacekeeping missions in Africa, each unique with varying degrees of success. Some examples include ONUC in the Congo, UNAVEM in Angola, and UNAMIR in Rwanda. On balance, peacekeeping operations writ large have succeed in achieving their mandate in 66% of cases. Their presence has reduced both civilian and military deaths during conflicts and has shortened and prevent conflicts from reemerging.[6]

Although claiming a desire to alleviate suffering, humanitarianism in Africa has often done the opposite. By often embracing a white-man's burden mentality, humanitarian organizations have engaged in a form of neocolonialism in which they maintain control and influence over formal colonies in the name of benevolent development.[7]

Terms

Humanitarianism

Humanitarianism broadly defined is an informal ideology with the primary goal of alleviating human suffering. With roots in late 18th century enlightenment thinking, humanitarianism stresses the universality of human rights and the responsibility of "civilized" people's to sympathize with those suffering and actively help.[8] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines humanitarianism as "the independent, neutral, and impartial provision of relief to victims of armed conflict and natural disasters."[9] In deploying relief, the ICRC follows seven principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.[10] However, this definition and its principles have been contested, as humanitarianism does not always follow these principles and has grown to encompass more long term political projects such as democracy promotion and economic development.[11]

Aid

One way humanitarianism achieves its goals is through foreign based aid. This aid consists of three types: emergency aid, charity-based aid, and systematic aid. Emergency aid, or pure humanitarian aid, is short term aid from foreign governments or institutions given to local entities suffering from natural disasters or human conflicts. Charity-based aid comes from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and can be directed towards locals to combat both short and long term issues. Conversely, systemic aid is solely focused on longer term pervasive issues and is made through direct government-to-government transfers, or through international institutions. Government-to-government transfers are termed bilateral aid, while aid from international institutions is termed multilateral aid. Systematic aid comes in two types, concessional loans or grants. Concessional loans are cheaper long-term loans given by countries or institutions at below market rate and are meant to be repaid, while grants are free economic resources not meant to be repaid.[12]

Humanitarian Intervention

Another way humanitarianism achieves its goals is through armed humanitarian intervention. Strictly defined, humanitarian intervention is when foreign states or international entities use or threaten military force on another state to end or prevent widespread human suffering within that state without the state's consent. What separates humanitarian intervention from other military conflicts is that it is motivated by humanitarian reasons to reduce suffering and that it occurs without the consent of the sovereign dominant authority.[13] The goal of humanitarian intervention is to stop immediate violent conflict, not to explicitly promote political rights or change another country's political/social context. Humanitarian intervention is justified under international law through the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which obligates UN Members to intervene when human rights abuses occur.[14]

United Nations Peacekeeping

However, much of humanitarian policy in Africa has been pursue via United Nations (UN) sanctioned peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping is not explicitly humanitarian intervention because it assists in a state transformation by stationing neutral foreign troops within a conflict area for an extended amount of time to promote stability.[15] Peacekeeping generally follows three principles: major parties to the conflict must consent to a UN presence, UN troops are impartial to the conflict, and UN troops can only use force in self-defense or defense of the mandate.[16] However, these principles are not always explicitly followed thus, missions can blur the line between humanitarian intervention and pure peacekeeping. For example, traditional "first-generation" peacekeeping requires the consent of both parties to a conflict to occur, a key difference from intervention.[17] However, modern "third-generation" peacekeeping can take on a more militarized form through peace-enforcement in which mission troops enforce post-conflict peace agreements through the threat or use of force with or without both parties consent, aspects more similar to humanitarian intervention.[18]

Ultimately, it is important to remember that wider humanitarian work has occurred without the use force, like NGOs or missionaries, meaning the strict definition of humanitarian intervention does not fully encompass all types of foreign interference for humanitarian reasons.

Brief History

Foreign Systemic Aid

Foreign aid in Africa can trace its origins to post World War II reconstruction and the Bretton Woods conference of 1944. At this conference three important development organizations were founded, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Trade Organization. Designed to promote the stability of the post-war world economy, these organizations shifted their focus to Africa after the success of the U.S. Marshall Plan in the 1950s to reconstruct war-torn western Europe.[19] Aid in the 1960s was focused on capital intensive infrastructure and industrial projects in Africa, because it was thought newly independent African countries were unlikely to invest in longer term pay off projects. By 1965, at least US$950 million in aid had been sent to Africa.[20]

However, the 1970s saw an important shift from infrastructure focused aid to poverty focused aid. The oil crisis of 1973 led to economic recession and high inflation marked by unsustainable fuel and food prices throughout Africa. To remedy this, the US and the World Bank reoriented their aid programs towards social services, literacy programs, food programs and agriculture in lieu of long term infrastructure. Importantly, the 1970s marked another shift in now most African aid was now coming from the World Bank instead of the U.S..[21]

The rise of neoliberal economics in the 1980s facilitated yet another change towards stabilization then structural adjustment in the same decade. Increases in floating loan rates after the 1979 oil crisis left African countries with a lot of concessionary loans unable to pay their debt obligations. 11 African countries ensued to default on their debt, leading to IMF restructuring the debt. In an effort to make developing African countries more economically resilient, aid programs now emphasized less government spending and free-market solutions to development, a model that had been working in China.[22]

However, by 1990 economic growth in many African countries was either stagnating or in decline, with the cost to service debt higher than the actual aid going to countries. Blame for poor economic performance was placed on poor African governance, with aid now targeting pro-democratic government reforms such as improving civil service and election transparency. Importantly, during the Cold War western aid entities provided aid to corrupt African dictators, such as Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko and Liberia's Samuel Doe, to gain their allegiance to combat Soviet expansion. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, aid was no longer motivated by anti-Soviet sentiment, and could be better targeted or even withheld. In fact, Africa's net Official Development Assistance(ODA) declined from a 1992 high of US$17 billion to US$12 billion by 1999.[23]

Aid from 2000 onwards has continued to be characterized by pro-democratic government reforms as well as a rise in "glamour aid" where rich and popular influencers promote celebrity humanitarianism (see below). Although this aid advocacy has increased awareness and funding for humanitarian causes, it has stifled nuanced analytical debate about the benefits and consequences of foreign aid.[24]

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention

Since 1960, the UN has completed 25 peacekeeping missions in Africa.[25] These missions have had varying degrees of success. Below are a few examples of Peacekeeping missions in Africa to showcase their uniqueness and variability for success.

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

After Congo gained independence from Belgium in 1960, political instability and infighting ensued. Various political factions vied for control, with members of the Congolese army revolting against the Lumumba government, killing both locals and Europeans in the process. Subsequently, the southern state of Katanga declared its independence from the Congo under the leadership of Moise Tshombe. To restore law and order, the UN sent what would be up to 20,000 personnel to the Congo to engage in peaceful enforcement of the Congo's territorial integrity. By January of 1963, the Katanga rebellion has been stopped, and its territory reintegrated into the Congo. ONUC left the Congo in 1964 partly in response to Soviet opposition that the US had been using UN forces to promote its interests in the Congo. This is one of the primary critiques levied against UN peacekeeping, that is simply serves as a cover for western imperialism.[26] The reintegration of Katanga, a state rich in minerals, by ONUC did directly benefit US controlled mineral companies in the Congo.[27] However on balance, preserving the territorial integrity of the Congo did save many lives compared to if ONUC had not happened at all, and therefore did accomplish its humanitarian mission.[28]

United Nations Operation in Angola (UNAVEM II,III)

After Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975, a bloody civil-war ensued between competing independence parties, the ruling communist MPLA and the rebel anti-communist UNITA party. A second UN Mission to Angola in 1991 was tasked with verifying Angola's first election and seeing the implementation of the Bicesse peace accords between the MPLA and UNITA. With only 350 military personal and 400 election observers, this small mission lacked the resources to justify the election's integrity when UNITA rejected unfavorable results, leading to conflict resuming. With more than 300,000 people dying in this new phase of conflict, a broader UN mission to Angola was mandated in 1994 to pacify UNITA and provide humanitarian aid. Although comprising 7000 troops, this larger force was still not equipped to provided the necessary amount of aid and deterrence to stabilize the country. Lacking the needed resources, UNAVEM III left Angola in 1997, leaving behind an even more ineffective observation mission (MONUA) to replace it. It was only after the leader of the UNITA, Jonas Savimbi's, death in 2002 that fighting ended.[29]

United Nations Operations in Rwanda (UNAMIR)

The 1993 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was mandated to help implement the Arusha Peace Accords, a ceasefire agreement designed to end the ethnic base civil war in Rwanda. UNAMIR was mandated with providing security around the capital of Kigali, providing security for refugees and displaced persons, demobilizing then integrating Hutu and Tutsi parties and eventually overseeing planned future elections. At the outset, the mission only received 2500 poorly trained and organized troops, many of whom lacked basic equipment.[30] This under resourced force was unable and at times unwilling to protect Tutsi RPF forces from Hutu genocidaires. While some UNAMIR troops did use force to prevent conflict, many troops resisted the use of force due to a perception of a strict UN mandate for only allowing force in self-defense. Because of this there was a belief among Rwanda soldiers that UNAMIR troops would not fire under any circumstances.[31] Along with lacking resources and a stronger UN mandate, the humanitarian mission in Rwanda lacked strong continued support from powerful countries such as the US and Belgium. The US decided not to send troops into Rwanda out of fear of repeating the mistakes it had made two years earlier in Somalia where 19 US solders died. Similarly, once 10 UNAMIR soldiers from Belgium where killed, Belgium removed all its troops from Rwanda.[32] Ultimately, lack of support from the international community lead to UNAMIR failing, a consequence of which contributed to the deaths of over 800,000 people in Rwanda within a 100 day period.[33]

Overall Peacekeeping Efficacy

Although not all peacekeeping missions succeed, as the above examples illustrate, a majority of them have been found to succeed in accomplishing their humanitarian mandate. In analyzing peacekeeping missions after the Cold War, Dr. Lise Howard found that in at least 60% of cases peacekeeping made a positive difference, with around two thirds succeeding in fulfilling their mandate. More peacekeeping forces has been found to reduce civilian deaths and sexual assault in conflict areas, as well shorting the duration of conflict and preventing violence from reemerging after the conflict. It has also been found that more diverse peacekeeping forces result in less civilian and military casualties compared to less diverse forces. Peacekeeping missions also produce more stable post-conflict institutions and civil societies, through helping to reform legal, military, and government systems.[34]

Public Image of Africa

Media coverage of current events in Africa result heavily influences public opinions in Western societies. Africa is often portrayed as a continent plagued with extreme poverty and genocidal warfare. However, it is also portrayed as a continent on the brink of becoming “civilized” if only more developed foreign nations would intervene. Media is often criticized as failing to report positive movements within African countries. As a result, foreign nations often view Africa as one of the two extremes.[35] While the media depicts these extremes, it fails to report the success of local governments and domestic efforts by African countries to aid themselves.

Challenges

Humanitarianism in Africa faces several challenges to date. Several western governments have introduced legislation that criminalizes terrorist organizations. While this is beneficial, it inadvertently ends up causing complications for humanitarian aid organizations because the anti-terrorist legislation does not make a difference between intentional and unintentional support to terrorist groups. Any commodities that end up in terrorist hands causes the people responsible for its distribution to be held criminally liable. This poses a large problem for humanitarian aid organizations that work in war-torn areas – specifically those areas which are oftentimes ruled by terrorist organizations as most organizations cannot say that 100% of their commodities get distributed to the original demographic it was meant for. The only exemption from criminal prosecution is medical assistance. Unfortunately some aid organizations do not bother to negotiate access to regions where terrorist groups have a strong presence. Consequently those who need this aid are the ones forced to pay the consequences. War-torn regions such as Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan have had villages attacked in response to their receiving aid from organizations because it was aimed at attaining allegiance. Aid in this regard can also then be seen as a tool or weapon of war. A prime example of this can be demonstrated through the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Paradoxes of Humanitarianism in Africa.[36]

Since 9/11 many humanitarian organizations have directed their aid with western political agendas – this can be seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not new however – aid was similarly distributed during the cold war. However there are other organizations such as Al qaida that in 2011 used aid to win the hearts and minds of the Somali population. It can be seen then that the best interests of the population receiving aid is not always the reason for distribution of aid from organizations but rather to influence the vulnerable. Aid should be given only on the basis of our shared humanity.[37]

Genocide

Genocide is the deliberate mass murder of individuals with a shared identity. The Rwandan Genocide resulted in the death of thousands of Rwandans. Media coverage was prevalent during the gruesome event. From April 6 to July 16, 1994, a mere 100 days, an estimated 800,000 to 1,000,000 Tutsis were believed to have been slaughtered. At height of the slaughtering, it was projected that six people were being slaughtered every minute.[38] As a result of the extreme violence, there was great public outcries from other nations to put an end to the slaughtering. As a result of the genocide, Western interest in Africa was heightened, as well as humanitarian organizations. Unfortunately, while genocide continues to shock nations, many nations have accepted that this a characteristic of Africa. Genocide is often depicted as a common occurrence within the continent.

HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS is a serious epidemic in Africa which has claimed the lives of millions. It continues to be one of the leading causes of death amongst countries in Africa. Reported cases of HIV/AIDS have increased from 8 million to 34 million by the end of 2011 worldwide. At height of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa, life expectancy began to drop in certain countries. The number of people being diagnosed with AIDS and dying from the illness continues to increase. In 2011, 23.5 million children and adults were estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. And in sub-Saharan Africa alone, 1.2 million children and adults have died due to the disease.[39] The severe outbreak of HIV/AIDS called for immediate attention. A number of countries began to implemented large-scale prevention programs in order to contain the outbreaks. Despite having the largest prevention program in the world, South Africa is estimated to have had 370,000 new infections in 2012. Senegal however, has been successful in maintaining low HIV statistics among the population. The success of the country is attributed to early initiative and political factors.[40]

Food Insecurity

According to the USDA, food insecurity is separated into two categories: low food security and very low food security. Low food security is defined as reports of reduced food quality and variety, where as very low food security reflects reduced food intake.[41] Food insecurity is a leading cause behind humanitarian efforts. Approximately 854 million people around the world are reported to live in food insecurity. Of this, 60% of these people live in sub-Saharan Africa or south Asia.[42] Of the 600 million people residing in sub-Saharan Africa, 200 million people are chronically malnourished. Over 40 million children are malnourished while 50 million suffer from vitamin deficiency.[43] Lack of proper nutrition can be attributed to governmental, social, or environmental factors. Individuals experience food insecurity may be dependent of food aid for survival, which may be provided through foreign aid.

On October 23, 2014, the United States Agency for International Development announced a $75 million food security program to aid Madagascar’s chronic food insecurity problem. The USDA defines the programs as “a sign of the United States’ renewed commitment to Madagascar.” [44]

Critique

Ethnocentrism is use of one's societal values to judge the values of another society. Ethnocentrism can also result in one using their as a blueprint for other cultures—ultimately causing one to pass judgment on the other culture. These judgments are often negative and detrimental.

Critics of foreign humanitarian efforts in Africa argue that Western society’s obsession with “saving” Africa bear traces of ethnocentrism. Western ethnocentric perception of Africa results in it being viewed as less civilized and developed. Thus, these views perpetuate Africa’s appearance as a continent composed of inferior countries. As a result, the continent Africa is painted as helpless without foreign intervention. Names of organizations, which call for Westerners to “save the children,” reflect this notion

While Western efforts have good intentions, critics argue that movements paint Africa as helpless without Western aid. Many critics have also brought up the neglect of domestic humanitarian efforts. Media coverage often shows Western organizations aiding impoverished sub-Saharan countries, yet fail to acknowledge inter-country activism and efforts. [45]

Furthermore, some argue that foreign aid were not beneficial to impoverished nations. It is argued that aid programs sponsored by rich countries merely shift food surpluses with the countries, thus causing it to be an ineffective form of aid. Western societies also encourage the education of African’s yet “fail to encourage” them to return to their home continent.[46]

The White Man’s Burden

The term The White Man’s Burden was coined to represent the duty of White race to bring Western society and education to non-White colonies. The term reflects the view that it is ultimately up to the West to save “lesser” nations. The source of these beliefs are embedded deeply in racism, regarding the White race as superior. This notion was prevalent during imperialism and colonialism. Critics argue that the shadows left behind imperialism and colonialism are still present in modern society; that western society has still failed to let go of the concept of “White Burden.” As a result of this shadow, Westerns have projected “White Burden” onto Africa. Western society’s promotion that is up to the responsibility of Westerners to save an entire nation reflects this. This notion is argued to be the new white man’s burden. [47]

Counter Argument

While critics of foreign humanitarianism in Africa argue it to be rooted in ethnocentrism, others argue that foreign aid is crucial for Africa to begin to sustain itself. That the act of financially aiding a country in need could not be detrimental. The work of foreign nations would allow the continent to eventually sustain itself and “feed itself”—addressing issues of extreme poverty in the nation. While this may be reflective of "The White Man's Burden," it is argued that Western nations are more developed scientifically and could then produce resources to assist the continent. Some argue that Africa’s current state is due to the shadows of imperialism and colonialism, and thus it is up to foreign nations to assist the continent.

Paradoxes of Humanitarianism in Africa

Humanitarian aid can therefore be considered a paradox in certain situations because instead of alleviating war, pain and suffering it can actually prolong them. Western society believes that the risk of a wounded soldier returning to conflict after being healed is better than leaving him or her to die where they are. This however, tends to prolong conflict. An extreme example of this can be seen through the Rwandan refugee camps that were formed along the border of Rwanda in 1994. The Rwandan army and the Interahamwe militias used the camps as a base to launch an attack and finish the genocide which had begun earlier that year in April. The militia was able to control the population through humanitarian aid and did not permit the return to Rwanda. Through these events they were also able to gain a considerably large amount of money through the humanitarian aid efforts. If and when it is found that aid is doing more harm than good, then that aid needs to be evaluated and stopped by the organization.[48]

Celebrity Humanitarianism

Thanks to an increase in “celebrity humanitarianism” a phenomenon that has arisen in the past few decades, many celebrities are now seen as global Samaritans, political activists, and celebrity diplomats. Some of the most popular spokespersons on behalf of Africa include many celebrities such as Bob Geldof and Bono along with Angelina Jolie and George Clooney. The debate surrounding “celebrity humanitarianism” is very controversial as many argue that they are instrumental to the development of Africa, while others argue that they are in fact detrimental to the development of Africa. Humanitarian actors such as Jolie, Clooney, Bono and Geldof come from western society and help to perpetuate the conceptualization and imagery of Africa as childlike in a western neo-colonial political framework. Africa has come to be a place that has a specific role in the neoliberal international system; it has become a place thanks to western stereotypes that needs to be saved from poverty, disease, and climate. Many argue that only westerners and celebrities are portrayed as saviors in the media while ignoring the very real local and regional progress as well as the movements and philanthropic work done by Africans themselves.

Overall celebrity involvement has been viewed positively especially from the United Nations (UN), World Economic Forum (WEF), and many western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who have used them as spokespeople or participants in their activities. The criticism mainly centers around the effectiveness of aid in the development process and real knowledge of the problems faced in Africa. Those who object to celebrity humanitarianism question not only question the knowledge of celebrities regarding African problems but also their ability to explain the issues since typically Africa is portrayed by them as a place that needs saving but the progress in Africa remains ignored. The debate and criticism also calls into question of celebrity humanitarianism acting as the process of subjectivization which produces imagery and “truths” of the third-world Africa. Historical and political practices generally stem from popular figures in colonial history who have dictated the current narrative that the world at large hears of Africa. In this narrative, westerners and missionaries were seen as the saviors and heroes of freedom and civilization, and aimed to fight barbarianism by being champions of the enlightened world. They aimed to do this by bringing both freedom and civilization to a dark continent which was viewed as savage, backwards and dangerous. For these reasons, western intervention was justified by the causes of bringing progress, reason and civilization to a place that needed it. As a result, Africa began to emerge as an empowered continent thanks to the westernization, a passive helpless victim of turmoil and disease, or a chaotic viral ground.

Another critical objection comes from the feminist view where celebrity humanitarian actors show a gendered division when it comes to the support of humanitarian causes. Men such as George Clooney, Bono, and Bob Geldof promote humanitarian causes by meeting with governmental officials and representatives while women such as Mia Farrow, Audrey Hepburn, and Angelina Jolie are acknowledged and well known for their involvement with women and children in areas of crisis. It is argued that this depicts a view that “rational” men have a better grasp and understanding of politics while “emotional” women are better suited to caring and dealing with household or societal issues. In this regard, celebrity humanitarianism is viewed to be constituted and constructed of racial, class-specific, and gendered limits.

Geldof, Bono, and Jolie have all met with high-profile political and financial leaders in the world and are celebrated in the press as heroes who are fighting against the western elite by declaring the truths of Africa and its politics. Jolie’s work mainly involves charities such as the Jolie-Pitt foundation and she is involved as a UN appointed Goodwill Ambassador for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees since 2001. Bono and Geldof are known for their contributions through mainly charity concerts and records. Subsequently, they have become household names and central spokesmen for the various campaigns for Africa such as the cancellation of Third World debt, which was followed by the organization of other Africa-related campaigns and events, such as DATA (Debt, AIDS, Trade, Africa), Product Red, Live 8 and Make Poverty History which George Clooney is also known for his involvement with.

However criticism arises as to their humanitarianism approaches because they are sometimes viewed as contradictory which results in differing images of Africa. From the feminist point of view, as artists their identities are said to lend an ambiguity to class, gender, and race. The men are feminized as artists however they convey a very white and hypersexual masculinity through their punk rock music which provides them the platform to act politically or as TIME magazine once said, to “rock the establishment”. Bono and Geldof’s representation of Africa was further strengthened as references were made to their working/lower-middle-class post-colonial Irish backgrounds. Jolie’s colorful past shows traces of masculinity but that was overcome through specific acts of femininity. In an article by the New York Times in October 2005, her bodily presentation – her hair and attire lent her an additional air of credibility as a humanitarian actor as it claimed: “Ms. Jolie stood poised and serious, her hands clasped behind her back, her sexy, streaky hair pinned up in a compassionate bun. Black was the color of her pearls, eyeliner, sleeveless silk dress, and the blurry tattoo on her arm that once bore the name Billy Bob.” Jolie’s disengagement from her hedonistic class privileges along with a public image makeover strengthened her position to be an advocate of humanitarian aid in Africa. Additional criticism arises as Bono gains even more credibility by discussing his Irish background and likening the past of the Irish colonial dispossession under the British to Africa. Bono and Geldof’s humanitarianism was enabled due to their masculinized disadvantaged backgrounds and pasts while Jolie’s humanitarianism was enabled because of her motherhood which was intertwined with her humanitarian work as she adopted children.[49]

Current Humanitarianism

Organizations asking others to assist Africa are omnipresent. They can be found at a wide variety of institutions and schools. Even television commercials asking for charitable donations to “sponsor” or feed a child are not uncommon in Western countries. There is also a myriad of organizations within the West with the mission to help aid poor African countries. These organizations attempt to settle issues from sustainable water source to education.[50]

Notes

  1. ^ Dambisa., Moyo, (2009). Dead aid : why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa. pp. 10–28. ISBN 978-0-374-53212-3. OCLC 1040767112.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  2. ^ Moyo, Dambisa (2009). Dead Aid : Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa. pp. 7–9. ISBN 978-0-241-95996-1. OCLC 1005015872.
  3. ^ Dambisa., Moyo, (2009). Dead aid : why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa. pp. 48–51. ISBN 978-0-374-53212-3. OCLC 1040767112.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  4. ^ Michael., Barnett, (2011). Humanitarianism Contested : Where Angels Fear to Tread. Taylor & Francis. pp. 10–16. ISBN 978-1-136-81439-6. OCLC 773564494.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  5. ^ Seybolt, Taylor B. (2007). Humanitarian military intervention : the conditions for success and failure. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 5–6. ISBN 978-0-19-925243-5. OCLC 85482131.
  6. ^ Howard, Lise, "The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa" Webinar from the Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., February 11, 2021. pp. 3-8. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/fp_20210211_africa_peacekeeping_transcript.pdf
  7. ^ Benjamin Onyekachi, Eneasato (2020). "Foreign Aid as Mechanism for Perpetuation of Neo-colonialism and Dependency: An Interrogation of Issues and Way Forward for Developing Economies" (PDF). INOSR. 6(1): 101–112.
  8. ^ Everill, Bronwen; Kaplan, Josiah (2013). The history and practice of humanitarian intervention and aid in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 4–5. ISBN 978-1-137-27001-6. OCLC 856864950.
  9. ^ Michael., Barnett, (2011). Humanitarianism Contested : Where Angels Fear to Tread. Taylor & Francis. p. 9. ISBN 978-1-136-81439-6. OCLC 773564494.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  10. ^ Cross., International Committee of the Red (1996). The fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (PDF). International Committee of the Red Cross. OCLC 43408619.
  11. ^ Michael., Barnett, (2011). Humanitarianism Contested : Where Angels Fear to Tread. Taylor & Francis. pp. 10–16. ISBN 978-1-136-81439-6. OCLC 773564494.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
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