Decentralisation in Thailand

Decentralisation in Thailand is a decentralisation reform since 1990s, caused by democratic movement. The constitution of 1997 and decentralisation law of 1999 started an official reform process, but from 2001 to 2010, the Thaksin Cabinet tried to recentralise the bureaucratic system under the CEO style management. In the 2014 coup, the reform process had been freezed from the military-dominated politics.

History

Around the 5th to 15th century, before the centralization period, Thailand was the state of Mandala, a model for describing the patterns of diffuse political power distributed among Mueang or Kedatuan (principalities) in early Southeast Asian history. One important factor is the tributary state system, a protection from invasion by other powers.

In the period of 1880 to 1910, freed of the Front Palace and Chinese rebellions, King Rama V initiated modernization and centralization reforms. He established the Royal Military Academy in 1887 to train officers in Western fashion. His upgraded forces provided the king much more power to centralize the country. Other reason is to survive the European colonisation of Southeast Asia since the 16th century, by boosting the power to govern the territory and population.

Central government agents

The Local Government Act of 1914 enacted to form the foundation of Thai modern local administration which is the form of deconcentration.

There are two groups of local agents, full-fledged working under the Ministry of Interior (MoI), to assist the MoI and the government ministries' tasks. Firstly, the central government's regional administration that was controlled through bureaucratic provincial governors (Thai: ผู้ว่าราชการจังหวัด) and chief district officers (Thai: นายอำเภอ). Secondly, sub-district heads (Thai: กำนัน), elected from Village heads, and Village heads (Thai: ผู้ใหญ่บ้าน), popularly elected within villages were also serving as quasi-agents of the central government. Those two group of agents do not replace each other, but the two systems link together and produce overlap authority.

Bureaucratic polity after 1932

The Siamese revolution of 1932 created the Administrative Law of 1933 with the new three-tier structure, central government, provincial administrations, and local levels. Provincial councils (Thai: สภาจังหวัด) were setup to do consultative tasks at the provincial level. Municipalities (Thai: เทศบาล) were at the time, local level area with delegation tasks and no autonomy with the status of juristic person.

In 1935, after the end of King Rama VII reign, Thailand became bureaucratic polity (Thai: รัฐราชการ). In the 1970s, the Thai Parliament (TP) introduced sub-district funds with the decision comes from the TP members.

In 1955, provincial councils were promoted to be the provincial administrative organizations (PAOs) (Thai: องค์การบริหารส่วนจังหวัด, อบจ.). PAOs was not just the council but the executive. PAOs councils were elected by province's population, but the chief executives were appointed by provincial governors, central government agents. In 1956, sub-district councils (Thai: สภาตำบล) were also created. In 1975 and 1978, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and Pattaya City were created as special local administrations.

Sub-districts (Tambon), central government's agents, gained more autonomy level through the Sub-district Council and Sub-district Administrative Organization Act (SCSAO) of 1994.

Since the 1980s, elected local councils were mostly a local contractor. In the study from 1997, a local contractor is representing 80 to 90 percent of local council seat, some dubbed as 'contractor councils' (Sapha Phulubmao). These opportunity increased an attractiveness from local politicians and national politicians. Candidates in local elections increased rapidly, they receive financial support from both parties in a form of vote buying. Viengrat Nethipo found that mayor position of PAOs, municipal, and SAOs may be required to spend 100 million, 50 million, and half million baht, contrary to a seat in the national parliament that may be required around 30 million.

Causes

The Black May in 1992, massive protests were craked down by armed militaries and polices. It ended in the victory of pro-democracy groups that led to adoption of decentralization, supporting by democracy movement. Policy to make local administrations stronger was incorporated in the 7th National Economic and Social Development Plan of 1991 to 1996 and the 8th National Plan of 1997 to 2001.

Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai formed the decentralization committee in 1992, considered as first time in the history of Thailand, aiming to increase efficiency and power of local adminitratives. In 1994, the Sub-district Council and Sub-district Administrative Organisation Act was enacted, sub-district councils (SDCs) with a revenue more than 150,000 baht for three consecutive fiscal years would be upgraded to SAOs.

Reform in 1997

Decentralization in Thailand was firstly promoted by neo liberal economists, policy practitioners of international development agencies, and non-governmental organizations.

Creation of local administrative organization (LAOs)

The 1997 Constitution and the Decentralization Act of 1999 entrusted the new creation of locally elected structures in municipalities (Thai: เทศบาล), SAOs (sub-districts administrative organizationsors) (Thai: องค์การบริหารส่วนตำบล, อบต.), PAOs (provincial administrative organizations) (Thai: องค์การบริหารส่วนจังหวัด, อบจ.). They are backed by a financial transfer from the central government. Another two unique local administratives are the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and the City of Pattaya.

These local elected structures were called local administrative organizations (LAOs) (Thai: องค์การบริหารส่วนท้องถิ่น, อปท.), which were not realized as local governments or having their own autonomy. Arghiros mentions that LAOs especially PAOs were more like colonies of central government to ensure effective central power over rural areas.

LAOs duties

PAOs duties are formulating provincial development plans, supporting other administratives in the province, allocating grant, and cooperating with them. City municipalities duties are enacting law and order, planning irrigation and transportation, managing waste and water, taking care of public health, and providing some welfare services and firefighting. SAOs duties are enacting law and order, maintaining irrigation and transportation, managing waste and water, taking care of public health, and providing some welfare services.

Transfering tasks

The decentralization reform in 1999 supported a form of checks on executive power to curb politicians' corruption. Local governments would be monitored by the MoI. It was rather to increase the rule of law and civil society more than to empower local autonomy. In 1999, the National Decentralization Committee (NDC) was created. The NDC reported to transfer 245 central government functions, 87 activities related to public infrastructure, and 103 welfare services to LAOs. NDC plan included the coordination plan between fifty departments inside eleven central government ministries and thousands of LAOs. The National Education Act also helped gradual decentralization of the education structure.

Local finance reform

By the end of 1990s, only 10 percent of annual fiscal was by local administrations. The Decentralization Act of 1999 called for 20 percent of the annual fiscal to be transferred to the new LAOs by 2001, and later at 35 percent by 2006. It required to create the National Decentralization Committee (NDC) and the formulation of a Decentralization Master Plan.

Local election

In 2013, local government executives are selected through direct elections, replacing the previous indirect and direct election choice.

Institutional problems

Central government involvement

LAOs have an autonomy to govern but the MoI-appointed provincial governors or chief district officers could dismiss local administration assemblies and local councils. Provincial governors could give legal provision or suspend decisions by LAOs. The MoI could control municipal clerks and section chiefs. Both the MoI and its agents can disapprove budget plans and regulations. The MoI with the Electoral Commission dismissed 5.6 percent in 2007 and 1 percent in 2012, of all local executives, mainly from SAOs.

PAOs councils are unable to control or monitor provincial governors, as provincial governors act as PAOs chief executive. PAOs alto have to rely on well-equiped provincial bureaucrats to carry on all local tasks.

Since the 2000s, LAOs lacked local competencies to carry out tasks. The MoI's provincial governors and chief district officers still retain official power over LAOs such as local elections, managing disputes among LAOs, coordinating activities of LAOs. Both provincial governors and chief district officers also can request fiscal support from LAOs such as sporting events, festivals, in which they are compulsory.

Central government limits local government's budget on personnel to 40 percent of their annual fiscal budgets. Local government's revenues are only limit to local services that comply with central government approval. Consequently, local leaders often object to be dissatisfy that they seem more like agents of central government.

LAOs has one personnel committee for their personnel management. The committees are from central government, LAOs council member, and scholars, mostly they are bureaucrats from central government. The committee secretaries also come from the MoI.

In 2002, the Decentralization Operational Plan required the Ministry of Education to review LAOs' education readiness before implement the plan, similar to the Ministry of Public Health.

Recentralization 2001 - 2010

Since Thaksin Shinawatra became the prime minister of Thailand in 2001, the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) also won the big landslide victory in 2004, his party implemented policies attemping to recentralize. Mansrisuk mentioned that his One Million Fund for Village had acted without local administrations such as PAOs or SAOs participation. TRT policies also swayed local voters with village-level support programmes. The CEO-styled provincial governors direction was also opposed to decentralization plan.

The 2006 Thai coup d'état repealed the 1997 Constitution and the military junta drafted the new 2007 constitution. It provided for referendum on main local issues and required for annual reports by LAOs on fiscal budget and annual expenditures. It causes central government fewer process to dismiss elected officials. The 2006 Thai coup d'état accelerated decentralization process to curb the central power of Thaksin Shinawatra's central government.

Central government gained more power over SAO committees. Even though, the 2007 constitution increased PAOs power and called on SAOs to engage in development planning more. The Community Council Act of 2007 also enforced SAOs to engage. In 2008, the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) led government amended the Provincial Administrative Act of 1914 to change Village heads tenure age to the age of 60. It was the return of practices before the 1997 Constitution. This attracts SAO Councilors to return to their villages to apply for Village head position instead.

The PTP government also change sub-district heads selection from Village head elective to chief district officers direct appointment. The final amendment was to forbit the abolition of both sub-district heads and Village heads.

Unger and Mahakanjana noted that the recentralization in 2008-2009 occurs because of their relationship with national level politicians which they often rely on sub-district heads to serve political supporters. Both military and the PTP governments involved in this recentralization.

2014 Coup

Before the 2014 Thai coup d'état, the PM Thaksin Shinawatra initiated the CEO governor policy by guaranteed status of PAOs and their provincial development plans and budgets in the 2007 Thai constitutional, but it was repealed by the 2014 coup. The National Peace Keeping Council's interim constitution suspended the election of the heads of both provincial governors and sub-district heads, and some were replaced by appointed officials from Prayut Chan-o-cha's order.

Financial system

Local government revenues are taxes imposed by central government, taxes levied by LAOs, revenue-sharing from the National Value Added Tax, and subsidies from central government. Local taxes are such as signboard tax, land and real-estate tax, and slaughter house tax. Land and real-estate tax accounts around one-ninth in 2010.

After 1999, local government revenues grew from 0.1 trillion baht in 2001 to 0.4 trillion baht in 2009. In 2009, revenue from LAOs including local taxes was 20 percent of local government revenue.

There are the general grants (GGs) and the specific grants (SGs) within the central government grants. The process depends on national-level politicians to control the specific grants. In fiscal year of 2007, the ratio between GGs and SGs was 12 to 1, but in fiscal year of 2010, it increase to 1.3 to 1. Local government leaders reportedly were dissatisfied with large SGs which limit their annual budget.

Loans can be processed in LAOs, generally used to buy land or to construct their offices or infrastructure. But it tends to be underused which the MoI must approve all loan requests.

Consequents

In 2010, the local share of central government budget is 25 percent, short by 10 percent from the target.

In 2016, comparing schools between the Ministry of Education and municipal in education sector, the result is not different, giving the poor performance of overall Thai schools.

The National Audit Office tends to stop short of decentralization process by strictly control over the process.

The Pollution Control Department unable to shift tasks to LAOs because they lack of equipment or inspectors. SAOs are required by the law to have a fire truck but they have no budget to hire firefighters.

"Waste wars" happened by high-density municipalities dump their waste in around low-density SAOs.

Political competition for executive in LAOs is may be limited, between 2012 to 2014, 23 percent of elected executives were unopposed.

Criticisms

Nagai, Funatsu and Kagoya comment that smaller LAOs refuse to bare the responsibilities with high-cost maintenance work, and that they tend to invest on new infrastructure. Some mandatory services are also beyond LAOs' capability.

Unger and Mahakanjana suspect that the main problems are insufficient resources and central government interference, causing the weaknesses of LAOs. Deeply-rooted centralism, patronage society, and weak civil society also stop decentralization process to grow. They also concluded that the 1997 reform was the culmination of a rather thin political process. Other point is the excessive regulation by central government required minicipal officers to submit an excessive qualitication to be promoted to level of secretary general.

See also

• Decentralisation in Japan

References

Bibliography

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