United States v. Peoni
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United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (1938), was a case decided by the Second Circuit that limited liability for criminal accomplices by requiring the conduct of the accomplice to purposefully facilitate the criminal conduct of the principal.[1]
[edit] Factual background
The defendant Peoni possessed bills that he knew to be counterfeit. He sold the bills to Regno, and Regno sold the bills to Dorsey. Dorsey was arrested with the bills while trying to pass them in Brooklyn. At the trial level, Peoni was convicted as an accomplice to Dorsey's possession of the counterfeit bills.[2]
[edit] Decision
In an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the Second Circuit reversed Peoni's conviction. The court looked to the statute under which Peoni was indicted, 18 U.S.C. §550 (the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. §2), which punished anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures" the commission of a crime. The court read this language to require purpose, and held that Peoni had no purpose regarding the use of the counterfeit bills once he had passed them to Regno. Peoni had no purpose regarding Dorsey's possession because Regno was free to do whatever he wanted with the bills.[3]
[edit] References
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