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Add India Partition to See Also[edit]

I currently don't have >500 edits, so I cannot edit this article due to it being locked with Extended Confirmed Protection. Instead, can someone with >500 edits please add the Partition of India to the "See Also" section? India/Pakistan was partitioned the year before this was voted-on, and this article states that both India and Pakistan voted against the Partition Plan for Palestine. I think the reader may want to read about what happened in India/Pakistan from their recent partition after reading this article. -- 03:21, 16 December 2022 Maltfield

Dr Heykal Pasha's quote[edit]


  • What I think should be changed (format using {{textdiff}}):
−
"Jewish blood will necessarily be shed elsewhere in the Arab world... to place in certain and serious danger a million Jews."
+
If Arab blood is shed in Palestine, Jewish blood will necessarily be shed elsewhere in the Arab world despite all the sincere efforts of the Governments concerned to prevent such reprisals. to place in certain and serious danger a million Jews simply in order to save a hundred thousand in Europe or to satisfy the Zionist dream?
  • Why it should be changed:

- I think quoting "If A, then B" as "...B" is misleading.

  • References supporting the possible change (format using the "cite" button):

The current reference already has the correct quote. it's in take #2 (so page 3 of the pdf) Bowad91017 (talk) 21:00, 17 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The genre of history-by-quotation is much beloved of propagandists and I would prefer that section to disappear. However, since removing it would get too much resistance, we should try to get it accurate. In this case you are correct again that the text is misleading. There are also sourcing problems in that paragraph. Morris cites Heykal with no context from an undated Jewish Agency memorandum; that might be good enough for Morris but it's not good enough for us. The UN source is a preliminary press release that has the meeting number wrong. The 29th meeting was on Nov 22, and neither Heykal nor Fawzi spoke then. Both Heykal's and Fawzi's statements were in the 30th meeting. The official summary is A/AC.14/SR.30. I'm going to replace the paragraph from that source. Zerotalk 04:17, 18 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
 Done though somewhat differently. Zerotalk 05:47, 18 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
To editor Bowad91017: Can you find an original source for "Jamal Husseini promised, 'The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East'"? Morris gives no source and no date or anything pointing at a source. I looked at lots of other places and none had a source or date either. I plan to remove it. Zerotalk 05:37, 18 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Why was the quote "Jewish blood will necessarily be shed elsewhere in the Arab world" removed? It's right here on page 3. Alaexis¿question? 07:42, 18 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
(a) Because I believe the official record is more reliable than a press release. (b) Because it now reports what happened in a less emotive way. (c) Because the previous text used ellipses to misrepresent both the source and the facts. Heykal did not threaten the Jews of Arab nations. At this time the Arab states (and the Palestinians) were putting forward every argument they could think of to prevent the passing of the partition resolution. This particular argument was that the resolution would provoke violent popular reactions in the Arab world that would endanger the Jews living there and the Arab states would not be able to control the situation "despite all the sincere efforts of the Governments concerned to prevent such reprisals". There is dramatic exaggeration in his words, but quoting them without the caveat or the context was outrageous. Zerotalk 10:11, 18 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I agree about the ellipses and have no problem with quoting him verbatim. Whether it a threat or not is a more complex question. It depends a lot on the context, so we need to follow secondary sources here.
I don't agree that a press release is not reliable for our purposes. What are the reasons for doubting the authenticity of UN press releases? Alaexis¿question? 06:42, 19 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Personally, I am opposed to adding material that I know to be false or give a false picture. Of course it was in the Zionists' interest to present the Arab statements in the worst possible light and of course their claims are presented as fact by enthusiastically Zionist writers like Gilbert (wrong page number). This is confirmed by the fact that Gilbert's only source is a NYT article which only uses "threat" in the voice of Shertok and uses "warning" otherwise. Disagreement with primary sources is an argument against the reliability of the secondary source, not an excuse to ignore the primary sources. Anyway, Gilbert uses "warned", "cautioned" and only once "threatening". Lawrence J. Epstein is not qualified at all. The third source (also not cited correctly) was written by the "Adviser on the law of Arab countries at the Israel Ministry of Justice" and frequent Israeli government delegate, and so is unreliable a fortiori. It quotes Heykal from the same UN document that I cited and the rest is spin. This article would look entirely different if we presented the Arab spin on Jewish statements in place of what the Jews themselves said, but nobody is trying to do that. I don't see why we should allow the opposite. Zerotalk 06:39, 30 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for noticing the wrong page number, I've fixed it. I've also replaced the book by Epstein since he's indeed not an expert. I don't agree that Forgotten million is an unreliable source. A biased source is not necessarily unreliable.
I have no problem with "present[ing] the Arab spin on Jewish statements" assuming it's properly sourced and is given due weight.
Also, I don't think that you can *know* this to be false. You can't get into Heykal's head and check whether he was genuinely worried about the Jews in Arab countries. Neither can I, of course, and that's why we need to follow reliable secondary sources. I'm also fine with quoting him directly, it was you who objected to that. Alaexis¿question? 09:26, 30 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I've never claimed to be able to read Heykal's or Husseini's minds. But we are required to judge the reliability of sources and no source is immune from that examination. When a source reports someone as saying something different from what their own sources contain, that's a red flag. When the distortion matches their obvious bias, that's reason to attribute or omit them. Citing an Israeli government source for something like this in wikivoice is simply out of the question and I'm surprised that you suggest it. Next, why do you think a Swiss businessman who publishes books on the Holocaust in a religious publishing house is a reliable source? Incidentally, I found al-Husseini's testimony in the UN records and noticed this "That was not meant as a threat, but to draw attention to the reactions of a policy for which the United Nations would be responsible." So as well as both Heykal and Husseini repeatedly phrasing their prediction as what the Arab states could not prevent, not as what the Arab states threatened, al-Husseini explicitly answered the charge from the Israeli delegate that it was a threat. At the moment you only have Gilbert, who supports you with one word "threatening" while undermining you by quoting "nobody could prevent disorders" and "even though the Arab States may do their best to save their skins" (which comes just before the part I quoted). This isn't a matter of reading minds because nobody is proposing to report what they thought, but only what they said. Gilbert can't read minds either, so his opinion that Heykal meant something different from what he said is just his opinion and has to be attributed. What I can agree to is a sourced statement that some historians regard this as threat, but there is no case to state in wikivoice that it was a threat. Zerotalk 12:33, 30 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]
As I said earlier, I'm fine with quoting them directly and letting the reader judge. But then things like "Jewish blood will necessarily be shed elsewhere in the Arab world" shouldn't be removed.
Of course Al-Husseini would say it wasn't a threat, but it doesn't mean we should automatically believe him. Please bring RS that interpret his and Heykal's words differently and we'll update the wording. Alaexis¿question? 14:34, 30 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

At Killings and massacres during the 1948 Palestine war, it has the following:

After the Partition vote, some Arab leaders threatened the Jewish population of Palestine. For example, they spoke of "driving the Jews into the sea" or ridding Palestine "of the Zionist Plague".[1]

According to the Israeli traditional historiography, these statements reflected the Arab intentions.[1][2] While Benny Morris considers the real picture of the Arab aims to be more complex, notably because they were well aware they could not defeat the Jews,[1] he argues that the Yishuv was indeed threatened with extinction and feared what would happen if the Arabs won.[3] Gelber, on the other hand, regards these public statements as 'meaningless' and judges that the 'actions [of their armies] imply that the aims of the Arab invasion were decidedly limited and focused mainly on saving Arab Palestine from total Jewish domination'.[4] Selfstudier (talk) 14:58, 30 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

This seems to concentrate more on the aims rather than what political statements were made by this or that person. Notice it doesn't mention threats towards Jews in Arab countries. Selfstudier (talk) 16:44, 30 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ a b c Benny Morris (2008), p.396.
  2. ^ Mitchell Bard, 1948 War, on the website of the Jewish Virtual Library.
  3. ^ Benny Morris (2004), pp.589-590.
  4. ^ Yoav Gelber, The Jihad that wasn't, Autumn 2008, n°34.

Edit request: Ad hoc Committee, last section[edit]

  • What I think should be changed (format using {{textdiff}}):
−
Arab states requested representation on the UN ad hoc subcommittees of October 1947, but were excluded from Subcommittee One, which had been delegated the specific task of studying and, if thought necessary, modifying the boundaries of the proposed partition. [FN 1]
+
The chairman [[H. V. Evatt]] excluded the Arab states from Subcommittee One, which had been delegated the specific task of studying and, if thought necessary, modifying the boundaries of the proposed partition. Initially, only this majority proposal was to be drafted, but an unnamed US politician maneuvered to also draft the minority proposal, thereby excluding the Arab states from the majority proposal's drafting. Instead, all Arab states were placed in Subcommittee 2 to draft the minority recommendation. [FN 2] Evatt also rejected a motion from Subcommittee 2 to balance this subcommittees' composition. [FN 3] He was later criticized for thereby preventing a compromise and a fairer partition proposal by creating these "unbalanced" subcommittees. [FN 4-6]
  • Why it should be changed:
    This was in fact one of the major irregularities in the drafting of the partition resolution. The matter is referenced in the UN Yearbook 1947/1948. Cohen reports on it, cited by Thomas, who is cited by the Wikitext. Each source presents it slightly differently from the previous one, so the Wikitext is not accurate in the end. I mark the crucial point with a "[!]".
    • UN, Department of Public Information: Yearbook of the United Nations. 1947–48. p. 240: "On a preliminary review of the task assigned to it - the drafting of a detailed plan for the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the establishment of Palestine as an independent unitary state - the Sub-Committee felt that it was somewhat unfortunate that both Sub-Committee 1 and Sub-Committee 2 were so constituted as to include in each of them representatives of only one school of thought, respectively, and that there was insufficient representation of neutral countries. Accordingly, it was proposed that the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee should be requested to reconstitute Sub-Committee 2 (irrespective of what might be done with regard to Sub-Committee 1) [!] by replacing two of the Arab States in the Sub-Committee (which were prepared to withdraw) by neutrals or countries which had not definitely committed themselves to any particular solution of the Palestine question. The Chairman of the ad hoc Committee, being approached in this connection, explained to the Sub-Committee that he could not see his way to accepting this recommendation. [!] In the circumstances, the representative of Colombia resigned from the Sub-Committee on October 28, and Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) was elected as Chairman in his stead, at the same time retaining his position as Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee."
    • Michael J. Cohen (2016): Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948. Princeton Legacy Library. p. 284: "On October 22, 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, chaired by Dr. Herbert E. Evatt of Australia, set up [!] two subcommittees, to study the majority and minority reports and to bring forward detailed proposals to the full assembly. Subcommittee One, with nine members, all supporters of partition, was deputed to work on the majority report; Subcommittee Two, composed of six Arab delegates and three supporters of the minority plan, was to work out the details of the unitary state scheme. [...] Subcommittee Two was not really taken seriously, and the unitary state scheme was never considered at any length by the assembly. Evatt found his freedom of choice severely limited by the right of delegates to opt out of subcommittees [!], but nevertheless he was criticized severely for composing them exclusively of delegates who already supported the schemes they were called upon to consider. The mutual exclusivity of the two reports was underlined by the fact that the Jewish Agency exploited to the full the opportunity afforded it to give evidence to Subcommittee One, while the HAC, which boycotted the first committee, was continually consulted by Subcommittee Two."
    • Thomas (see text): "The Arabs had boycotted the June 1947 UNSCOP inquiry [this is completely wrong; it was only the Arab Higher Committee (sc. Palestine's 'government') that boycotted UNSCOP] but wished to participate in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine's subcommittees of October 1947. They were excluded from Subcommittee One, responsible for studying and modifying the boundaries and other specifics of partition. The UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine placed only pro-partition, pro-Jewish countries (including the United States and U.S.S.R.) on this subcommittee. The chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, though limited in his freedom of choice concerning the assignment of delegates to various committees [!], 'was criticized severely for composing them exclusively of delegates who already supported the schemes that were called upon to consider.' The Arabs were included only in Subcommittee Two, dealing with the minority report (unitary Arab plan), which was not taken seriously. Cohen, Palestine, 284."
  1. ^ Baylis Thomas, How Israel was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Lexington Books 1999 p.57 n.6.
  2. ^ Cf. Daniel Mandel (2004): H. V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel. The Undercover Zionist. Frank Cass. p. 128.
  3. ^ UN, Department of Public Information: Yearbook of the United Nations. 1947–48. p. 240.
  4. ^ E.g. Nabil Elaraby (1968): Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Law and Contemporary Problems 33 (1). p. 101: „It seems anomalous that the procedure adopted for the consideration of the report was delegated to two subcommittees of the Ad Hoc Committee, one composed of pro-partition delegates and the other of Arab delegates plus Colombia and Pakistan, which were sympathetic to the Arab cause. It was obvious that those two sub-committees were so unbalanced as to be unable to achieve anything constructive. As was later evident, the task of reconciling their conflicting recommendations was impossible. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that no serious attention was given to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians.“
  5. ^ E.g. John B. Judis (2014): Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Section 13: "Months later, [Swedish UN representative] Hagglof told Lionel Gelber from the Jewish Agency that a majority of nations felt that the United States and the chairman of the ad hoc committee, the Australian Herbert Evatt, had manipulated the issue so that the countries were forced to choose between 'partition and some pro-Arab scheme.' They would have preferred an 'attempt at conciliation,' but that was not among the choices they were given."
  6. ^ Similarly, Victor Kattan (2009): From Coexistence to Conquest. International Law and the Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949. Pluto Press. p. 149: "In this regard, two of the Arab states let it be known that they were anxious to step down from Subcommittee 2 so that it might be reconstituted on a fairer basis with countries both for and against partition working together. But the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee rejected the proposal. In the words of Khan: 'It was either partition or nothing.' There was no middle way."

DaWalda (talk) 18:50, 7 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Edit request: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), First Section[edit]

  • What I think should be changed (format using {{textdiff}}):
−
The Arab states, convinced statehood had been subverted, and that the transition of authority from the League of Nations to the UN was questionable in law, wished the issues to be brought before an International Court, and refused to collaborate with UNSCOP, which had extended an invitation for liaison also to the [[Arab Higher Committee]]. [FN 1: Thomas] [FN 2]
+
The Arab states, convinced statehood had been subverted, and that the transition of authority from the League of Nations to the UN was questionable in law, wished the issues to be brought before an International Court. The [[Arab Higher Committee]] even officially refused to cooperate with UNSCOP. [FN 2] [FN 3]
  • Why it should be changed: The information in Thomas is wrong. I have actually found even more books where a boycott by 'the Arabs' is mentioned. However, the matter is thoroughly discussed by Levenberg: It was only some members of the Arab Higher Committee who wanted to boycott UNSCOP. The other Arab states were against it, did of course work together with UNSCOP, and even within the AHC, several individuals (e.g., Khalidi [cf., e.g., Morris: 1948. p. 45] and Alami [cf., e.g., Levenberg: Politics... p. 157]) unofficially collaborated with UNSCOP.

DaWalda (talk) 09:19, 8 June 2024 (UTC)[reply]

  1. ^ Cite error: The named reference Baylis Thomas p.47 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  2. ^ Mandel, p.88.
  3. ^ Haim Levenberg: Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945-1948. Frank Cass 1993. p. 108-116.
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