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'''Compellence''' (or '''coercion<ref name=":1" />'''<ref>{{Cite book|last=Greenhill|first=Kelly M.|url=https://books.google.com/books/about/Coercion.html?id=U_U-DwAAQBAJ&source=kp_book_description|title=Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics|last2=Krause|first2=Peter|date=2018|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-084633-6|language=en}}</ref> or '''compellence<ref name=":0" />''' or '''forceful persuasion''') is a form of [[Coercion (international relations)|coercion]] that attempts to get an actor (such as a state) to change its behavior through threats to use of force or the actual use of limited force.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Art|first=Robert J.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ez8xCgAAQBAJ&newbks=0&hl=en&source=newbks_fb|title=The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics|last2=Greenhill|first2=Kelly M.|date=2015|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers|isbn=978-1-4422-3306-5|pages=3–5|language=en}}</ref><ref name=RArt>[[Robert J. Art]] and Patrick M. Cronin, ''The United States and Coercive Diplomacy'' [[United States Institute of Peace#Publications|United States Institute of Peace Press]], Washington, DC 2003</ref> Coercive diplomacy can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's will or incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation."<ref name="JLevy">Jack S. Levy. [http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/Levy%20-%20Deterrence%20&%20Coercive%20Diplomacy.pdf "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110720040305/http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/Levy%20-%20Deterrence%20%26%20Coercive%20Diplomacy.pdf |date=2011-07-20 }}</ref>
#REDIRECT [[Coercive diplomacy ]]

As distinguished from [[deterrence theory]], which is a strategy aimed at maintaining the status quo (dissuading adversaries from undertaking an action), coercive diplomacy entails efforts to change the status quo (persuading an opponent to change their behavior).<ref name=AGeorge1994>George, Alexander and William Simons. ''The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy'', 2nd Rev. ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994</ref> Coercive diplomacy has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /> Coercive diplomacy can entail strategies to punish an adversary, raise the risk for an adversary, or deny the adversary from achieving their objectives.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":0" /> Successful instances of coercive diplomacy in one case may have a deterrent effect on other states,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhang|first=Ketian|date=2019|title=Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea|url=https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00354|journal=International Security|volume=44|issue=1|pages=117–159|doi=10.1162/isec_a_00354|issn=0162-2889}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Miller|first=Nicholas L.|date=2014|title=The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0020818314000216/type/journal_article|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=68|issue=4|pages=913–944|doi=10.1017/S0020818314000216|issn=0020-8183}}</ref>'''<ref name=":0" />''' whereas a reputation for a lack of resolve may undermine general deterrence<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Weisiger|first=Alex|last2=Yarhi-Milo|first2=Keren|date=2015|title=Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/revisiting-reputation-how-past-actions-matter-in-international-politics/8BF54EA849FC4925FDC4C43FB9A810C4|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=69|issue=2|pages=473–495|doi=10.1017/S0020818314000393|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref> and future compellence.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Peterson|first=Timothy M.|date=2013|title=Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior|url=https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12017|journal=International Studies Quarterly|volume=57|issue=4|pages=672–682|doi=10.1111/isqu.12017|issn=0020-8833}}</ref>

==Background==

The term 'coercive diplomacy' falls under the theory of [[coercion]] as a [[foreign policy]] tool.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Schelling|first=Thomas C.|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vm52s|title=Arms and Influence|date=1966|publisher=Yale University Press|isbn=978-0-300-00221-8}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Pape|first=Robert A.|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v|title=Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War|date=1996|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-3134-0|edition=1|doi=10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v}}</ref> Coercive diplomacy typically entails efforts to change the decision calculus of an adversary by manipulating the costs and benefits of certain actions.<ref name=":1" /> [[Daniel Byman]] and [[Matthew Waxman]] define coercive diplomacy as "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Coercion strategy "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also include limited uses of actual force".<ref name=DByman>Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. ''The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might'' New York. Cambridge University Press. 2002.</ref> [[Joseph Nye]] emphasizes that coercive diplomacy depends upon the credibility and the cost of the threat.<ref name=JNye>{{cite book|last=Nye|first=Joseph S.|title=The Future of Power|year=2011|publisher=PublicAffairs|location=New York|isbn=9781586488925|page=45|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jThyCT8d3mYC}}</ref> "If a threat is not credible, it may fail to produce acceptance ''and'' it may lead to costs to the reputation of the coercing state. In general, threats are costly when they fail, not only in encouraging resistance in the target, but also in negatively influencing third parties observing the outcome."<ref name=JNye />

The term ''deterrence'' is differentiated from coercive diplomacy. In his influential work, ''Arms and Influence'', [[Thomas Schelling]] puts forth a general concept of ''coercion theory'' as it emerges beyond deterrence. According to Schelling, deterrence is merely a passive threat aimed at keeping an adversary from acting. It is only a threat. "Initiative is placed on the opponent to take the first action triggering a response from the coercer." Schelling believes that deterrence does not present "a comprehensive picture of coercion, leading Schelling to introduce the concept of compellence".<ref name="LNemeth">Major Lisa A. Nemeth. [http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA506197#.pdf "The Use of Pauses in Coercion: An Explanation in Theory"]</ref>

'Compellence', in contrast to 'deterrence', shifts the initiative for the first action to the coercer. While deterrence means waiting passively in hope of not seeing a response, compellence is active, thereby, "inducing his withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action that threatens to hurt".<ref name=LNemeth />
When differentiating between deterrence and compellence, deterrence can be described as "drawing a line in the sand" and acting only if the adversary crosses it; in contrast, compellence "requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts" as in deterrence. "Coercion composed of both compellence and deterrence is about action and inaction."<ref name=LNemeth />
[[Alexander L. George]], a scholar of international relations and former professor of political science at [[Stanford University]], was a pioneer in the field of [[political psychology]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2006/august23/obitgeorge-082306.html|title=Alexander George, 'giant' in international relations, dead at 86}}</ref> Like Schelling before him, Alexander George worked to create a diplomatic strategy of coercion; his was the theory of ''coercive diplomacy''. Unlike Schelling, George's theory of 'coercive diplomacy' is different than Schelling's 'coercive warfare', in that he believed that coercive diplomacy was "a subset of coercion and compellence". He viewed it as encompassing "defensive" compellent actions only: to force a target to stop or reverse action already taken, rather than an offensive goal of forcing them to do something&nbsp;... Coercive diplomacy essentially is the embodiment of a "carrot and stick" philosophy: motivation is used to induce a target to submit to your wishes, while appearing threatening at the same time".<ref name=LNemeth />

==Types of coercive strategy==

=== Alexander George's types ===
According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it attempts to persuade an adversary to turn away from its goal. Second, it seeks to convince an adversary to reverse an action already taken. Third, it may persuade an adversary to make "fundamental changes in its government".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA414554&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf|title=Building a Psychological Strategy for the U.S.: Leveraging the Informational Element of National Power|author=Stephen M. Tanous}}</ref>
When constructing a coercive diplomacy strategy, policymakers must consider certain variables or "empty boxes" that must be filled. They must decide "what to demand of the opponent; whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with demand; whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand".<ref name="AGeorge1991">George, Alexander. ''Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War.'' Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1991 </ref>

Alexander George developed a framework in which a number of "variants" or methods of using ''coercive diplomacy'' could be deployed to achieve these objectives. These variants include the following:
#Ultimatum
#Tacit Ultimatum
#Try-and-See
#Gradual Turning of the Screw

The first variant of the 'coercive diplomacy' strategy is the classic '[[ultimatum]]'. An ultimatum itself has three distinct components: "a demand on the opponent; a time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; and a threat of punishment for noncompliance that is both credible to the opponent and sufficiently potent to impress upon him that compliance is preferable".<ref name=AGeorge1991 />

The second variant of coercive diplomacy, 'Tacit ultimatum', is similar to 'ultimatum' except that it doesn't set forth an explicit time limit.

The third variant of coercive diplomacy, the 'Try-and-See', addresses strictly the first component of the 'ultimatum' variant, "a demand on the opponent". There is no time limit set, no sense of urgency conveyed, instead the coercer makes a single threat or takes a single action "to persuade the opponent before threatening or taking another step".<ref name=AGeorge1991 />

Finally, the 'Gradual Turning of the Screw' approach is similar to the 'Try-and-See' method in that it makes a threat but then "relies the threat of a gradual, incremental increase of coercive pressure rather than threatening large escalation to strong, decisive military action if the opponent does not comply".<ref name=AGeorge1991 />

=== Other types ===
Thomas Schelling and Robert Pape distinguished between coercive strategies that sought to:

# Punish: Raise the costs for the adversary
# Risk: Raise the probability of future costs for the adversary
# Deny: Prevent the adversary from obtaining their objectives.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" />
Pape also added the strategy of decapitation, which typically entails targeting leaders.<ref name=":1" /> Alexander Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran distinguish between two punishment strategies: (i) Coercive victimization (which raises the costs of war for a government by targeting its civilians) and (ii) Eliminationist victimization (which removes civilians from territory).<ref name=":2">Alexander B. Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran, “[https://alexanderdownes.weebly.com/uploads/9/2/6/8/92684520/downes-cochran-crime-blunder-published.pdf It’s a Crime, but Is It a Blunder? Investigating the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization],” in Civilians and Warfare in History, ed. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 288-312. </ref>

==Requirements for success==

Among the numerous theories on coercive diplomacy, Peter Viggo Jakobsen's (1998) ''ideal policy'' succinctly identifies the four key conditions the coercer must meet to maximize the chance of success to stop or undo acts of aggression:

# A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost.
# A deadline for compliance.
# An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
# An offer of inducements for compliance.

The first requirement in Jakobsen's 'ideal policy' is to make the threat so great that non-compliance will be too costly for the resisting actors.<ref name="Jakobsen">Jakobsen, P.V. (2007). "Coercive Diplomacy", ''Contemporary Security Studies'', (Oxford: Oxford University Press).</ref> The second requirement demands that after maximizing the credibility of the threat, the coercer must set a specific deadline, as failure to set a deadline for compliance "is likely to be interpreted as evidence that the coercer lacks the will to implement the threat".<ref name="Jakobsen" /> Assurance against new demands must also be carried out for greater chance of success. Jakobsen points out that the incentive to comply with the coercer's demands will be significantly downgraded if the resisting actor fears compliance will merely invite more demands. The last requirement for successful coercion is the effective use of inducements, which are important facilitators used to give more credibility and assurance.<ref name="Jakobsen" />

According to [[Richard Ned Lebow]], a credible threat entails:<ref name=":5">{{Cite book|last=Lebow|first=Richard Ned|url=https://books.google.com/books/about/Between_Peace_and_War.html?id=N92OAAAAMAAJ&source=kp_book_description|title=Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis|date=1981|publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press|isbn=978-0-8018-2311-4|language=en}}</ref>
# A formulated commitment
# A communication of that commitment to the other side
# The capability to back up the commitment
# The will to back up the commitment
According to Robert Art, the perquisites for compellence success are:<ref name="RArt" />

# Clear objectives
# Strong motivation
# Domestic and international support
# Strong leadership
# Clearly stated demands
# Creation of a sense of urgency in the other state's mind
# Making the target fear unacceptable escalation
# Asymmetry in motivation

=== Credibility ===
{{Main|Credibility (international relations)}}
Much of the scholarship on coercive diplomacy focuses on the credibility of coercive threats as a key component of the success of coercive diplomacy.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Press|first=Daryl Grayson|url=https://books.google.com/books/about/Calculating_Credibility.html?id=jecGSD9PSh0C|title=Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats|date=2005|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-4343-5|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Sechser|first=Todd S.|date=2010|title=Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40930451|journal=International Organization|volume=64|issue=4|pages=627–660|issn=0020-8183}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Weisiger|first=Alex|last2=Yarhi-Milo|first2=Keren|date=2015|title=Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/revisiting-reputation-how-past-actions-matter-in-international-politics/8BF54EA849FC4925FDC4C43FB9A810C4|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=69|issue=2|pages=473–495|doi=10.1017/S0020818314000393|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Mercer|first=Jonathan|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv5rf1n9|title=Reputation And International Politics|date=1996|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-3055-8|doi=10.7591/j.ctv5rf1n9}}</ref><ref name=":0" /><ref name=":5" /> According to Anne Sartori, states rarely seek to obtain goals through bluffing, because doing so undermines their reputation in future crises.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Sartori|first=Anne|date=2005|title=Deterrence by Diplomacy on JSTOR|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt4cgcgz|url-status=live|website=Princeton University Press|language=en}}</ref> Survey experiment data from Barbara Walter and Dustin Tingley confirm the findings of Sartori's study, as they find that people "invest more heavily in reputation building if they believe a game will be repeated many times."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Tingley|first=Dustin H.|last2=Walter|first2=Barbara F.|date=2011|title=The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0020818311000026/type/journal_article|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=65|issue=2|pages=343–365|doi=10.1017/S0020818311000026|issn=0020-8183}}</ref>

Credibility (or reputation) refers to the degree to which an actor is expected to uphold their commitments based on past behavior.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sharman|first=J. C.|date=2007|title=Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation|url=https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00643.x|journal=Political Studies|language=en|volume=55|issue=1|pages=20–37|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00643.x|issn=0032-3217}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Weisiger|first=Alex|last2=Yarhi-Milo|first2=Keren|date=2015|title=Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/revisiting-reputation-how-past-actions-matter-in-international-politics/8BF54EA849FC4925FDC4C43FB9A810C4|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=69|issue=2|pages=473–495|doi=10.1017/S0020818314000393|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}}</ref> In terms of credible coercive diplomacy, credibility entails that defiance will be met with punishment, and that compliance will be met with restraint.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Cebul|first=Matthew D.|last2=Dafoe|first2=Allan|last3=Monteiro|first3=Nuno P.|date=2020|title=Coercion and the Credibility of Assurances|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/711132|journal=The Journal of Politics|doi=10.1086/711132|issn=0022-3816}}</ref><ref name=":3" /> One of the main problems in coercive diplomacy is that it is hard to credibly signal that compliance will not lead to punishment.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bowen|first=Wyn|last2=Knopf|first2=Jeffrey W.|last3=Moran|first3=Matthew|date=2020-10-19|title=The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the “Resolve plus Bombs” Formula|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1859130|journal=Security Studies|volume=29|issue=5|pages=797–831|doi=10.1080/09636412.2020.1859130|issn=0963-6412|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":4" /> Scholars have argued that when great powers increase their power, their credibility to engage in restraint decreases.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Reiter|first=Dan|date=2021|title=Gulliver Unleashed? International Order, Restraint, and The Case of Ancient Athens|url=https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab061|journal=International Studies Quarterly|issue=sqab061|doi=10.1093/isq/sqab061|issn=0020-8833}}</ref>

To enhance the credibility of threats, some scholars argue that [[Audience cost|audience costs]] are effective in doing so.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fearon|first=James D.|date=1994|title=Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2944796|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=88|issue=3|pages=577–592|doi=10.2307/2944796|issn=0003-0554}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Schultz|first=Kenneth A.|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/democracy-and-coercive-diplomacy/87C76B721996668F3AEDC7B299121931|title=Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy|date=2001|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-79227-1|series=Cambridge Studies in International Relations|location=Cambridge|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511491658}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gelpi|first1=Christopher F.|last2=Griesdorf|first2=Michael|date=2001|title=Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/winners-or-losers-democracies-in-international-crisis-191894/16827D1778F08D49C436F75B62014E24|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=95|issue=3|pages=633–647|doi=10.1017/S0003055401003148|issn=0003-0554|s2cid=146346368}}</ref> Other scholars dispute that audience costs enhance credibility.<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal|last1=Downes|first1=Alexander B.|last2=Sechser|first2=Todd S.|date=2012|title=The Illusion of Democratic Credibility|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23279964|journal=International Organization|volume=66|issue=3|pages=457–489|doi=10.1017/S0020818312000161|issn=0020-8183|jstor=23279964|s2cid=154325372}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Snyder|first1=Jack|last2=Borghard|first2=Erica D.|date=2011|title=The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000305541100027x|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=105|issue=3|pages=437–456|doi=10.1017/s000305541100027x|issn=0003-0554|s2cid=144584619}}</ref>

Some scholars question whether credibility or reputation matters in international disputes.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Press|first=Daryl G.|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=9RnmEd581a8C&newbks=0&printsec=frontcover&pg=PP1&dq=calculating+credibility&hl=en&redir_esc=y|title=Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats|date=2007|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-7415-6|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Mercer|first=Jonathan|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=FEF0CS_QCuoC&newbks=0&printsec=frontcover&pg=PP1&dq=mercer+reputation&hl=en&redir_esc=y|title=Reputation and International Politics|date=2010|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-7489-7|language=en}}</ref>

==Case studies==

===Success===
Scholars have found that coercive diplomacy is less likely to be successful than deterrence.<ref name="RArt" /><ref name=":0" /> Studies have indicated that "punishment" strategies that target civilians tend to be ineffective.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mueller|first=Karl|date=1998-03-01|title=Strategies of coercion: Denial, punishment, and the future of air power|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419808429354|journal=Security Studies|volume=7|issue=3|pages=182–228|doi=10.1080/09636419808429354|issn=0963-6412}}</ref>

President [[John F. Kennedy]] used coercive diplomacy successfully in 1962 when he was able to bring about a peaceful resolution to the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] and avert possible warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Kennedy learned of the Soviet Union's attempt to deploy forty-two [[Medium-range ballistic missile|medium-range]] and twenty-four [[intermediate-range ballistic missile]]s into [[Cuba]], he established a [[naval blockade]] and threatened an invasion of Cuba with force to remove the missiles already there.<ref name="AGeorge1994" />

Instead of resorting to a strictly military strategy to forcibly remove the missiles, Kennedy decided to use coercive diplomacy. He initiated this strategy by first using the 'Try-and-See' approach. The giant naval blockade, along with a massive buildup of U.S. military forces, was a message to [[Nikita Khrushchev]] to persuade him that the U.S. was able and willing to use force if needed to remove this missile threat from Cuba.<ref>Coercive Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A New Framework for the "Carrot and Stick"</ref> The blockade limited the showdown to Kennedy and Khrushchev rather than develop into all-out war. Because of Kennedy's tough naval blockade, Khrushchev "directed all Soviet vessels carrying missiles and other military equipment to Cuba to immediately turn back".<ref name=AGeorge1994 />

To intensify the coercive diplomacy strategy, Kennedy shifted from the 'Try-and-See' approach to a hybrid of a virtual 'ultimatum' and a carrot-and-the stick approach.<ref name=AGeorge1991 /> Kennedy addressed the sense of urgency about the growing hostile situation by standing firm and tightening the naval blockade as well as conveying to Khrushchev the continued threat of a possible invasion of Cuba. As a result of Kennedy's successful use of coercive diplomacy added to negotiated concessions, Khrushchev agreed to remove missiles in place and to discontinue the deployment of new missiles into Cuba while the U.S. agreed to remove its [[PGM-19 Jupiter|Jupiter missiles]] stationed in Turkey and to call off any invasion of Cuba.<ref name=AGeorge1991 /><ref>Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits</ref>

===Failure===
During the 1990–91 [[Gulf War]], coercive diplomacy failed to persuade [[Saddam Hussein]] to exit [[Kuwait]] and move his military forces back to [[Iraq]]; though the use of deterrence effectively convinced the Iraqi president that he could not invade further south into [[Saudi Arabia]], it did little to expel him from Kuwait.<ref name=AGeorge1994 />
Initially, the Bush administration along with the United Nations issued sanctions to pressure Iraq to withdraw troops inside Kuwait. The [[UN Security Council]] placed economic sanctions by imposing an embargo on Iraq's imports and exports. This initial stage of the crisis was the United States' attempt to use the coercive diplomatic variant, 'Gradual Turning of the Screw' to apply pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply to the demands to leave Kuwait.<ref name=AGeorge1991 />

Then the [[George H. W. Bush#Presidency (1989–1993)|Bush administration]], along with the UN Security Council, used the variant 'ultimatum' by setting a deadline of January 15, 1991, for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. When this deadline came and passed, without Saddam Hussein's compliance, Operation Desert Storm commenced and military force was used to remove Iraq's forces from Kuwait. Despite the massive build-up of U.S. forces along the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border, economic sanctions, and a declared deadline for withdrawal, Saddam Hussein failed to remove his forces.<ref name=AGeorge1991 /> In this instance, coercive diplomacy failed, leading to the Gulf War, which concluded with the United States and coalition forces succeeding in removing Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait. Thus, when implementing coercive diplomacy not only the benefits but also the aftermath must be considered. Especially in the 21st century, every nation is interdependent so other forces by state actors may affect a nation's diplomacy.

== References ==
{{reflist}}

{{Diplomacy}}
[[Category:Types of diplomacy]]
[[Category:Monetary hegemony]]

Revision as of 21:24, 31 August 2021

Compellence (or coercion[1][2] or compellence[3] or forceful persuasion) is a form of coercion that attempts to get an actor (such as a state) to change its behavior through threats to use of force or the actual use of limited force.[4][5] Coercive diplomacy can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's will or incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation."[6]

As distinguished from deterrence theory, which is a strategy aimed at maintaining the status quo (dissuading adversaries from undertaking an action), coercive diplomacy entails efforts to change the status quo (persuading an opponent to change their behavior).[7] Coercive diplomacy has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence.[3][1] Coercive diplomacy can entail strategies to punish an adversary, raise the risk for an adversary, or deny the adversary from achieving their objectives.[1][3] Successful instances of coercive diplomacy in one case may have a deterrent effect on other states,[8][9][3] whereas a reputation for a lack of resolve may undermine general deterrence[10] and future compellence.[11]

Background

The term 'coercive diplomacy' falls under the theory of coercion as a foreign policy tool.[3][1] Coercive diplomacy typically entails efforts to change the decision calculus of an adversary by manipulating the costs and benefits of certain actions.[1] Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define coercive diplomacy as "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Coercion strategy "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also include limited uses of actual force".[12] Joseph Nye emphasizes that coercive diplomacy depends upon the credibility and the cost of the threat.[13] "If a threat is not credible, it may fail to produce acceptance and it may lead to costs to the reputation of the coercing state. In general, threats are costly when they fail, not only in encouraging resistance in the target, but also in negatively influencing third parties observing the outcome."[13]

The term deterrence is differentiated from coercive diplomacy. In his influential work, Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling puts forth a general concept of coercion theory as it emerges beyond deterrence. According to Schelling, deterrence is merely a passive threat aimed at keeping an adversary from acting. It is only a threat. "Initiative is placed on the opponent to take the first action triggering a response from the coercer." Schelling believes that deterrence does not present "a comprehensive picture of coercion, leading Schelling to introduce the concept of compellence".[14]

'Compellence', in contrast to 'deterrence', shifts the initiative for the first action to the coercer. While deterrence means waiting passively in hope of not seeing a response, compellence is active, thereby, "inducing his withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action that threatens to hurt".[14] When differentiating between deterrence and compellence, deterrence can be described as "drawing a line in the sand" and acting only if the adversary crosses it; in contrast, compellence "requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts" as in deterrence. "Coercion composed of both compellence and deterrence is about action and inaction."[14] Alexander L. George, a scholar of international relations and former professor of political science at Stanford University, was a pioneer in the field of political psychology.[15] Like Schelling before him, Alexander George worked to create a diplomatic strategy of coercion; his was the theory of coercive diplomacy. Unlike Schelling, George's theory of 'coercive diplomacy' is different than Schelling's 'coercive warfare', in that he believed that coercive diplomacy was "a subset of coercion and compellence". He viewed it as encompassing "defensive" compellent actions only: to force a target to stop or reverse action already taken, rather than an offensive goal of forcing them to do something ... Coercive diplomacy essentially is the embodiment of a "carrot and stick" philosophy: motivation is used to induce a target to submit to your wishes, while appearing threatening at the same time".[14]

Types of coercive strategy

Alexander George's types

According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it attempts to persuade an adversary to turn away from its goal. Second, it seeks to convince an adversary to reverse an action already taken. Third, it may persuade an adversary to make "fundamental changes in its government".[16] When constructing a coercive diplomacy strategy, policymakers must consider certain variables or "empty boxes" that must be filled. They must decide "what to demand of the opponent; whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with demand; whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand".[17]

Alexander George developed a framework in which a number of "variants" or methods of using coercive diplomacy could be deployed to achieve these objectives. These variants include the following:

  1. Ultimatum
  2. Tacit Ultimatum
  3. Try-and-See
  4. Gradual Turning of the Screw

The first variant of the 'coercive diplomacy' strategy is the classic 'ultimatum'. An ultimatum itself has three distinct components: "a demand on the opponent; a time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; and a threat of punishment for noncompliance that is both credible to the opponent and sufficiently potent to impress upon him that compliance is preferable".[17]

The second variant of coercive diplomacy, 'Tacit ultimatum', is similar to 'ultimatum' except that it doesn't set forth an explicit time limit.

The third variant of coercive diplomacy, the 'Try-and-See', addresses strictly the first component of the 'ultimatum' variant, "a demand on the opponent". There is no time limit set, no sense of urgency conveyed, instead the coercer makes a single threat or takes a single action "to persuade the opponent before threatening or taking another step".[17]

Finally, the 'Gradual Turning of the Screw' approach is similar to the 'Try-and-See' method in that it makes a threat but then "relies the threat of a gradual, incremental increase of coercive pressure rather than threatening large escalation to strong, decisive military action if the opponent does not comply".[17]

Other types

Thomas Schelling and Robert Pape distinguished between coercive strategies that sought to:

  1. Punish: Raise the costs for the adversary
  2. Risk: Raise the probability of future costs for the adversary
  3. Deny: Prevent the adversary from obtaining their objectives.[3][1]

Pape also added the strategy of decapitation, which typically entails targeting leaders.[1] Alexander Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran distinguish between two punishment strategies: (i) Coercive victimization (which raises the costs of war for a government by targeting its civilians) and (ii) Eliminationist victimization (which removes civilians from territory).[18]

Requirements for success

Among the numerous theories on coercive diplomacy, Peter Viggo Jakobsen's (1998) ideal policy succinctly identifies the four key conditions the coercer must meet to maximize the chance of success to stop or undo acts of aggression:

  1. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost.
  2. A deadline for compliance.
  3. An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
  4. An offer of inducements for compliance.

The first requirement in Jakobsen's 'ideal policy' is to make the threat so great that non-compliance will be too costly for the resisting actors.[19] The second requirement demands that after maximizing the credibility of the threat, the coercer must set a specific deadline, as failure to set a deadline for compliance "is likely to be interpreted as evidence that the coercer lacks the will to implement the threat".[19] Assurance against new demands must also be carried out for greater chance of success. Jakobsen points out that the incentive to comply with the coercer's demands will be significantly downgraded if the resisting actor fears compliance will merely invite more demands. The last requirement for successful coercion is the effective use of inducements, which are important facilitators used to give more credibility and assurance.[19]

According to Richard Ned Lebow, a credible threat entails:[20]

  1. A formulated commitment
  2. A communication of that commitment to the other side
  3. The capability to back up the commitment
  4. The will to back up the commitment

According to Robert Art, the perquisites for compellence success are:[5]

  1. Clear objectives
  2. Strong motivation
  3. Domestic and international support
  4. Strong leadership
  5. Clearly stated demands
  6. Creation of a sense of urgency in the other state's mind
  7. Making the target fear unacceptable escalation
  8. Asymmetry in motivation

Credibility

Main article: Credibility (international relations)

Much of the scholarship on coercive diplomacy focuses on the credibility of coercive threats as a key component of the success of coercive diplomacy.[21][22][23][24][3][20] According to Anne Sartori, states rarely seek to obtain goals through bluffing, because doing so undermines their reputation in future crises.[25] Survey experiment data from Barbara Walter and Dustin Tingley confirm the findings of Sartori's study, as they find that people "invest more heavily in reputation building if they believe a game will be repeated many times."[26]

Credibility (or reputation) refers to the degree to which an actor is expected to uphold their commitments based on past behavior.[27][28] In terms of credible coercive diplomacy, credibility entails that defiance will be met with punishment, and that compliance will be met with restraint.[29][22] One of the main problems in coercive diplomacy is that it is hard to credibly signal that compliance will not lead to punishment.[22][30][29] Scholars have argued that when great powers increase their power, their credibility to engage in restraint decreases.[22][31]

To enhance the credibility of threats, some scholars argue that audience costs are effective in doing so.[32][33][34] Other scholars dispute that audience costs enhance credibility.[35][36]

Some scholars question whether credibility or reputation matters in international disputes.[37][38]

Case studies

Success

Scholars have found that coercive diplomacy is less likely to be successful than deterrence.[5][3] Studies have indicated that "punishment" strategies that target civilians tend to be ineffective.[1][18][39]

President John F. Kennedy used coercive diplomacy successfully in 1962 when he was able to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis and avert possible warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Kennedy learned of the Soviet Union's attempt to deploy forty-two medium-range and twenty-four intermediate-range ballistic missiles into Cuba, he established a naval blockade and threatened an invasion of Cuba with force to remove the missiles already there.[7]

Instead of resorting to a strictly military strategy to forcibly remove the missiles, Kennedy decided to use coercive diplomacy. He initiated this strategy by first using the 'Try-and-See' approach. The giant naval blockade, along with a massive buildup of U.S. military forces, was a message to Nikita Khrushchev to persuade him that the U.S. was able and willing to use force if needed to remove this missile threat from Cuba.[40] The blockade limited the showdown to Kennedy and Khrushchev rather than develop into all-out war. Because of Kennedy's tough naval blockade, Khrushchev "directed all Soviet vessels carrying missiles and other military equipment to Cuba to immediately turn back".[7]

To intensify the coercive diplomacy strategy, Kennedy shifted from the 'Try-and-See' approach to a hybrid of a virtual 'ultimatum' and a carrot-and-the stick approach.[17] Kennedy addressed the sense of urgency about the growing hostile situation by standing firm and tightening the naval blockade as well as conveying to Khrushchev the continued threat of a possible invasion of Cuba. As a result of Kennedy's successful use of coercive diplomacy added to negotiated concessions, Khrushchev agreed to remove missiles in place and to discontinue the deployment of new missiles into Cuba while the U.S. agreed to remove its Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey and to call off any invasion of Cuba.[17][41]

Failure

During the 1990–91 Gulf War, coercive diplomacy failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to exit Kuwait and move his military forces back to Iraq; though the use of deterrence effectively convinced the Iraqi president that he could not invade further south into Saudi Arabia, it did little to expel him from Kuwait.[7] Initially, the Bush administration along with the United Nations issued sanctions to pressure Iraq to withdraw troops inside Kuwait. The UN Security Council placed economic sanctions by imposing an embargo on Iraq's imports and exports. This initial stage of the crisis was the United States' attempt to use the coercive diplomatic variant, 'Gradual Turning of the Screw' to apply pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply to the demands to leave Kuwait.[17]

Then the Bush administration, along with the UN Security Council, used the variant 'ultimatum' by setting a deadline of January 15, 1991, for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. When this deadline came and passed, without Saddam Hussein's compliance, Operation Desert Storm commenced and military force was used to remove Iraq's forces from Kuwait. Despite the massive build-up of U.S. forces along the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border, economic sanctions, and a declared deadline for withdrawal, Saddam Hussein failed to remove his forces.[17] In this instance, coercive diplomacy failed, leading to the Gulf War, which concluded with the United States and coalition forces succeeding in removing Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait. Thus, when implementing coercive diplomacy not only the benefits but also the aftermath must be considered. Especially in the 21st century, every nation is interdependent so other forces by state actors may affect a nation's diplomacy.

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h Pape, Robert A. (1996). Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (1 ed.). Cornell University Press. doi:10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v. ISBN 978-0-8014-3134-0.
  2. ^ Greenhill, Kelly M.; Krause, Peter (2018). Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-084633-6.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-00221-8.
  4. ^ Art, Robert J.; Greenhill, Kelly M. (2015). The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 3–5. ISBN 978-1-4422-3306-5.
  5. ^ a b c Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC 2003
  6. ^ Jack S. Levy. "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George" Archived 2011-07-20 at the Wayback Machine
  7. ^ a b c d George, Alexander and William Simons. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd Rev. ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1994
  8. ^ Zhang, Ketian (2019). "Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea". International Security. 44 (1): 117–159. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00354. ISSN 0162-2889.
  9. ^ Miller, Nicholas L. (2014). "The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions". International Organization. 68 (4): 913–944. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000216. ISSN 0020-8183.
  10. ^ Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015). "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics". International Organization. 69 (2): 473–495. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000393. ISSN 0020-8183.
  11. ^ Peterson, Timothy M. (2013). "Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior". International Studies Quarterly. 57 (4): 672–682. doi:10.1111/isqu.12017. ISSN 0020-8833.
  12. ^ Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might New York. Cambridge University Press. 2002.
  13. ^ a b Nye, Joseph S. (2011). The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs. p. 45. ISBN 9781586488925.
  14. ^ a b c d Major Lisa A. Nemeth. "The Use of Pauses in Coercion: An Explanation in Theory"
  15. ^ "Alexander George, 'giant' in international relations, dead at 86".
  16. ^ Stephen M. Tanous. "Building a Psychological Strategy for the U.S.: Leveraging the Informational Element of National Power" (PDF).
  17. ^ a b c d e f g h George, Alexander. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1991
  18. ^ a b Alexander B. Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran, “It’s a Crime, but Is It a Blunder? Investigating the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization,” in Civilians and Warfare in History, ed. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 288-312.
  19. ^ a b c Jakobsen, P.V. (2007). "Coercive Diplomacy", Contemporary Security Studies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
  20. ^ a b Lebow, Richard Ned (1981). Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-2311-4.
  21. ^ Press, Daryl Grayson (2005). Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-4343-5.
  22. ^ a b c d Sechser, Todd S. (2010). "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power". International Organization. 64 (4): 627–660. ISSN 0020-8183.
  23. ^ Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015). "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics". International Organization. 69 (2): 473–495. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000393. ISSN 0020-8183.
  24. ^ Mercer, Jonathan (1996). Reputation And International Politics. Cornell University Press. doi:10.7591/j.ctv5rf1n9. ISBN 978-0-8014-3055-8.
  25. ^ Sartori, Anne (2005). "Deterrence by Diplomacy on JSTOR". Princeton University Press.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  26. ^ Tingley, Dustin H.; Walter, Barbara F. (2011). "The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach". International Organization. 65 (2): 343–365. doi:10.1017/S0020818311000026. ISSN 0020-8183.
  27. ^ Sharman, J. C. (2007). "Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation". Political Studies. 55 (1): 20–37. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00643.x. ISSN 0032-3217.
  28. ^ Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015). "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics". International Organization. 69 (2): 473–495. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000393. ISSN 0020-8183.
  29. ^ a b Cebul, Matthew D.; Dafoe, Allan; Monteiro, Nuno P. (2020). "Coercion and the Credibility of Assurances". The Journal of Politics. doi:10.1086/711132. ISSN 0022-3816.
  30. ^ Bowen, Wyn; Knopf, Jeffrey W.; Moran, Matthew (2020-10-19). "The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the "Resolve plus Bombs" Formula". Security Studies. 29 (5): 797–831. doi:10.1080/09636412.2020.1859130. ISSN 0963-6412.
  31. ^ Reiter, Dan (2021). "Gulliver Unleashed? International Order, Restraint, and The Case of Ancient Athens". International Studies Quarterly (sqab061). doi:10.1093/isq/sqab061. ISSN 0020-8833.
  32. ^ Fearon, James D. (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes". The American Political Science Review. 88 (3): 577–592. doi:10.2307/2944796. ISSN 0003-0554.
  33. ^ Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491658. ISBN 978-0-521-79227-1.
  34. ^ Gelpi, Christopher F.; Griesdorf, Michael (2001). "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94". American Political Science Review. 95 (3): 633–647. doi:10.1017/S0003055401003148. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 146346368.
  35. ^ Downes, Alexander B.; Sechser, Todd S. (2012). "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility". International Organization. 66 (3): 457–489. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000161. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 23279964. S2CID 154325372.
  36. ^ Snyder, Jack; Borghard, Erica D. (2011). "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound". American Political Science Review. 105 (3): 437–456. doi:10.1017/s000305541100027x. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 144584619.
  37. ^ Press, Daryl G. (2007). Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-7415-6.
  38. ^ Mercer, Jonathan (2010). Reputation and International Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-7489-7.
  39. ^ Mueller, Karl (1998-03-01). "Strategies of coercion: Denial, punishment, and the future of air power". Security Studies. 7 (3): 182–228. doi:10.1080/09636419808429354. ISSN 0963-6412.
  40. ^ Coercive Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A New Framework for the "Carrot and Stick"
  41. ^ Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits
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