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Created page with ''''Anti-Erdoğanism''' refers to the rejection and opposition of Erdoğanism, which is the ideology and policies of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Anti-Erdoğanism has a presence in every Turkish political faction, from the far-left to the far-right, as well as from liberals, communists, and socialists to conservatives, Turkish nationalism|nationalists...'
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Anti-Erdoğanism refers to the rejection and opposition of Erdoğanism, which is the ideology and policies of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Anti-Erdoğanism has a presence in every Turkish political faction, from the far-left to the far-right, as well as from liberals, communists, and socialists to conservatives, nationalists, and Islamists.

Variants

Some Anti-Erdoganists accused Erdoğan and his AKP of being Neo-Ottomanists.[1][2]

Despite many criticising Erdoğan due to the perception of him being an Islamist, most Islamists criticise Erdoğan and his rule, as well as his supporters due to their extreme cult of personality around Erdoğan.[3] The Felicity Party is among the fiercest Anti-Erdoganist parties in Turkey, which claims that Erdoğan is an opportunist who only uses religious rhetoric to maintain popular support among conservatives.[4][5]

Erdoğanism had been likened to Putinism.[6]

Critics of Erdoğan accuse him of fascism, especially after 2015[7] The accusations of fascism increased throughout the years.[8]

Although Erdoğan had initially helped the Kurdish community,[9] he began to lose more and more Kurdish support starting in 2015 because of his alliance with the MHP. Erdoğan often immediately accuses his Kurdish opposition of being PKK, despite many of them not being PKK sympathisers, which disillusions many Kurds.[10] Even conservative Kurds, of whom many were once staunch Erdoğan supporters, had ceased their support due to Erdoğan's increasing nationalism.[11] During the 2023 elections, while Erdoğan was pushing a very strong nationalist rhetoric, the majority of Kurds did not vote for him, and many conservative Kurds were repulsed by his nationalism to the point they viewed the opposition as a better alternative.[12][13] Many Kurds also denied that Erdoğan was an Islamist, and claimed that he was a mere "Green Kemalist".[14]

Abdullah Gül and Ahmet Davutoğlu are famous Anti-Erdoğanists who parted ways with Erdoğan due to his nationalism.[15]

The National Path Party was founded in 2021 by Great Unity Party politicians and Alperen Hearths who were repulsed Erdoğan.[16][17][18] The party has no major ideological difference with the BBP except for the dispute about Erdoğan.[19] Remzi Çayır had also claimed that Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and Alparslan Türkeş would be very disappointed seeing Idealists supporting Erdoğan.[20]

References

  1. ^ "Turkey: AKP's Hidden Agenda or a Different Vision of Secularism?". Nouvelle Europe. 7 April 2011. Retrieved 7 June 2015."The "Hidden" That Never Was". Reflections Turkey. 28 May 2012. Retrieved 7 June 2015.[permanent dead link]
    "Support for Muslim Brotherhood isolates Turkey". Die Weld. Retrieved 7 June 2015.Ömer Taşpınar (1 April 2012). "Islamist Politics in Turkey: The New Model?". The Brookings Institution. Retrieved 7 June 2015.
  2. ^ Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi (1 October 2016). "Turkey's Diyanet under AKP rule: from protector to imposer of state ideology?" (PDF). Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16 (4): 619–635. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1233663. ISSN 1468-3857. S2CID 151448076.
  3. ^ "Is 'Erdoganism' a Threat to Turkey's Islamism?". US News. 2015-03-31. Retrieved 2016-07-30.
  4. ^ Mustafa Akyol (30 March 2015). "Is 'Erdoganism' threat to Turkey's Islamism?". Al-monitor.com. Archived from the original on 1 April 2015. Retrieved 30 July 2016.
  5. ^ Yavuz, M. Hakan; Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi (18 February 2019). "Turkish secularism and Islam under the reign of Erdoğan". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 19: 1–9. doi:10.1080/14683857.2019.1580828. ISSN 1468-3857. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |doi-access=ücretsiz (help)
  6. ^ Akyol, Mustafa (2016-06-21). "Erdoganism". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2016-07-30.
  7. ^ https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/turkey-referendum-erdogan-kurds/522894/
  8. ^ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/06/25/erdogan/
  9. ^ "The Blackballers' Club". The Economist. December 16–22, 2006. pp. 10–11. Archived from the originalon February 24, 2021.
  10. ^ Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove; Fernandes, Desmond (2008). "Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan: A Comparison of Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Situations of Occupation". Genocide Studies and Prevention. 3 (1): 45–46. doi:10.3138/gsp.3.1.43.
  11. ^ rs.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-kurds-eye-kingmaker-role-election-against-erdogan-2023-03-21/ "Turkey's Kurds eye kingmaker role in election against Erdogan". March 21, 2023. {{cite web}}: Check |url= value (help)
  12. ^ "Let down by Erdogan, Kurds cautiously back secular rival". France 24. 2023-05-07. Retrieved 2024-01-30.
  13. ^ "Kurds fear Erdogan win amid sharper nationalist rhetoric". May 25, 2023.
  14. ^ https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-kurds/turkeys-kurds-see-ruling-akp-green-kemalism-gulay-turkmen?amp
  15. ^ "Turkey's Hour of Nationalism: The Deeper Sources of Political Realignment". The American Interest. 18 June 2019.
  16. ^ https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/bbp-bolundu-milli-yol-kurulus-basvurusunu-yapti-haber-1544993
  17. ^ https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/milli-yol-partisi-genel-baskani-remzi-cayir-erken-secim-veya-zamanindaki-secime-bu-hareket-damga-vuracak-495674h.htm
  18. ^ "Milli Yol Partisi Genel Başkanı Remzi Çayır Manisa'da" (in Turkish). Retrieved 2024-03-09.
  19. ^ "BBP'den ayrılanlardan "Milli Yol Partisi"". Journal Medya (in Turkish). Retrieved 2024-03-09.
  20. ^ "Remzi Çayır: Devletin büyüklüğü adalettir, liyakattır - Son Dakika Politika Haberleri". www.dha.com.tr. Retrieved 2024-03-09.