Draft:Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Asymmetric Digital Contact Tracing

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  • Comment: Not quite enough independent, significant coverage showing why this is notable enough for a Wikipedia article. WikiOriginal-9 (talk) 13:20, 7 November 2023 (UTC)

Decentralized Privacy-preserving Asymmetric digital Contact Tracing (DP-ACT)[1][2] is a decentralized privacy-preserving contact tracing protocol with both active and passive participants. Active participants transmit BLE beacons with pseudo-random IDs, while passive participants model conservative users who do not broadcast BLE beacons but actively listen to the transmitted BLE beacons. Hence, passive participants can become aware of their potential exposure and take appropriate actions. Conversely, when passive participants become infected, they may release their list of high-risk contacts based on the pseudo-random IDs they've received. This allows active participants to exercise home quarantine if their pseudo-random IDs are released by passive participants. Consequently, the proposed protocol facilitates high-precision digital contact tracing by encouraging and leveraging the participation of conservative passive users.

Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) is the state-of-the-art protocol for COVID-19 contact tracing.[3] In this decentralized protocol, each user broadcasts pseudo-random IDs through BLE beacons. Despite several excellent initiatives to develop privacy-preserving contact tracing protocols and applications, their adoption by the public has been, to a large extent, limited. Privacy concerns represent one of the foremost barriers to the widespread adoption of digital contact tracing mobile applications.[4] From a technical perspective, broadcasting BLE beacons carries inherent privacy risks. Recent studies[5][6] have underscored that adversaries can exploit unique physical-layer imperfections and hardware variations in BLE chipsets to uniquely identify transmitting mobile devices despite the use of pseudo-random IDs.[7] Hence, a research question is whether the participation of the users who do not broadcast BLE beacons, but still listen to BLE beacons and upload contacts upon infection, can improve the precision of digital contact tracing compared to when these users do not participate.[8] argues that indeed, this is the case and proposes the DP-ACT protocol to allow both active and passive users participate in the contact tracing.

References[edit]

  1. ^ https://petsymposium.org/popets/2024/popets-2024-0019.pdf
  2. ^ Abtahi, Azra; Payer, Mathias; Aminifar, Amir. "DP-ACT: Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Asymmetric Digital Contact Tracing". 24th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, PETS 2024.
  3. ^ Troncoso, Carmela; et al. (2020). "Decentralized privacy-preserving proximity tracing". arXiv:2005.12273 [cs.CR].
  4. ^ Parker, Michael J; et al. (2020). "Ethics of instantaneous contact tracing using mobile phone apps in the control of the COVID-19 pandemic". Journal of Medical Ethics. 46 (7): 427–431. doi:10.1136/medethics-2020-106314. PMC 7231546. PMID 32366705.
  5. ^ Givehchian, Hadi; et al. (2022). "Evaluating Physical-Layer BLE Location Tracking Attacks on Mobile Devices". 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). pp. 1690–1704. doi:10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833758. ISBN 978-1-6654-1316-9. S2CID 240492894.
  6. ^ Zuo, Chaoshun; Wen, Haohuang; Lin, Zhiqiang; Zhang, Yinqian (2019). "Automatic Fingerprinting of Vulnerable BLE IoT Devices with Static UUIDs from Mobile Apps". Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. pp. 1469–1483. doi:10.1145/3319535.3354240. ISBN 9781450367479. S2CID 207940327.
  7. ^ Givehchian, Hadi; et al. (2022). "Evaluating Physical-Layer BLE Location Tracking Attacks on Mobile Devices". 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). pp. 1690–1704. doi:10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833758. ISBN 978-1-6654-1316-9. S2CID 240492894.
  8. ^ Abtahi, Azra; Payer, Mathias; Aminifar, Amir. "DP-ACT: Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Asymmetric Digital Contact Tracing". 24th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, PETS 2024.
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