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Fractionally subadditive valuation

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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 130.60.156.136 (talk) at 16:34, 22 March 2022 (Removed wrong sentence. Xos is not a "fractional relaxation" of subadditive, as a relaxation would make the class larger, not smaller.). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

A set function is called fractionally subadditive (or XOS) if it is the maximum of several additive set functions. This valuation class was defined, and termed XOS, by Noam Nisan, in the context of combinatorial auctions.[1] The term fractionally-subadditive was given by Uriel Feige.[2]

Definition

There is a finite base set of items, .

There is a function which assigns a number to each subset of .

The function is called fractionally-subadditive (or XOS) if there exists a collection of set functions, , such that:[3]

  • Each is additive, i.e., it assigns to each subset , the sum of the values of the items in .
  • The function is the pointwise maximum of the functions . I.e, for every subset :

Equivalent Definition

The name fractionally subadditive comes from the following equivalent definition: a set function is fractionally subadditive if, for any and any collection with and such that for all , we have .

Relation to other utility functions

Every submodular set function is XOS, and every XOS function is a subadditive set function.[1]

See also: Utility functions on indivisible goods.

References

  1. ^ a b Nisan, Noam (2000). "Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions". Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '00. p. 1. doi:10.1145/352871.352872. ISBN 1581132727.
  2. ^ Feige, Uriel (2009). "On Maximizing Welfare when Utility Functions Are Subadditive". SIAM Journal on Computing. 39: 122–142. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.86.9904. doi:10.1137/070680977.
  3. ^ Christodoulou, George; Kovács, Annamária; Schapira, Michael (2016). "Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions". Journal of the ACM. 63 (2): 1. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.721.5346. doi:10.1145/2835172.