Gaius Terentius Varro

For others with a similar name, see Varro (cognomen).

Gaius Terentius Varro (fl. 3rd century BC) was a Roman consul and commander. Along with his colleague, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, he commanded at the Battle of Cannae during the Second Punic War, in 216 BC, against the Carthaginian general Hannibal. The battle resulted in a decisive Roman defeat.

Varro had been a praetor in 218 BC. He was proconsul in Picenum from 215–213 BC, and in 208–207 BC, as propraetor he held Etruria against Hannibal's younger brother Hasdrubal Barca. He went to Africa, in 200 BC as ambassador.

Varro reassessed

Varro's role in the defeat at Cannae has been re-assessed recently by modern historians and historiographers, who point out that Livy emphasized Varro's low birth and his rashness. Livy's own stress on Varro's rashness runs contrary to internal evidence in Livy's own history that the plebeian consul was held in high regard by the Senate and people of Rome, even after the defeat. One view is that the defeat was more the work of Aemilius Paullus, who commanded the right wing of the army (the wing traditionally commanded by the commander-in-chief). Polybius's surviving histories say little of Varro at Cannae, but since his informants were the other general's son Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus and grandsons Scipio Aemilianus and Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, this is not surprising. Livy relies heavily on Polybius.

Such modern re-assessment can be the practice of interjecting hindsight and theory over the conclusions of historians of the era. Livy intricately described Varro as a demagogue, rousing popular passions against the painstaking strategies of Quintus Fabius Maximus who was, in fact, hampering Hannibal in the field. Varro succeeded by maligning Fabius during the election process, and in directing the "limelight" onto himself (Livy's descriptions) such that he succeeded in taking the reins and ousting Fabius. He then promptly led the armies to the catastrophe of Cannae. The fact that Paullus wrested control of the right wing is foreseen in Livy's own account of Fabius exhorting his friend prior to the battle to be wary the rashness of Varro and the inevitable portents. Thus, it makes perfect sense that Publius might exert controls as a means of staving off the Carthaginians, if at all possible, in an attempt to survive the perceived weaknesses in the command of Varro. This perspective is found in Livy's account of Paullus' death as well. And certainly Polybius' use of the predecessors of generals surviving that battle to record his history, is the natural work of a historian, and cannot be proof that Varro was held in high repute because he was missing from their accounts. The fact that these military men did not mention the politician Varro, in recounting their understandings of the battle is perhaps stronger evidence of the irrelevance of the man as any kind of credit to Rome during the moment.

Sources

• Livy, History of Rome, Rev. Canon Roberts (translator), Ernest Rhys (Ed.); (1905) London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.

Preceded by Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus (Suffect)

Consul of the Roman Republic with Lucius Aemilius Paullus 216 BC

Succeeded by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and Lucius Postumius Albinus