Paradox of fiction

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The paradox of fiction asks why do we experience strong emotions when, for example, we are watching Hamlet on stage while at the same time knowing that it is not really Hamlet but merely an actor.

The paradox of fiction is a philosophical problem about how people can experience strong emotions from purely fictional things, such as art, literature and imagination. The paradox draws attention to an everyday issue of how people are moved by things which, in many ways, do not really exist. Although, the ontology of fictional things in general has been discussed in philosophy since Plato,[1] it was first suggested by Colin Radford and Michael Weston in 1975.[2] After Radford & Weston's original paper they and others have continued the discussion giving the problem both slightly differing formulations as well as different solutions. The basic paradox, which is largely accepted by all is:[1]

  1. Most people have emotional responses to characters, objects, events etc. which they know to be fictitious.
  2. On the other hand, in order for us to be emotionally moved, we must believe that these characters, objects, or events, truly exist.
  3. But no person who takes characters or events to be fictional at the same time believes that they are real.

The paradox is that all three premises cannot seem to be true at the same time. If points 1 and 2 are taken to be true, it would seem that either point 3 must be false, or we have reached a contradiction. On the other hand, if we assume points 1 and 3 to be true, then 2 must be false. Or if we assume that 2 and 3 are true, we need to reject point 1.

Proposed solutions

The various proposed solutions to the paradox can be divided into three basic groups:[3][1]

  • The pretend or the simulation theories, proposed for example by Kendall Walton.
The pretend theories deny premise 1 and argue that with fiction we do not experience "real" emotions but rather something less intense. For example, when watching a horror movie where the monster makes an attack towards the viewer (towards the camera), the viewer can be startled but does not truly fear for his or her life.
The thought theories deny premise 2 and claim that we can have genuine emotions from things even if we do not believe them to exist.
  • The illusion or realist theories, for example from Alan Paskow.
The illusion theories deny premise 3 and claim that, in a way, the fictional characters are real. They suggest that Samuel Taylor Coleridge was right saying that fiction involves a "willing suspension of disbelief", i.e. believing in the fiction while engaging with it.

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c Paskow, Alan (2004). The Paradoxes of Art : A phenomenological investigation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-82833-3.
  2. ^ Radford, Colin (1975). "How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina?". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. 49: 67–93. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  3. ^ Schneider, Steven. "The Paradox of Fiction". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 27 June 2012.
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