Steven Brams

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Steven J. Brams
[[File:<!
Steven J. Brams, professor at NewYork University, specializing in game theory; co-inventor with Alan D. Taylor of the fair division procedure, Adjusted Winner, and one of the independent discoverers of approval voting.
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Born November 28, 1940 (1940-11-28) (age 71)
Concord, New Hampshire
Nationality United States United States
Fields Political science
Institutions Syracuse University
New York University
Alma mater Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Northwestern University
Known for Independent discoverer of approval voting
Solved the problem of envy-free fair division
Has applied game theory to a wide range of strategic situations

Steven J. Brams (born November 28, 1940 in Concord, New Hampshire) is a game theorist and political scientist at the New York University Department of Politics. Brams is best known for using the techniques of game theory and public choice to analyze voting systems and fair division. He is one of the independent discoverers of approval voting.[1] Also, he was a co-discoverer, with Alan Taylor of the first envy-free solution to the n-person cake cutting problem.[2][3] Previous to the Brams-Taylor procedure, the cake cutting problem had been one of the most important open problems in contemporary mathematics.[4] He is co-inventor with Taylor of the fair-division procedure, Adjusted Winner,[5] which was patented by New York University in 1999 (# 5,983,205).[6] Adjusted Winner has been licensed to a Boston law firm, which formed a company, Fair Outcomes, Inc.,[7] that markets several fair-division algorithms. Brams has applied game theory to a wide variety of strategic situations, from the Bible to international relations.

Brams earned his B.S. at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Politics, Economics, and Science in 1962. In 1966, he earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at Northwestern University.

He worked briefly in U.S. federal government positions before taking an Assistant Professor position at Syracuse University in 1967. He moved to New York University in 1969, where he is a Professor in the Department of Politics. In 1990-1991 he was president of the Peace Science Society (International);[8] in 2004-2006, he was president of the Public Choice Society.[9] [10]

[edit] Bibliography

  • Game Theory and Politics. New York: Free Press, 1975. Rev. ed., 2004 (Dover).
  • Paradoxes in Politics: An Introduction to the Nonobvious in Political Science. New York: Free Press, 1976.
  • The Presidential Election Game. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978. Rev. ed., 2008 (A K Peters).
  • Co-edited with A. Schotter and G. Schwödiauer, Applied Game Theory: Proceedings of a Conference, Vienna, 1978. Würzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, 1979.
  • Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980. Rev. ed., 2003 (MIT Press). Japanese translation, 2006.
  • Co-edited with William F. Lucas and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., Modules in Applied Mathematics: Political and Related Models, vol. 2. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983.
  • Co-authored with Peter C. Fishburn, Approval Voting. Cambridge, MA: Birkhäuser Boston, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer).
  • Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer).
  • Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.
  • Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985. Reprinted by Academic Press, 1989.
  • Co-authored with D. Marc Kilgour, Game Theory and National Security. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Spanish translation, 1989.
  • Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration. New York: Routledge, 1990. Rev. ed., 2003.
  • Theory of Moves. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
  • Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
  • Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. Japanese, Portuguese, and Spanish translations, 2000; Chinese, Korean, and Russian translations, 2002.
  • Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
  • Co-edited with William V. Gehrlein and Fred S. Roberts. The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn. Berlin: Springer, 2009.
  • Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Brams, Steven and Fishburn, Peter (1978). "Approval Voting". American Political Science Review 72 (3): 831–847. doi:10.2307/1955105. JSTOR 1955105. 
  2. ^ Steven J. Brams; Alan D. Taylor (January 1995). "An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol". The American Mathematical Monthly (Mathematical Association of America) 102 (1): 9–18. doi:10.2307/2974850. JSTOR 2974850. 
  3. ^ Will Hively (March 1995). "Dividing the spoils - Steven Brams, Alan Taylor devise procedure to divide anything equitably". Discover Magazine. 
  4. ^ Sol Garfunkel (1988). "More Equal than Others: Weighted Voting. For All Practical Purposes.". COMAP. 
  5. ^ Adjusted Winner http://www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner
  6. ^ Adjusted Winner US patent http://www.google.com/patents/about/5983205_Computer_based_method_for_the_fa.html?id=C8QWAAAAEBAJ
  7. ^ Fair Outcomes, Inc. http://www.appellex.com
  8. ^ Peace Science Society (International) http://pss.la.psu.edu
  9. ^ Public Choice Society: Past Presidents http://www.pubchoicesoc.org/pastpres.htm
  10. ^ Public Choice Society http://www.pubchoicesoc.org

[edit] External links

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