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Garcetti v. Ceballos
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 12, 2005 Reargued March 21, 2006 Decided May 30, 2006
Full case name	Gil Garcetti, Frank Sundstedt, Carol Najera, and County of Los Angeles v. Richard Ceballos
Citations	547 U.S. 410 (more)
Case history
Prior	Summary judgment granted to defendants, No. 00-11106, C.D. Cal.; reversed, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004); cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1186 (2005)
Holding
Statements made by public employees pursuant to their official duties are not protected by the First Amendment from employer discipline. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
Court membership
Chief Justice John Roberts Associate Justices John P. Stevens · Antonin Scalia Anthony Kennedy · David Souter Clarence Thomas · Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen Breyer · Samuel Alito
Case opinions
Majority	Kennedy, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito
Dissent	Stevens
Dissent	Breyer, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I

Garcetti et all v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the First Amendment free speech protections for government employees. The plaintiff in the case was a district attorney who claimed that he had been passed up for a promotion for criticizing the legitimacy of a warrant. The Court ruled that because his statements were made pursuant to his position as a public employee, rather than as a private citizen, his speech had no First Amendment protection.

Background of the case

Richard Ceballos had been employed since 1989 as a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. After the defense attorney in a pending criminal case contacted Ceballos about his motion to challenge a critical search warrant based on inaccuracies in the supporting affidavit, Ceballos conducted his own investigation and determined that the affidavit did contain serious misrepresentations. Ceballos contacted the deputy sheriff who had sworn out the affidavit, but was not satisfied by his explanations. Ceballos then communicated his findings to his supervisors and submitted a memorandum in which he recommended dismissal of the case. A meeting was subsequently held to discuss the affidavit with his superiors and officials from the sheriff's department, which Ceballos claimed became heated and accusatory of his role in handling the case. Despite Ceballos’ concerns, his supervisor decided to proceed with the prosecution. The criminal trial court held a hearing on the motion, during which Ceballos was called by the defense to recount his observations about the affidavit. The trial court nevertheless denied the motion and upheld the warrant.

Ceballos claimed that he was subsequently subjected to a series of retaliatory employment actions. These included reassignment to a different position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion. He initiated an employment grievance, which was denied based on a finding that he had not suffered any retaliation.

District Court proceedings

Ceballos then brought a section 1983 claim in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting that his supervisors violated the First Amendment by retaliating against him for his memo. His supervisors claimed that there was no retaliation, that the changes in his job were instead dictated by legitimate staffing concerns, and that regardless, Ceballos’ memo was not constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment. The District Court granted their motion for summary judgment, concluding that because Ceballos wrote his memo pursuant to the duties of his employment, he was not entitled to First Amendment protection for the memo’s contents. In the alternative, it ruled that even if he had a protected speech right in this context, the right was not clearly established and so qualified immunity applied to his supervisors' actions.

Court of Appeals decision

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that his criticism of the warrant in the memo constituted protected speech under the First Amendment. The court applied the analysis set forth in Supreme Court precedent that looks to whether the expression at issue was made by the speaker "as a citizen upon matters of public concern.". Because his memo dealt with what he thought to be governmental misconduct, the court believed its subject was "inherently a matter of public concern." However, the court did not evaluate whether it was made in Ceballos' capacity as a citizen, due to Ninth Circuit precedent ruling that the First Amendment applied to statements made pursuant to a duty of employment.

Having concluded that Ceballos’ memo satisfied the public-concern requirement, the Court of Appeals proceeded to balance Ceballos’ interest in his speech against his supervisors’ interest in responding to it. The court struck the balance in Ceballos’ favor, noting that his supervisors had "failed even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in the workings of the District Attorney’s Office" as a result of the memo. The court further concluded that Ceballos’ First Amendment rights were clearly established and that petitioners’ actions were not objectively reasonable.

Judge Diarmuid Fionntain O'Scannlain specially concurred. Though agreeing that the panel’s decision was compelled by Circuit precedent, he nevertheless concluded Circuit law should be revisited and overruled. O’Scannlain argued that "when public employees speak in the course of carrying out their routine, required employment obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right."

The Court's decision

The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling in a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy that the First Amendment does not prevent employees from being disciplined for expressions they make pursuant to their professional duties. The case had been reargued following the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, as the decision was tied without her; her successor, Justice Samuel Alito, then broke the tie.

The four dissenting justices, in three dissents written by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer, took issue with the majority's firm line against the First Amendment ever applying to speech made within the scope of public employment, arguing instead that the government's stronger interest in this context could be accommodated by the ordinary balancing test.

Kennedy's majority opinion

The Court wrote that its "precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job." Instead, public employees are not speaking as citizens when they are speaking to fulfill a responsibility of their job.

Though the speech at issue concerned the subject matter of his employment, and was expressed within his office rather than publicly, the Court did not consider either fact dispositive, and noted that employees in either context may receive First Amendment protection. The "controlling factor" was instead that his statements were made pursuant to his duties as a deputy district attorney. Restricting such speech, which "owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities," did not in the Court's view violate any rights that the employee had as a private citizen. Instead, the restrictions were simply the control an employer exercised "over what the employer itself has commissioned or created."

The Court found that Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he wrote the memo that addressed the proper disposition of a pending criminal case; he instead acted as a government employee. "The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance." The Court believed this result was consistent with its precedents regarding the protected speech of public employees, because barring First Amendment claims based on "government employees' work product," as the Court characterized the speech at issue, would not prevent those employees from participating in public debate.

The Court criticized the Ninth Circuit's ruling, which had perceived a "doctrinal anomaly" between the toleration of employee speech made publicly but not made pursuant to assigned duties resulted from a misconception of "the theoretical underpinnings of our decisions." The Court instead found a reason for limiting First Amendment protection to public statements made outside the scope of official duties "because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government."

The Court finally rejected the argument raised in Justice Souter's dissent that employers could restrict the rights of employees "by creating excessively broad job descriptions." Instead, the Court observed that formal job descriptions do not always correspond to actual expected duties, "and the listing of a given task in an employee’s written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First Amendment purposes." The Court also reserved for a future decision the issue of whether its analysis would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.

References

• Full text of the Court's opinion (.pdf)
• ^ 04-473 Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com