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'''Mission Command''' is a style of military command, derived from the Prussian-pioneered [[mission-type tactics]] doctrine, promoting relatively decentralised [[subsidiarity]] of command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative, within certain constraints. Subordinates, understanding the commander's intentions, their own missions and the context of those missions, are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be achieved. They then decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions. Orders provide only enough detail to establish intent and objectives, allowing freedom of action. Mission Command is closely related to civilian management concept of [[empowerment#Workplace empowerment|workplace empowerment]]. It is advocated, but not always used,<ref>Stewart, Keith (2009). “Command Approach: Problem Solving in Mission Command.” Proc. 14th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Washington, D.C.</ref> by the [[Chain of command]] in the [[United States]],<ref>United States Army (2003). Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 6-0.</ref><ref>United States Marine Corps (1996). Command and Control. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Doctrine Publication MCDP 6.</ref> Canadian,<ref>Canada Department of National Defence (1996). Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army. Publication B-GL-300-001/FP- 000. Ottawa, Ontario: Queen’s Printer.</ref> Dutch and the [[British Army]].<ref>Army of the United Kingdom (2005). Land Operations. Shrivenham, UK: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Director General, Development, Concepts, & Doctrine, Publication AC 71819.</ref> Mission Command is compatible with modern military [[net-centric]] concepts,<ref>Alberts, David S. (2002). Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military. Washington, D.C.: CCRP Press</ref> and less centralized approaches to command and control (C2) in general.<ref>Vassiliou, Marius (2010). The Evolution Towards Decentralized C2. Proc. 15th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Santa Monica, CA.</ref>
'''Mission command''', also referred to as [[mission-type tactics]], is a style of military command, derived from the Prussian-pioneered [[mission-type tactics]] doctrine, which combines centralized intent with decentralized execution [[subsidiarity]] and promotes freedom and speed of action, and initiative, within defined constraints. Subordinates, understanding the commander's intentions, their own missions and the context of those missions, are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be achieved. They then decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions. Orders focus on providing intent, control measures, and objectives, allowing for greater freedom of action by subordinate commanders.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Storr|first=Jim|title=A command philosophy for the information age: The continuing relevance of mission command|journal=Defence Studies|volume=3|issue=3|pages=119–129|doi=10.1080/14702430308405081|year=2003|doi-access=free}}</ref> Mission command is closely related to civilian management concept of [[empowerment#Workplace|workplace empowerment]] and its use in business has been explored by writers such as [[Stephen Bungay|Bungay]] (2011) and Tozer (1995, 2012). It is advocated, but not always used,<ref>Stewart, Keith (2009). “Command Approach: Problem Solving in Mission Command.” Proc. 14th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Washington, D.C.</ref> by the militaries of the [[United States]],<ref>United States Army (2003). Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 6-0.</ref><ref>United States Marine Corps (1996). Command and Control. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Doctrine Publication MCDP 6.</ref> Canada,<ref>Canada Department of National Defence (1996). Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army. Publication B-GL-300-001/FP- 000. Ottawa, Ontario: Queen’s Printer.</ref> Netherlands, Australia and the United Kingdom.<ref>Army of the United Kingdom (2005). Land Operations. Shrivenham, UK: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Director General, Development, Concepts, & Doctrine, Publication AC 71819.</ref> Mission command is compatible with modern military [[net-centric]] concepts,<ref>Alberts, David S. (2002). Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military. Washington, D.C.: CCRP Press</ref> and less centralized approaches to command and control (C2) in general.<ref>Vassiliou, Marius (2010). The Evolution Towards Decentralized C2. Proc. 15th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Santa Monica, CA.</ref>

== History ==
Originating from the [[Grande Armée#Organization|Napoleonic corps]] concept, increasingly larger armies prevented movement ''[[wikt:en bloc|en bloc]]''. Commanders often separated by miles, communicating through horse-carried dispatches, were expected to maneuver in concert with one another.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Storr|first=Jim|title=A command philosophy for the information age: The continuing relevance of mission command|journal=Defence Studies|volume=3|issue=3|pages=119–129|doi=10.1080/14702430308405081|year=2003|doi-access=free}}</ref> Beginning as early as 1807, the Prussian high command began to emphasize a battle philosophy that Moltke would later describe as:<blockquote>A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient<ref>{{Cite book|title=A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945|last=Dupuy|first=T. N.|publisher=Macdonald & Jane's|year=1977|isbn=978-0133511147|location=London|pages=[https://archive.org/details/geniusforwarge00dupu/page/116 116]|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/geniusforwarge00dupu/page/116}}</ref></blockquote> Continued focus on tactical initiative at the lowest levels developed within the German army through the First World War and formally became ''Auftragstaktik'' during the Second World War. Despite the exceptional performance of the ''Wehrmacht'' at the tactical level, mission command was not adopted by NATO commanders until the 1970s.<ref name=":0" />

The break up of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s drew in contingents from several modern militaries to United Nations or two stabilization forces (IFOR and SFOR). One was NORDBAT 2, consisting of a reinforced Swedish-Danish-Norwegian mechanized battalion in [[United Nations Protection Force]] (UNPROFOR). The infantry were Swedish volunteers, tanks from a Danish Leopard company, and a Norwegian helicopter detachment, under Swedish command. Coming from a nation that had not experienced war for almost 200 years, the Swedish leaders faced an unresponsive UN bureaucracy, an unclear mandate, and conflicting UN-imposed [[rules of engagement]]. Not unexpectedly, the Swedes turned to their culture of mission command which had grown and developed over decades preparing for expected invasions.<ref>https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/9/20/trigger-happy-autonomous-and-disobedient-nordbat-2-and-mission-command-in-bosnia</ref> Mission command turned out to be a force multiplier and an effective strategic asset. When facing ethical and practical challenges to its clear orders to protect the civilian population, commanders realized they had no choice but to disregard orders that conflicted with the purpose of the mission. Mission command gave permission to every level of command to interpret orders that could be disobeyed and rules could be broken as long as the mission was successful.

== Modern usage ==

=== Key tenets ===
* Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
* Create shared understanding
* Provide a clear commander’s intent
* Exercise disciplined initiative
* Use mission orders
* Competence
* Accept prudent risk.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/adrp6_0.pdf|title=ADRP 6-0|website=armypubs.us.army.mil|publisher=Army Publications}}</ref>

== See also ==
* [[Command by negation]]
* [[International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium]]
* [[Maneuver warfare]]
* [[Operational art]]


== External links ==
== External links ==
* [http://www.army.mod.uk/linked_files/ag/servingsoldier/clm/radio_interviews/SSN1.2.doc Command notes]
* [http://www.army.mod.uk/linked_files/ag/servingsoldier/clm/radio_interviews/SSN1.2.doc Command notes]
* [http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/moltke-master-of-modern-management/ Stephen Bungay: Moltke – Master of Modern Management]


== References ==
{{Reflist}}
{{Reflist}}


[[Category:Command and control]]
[[Category:Command and control]]


{{mil-stub}}

Revision as of 01:45, 24 April 2021

Mission command, also referred to as mission-type tactics, is a style of military command, derived from the Prussian-pioneered mission-type tactics doctrine, which combines centralized intent with decentralized execution subsidiarity and promotes freedom and speed of action, and initiative, within defined constraints. Subordinates, understanding the commander's intentions, their own missions and the context of those missions, are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be achieved. They then decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions. Orders focus on providing intent, control measures, and objectives, allowing for greater freedom of action by subordinate commanders.[1] Mission command is closely related to civilian management concept of workplace empowerment and its use in business has been explored by writers such as Bungay (2011) and Tozer (1995, 2012). It is advocated, but not always used,[2] by the militaries of the United States,[3][4] Canada,[5] Netherlands, Australia and the United Kingdom.[6] Mission command is compatible with modern military net-centric concepts,[7] and less centralized approaches to command and control (C2) in general.[8]

History

Originating from the Napoleonic corps concept, increasingly larger armies prevented movement en bloc. Commanders often separated by miles, communicating through horse-carried dispatches, were expected to maneuver in concert with one another.[9] Beginning as early as 1807, the Prussian high command began to emphasize a battle philosophy that Moltke would later describe as:

A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient[10]

Continued focus on tactical initiative at the lowest levels developed within the German army through the First World War and formally became Auftragstaktik during the Second World War. Despite the exceptional performance of the Wehrmacht at the tactical level, mission command was not adopted by NATO commanders until the 1970s.[9]

The break up of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s drew in contingents from several modern militaries to United Nations or two stabilization forces (IFOR and SFOR). One was NORDBAT 2, consisting of a reinforced Swedish-Danish-Norwegian mechanized battalion in United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The infantry were Swedish volunteers, tanks from a Danish Leopard company, and a Norwegian helicopter detachment, under Swedish command. Coming from a nation that had not experienced war for almost 200 years, the Swedish leaders faced an unresponsive UN bureaucracy, an unclear mandate, and conflicting UN-imposed rules of engagement. Not unexpectedly, the Swedes turned to their culture of mission command which had grown and developed over decades preparing for expected invasions.[11] Mission command turned out to be a force multiplier and an effective strategic asset. When facing ethical and practical challenges to its clear orders to protect the civilian population, commanders realized they had no choice but to disregard orders that conflicted with the purpose of the mission. Mission command gave permission to every level of command to interpret orders that could be disobeyed and rules could be broken as long as the mission was successful.

Modern usage

Key tenets

  • Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
  • Create shared understanding
  • Provide a clear commander’s intent
  • Exercise disciplined initiative
  • Use mission orders
  • Competence
  • Accept prudent risk.[12]

See also

References

  1. ^ Storr, Jim (2003). "A command philosophy for the information age: The continuing relevance of mission command". Defence Studies. 3 (3): 119–129. doi:10.1080/14702430308405081.
  2. ^ Stewart, Keith (2009). “Command Approach: Problem Solving in Mission Command.” Proc. 14th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Washington, D.C.
  3. ^ United States Army (2003). Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 6-0.
  4. ^ United States Marine Corps (1996). Command and Control. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Doctrine Publication MCDP 6.
  5. ^ Canada Department of National Defence (1996). Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army. Publication B-GL-300-001/FP- 000. Ottawa, Ontario: Queen’s Printer.
  6. ^ Army of the United Kingdom (2005). Land Operations. Shrivenham, UK: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Director General, Development, Concepts, & Doctrine, Publication AC 71819.
  7. ^ Alberts, David S. (2002). Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military. Washington, D.C.: CCRP Press
  8. ^ Vassiliou, Marius (2010). The Evolution Towards Decentralized C2. Proc. 15th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Santa Monica, CA.
  9. ^ a b Storr, Jim (2003). "A command philosophy for the information age: The continuing relevance of mission command". Defence Studies. 3 (3): 119–129. doi:10.1080/14702430308405081.
  10. ^ Dupuy, T. N. (1977). A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945. London: Macdonald & Jane's. pp. 116. ISBN 978-0133511147.
  11. ^ https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/9/20/trigger-happy-autonomous-and-disobedient-nordbat-2-and-mission-command-in-bosnia
  12. ^ "ADRP 6-0" (PDF). armypubs.us.army.mil. Army Publications.
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