Ordinary language

The phrase ordinary English, like "ordinary language," is often used in philosophy and logic to distinguish between ordinary, unsurprising uses of terms and their more specialized uses in theorizing, or jargon. For example, the statements "I find that class of person very annoying" and "Birds fall into a different class from bees" might be said to contain ordinary English uses of 'class'. By contrast, when Bertrand Russell writes, in The Principles of Mathematics (sect. 70), "A class...is neither a predicate nor a class-concept, for different predicates and different class-concepts may correspond to the same class," Russell uses (is teaching) the word 'class' in a sense that might or might not correspond neatly to any identifiable "ordinary English" use of the word; so we might say that he is not using ordinary language, but jargon.

So-called ordinary language philosophy held that many philosophical problems arose due to confused and inappropriate specialized uses of language, and that philosophers should always attempt to frame their problems in terms of, and to respect the "intuitions" of, ordinary language. Often this point was made by referring to "ordinary English" since the school of philosophy that most vigorously promoted this meta-philosophy was Oxford.

See ordinary language and ordinary language philosophy for further discussion.