User:Jean KemperN

(90.55.205.181 (talk) 16:39, 23 March 2010 (UTC)) I have an account: User Jean KemperN (90.55.205.181 (talk) 16:42, 23 March 2010 (UTC))

You seem to have knowledge of logic, and I want to encourage you to become an editor in good standing in WP:WPLOG. Please take as much time as you like; editing Wikipedia should not be thought of as an obligation. Creating a Wikipedia account and using that is also a constructive step. — Charles Stewart (talk) 10:44, 16 June 2009 (UTC) [User talk:84.101.36.181|talk]]) 11:53, 16 June 2009 (UTC)I thank you sincerely. JF M (84.101.36.15 (talk) 18:09, 14 January 2010 (UTC)) (talk) 00:52, 27 October 2009 (UTC))

(Jean KemperN (talk) 09:01, 23 March 2010 (UTC)) (Jean KemperN (talk) 10:10, 27 May 2010 (UTC))

(Jean KemperNN (talk) 06:20, 7 December 2010 (UTC))(cf. here)

KEY WORDS: modal logic, strict implication,material implication, logical square, logical hexagon of Robert Blanché (Structures intellectuelles), Aristotle On interpretation( De Interpretatione, Peri Hermeneneias) chapter 7, indeterminate propositions in Peri Hermeneias, second book of the Aristotelian Organon, natural language and underlying logical system

(Jean KemperN (talk) 09:57, 17 March 2010 (UTC))

MOTS CLES: logique modale, implication stricte, implication matérielle, carré logique,hexagone logique de Robert Blanché (Structures intellectuelles), Aristote De l'interprétation(De interpretatione, Peri Hermeneias, On interpretation) chapitre 7, propositions indéterminées dans le Peri Hermeneias, deuxième livre de l'Organon,langue naturelle et système logique sousjacent

(Jean KemperN (talk) 04:11, 13 May 2010 (UTC))

Somebody put a text of mine on the talk page relating to strict conditional without my consent

Great is my surprise to find a text of mine on the talk page corresponding to strict conditional. Indeed, I don't object in principle to this coming back of a text which in fact was found on the talk page I had created to comment upon a definition of strict implication by a contributor of wiktionary. Recently, many of my contributions were deleted. I found the thing most unpleasant indeed but this is the attitude I decided to adopt: acceptation of the deletions with the hope they will be provisional and that the deleting authority will bring me back itself. As I wrote to one Koko90, I only asked that my texts on Aristotle's De Interpretatione should be restored on the talk pages relative to the Article De l'interprétation of W.F and to the entry De Interpretatione of W.E, arguing that the content of them can be found in papers published in well-known reviews, arguing that this content is appreciated by the great Jacques Brunschwig. I here protest I don't remember putting the text found today on the talk page Strict conditional myself. Jean-François Monteil (Jean KemperN (talk) 00:26, 27 February 2010 (UTC)) (Jean KemperN (talk) 11:32, 4 March 2010 (UTC))

The English text of Jean-François Monteil which was deleted by a Frenchman at the beginning of Februar contains these words of Charles Stewart (Jean KemperN (talk) 08:56, 28 February 2010 (UTC))

You seem to have knowledge of logic, and I want to encourage you to become an editor in good standing in WP:WPLOG. Please take as much time as you like; editing Wikipedia should not be thought of as an obligation. Creating a Wikipedia account and using that is also a constructive step. — Charles Stewart (talk) 10:44, 16 June 2009 (UTC) [User talk:84.101.36.181|talk]]) 11:53, 16 June 2009 (UTC)I thank you sincerely. JF M (84.101.36.15 (talk) 18:09, 14 January 2010 (UTC)) (talk) 00:52, 27 October 2009 (UTC)) ==(Jean KemperN (talk) 13:35, 6 March 2010 (UTC))

(Jean KemperNN (talk) 06:19, 7 December 2010 (UTC))(cf. here)

The following text that I call text A was removed from the talk page relating to strict conditional on 6 February 2010

On strict implication in the Treatise on logic of J.F Monteil The present text can be found on the personal site of Jean-François Monteil: http://www.grammar-and-logic.com/dossiers.php, called Tract Eight-8 under number 53 of page DOSSIERS. Under number 51, the traité de logique modale is also available. It will be translated into English before long.

On strict implication : p ≡ Lq . Note concerning modal logic Certain linguists, for instance John Lyons, affirm that the formula of strict implication p => q has been found. According to them, p strictly implies q, if one can pose ~ M (p & ~q) It is im -possible to have p and ~q together So it is not. ~ M (p & ~q) cannot by itself symbolize the strict implication of q by p. In effect, ~ M (p & ~q) It is im -possible to have p and ~q together is quite compatible with ~ M (p & q) It is im -possible to have p and q together.If one has ~ Mp , that is to say, if p is im-possible, it is im-possible to have p & q and it is also im-possible to have p & ~q.If ~ M p, then ~ M (p & q) & ~ M (p & ~q).Of itself, the proposition ~ M (p & ~q) cannot represent the strict implication of q by p, cannot represent the causal relation between a cause p and its effect q in so far as the impossibility of p & ~ q may result from the fact that p is im-possible and not from the fact that p is the cause of its effect q. Hence, the necessity of adding the idea that p is possible to the content of ~ M (p & ~q), of adding Mp to ~ M (p & ~q). Hence, our formula of strict implication: ~ M (p & ~q) & Mp, which formula becomes p ≡ Lq p strictly implies q, if p is equivalent to the certainty of q.The developed form of p ≡ Lp is ( p & Lq) w (~ p & M~q ) One of two things: Either we have p and then certainly q or we have not p and in that case it is possible to have ~q. ( p & Lq) w (~p & M~q ), the developed form of p ≡ Lq, contains the two elements of ~ M (p & ~q) & Mp namely the idea that it is im-possible to have p and ~q on the one hand and the idea that p is possible on the other.In John Lyons (page 165, chapitre 6 Logical semantics, Semantics 1,Cambridge University Press, 1977), one can read:“Entailment can be defined in terms of poss and material implication as follows (19)(p => q) ≡ ~ poss (p &~q).That is to say, if p entails q, then it is not logically possible for both p to be true and not-q to be true and conversely…..” If I translate in my own terms, it reads “Strict implication can be defined in terms of possibility M and material implication as follows:19) (p => q) ≡ ~ M (p &~q). That is to say, if the fact p entails the fact q, if the fact p strictly implies the fact q, then it is not logically possible for the two facts p and not-q to coexist in reality and conversely if the facts p and not-q cannot coexist in reality, it means that the fact p entails the fact q, it means that the fact p strictly implies the fact q.” John Lyons is obviously wrong.Indeed, ~ M (p &~q) is a value implied by p => q the strict implication of q by p,but the converse is untrue for ~ M (p &~q) does not imply of itself p => q, does not imply our p ≡ Lq. ~M (p &~q) it is im-possible to have the conjunction of p and non-q is perfectly compatible,I repeat,with ~M (p & q) it is impossible to have the conjunction of p and q. In fact, when you have ~Mp, the impossibility of p, you have necessarily the conjunction of two impossibilities,for you can write :~M p ≡ ~M (p & q) & ~M (p &~q).

You seem to have knowledge of logic, and I want to encourage you to become an editor in good standing in WP:WPLOG. Please take as much time as you like; editing Wikipedia should not be thought of as an obligation. Creating a Wikipedia account and using that is also a constructive step. — Charles Stewart (talk) 10:44, 16 June 2009 (UTC) [User talk:84.101.36.181|talk]]) 11:53, 16 June 2009 (UTC)I thank you sincerely. JF M

On p => q : the strict implication of the fact q by the fact p.p => q is equivalent to Mp & L ~ ( p & ~q) + ~p.M ≡ M(q) and finally to p ≡ Lq NOTE In the page Dossiers of the site :http://www.grammar-and-logic.com under the number 51 is to be found the Traité de logique modale with its useful paragraph C3 In the articles published by the site http://www.grammar-and-logic.com named Tract Eight-8, Jean-François Monteil employs two capital letters L. The smaller one indicates the necessity of those facts that are a priori real and constitute the foundation of the system. The greater one indicates that a fact known a posteriori through experience is certain. In transferring the present text to this talk page, I see that I can't mark the difference between the two L as I do in my papers. This is the convention adopted here below: {L} corresponds to the smaller L and symbolizes the necessity of a fact a priori real such as {L}p w ~p,L corresponds to the certainty of an empirical fact. Here,the symbol L~p It is certain that we have the fact not-p is preferred to the equivalent symbol ~Mp, used above, It is im-possible to have the fact p.In the same way L ~ ( p & ~q)It is certain ‘L’ that we have not ‘~’ the conjunction of the fact p and the fact not-q ‘p & ~q’ replaces the equivalent expression ~ M (p & ~q) used above It is im-possible ‘~ M ’ to have the conjunction of the fact p and the fact not-q ‘p & ~q’. L ~ ( p & ~q) is compatible with L ~ ( p & q) for if we have the fact L~p, certainty of not-p, we have certainly both the exclusion of the conjunction p & q and the exclusion of the conjunction p & ~q. L~p ≡ L ~ ( p & q) & L ~ ( p & ~q.The point is to make it impossible that L ~ ( p & ~q), the certain exclusion of the conjunction p & ~q might result from the certainty of not-p. The point is to link the fact L ~ ( p & ~q) to the fact that p is the cause of q. To do so, one must at the same time assert the possibility of p symbolized by Mp and the certain exclusion of p & ~q symbolized by L ~ ( p & ~q). In other words, we must write:

p => q ≡ Mp & L ~ ( p & ~q)+ ~p.M ≡ M(q)

p => q and L ~(p & ~q) are not equivalent. Indeed, p => q implies L ~( p & ~q) but the converse does not hold: L ~(p & ~q) does not imply p => q, since L ~( p & ~q), I repeat, may result from L~p. What is equivalent to p => q, it is L ~( p & ~q) combined with Mp, which Mp has the same meaning as ~L~p, exclusion of the fact: certainty of not-p. More exactly, what is equivalent to p => q, it is L ~( p & ~q) combined with Mp, which Mp has the same meaning as ~L~p, exclusion of the fact: certainty of not-p plus ~p.M ≡ M(q), we must add. This important addition will be commented upon below. To grasp the content of the following lines more easily, the readers mastering some French should refer to the Partie C of the Traité de logique modale published by the site Tract Eight-8 http://www.grammar-and-logic.com. Therein, some useful notions and principles are explicated. Through lack of space, it is out of question here to demonstrate to perfection. Suffice it to suggest. All the more so as every logician knows perfectly well by intuition what strict implication is in so far as he knows perfectly well by intuition why the so-called material implication inflicts crucifying paradoxes upon the mind. In a sense the problem is practical. What we solely need is a symbolic representation of a truth already conceived by the mind. Useful in this respect is the founding a priori fact {L} p w ~p. So are equivalences like {L}M p & M~p ≡ p.M w ~p.M ; {L} p ≡ Lp w p.M ; {L} Mp ≡ p w ~p.M to be found in Part C of Jean-François Monteil’s Treatise on modal logic. In our Traité, the smaller capital letter {L} indicates the necessity of those facts that are a priori real and constitute the foundation of the system, the greater capital letter l: L indicates that a fact, known a posteriori through experience, is certain. Such is the rain, referent of the two following sentences of English: It is raining, It is certain that it is raining. It is raining opposes Lp certainty of the fact p to L~p certainty of the fact ~p apprehended by It is not raining whereas It is certain that it is raining opposes Lp certainty of the fact p to what is called in French possible bilatéral: M p & M~p. This possible bilateral is apprehended by It is possible that it is not raining, the proposition contradicting It is certain that it is raining. Mp & L ~ ( p & ~q) symbolizes what we think when we think strict implication. Mp drastically removes L~p, the hideous spectre conjured up by the so-called material implication. Associated with Mp, L ~ ( p & ~q) tells us that the fact p cannot but be the cause of the fact q. When we think strict implication, we think a certain number of things.First, p is to be associated with q and that certainly. Second, the fact ~p is not at all excluded by Mp and the practical problem then is to see how to symbolize this fact ~p to which Mp denies certainty but not reality. Denying to ~p not only certainty but also reality is the function of the symbol Lp. The treatise on modal logic defines Mp the possibility of the fact p by means of the equivalence {L} Mp ≡ p w ~p.M, which most explicitly indicates that the fact ~p is not all excluded by Mp.The reader of this short text is invited to refer to the traité de logique modale of Tract Eight-8 and to ponder on the equivalences: {L} p ≡ Lp w p.M {L} ~p ≡ L~p w ~p.M So, there can exist a fact ~p that is not certain but must be conceived all the same, and therefore duly represented as it is by the ~p.M of our Tract Eight-8. The third thing to be thought about the strict implication of q by p is that this not certain fact ~p symbolized by ~p.M is compatible both with the fact q and with the fact ~q. The point here is to be able to symbolize the possible bilateral Mq & M~q which is associated with ~p.M in case we have p => q: the strict implication of q by p. The possible bilatéral Mq & M~q corresponds to the “third contrary” Y of Robert Blanché’s hexagon when applied to modal logic. Owing to its importance, the third contrary Mq & M~q must be represented by a more concise symbolization: M(q). Hence, the convention: {L} M(q) ≡ Mq & M~q. But that’s not all. When we have to do with the possible bilatéral represented by Mq & M~q or M(q), we must never forget that it is associated with a permanent a priori fact represented by: {L} q w ~q One of two things, either q or non-q. In case we have the state of things Mq & M~q or M(q), consisting in the fact that neither q nor ~q is certain, still it remains true that {L}q w ~q. M(q) is necessarily combined with {L} q w ~q as Lq is,as L~q is. Hence the fact that if we have M(q), we have necessarily: {L} q w ~q & M(q)or {L} q w ~q & q & M(q) w ~q & M(q). If we use the point instead of & as sign of conjunction, we arrive at q.M(q) w ~q.M(q). For obvious reasons the reader will find in the paragraph C3 of the Traité de logique modale that q.M(q) and ~q.M(q) can be simplified into q.M and ~q.M respectively. So, we can safely write: {L} M(q) ≡ q.M w ~q.M. To represent the possible bilateral M(q) in a clear analytical way, we have at our disposal two equivalent expressions: Mq & M~q and q.M w ~q.M.The representation of the third contrary M(p) as p.M w ~p.M has felicitous consequences concerning the way the content of p,~p, Mp, M~p can be explicated. For instance,we can write {L}p ≡ Lp w p.M, {L} Mp ≡ Lp w M(p) or {L}Mp ≡ p w ~p. M. In fact, we have successfully: a){L}Mp ≡ Lp w M(p) b) {L}Mp ≡ Lp w (p.M w ~p.M) c) {L}Mp ≡ (Lp w p.M) w ~p.M d) {L}Mp ≡ p w ~p.M. In the light of the preceding remarks,let us try to show why p ≡ Lq the fact p is equivalent to the certainty of the fact q is probably a good representation of p => q, the strict implication of q by p. What we have to do is to show that p ≡ Lq contains the two ingredients Mp and L ~ ( p & ~q) of p => q. Two facts r and s are equivalent if one of two things, either they are both real or they are both excluded, which equivalence can be represented thus: {L}( r ≡ s) ≡ (r & s) w (~r & ~s) The developed form of p ≡ Lq is as follows: p.Lq w ~p.M~q.It is clear that M~q possibility of non-q is the negation of Lq certainty of q as non-p is the negation of p. Each of the two terms of the alternative p.Lq w ~p.M~q excludes the conjunction p & ~q. Since both exclude p & ~q, this exclusion is a fact that is certain. Therefore, p ≡ Lq implies L~( p & ~q). From the former term of the alternative, it is also evident that p ≡ Lq is incompatible with L~p certainty of non-p and therefore implies Mp the possibility of p. It remains to give the right interpretation of the elements ~p and M~q present in the second term. As we have Mp, ~p is not ambiguous since it cannot but be interpreted as ~p.M. If {L} Mp ≡ p w ~p.M ,then {L}Mp ≡ (~p ≡ ~p.M). As to the M~q, it has necessarily the sense of the possible bilatéral M(q) or q.M w ~q.M which intuitively we associate here with the ~p.M. The term p.Lq indicates that we have Mq, the possibility of the fact q. If {L} Mq ≡ Lq w M(q), then {L}Mq ≡ (M~q ≡ M(q)) which means that if we have Mq, then M~q is to be interpreted as M(q).

Bibliography: Traité de logique modale (Treatise on modal logic when translated into English) by Jean-François Monteil on the site http://www.grammar-and-logic.com. (numéro 51).The text above is to be found in the page Dossiers of the site http://www.grammar-and-logic.com under the numéro 55. It is better presented and clearer in so far as the difference between the smaller L and the greater L is clearly expressed. The greater L symbolizes the character of certainty attributed to a contingent fact which is known a posteriori through experience whereas the smaller L symbolizes a necessary fact known a priori. I suggest one types on Google "strict implication", "implication stricte" and clicks on talk strict implication wiktionary and on Document 9. Jean-François Monteil

The following text that I call text B was removed from the talk page relating to strict implication, an entry in wiktionary and that in the first days of February 2010

Strict implication 
Charles Stewart 

You seem to have knowledge of logic, and I want to encourage you to become an editor in good standing in WP:WPLOG. Please take as much time as you like; editing Wikipedia should not be thought of as an obligation. Creating a Wikipedia account and using that is also a constructive step. — Charles Stewart (talk) 10:44, 16 June 2009 (UTC) [User talk:84.101.36.181|talk]]) 11:53, 16 June 2009 (UTC)I thank you sincerely. JF M (84.101.36.15 (talk) 18:09, 14 January 2010 (UTC)) (talk) 00:52, 27 October 2009 (UTC))

Short comment on the definition of strict implication given in the entry 

I am not sure at all that the definition of strict implication as a material implication that is acted upon by the necessity operator from modal logic is sufficient and right. I invite the reader of these lines to read what I write in the article devoted by wikipedia to strict conditional and to peruse two papers to be found on the site http://www.grammar-and-logic.com: Traité de logique modale pour grammairiens et Les deux postulats du traité de logique modale. Both papers will be translated into English in a few weeks. L~(p & ~q) or ~ M (p & ~q) cannot by itself symbolize the strict implication of q by p. In effect, ~ M (p & ~q) It is im -possible to have p and ~q together is quite compatible with ~ M (p & q) It is im -possible to have p and q together.If one has ~ Mp , that is to say, if p is im-possible, it is im-possible to have p & q and it is also im-possible to have p & ~q.If ~ M p, then ~ M (p & q) & ~ M (p & ~q). Jean-François Monteil May 09

On strict implication : p ≡ Lq. Note concerning modal logic  

Certain linguists, for instance John Lyons, affirm that the formula of strict implication p => q has been found. According to them, p strictly implies q, if one can pose ~ M (p & ~q) It is im -possible to have p and ~q together So it is not. ~ M (p & ~q) cannot by itself symbolize the strict implication of q by p. In effect, ~ M (p & ~q) It is im -possible to have p and ~q together is quite compatible with ~ M (p & q) It is im -possible to have p and q together.If one has ~ Mp , that is to say, if p is im-possible, it is im-possible to have p & q and it is also im-possible to have p & ~q.If ~ M p, then ~ M (p & q) & ~ M (p & ~q).Of itself, the proposition ~ M (p & ~q) cannot represent the strict implication of q by p, cannot represent the causal relation between a cause p and its effect q in so far as the impossibility of p & ~ q may result from the fact that p is im-possible and not from the fact that p is the cause of its effect q. Hence, the necessity of adding the idea that p is possible to the content of ~ M (p & ~q), of adding Mp to ~ M (p & ~q). Hence, our formula of strict implication: ~ M (p & ~q) & Mp, which formula becomes p ≡ Lq p strictly implies q, if p is equivalent to the certainty of q.The developed form of p ≡ Lp is ( p & Lq) w (~ p & M~q ) One of two things: Either we have p and then certainly q or we have not p and in that case it is possible to have ~q. ( p & Lq) w (~p & M~q ), the developed form of p ≡ Lq, contains the two elements of ~ M (p & ~q) & Mp namely the idea that it is im-possible to have p and ~q on the one hand and the idea that p is possible on the other.In John Lyons (page 165, chapitre 6 Logical semantics, Semantics 1,Cambridge University Press, 1977), one can read:“Entailment can be defined in terms of poss and material implication as follows (19)(p => q) ≡ ~ poss (p &~q).That is to say, if p entails q, then it is not logically possible for both p to be true and not-q to be true and conversely…..” If I translate in my own terms, it reads “Strict implication can be defined in terms of possibility M and material implication as follows:19) (p => q) ≡ ~ M (p &~q). That is to say, if the fact p entails the fact q, if the fact p strictly implies the fact q, then it is not logically possible for the two facts p and not-q to coexist in reality and conversely if the facts p and not-q cannot coexist in reality, it means that the fact p entails the fact q, it means that the fact p strictly implies the fact q.” John Lyons is obviously wrong.Indeed, ~ M (p &~q) is a value implied by p => q the strict implication of q by p,but the converse is untrue for ~ M (p &~q) does not imply of itself p => q, does not imply our p ≡ Lq. ~M (p &~q) it is im-possible to have the conjunction of p and non-q is perfectly compatible,I repeat,with ~M (p & q) it is impossible to have the conjunction of p and q. In fact, when you have ~Mp, the impossibility of p, you have necessarily the conjunction of two impossibilities,for you can write

 ~M p ≡ ~M (p & q) & ~M (p &~q).

(Jean KemperN (talk) 18:51, 16 March 2010 (UTC))

To sum up

1- Firstly, the texts A and B were removed from the respective places where Jean-François Monteil i.e user Jean KemperN had put them

2- Secondly, the text B relating to Strict implication (wiktionary) reappeared without his consent on the talk page relating to Strict conditional (wikipedia), so replacing the text A deleted by one signing Epsilon0 on the sixth of February 2010. The subterfuge is flattering and Jean-François Monteil is not angry. He hopes that some day his texts, deleted in February, will be restored by the deleting authorities themselves.

(Jean KemperN (talk) 09:07, 17 March 2010 (UTC))

  http://www.grammar-and-logic.com

(Jean KemperN (talk) 19:02, 29 April 2010 (UTC)) (84.100.243.153 (talk) 23:34, 10 May 2010 (UTC))(Jean KemperN (talk) 23:39, 10 May 2010 (UTC))

Jean-François Monteil and Theory and History of Ontology by Raul Corazzon. Semantics and Philosophy of Language in Aristotle's De Interpretatione Annotated bibliography on Aristotle's De Interpretatione

e-mail: raul.corazzon@formalontology.it

(62)Monteil Jean-François, "De la traduction en arabe et en français d'un texte d'Aristote: le chapitre VII du Peri Hermeneias," Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales 48: 57-76 (1996). "Les propositions indéterminées du chapitre VII de Peri Hermeneias sont des particulières traduites par des universelles fausses. La cause de cette bizarrerie est dans le maître, et non dans les traducteurs. Aristote mutile un système naturel de propositions dont l'intégrité est restaurée par l'hexagone de Robert Blanché. Celui-ci ajoute deux postes au carré: Y (quantité partielle) et U (exclusion de la quantité partielle). Le carré représente A (totalité) et E (quantité zéro), mais pas avec la tierce quantité Y. Or, la quantité partielle (Y) est essentielle: c'est celle des particulières naturelles contenant notoirement plus d'information que les particulières logiques. U (exclusion de la quantité partielle) est le signifié commun aux deux phrases qu'Aristote élimine du système naturel." (63) Monteil Jean-François, "Une exception allemande: la traduction du De Interpretatione par le Professeur Gohlke: la note 10 sur les indéterminées d'Aristote," Revues de Études Anciennes 103: 409-427 (2001). "Professor Paul Gohlke (*) is the only translator to fully respect Aristotle's own conception of indeterminates. He was the first to perceive the linguistic problem raised by the indeterminate negative. All the other translators of De Interpretatione mistakenly render Aristotle's indeterminates, which are particulars, as universals. The origin of this mistake lies in one of the two Arabic translations."(*) Kategorien und Hermeneutik, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1951 (64)Monteil Jean-François, "La transmission d'Aristote par les Arabes à la chrétienté occidentale: une trouvaille relative au De Interpretatione," Revista Española de Filosofia Medieval 11: 181-195 (2004)."Some men are not white and Some men are white versus No man is white are illegitimately identified to the two pairs of logical contradictories constituting the logical square: A versus O and I versus E, respectively. Thus, the level of natural language and that of logic are confused. The unfortunate Aristotelian alteration is concealed by the translation of propositions known as indeterminates. To translate these, which, semantically, are particulars, all scholars, except for Paul Gohlke, employ the two natural universals excluded by the Master! The work of Isador Pollak, published in Leipzig in 1913, [Die Hermeneutik des. Aristoteles in der Arabischen übersetzung des Ishiik Ibn Honain] reveals the origin of this nearly universal translation mistake: the Arabic version upon which Al-Farabi unfortunately bases his comment. In adding the vertices Y and U to the four ones of the square, the logical hexagon of Robert Blanché (*) allows for the understanding of the manner in which the logical system and the natural system are linked."(*) Structures Intellectuelles. Essai sur l'organisation systématique des concepts - Paris, Vrin, 1966; Raison et Discours. Défense de la logique réflexive - Paris, Vrin, 1967(65)Monteil Jean-François, "Isidor Pollak et les deux traductions arabes différentes du De interpretatione d'Aristote," Revue d'Études Anciennes 107: 29-46 (2005)."Dans le chapitre VII du De interpretatione, Aristote mutile un système naturel de trois couples de contradictions naturelles. Il évince le couple où deux universelles naturelles "Les hommes sont blancs", "Les hommes ne sont pas blancs" s'opposent contradictoirement. Conséquence grave: les deux couples de contradictoires naturelles, qu'Aristote considère exclusivement, sont identifiés illégitimement aux deux couples de contradictoires logiques constituant le carré logique. Cette mutilation est dissimulée par la traduction des propositions dites "indéterminées". L'ouvrage d'Isidor Pollak, publié à Leipzig en 1913 (Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung des Ishak Ibn Honain, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 13,1), révèle l'origine de cette faute de traduction quasi universelle: la version arabe sur laquelle al-Farabi fonde son commentaire." (Jean KemperN 04:23, 16 May 2010 (UTC)) (Jean KemperN (talk) 10:05, 22 May 2010 (UTC)) (86.201.136.236 (talk) 09:50, 27 May 2010 (UTC)) (09:58, 27 May 2010 (UTC)) (Jean KemperN (talk) 12:25, 27 May 2010 (UTC))

(Jean KemperN (talk) 12:29, 27 May 2010 (UTC))

Témoignage du grand Jacques Brunschwig Voici …un essai de bibliographie sélective que j’ai préparée pour ceux d’entre vous qui se sont intéressés au fameux PASTOUT. Je remercie Jean-François Monteil, dont le travail exemplaire m’en a fourni les éléments.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE SÉLECTIVE -POLLAK (I .), Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung (...), Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XIII, Leipzig, 1913. [où le commencement touche à sa fin]. -BLANCHÉ (R.), Introduction à la logique contemporaine, 1957; Structures intellectuelles, 1966; La logique et son histoire, d'Aristote à Russell, 1970. -Brunschwig (J)., La proposition particulière et les preuves de non-concluance chez Aristote. Cahiers pour l'Analyse, n° 10, hiver 1969*. Traduction espagnole et commentaires par Lucia AMORUSO, chercheuse à l'Université de Rosario (Argentine), in progress, 2009. John LYONS, /SEMANTICS I, /Cambridge, 1977 -Brunschwig (J.) Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques (consultées par Mohamed DJEDIDI, enseignant de philosophie à l'Université de Constantine, Algérie). Recueil d'articles déjà publiés, 1995. -Jean-François MONTEIL, Maître de conférences de logique et de linguistique, DE LA TRADUCTION EN ARABE ET EN FRANçAIS D'UN TEXTE D'ARISTOTE: LE CHAPITRE VII DU /PERI HERMENEIAS, / Bulletin d'Études Orientales, 1996, Institut français d'Études Arabes de Damas. -Jean-François MONTEIL, UNE EXCEPTION ALLEMANDE: LA TRADUCTION DU /DE INTERPRETATIONE /PAR LE PROFESSEUR GOHLKE. LA NOTE 10 SUR LES INDÉTERMINÉES D'ARISTOTE, Revue des Études Anciennes, 2001. -Jean-François MONTEIL, DE LA TRADUCTION EN HÉBREU D'UN TEXTE ARABE DE MAÎMONIDE: LE CHAPITRE II DU MAQALA FI SINA AT AL MANTIQ OU TRAITÉ DE LOGIQUE, en français dans les Cahiers de Tunisie -Jean-François MONTEIL, ISIDOR POLLAK ET LES DEUX TRADUCTIONS ARABES DIFFÉRENTES DU /DE INTERPRETATIONE D'ARISTOTE, /Revue des Études Anciennes, 2005. [un "retour" fulgurant, après tant d'années, et quelles années ? ] -Guy LE GAUFEY, LE PASTOUT DE LACAN : CONSISTANCE LOGIQUE, CONSÉQUENCES CLINIQUES, Paris, EPEL., 2006. (86.201.136.236 (talk) 09:58, 27 May 2010 (UTC)) (Jean KemperN (talk) 16:50, 10 July 2010 (UTC))

(84.100.243.210 (talk) 10:00, 27 June 2010 (UTC))

(Jean KemperN (talk) 17:35, 9 July 2010 (UTC))

Note about On interpretation translated by Edghill and published by Kessinger Publishing,(2004)

References from the web

On Interpretation by Aristotle Translated by EM Edghill. Text-only version at Eserver eserver.org/philosophy/aristotle/on-interpretation.txt

Aristotle - On Interpretation You can download Netscape 2.0 for free for your computer. Go to On Interpretation. On Interpretation. by Aristotle translated by em Edghill ... libertyonline.hypermall.com/Aristotle/Logic/On-Interpretation.html Plus

On Interpretation / Aristotle 350 BC ON INTERPRETATION by Aristotle translated by em Edghill 1 First we must define the terms 'noun' and 'verb', then the terms 'denial' and 'affirmation' ... infomotions.com/etexts/philosophy/400BC-301BC/aristotle-on-84.htm

On Interpretation, or “De interpretatione” (work by Aristotle ... discussed in biography, history of logic, theory of language www.britannica.com/eb/topic-428564/On-Interpretation

Aristotle's De Interpretatione (On Interpretation) Aristotle’s works on logic are collected in the Organon, which includes the Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, ... www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/aristotle.html

Aristotle - The Organon ON INTERPRETATION 1 13 Possibility and ... ON INTERPRETATION Book 1 Part 13. Possibility and contingency. 1. Logical sequences follow in due course when we have arranged the propositions thus. ... www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/aristotl/o2113c.htm

Aristotle: On Interpretation by Cajetan, St. Thomas, Jean T ... Book details. Aristotle: On Interpretation. Aristotle: On Interpretation ... Read the complete book Aristotle: On Interpretation by becoming a questia.com ... www.questia.com/library/book/aristotle-on-interpretation-by-cajetan-st-thomas-jean-t-oesterle.jsp

ARISTOTLE - On Interpretation Written 350 bc E - FULL TEXT - In ... On Interpretation 350 bc E. In Two Webpage Parts WEBPAGE ONE. Translated by em Edghill. PART ONE Part 1 First we must define the terms 'noun' and 'verb', ... evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/aristotle_interpretation01.htm

A German exception: the translation of On Interpretation by Professor Gohlke. His tenth note on indeterminate propositions. Article of Jean-François Monteil published in La Revue des études anciennes, 2001, Numéro 3-4

The seventh chapter of Aristotle’s On Interpretation is a text of exceptional importance for it is at the origin of the logical square. erssab.u-bordeaux3.fr/IMG/doc/Gohlke_en_anglais.doc

On Interpretation, by Aristotle; translated by em Edghill On Interpretation. 1. First we must define the terms ‘noun’ and ‘verb’, then the terms ‘denial’ and ‘affirmation’, then ‘proposition’ and ‘sentence.’ ... ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/interpretation/

(Jean KemperN (talk) 23:06, 9 July 2010 (UTC)) Kessinger Publishing, l'éditeur qui, en 2004, publia la traduction par Edghill du De Interpretatione (en anglais On interpretation) constate donc que parmi les 10 articles anglophones les plus consultés sur la toile concernant le De interpretatione d'Aristote se trouve mon papier A German exception: the translation of On Interpretation by Professor Gohlke. His tenth note on indeterminate propositions publié par la Revue des Etudes anciennes en 2001. (Jean KemperN (talk) 09:36, 10 July 2010 (UTC))

(79.90.42.155 (talk) 23:22, 22 December 2010 (UTC))

Greg Bard

(Jean KemperNN (talk) 23:25, 22 December 2010 (UTC)) Logical hexagon

I have created an article for Logical hexagon and refactored a large amount of material contributed byUser:Jean KemperNN. The material is wonderful, but I think it is more appropriate in its own article.Greg Bard (talk) 22:59, 14 November 2010 (UTC) (Jean KemperNN (talk) 01:51, 31 December 2010 (UTC))http://erssab.u-bordeaux3.fr