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'''Physical determinism''' generally refers to the assertion of a [[determinism|deterministic]] [[physical universe]] (greater [[physical system]]).<ref name=Swinburne/><ref name="Papineau2002"/><ref name=stanfordcausaldeterminism/><ref name=blackwell/><ref name="Earman1986"/><ref name="deBroglie1930"/><ref name=Bishop /><ref name="IllesSahakian2011"/><ref name="Stapp2009"/> Physical determinism holds that a complete description of the ''physical'' state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the ''physical'' laws of nature together entail every truth as to what ''physical'' events happen after that time.<ref name=Ginet /> Physical determinism is therefore more restrictive than [[nomological determinism]], that ''all'' future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing ''deterministic'' laws.<ref name=Horst /><ref name=Vihvelin/>
'''Physical determinism''' generally refers to the assertion of a [[determinism|deterministic]] [[physical universe]] (greater [[physical system]]).<ref name=Swinburne/><ref name="Papineau2002"/><ref name=stanfordcausaldeterminism/><ref name=blackwell/><ref name="Earman1986"/><ref name="deBroglie1930"/><ref name=Bishop /><ref name="IllesSahakian2011"/><ref name="Stapp2009"/> Physical determinism holds that a complete description of the ''physical'' state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the ''physical'' laws of nature together entail every truth as to what ''physical'' events happen after that time.<ref name=Ginet /> Physical determinism therefore implies [[nomological determinism]], which holds that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.<ref name=Horst /><ref name=Vihvelin/>


The definition of physical indeterminism, in which all ''physical'' events occur as described by ''physical'' laws, is not the opposite of [[indeterminism]], which last is the opposite of [[nomological determinism]].<ref name=Popper1/> Stronger forms of physical determinism have been used to denote the predictability of a physical system.<ref name="Hunt1987"/>
Physical determinism has also been considered more broadly as a position in which all ''physical'' events occur as described by ''physical'' laws, in which case it is not the opposite of [[Indeterminism|physical indeterminism]].<ref name=Popper1 /> Physical determinism has even been used to denote the predictability of a physical system.<ref name="Hunt1987" />


==Causal completeness==
==Causal completeness==
{{See also|Causal closure}}
{{See also|Causal closure}}
Physical determinism is related to the question of ''causal completeness'' of physics, which is synonymous with the weaker form of [[causal closure]]. This is the idea that every real event has a scientific explanation, that science need not search for explanations beyond itself.<ref name=Sarkar/> If causal completeness does not apply to ''everything'' in the universe, then the door is open to events that are not subject to physical determinism.<ref name=Atmanspacher/> For example, a relatively common view of mental events is that they are an [[Epiphenomenalism|epiphenomenon]] produced as a by-product of neurological activity, and without [[Problem of mental causation|causal impact]]. In this case, only a failure of physical determinism would allow room for their causal significance.
Physical determinism is related to the question of ''causal completeness'' of physics, which is synonymous with the weaker form of [[causal closure]]. This is the idea that every real event has a scientific explanation, that science need not search for explanations beyond itself.<ref name=Sarkar/> If causal completeness does not apply to ''everything'' in the universe, then the door is open to events that are not subject to deterministic physical law.<ref name=Atmanspacher/> For example, a relatively common view of mental events is that they are an [[Epiphenomenalism|epiphenomenon]] produced as a by-product of neurological activity, and without [[Problem of mental causation|causal impact]]. In this case, only a failure of deterministic physical law would allow room for their causal significance.


==Other formulations==
==Other formulations==
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{{quote| "a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."<ref name=Nagel/>|Ernest Nagel|''Alternative descriptions of physical state'' p. 292 }}
{{quote| "a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."<ref name=Nagel/>|Ernest Nagel|''Alternative descriptions of physical state'' p. 292 }}
This quote replaces the idea of 'cause-and-effect' with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events. In addition, an 'event' is related by the theory itself to formalized ''states'' described using the parameters defined by that theory. Thus, the details of interpretation are placed where they belong, fitted to the context in which the chosen theory applies. Using the definition of physical determinism above, the limitations of a theory to some particular domain of experience also limits the associated definition of 'physical determinism' to that same domain. That limitation leaves open the question whether there is a physical "[[theory of everything]]" waiting to be invented.
This quote replaces the idea of 'cause-and-effect' with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events. In addition, an 'event' is related by the theory itself to formalized ''states'' described using the parameters defined by that theory. Thus, the details of interpretation are placed where they belong, fitted to the context in which the chosen theory applies. Using the definition of physical determinism above, the limitations of a theory to some particular domain of experience also limits the associated definition of 'physical determinism' to that same domain. That limitation leaves open the question whether there is a physical "[[theory of everything]]" waiting to be invented.

==Popper's three worlds==
A more general reservation about the scope of physical determinism stems from the formulation of [[Popper's three worlds]]. [[Karl Popper|Popper]] split the world into three categories:<ref name=Popper2/>

* World 1: the world of physical [[object (philosophy)|object]]s and [[event (philosophy)|event]]s, including [[biology|biological]] entities
* World 2: the mental or psychological world, the world of our feelings of pain and of pleasure, of our thoughts, of our decisions, of our perceptions and our observations; in other words, the world of mental or psychological states or processes, or of subjective experiences.
* World 3: the world of products of the human mind, including art, science, and religion.

World 3 includes physical theory as a particular case. But World 3 is a creation of the human imagination, and such acts of imagination are a part of World 2. Accordingly, one could argue that physical determinism is a child of the imagination, and although physical determinism has its successes in describing World 1, it may not apply to World 2 or World 3. The subjective aspects of theories contained in World 3 are not readily framed within the third-person perspective of science used to explain World 1. For example, in describing mental events:
{{quote|"Epistemically, the mind is determined by mental states, which are accessible in First-Person Perspective. In contrast, the brain, as characterized by neuronal states, can be accessed in Third-Person Perspective. The Third-Person Perspective focuses on other persons and thus on the neuronal states of others' brain while excluding the own brain. In contrast, the First-Person Perspective could potentially provide epistemic access to own brain...However, the First-Person Perspective provides access only to the own mental states but not to the own brain and its neuronal states."
<ref name=Northoff/>|Georg Northoff |''Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem'', p. 5 }}

These subjective aspects, and others pointed out by [[Thomas Kuhn]] and many others,<ref name=Kuhn/> are described in the article [[subject–object problem]].


==See also==
==See also==
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<ref name="IllesSahakian2011">
<ref name="IllesSahakian2011">
{{cite book|author1=Judy Illes|author2=Barbara J. Sahakian|title=Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=0xDx1pd39moC|accessdate=7 February 2013|date=7 April 2011|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-162091-1|page=156|quote=From the 17th century onwards- and particularly with the success of Newtonian physics, as it was said before- a new concept of nature emerged, superseding the Aristotelian perspective. In this conception, the world is causally closed: every event is caused by another event of the same ontological kind, and there is no place for an event that would not be imprisoned in the causal network of the world. In short, every event in the world is caused, and caused and effects are of the same material nature, their interaction being regulated by the laws of nature. This is physical determinism or determinism tout court.}}
{{cite book|author1=Judy Illes|author2=Barbara J. Sahakian|title=Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=0xDx1pd39moC|accessdate=7 February 2013|date=7 April 2011|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-162091-1|page=156|quote=From the 17th century onwards- and particularly with the success of Newtonian physics, as it was said before- a new concept of nature emerged, superseding the Aristotelian perspective. In this conception, the world is causally closed: every event is caused by another event of the same ontological kind, and there is no place for an event that would not be imprisoned in the causal network of the world. In short, every event in the world is caused, and caused and effects are of the same material nature, their interaction being regulated by the laws of nature. This is physical determinism or determinism tout court.}}
</ref>

<ref name=Kuhn>
One of his discussions is reprinted in {{cite book |title=The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, |author=Thomas S Kuhn |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=sXufWLnPp94C&pg=PA208 |pages=208 ''ff'' |chapter=Chapter 9: Rationality and Theory Choice |editor=James Conant, John Haugeland, eds |edition=2nd |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=0226457990}}
</ref>
</ref>


<ref name=Nagel>
<ref name=Nagel>
{{cite book |title=The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation |author=Ernest Nagel |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=u6EycHgRfkQC&pg=PA285 |pages =285-292 |chapter=§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state |isbn=0915144719 |year=1999 |publisher=Hackett |edition=2nd }}
{{cite book |title=The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation |author=Ernest Nagel |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=u6EycHgRfkQC&pg=PA285 |pages =285-292 |chapter=§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state |isbn=0915144719 |year=1999 |publisher=Hackett |edition=2nd }}
</ref>

<ref name=Northoff>
A rather extended discussion is provided in {{cite book |title=Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem |author=Georg Northoff |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=r0Bf3lLys6AC&printsec=frontcover |publisher=John Benjamins Publishing |isbn=1588114171 |year=2004 |edition=Volume 52 of Advances in Consciousness Research}}
</ref>
</ref>


Line 89: Line 68:
<ref name=Popper1>
<ref name=Popper1>
{{cite book| author=Popper, K| title=Of Clouds and Cuckoos, included in ''Objective Knowledge''|date=1978| page=220 |quote=For the thesis of philosophical determinism, that 'Like effects have like causes' or that 'Every event has a cause' is so vague that it is perfectly compatible with physical indeterminism}}
{{cite book| author=Popper, K| title=Of Clouds and Cuckoos, included in ''Objective Knowledge''|date=1978| page=220 |quote=For the thesis of philosophical determinism, that 'Like effects have like causes' or that 'Every event has a cause' is so vague that it is perfectly compatible with physical indeterminism}}
</ref>

<ref name=Popper2>
{{cite web |title=Three Worlds|author=Karl Popper |date=April 7, 1978 |work=The Tanner lectures on human values |url=http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/popper80.pdf |publisher=The University of Utah |accessdate=2013-01-24}} The list of lectures is found in the [http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/atoz.html Tanner Lecture Library].
</ref>
</ref>


Revision as of 09:46, 7 February 2013

Physical determinism generally refers to the assertion of a deterministic physical universe (greater physical system).[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9] Physical determinism holds that a complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature together entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time.[10] Physical determinism therefore implies nomological determinism, which holds that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.[11][12]

Physical determinism has also been considered more broadly as a position in which all physical events occur as described by physical laws, in which case it is not the opposite of physical indeterminism.[13] Physical determinism has even been used to denote the predictability of a physical system.[14]

Causal completeness

See also: Causal closure

Physical determinism is related to the question of causal completeness of physics, which is synonymous with the weaker form of causal closure. This is the idea that every real event has a scientific explanation, that science need not search for explanations beyond itself.[15] If causal completeness does not apply to everything in the universe, then the door is open to events that are not subject to deterministic physical law.[16] For example, a relatively common view of mental events is that they are an epiphenomenon produced as a by-product of neurological activity, and without causal impact. In this case, only a failure of deterministic physical law would allow room for their causal significance.

Other formulations

A more modern formulation of physical determinism skirts the issue of causal completeness. It is based upon connections between 'events' supplied by a theory:

"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."[17]

— Ernest Nagel, Alternative descriptions of physical state p. 292

This quote replaces the idea of 'cause-and-effect' with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events. In addition, an 'event' is related by the theory itself to formalized states described using the parameters defined by that theory. Thus, the details of interpretation are placed where they belong, fitted to the context in which the chosen theory applies. Using the definition of physical determinism above, the limitations of a theory to some particular domain of experience also limits the associated definition of 'physical determinism' to that same domain. That limitation leaves open the question whether there is a physical "theory of everything" waiting to be invented.

See also

References

  1. ^ Swinburne,R. G. (1969). "Physical Determinism". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. 3: 155–168. There is for every physical state at some earlier instant a set of conditions jointly sufficient for its occurrence.
  2. ^ David Papineau (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-19-924382-2. Retrieved 6 February 2013. ...physical determinism (the doctrine that prior physical conditions alone are enough to determine later physical conditions)
  3. ^ See for example Hoefer, Carl (Apr 1, 2008). "Causal Determinism". In Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 edition). {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help) See also Popper, K (1978). p. p212. {{cite book}}: |page= has extra text (help); Missing or empty |title= (help); Unknown parameter |name= ignored (help) See also Felix T Hong (2003). "Towards physical dynamic tolerance: an approach to resolve the conflict between free will and physical determinism". Biosystems. 68 (2–3): 85 - 105. doi:10.1016/S0303-2647(02)00089-8. Classical (physical) determinism is also widely accepted by physicists and philosophers. See also Robert C. Bishop (2003). "On Separating Predictability and Determinism". Erkenntnis. 58 (2): 169. The belief that any deterministic system is predictable has been part of our scientific traditions in some form from their beginnings through the twentieth century. This belief is persistent because of the power of the intuitions that lie behind the concept of physical determinism.
  4. ^ Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, ed. (2004). "physical determinism". The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. doi:10.1111/b.9781405106795.2004.x. ISBN 9781405106795. The development of modern science, especially physics, led many to think that physical determinism must be true. Science claims that its aim is to discover these objective laws. If we can provide a complete physical explanation at this time for one thing, we will be able to predict its future on the grounds of natural laws
  5. ^ John Earman (31 August 1986). A Primer on Determinism. Springer. p. 9. ISBN 978-90-277-2240-9. Retrieved 6 February 2013. If physical determinism holds and the antecedent state of the universe suffices to fix the future physical state, including all of our movements and thus all of our actions, then "all of our thoughts, feelings, and efforts can have no practical influence upon what happens in the world..."
  6. ^ Louis de Broglie (1930). "Introduction à l'Étude de la Mécanique Ondulatoire (Recueil d'Exposés sur les Ondes et Corpuscules)". Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 38: 292 (80). Beginning with the celebrated statement of physical determinism by Laplace, the author traces the development of the causal idea in physics up to the time when the quantum mechanics began to render its previous strict interpretation doubtful
  7. ^ Robert C Bishop (2011). "Chapter 4: Chaos, indeterminism, and free will". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 84. ISBN 0195399692. all physical events are determined to occur according to physical laws {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  8. ^ Judy Illes; Barbara J. Sahakian (7 April 2011). Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. p. 156. ISBN 978-0-19-162091-1. Retrieved 7 February 2013. From the 17th century onwards- and particularly with the success of Newtonian physics, as it was said before- a new concept of nature emerged, superseding the Aristotelian perspective. In this conception, the world is causally closed: every event is caused by another event of the same ontological kind, and there is no place for an event that would not be imprisoned in the causal network of the world. In short, every event in the world is caused, and caused and effects are of the same material nature, their interaction being regulated by the laws of nature. This is physical determinism or determinism tout court.
  9. ^ Henry P. Stapp (2009). "Quantum Reality and Mind". Journal of Cosmology. 3: 570–579. ...the precept of physical determinism, which is the notion that a complete description of the values of all physically described variables at any one time determines with certainty the values of all physically described variables at any later time. This idea of universal physical determinism is a basic precept of the development of Newtonian dynamics into what is called "classical physics".
  10. ^ This definition is from Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press. p. 92. ISBN 052138818X.
  11. ^ Steven W Horst (2011). Laws, Mind, and Free Will. MIT Press. p. 98. ISBN 0262015250.
  12. ^ Vihvelin, Kadri (Mar 1, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Arguments for Incompatibilism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). Retrieved 2013-02-06. {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  13. ^ Popper, K (1978). Of Clouds and Cuckoos, included in Objective Knowledge. p. 220. For the thesis of philosophical determinism, that 'Like effects have like causes' or that 'Every event has a cause' is so vague that it is perfectly compatible with physical indeterminism
  14. ^ G. M. K. Hunt (June 1987). "Determinism, Predictability and Chaos". 47 (3). Oxford University Press: 129. The thesis of physical determinism is often supported by an appeal to a mechanical view of the world. This mechanical view derives much of its support from an appeal to classical mechanics. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  15. ^ See for example, Sahotra Sarkar, Jessica Pfeifer (2006). "Physicalism: The causal impact argument". The Philosophy of Science: N-Z, Index. Taylor & Francis. p. 566. ISBN 041597710X.
  16. ^ Robert C Bishop, Harald Atmanspacher (2011). "Chapter 5: The causal closure of physics and free will". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 101. ISBN 0195399692. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  17. ^ Ernest Nagel (1999). "§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state". The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (2nd ed.). Hackett. pp. 285–292. ISBN 0915144719.
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