Hitler and Mannerheim recording

Friendly conversation between Adolf Hitler, Gustaf Mannerheim, and President Risto Ryti in front of Hitler's private converted plane.

The Hitler and Mannerheim Recording is a secret voice recording of a private conversation between Adolf Hitler and Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim in 1942. The Finnish engineer of the broadcasting company YLE, Thor Damen, succeeded in recording the first 11 minutes of Hitler's and Mannerheim's private conversation. This had to be done secretly, as Hitler never allowed others to record him off-guard. How long the entire conversation lasted is uncertain. Damen was given the assignment to record the official birthday speeches and Mannerheim's responses and following those orders added microphones to certain railway cars.

When the SS spotted the cords coming out of the window and realized that the Finnish engineer was recording the conversation, they gestured to him to stop recording immediately, and he complied. Even so, YLE was allowed to keep the tape after promising to keep it in a sealed container. It was given to the head of the state censors' office, Kustaa Vilkuna, and in 1957 returned to YLE. It was made available to the public a few years later. It is the only known recording of Hitler speaking in an unofficial tone.

The conversation is about Hitler explaining the failure of Operation Barbarossa, Italian defeats in North Africa, Yugoslavia, and Albania, armaments in the Soviet Union, and Romanian petroleum wells.

Visit by Adolf Hitler

Adolf Hitler decided to visit Finland on 4 June 1942, ostensibly to congratulate Mannerheim on his 75th birthday. But Mannerheim did not want to meet him at his headquarters in Mikkeli or Helsinki, as it would have seemed like an official state visit. The meeting took place near Imatra, in south-eastern Finland, and was arranged in secrecy.

From Immola Airfield, Hitler, accompanied by President Ryti, was driven to the place where Mannerheim was waiting at a railway siding. After a speech from Hitler, and following a birthday meal and negotiations between him and Mannerheim, Hitler returned to Germany. President Ryti and other high-ranking Finns and Germans were also present.

Hitler spent about five hours in Finland. Hitler reportedly intended to ask the Finns to step up military operations against the Soviets, but he apparently made no specific demands.

The recording

Hitler: ... A very serious danger, perhaps the most serious one (short pause) its whole extent we can only now judge. We did not ourselves understand just how monstrously strong this state [the USSR] was armed.

Mannerheim: No, we hadn't thought of this.

Hitler: No, I too, no.

Mannerheim: During the Winter War (short pause) during the Winter War we had not even thought of this. Of course.

Hitler: (Interrupting) Yes.

Mannerheim: But so, how they, in reality, and now there is no doubt all they had, what they had in their stocks.

Hitler: Absolutely, this is (short pause) they had the most immense armaments that, uh, people could imagine. Well, if somebody had told me that a country with...

(Hitler is interrupted by the sound of a door opening and closing).

Hitler: If somebody had told me a nation could start with 35,000 tanks, then I'd have said: "You are crazy!"

Mannerheim: 35,000?

Hitler: 35,000 tanks.

Another voice in the background: 35,000 yes!

Hitler: We have destroyed, right now, more than 34,000 tanks. If someone had told this, I'd have said: "You!" if you are one of my generals had stated that any nation has 35,000 tanks I'd have said: "You, my good sir, you see everything twice or ten times. You are crazy; you see ghosts." This I would have deemed [im]possible. I told you earlier we found factories, one of them at Kramatorskaja, for example, two years ago there were just a couple of hundred [tanks]. We didn't know anything. Today, there is a tank plant, where (short pause) during the first shift a little more than 30,000, and around the clock a little more than 60,000, workers would have labored (short pause) a single tank plant, we occupied it, a gigantic factory, masses of workers who certainly lived like animals and...

Another voice in the background: (Interrupting) In the Donets area?

Hitler: In the Donets area.

(Background noises from rattling of cups and plates over the exchange).

Mannerheim: Well, if you keep in mind they had almost 20 years, almost 25 years of (short pause) freedom to arm themselves.

Hitler: (Interrupting quietly) It was unbelievable.

Mannerheim: And everything (short pause) everything spent on armament.

Hitler: Only on armament.

Mannerheim: Only on armament.

Hitler: (Sighs) Only (short pause) well. It's (short pause) as I told your president [Ryti] before (short pause) I had no idea of it. If I had an idea (short pause) then it would have been even more difficult for me, but I would have taken the decision [to invade] anyhow, because (short pause) there was no other possibility. It was certain, already in the winter of 1939/1940, that the war had to begin. I had only this nightmare, but there is even more! Because a war on two fronts would have been impossible (short pause) that would have broken us. Today, we see more clearly than we saw at that time; it would have broken us. And my whole (short pause) I originally wanted to already in the fall of 1939 I wanted to conduct the campaign in the west (short pause) on the continuously bad weather we experienced hindered us. Our whole armament, you know, was (short pause) is a good weather armament. It's very capable, very good, but it's unfortunately just a good-weather armament. We have seen this in the war. Our weapons naturally were made for the west, and we all thought, and this was true until that time, uh, it was the opinion from the earliest times; you cannot wage war in winter. And we too, have, the German tanks, they weren't tested, for example, to prepare them for winter war. Instead we conducted trials to prove it was impossible to wage war in the winter. This is a different starting point [than the Soviet's]. In the fall of 1939 we always faced the question. I desperately wanted to attack, and I firmly believed we could finish France in six weeks. However, we faced the question of whether we could move at all (short pause) it was raining continuously. And I know the French area myself very well and I too could ignore the opinions, of many of my generals that, we (short pause) probably (short pause) would not have had the, that our tank arm would not been effective from out airfields because of the rain. I know northern France myself. You know, I served in the Great War for four years. And so the delay happened. If I had in 1939 eliminated France, then world history would have changed. But I had to wait until 1940, and unfortunately it wasn't possible before May. Only on the 10 May was the first nice day, and on 10 May I immediately attacked. I gave the order to attack on the 10 on the 8. And then we had to, conduct this huge transfer of our divisions from the west to the east. First the occupation of (short pause) then we had the task in Norway (short pause) at the same time we faced (short pause) I can frankly say it today (short pause) a grave misfortune, namely the weakness of Italy. Because of (short pause) the first, the situation in North Africa, then second, because of the situation in Albania and Greece (short pause) a very big misfortune. We had to help. This meant for us, with one small stroke, fist the splitting of our air force, splitting our tank force, while at the same time were preparing, the, tank arm in the east. We had to hand over (short pause) with one stroke, two divisions, two whole divisions and a third was then added, and we had to replace continuous, very severe, losses there. It was bloody fighting in the desert. This all naturally was inevitable, you see, I had a conversation with [Soviet Minister] Molotov at that time, and it was absolutely certain that Molotov departed with the decision to begin a war, and I dismissed the decision to begin a war, and I dismissed him with the decision to (short pause) impossible, to forestall him. There was (short pause) this was the only (short pause) because the demands that man brought up were clearly aimed to rule, Europe in the end. (Practically whispering here) then I have him (short pause) not publicly (fades out). Already in the fall of 1940 we continuously faced the question: shall we consider a break up [in relations with the USSR]? At that time, I advised the Finnish government, to negotiate and, to gain the time and, to act dilatory in this matter because I always feared that Russia suddenly would attack Romania in the late fall, and occupy the petroleum wells, and we could have not been readying the late fall of 1940. If Russia indeed had taken Romanian petroleum wells, then Germany would have been lost. It would have required just 60 Russian divisions to handle that matter. In Romania we had of course (short pause) at that time (short pause) no major units. The Romanian government had turned to us only recently and what we did have there was laughable. They only had to occupy the petroleum wells. Of course, with our weapons I could not start a war in September or October. That was out of the question. Naturally, the transfer to the east wasn't that far advanced yet. Of course, the units first had to reconsolidate in the west. First the armaments had to be taken care of because we too had (short pause) yes. we also had losses in our campaign in the West. It would have been impossible to attack before the spring of 1939/1941. And if the Russians at that time (short pause) in the fall of 1940 had occupied Romania [and] taken the petroleum wells, then we would have been helpless in 1941.

Another voice in the background: Without petroleum...

Hitler: (Interrupting) We had huge German production, however, the demands of the air force, our panzer divisions they are really huge. It's a level of consumption that surpasses the imagination. And without the addition of four to five million tons of Romanian petroleum, we could not have fought the war, and would have had to let it be, and that was my big worry. Therefore I aspired to, the bridge the period of negotiations until we would be strong enough to, counter those extortive demands [from Moscow] because (short pause) those demands were simply naked extortions. They were extortions. The Russians knew we were tied up in the west. They could really extort everything from us. Only when Molotov visited (short pause) then (short pause) I told him frankly that the demands, their numerous demands, weren't acceptable to us. With that the negotiations came to abrupt end that same morning. There were four topics. The one topic that, involved Finland was, the, freedom to protect themselves from the Finnish threat, he said. [I said:] "You do not want to tell me Finland threatens you!" But he said: "In Finland it's they who take action against the friends of the Soviet Union. They would [take action] against [our] society, against us, and a great power cannot be threatened by a minor country. I said: "Your existence isn't threatened by Finland! That is, you don't mean to tell me...

Mannerheim: (Interrupting) Laughable!

Hitler: That our existence is threatened by Finland?" "Well" [he said] "There was a moral threat being made against a great power, and what Finland was doing, that was a moral (short pause) a threat to their moral existence." Then I told him we would not accept a further war in the Baltic area as passive spectators. In reply he asked how we viewed our position in, Romania. You know, we had given them a guarantee. [He wanted to know] If that guarantee was directed against Russia as well? And that time I told him: "I don't think it's directed at you, because I don't think you have the intention of attacking Romania. You have always stated that Bessarabia is yours, but that you have (short pause) never stated that you want to attack Romania!" "Yes", he told me, but wanted to know more precisely if this guarantee (a door opens and the recoding ends).

Authenticity

After the tape was revealed to the public, many believed it was a fake because Hitler's voice sounded too hoarse and soft. Pictures taken by a Finish military photographer on the day of the event later showed that Hitler had been drinking alcohol in the dining room of the train, which could have effected his voice as he rarely drank alcohol. After listing to the recording, Rochus Misch, Hitler's former bodyguard and radio operator, said:

"He is speaking normally, but I'm having problems with the tone, the intonation isn't quite right. Sometimes it seems okay, but at others points not. I have the feeling it's someone mimicking Hitler. It really sounds as if someone is mimicking him."

The BKA (the German Federal Criminal Police Office) later made an examination of the tape and head of frequencies Dr. Stefan Gfroerer declared:

"Well, if Misch finds this voice pleasant, [then] this is not surprising to me, because I guess that his experience with Hitler's voice was a totally different setting. It is very obvious to us that this is Hitler's voice."

National Geographic also declared:

"Our analyses leaves no doubt [that] this is [the voice of] Adolf Hitler."

See also

• Hitler's Table Talk
• 1942 in Germany
• Operation Barbarossa

References

• Dietrich, Otto (2010). The Hitler I Knew: Memoirs of the Third Reich's Press Chief. New York: Skyhorse. ISBN 978-1-60239-972-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Weinberg, Gerhard (1980). The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II. Chicago, Illinois: Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-88511-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Virkkunen, Sakari (1994). Presidents of Finland II. Helsinki, Otava. ISBN 978-3-8329-5609-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Laine, Antti (1982). Suur-Suomen Kahdet Kasvot. ISBN 951-1-06947-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)