Battle of Raseiniai

Battle of Raseiniai
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
File:Bt7 6.jpg A BT-7 tank; many vehicles like this were destroyed in the battle.
Date 23–27 June 1941 Location Raseiniai, Lithuania Result German victory
Belligerents
Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Gen. Erich Hoepner	Col.-Gen. Fyodor Kuznetsov
Strength
245 tanks[I]	749 tanks
Casualties and losses
Light	704 tanks

The Battle of Raseiniai (23–27 June 1941) was a tank battle fought between the elements of the German 4th Panzer Group (General Erich Hoepner) and the Soviet 3rd Mechanized Corps (Major General Kurkin) with Major General Shestapolov's 12th Mechanised Corps, in Lithuania, 75 km northwest of Kaunas. The commander of the Northwestern Front, Colonel General Fyodor Kuznetsov tried to contain and destroy German troops that had crossed the Neman River (Nemunas). The result of the battle was the destruction of most of the Soviet armoured forces of the Northwestern Front, clearing the way for the Germans to attack towards the crossings of the Daugava River (Western Dvina). This was one of the major battles during the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa known in Soviet history as the Border Defensive Battles (22–27 June 1941) as part of the larger Baltic Strategic Defensive Operation.

Prelude

Army Group North, commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, and staging in East Prussia prior to the commencement of the offensive, was the northern of three Army Groups participating in Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. Army Group North controlled the 18th Army and the 16th Army, along with General Erich Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group. The Germans had 20 infantry divisions, three Panzer and three motorized infantry divisions. Air support was provided by the Luftflotte 1 (1st Air Fleet).

The military administrative control over the Baltic republics area where the Army Group North would be deployed was exercised by the Special Baltic Military District which after the invasion was renamed into the Northwestern Front, commanded by Colonel General Fyodor Kuznetsov. The front fielded 8th and 11th Armies with the 27th Armies in its second echelon. All together, Northwestern Front had 28 rifle, 4 tank, and 2 motorized divisions.

A key part of Northwestern Front's potential were the two mechanised corps deployed with it. On 22 June 1941 3rd Mechanised Corps had 31,975 men and 651 tanks including (10 T-34s and two battalions of 50 heavy KV-1s). The same day, 12th Mechanized Corps had 28,832 men and 749 tanks including only lighter Soviet T-26, Bt Series tanks.

Battle

Location map of Lithuania showing Raseiniai

The 4th Panzer Group advanced in two spearheads, led by the XLI Panzer Corps and LVI Panzer Corps. Their objectives was to cross the Neman and Daugava, the most difficult natural obstacles in front of the Army Group North drive towards Leningrad. German bombers destroyed many of the signals and communications centers, naval bases, and the Soviet aerodromes in particular; from Riga to Kronstadt, on Šiauliai, Vilnius and Kaunas the bombs rained on carefully selected targets. Soviet aircraft had been on one-hour alert, but were held on their airfields after the first wave of German bombers passed.

At 9:30 AM on 22 June, Kuznetsov ordered the 3rd and 12th Mechanized Corps to take up their counterattack positions, intending to use them in flanking attacks on the 4th Panzer Group, which had broken through to the river Dubysa (Dubissa). By noon, the Soviet divisions began to fall back. The German columns then began to swing towards Raseiniai, where Kuznetsov was concentrating his own armor for a big counterattack on the next day. By the evening, Soviet formations had fallen back to the Dubysa. Northwest of Kaunas, forward elements of Erich von Manstein's LVI Panzer Corps reached the Dubysa and seized the vital Ariogala road viaduct across it. Without this crossing, Germans tanks might have been trapped in what was a giant natural tank ditch. A dash to Dvinsk would have been wholly ruled out. Southwest of Vilnius more armor from the 3rd Panzer Army, which had defeated the Soviet 11th Army, crossed the Niemen River.

By the end of 22 June, the German armoured spearheads over the Niemen had penetrated 80 kilometres (50 mi). The next day, Kuznetsov committed his armoured forces to battle. Near Raseiniai, the XLI Panzer Corps was counter-attacked by the Soviet 3rd and 12th Mechanised Corps. The concentration of Soviet armour was detected by the Luftwaffe, which immediately attacked tank columns of the 12th Mechanised Corps south west of Šiauliai. The attacks were unopposed by Soviet fighters and were a great success. The Soviet 23rd Tank Division sustained particularly severe losses, Ju 88s from Luftflotte 1 attacking at low level, setting ablaze 40 vehicles, including tanks and lorries.

German forces encountered a unit equipped with the Soviet KV heavy tanks for the first time. On 23 June, Kampfgruppe Von Seckendorff of the German 6th Panzer Division, consisting of 114th Panzergrenadier Regiment (motorized infantry), Aufklärungsabteilung 57 (Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 57), one company of Panzerjäger Battalion 41, and, that morning only, Motorcycle Battalion 6, was overrun by Gen. Yegor Solyankin's 2nd Tank Division from the 3rd Mechanised Corps near Skaudvilė.^[I] The German Panzer 35(t) tanks and antitank weapons were ineffective against the Soviet heavy tanks—some of them were out of ammunition but closed in and destroyed German antitank guns by driving over them.^[f] The Germans concentrated on immobilising the Soviet tanks by firing at their tracks and then by tackling them with artillery, anti-aircraft guns, or by blowing them up with explosive charges of the sticky bomb type. A report of the Thuringian 1st Panzer Division described,

The KV-1 and KV-2, which we first met here, were really something! Our companies opened fire at about 800 yards, but it remained ineffective. We moved closer and closer to the enemy, who for his part continued to approach us unconcerned. Very soon we were facing each other at 50 to 100 yards. A fantastic exchange of fire took place without any visible German success. The Russian (sic – Soviet) tanks continued to advance, and all armour-piercing shells simply bounced off them. Thus we were presently faced with the alarming situation of the Russian (sic) tanks driving through the ranks of 1st Panzer Regiment towards our own infantry and our hinterland. Our Panzer Regiment therefore about turned and rumbled back with the KV-1s and KV-2s, roughly in line with them. In the course of that operation we succeeded in immobilizing some of them with special purpose shells at very close range 30 to 60 yards. A counter attack was launched and the Russians (sic – Soviets) were thrown back. A protective front established and defensive fighting continued.

The 'Lone Wolf' KV-2

A KV-2 tank; one held up the 6th Panzer Division for a day.

On 24 June, 1941, a German convoy transporting troops, supplies and POWs was traveling east towards the town of Raseiniai when they encountered a KV-2 in the street, most likely left by its division for slowing down. A local person stated that the tank, 'drove into the crossroads, stopped, and remained motionless all night.' The KV-2 crew spotted the trucks almost immediately and fired on them. The Germans believed they were under fire by an entire tank division and retreated behind a nearby hill. The armour of the tank was too thick for standard German anti-tank guns to penetrate and only the 88 mm AA gun and 105 mm howitzer might succeed. The Germans tried to call for 88 mm AA guns but by coincidence, the KV-2 ran down a telephone pole, severing the telephone line. As this occurred, a German convoy came from the east, transporting fuel and ammunition, drove into the area and was annihilated by the KV-2. According to the German group commander, at least 12 smoldering trucks blocked the road and vehicles that tried to go around the tank would be stuck in the swamps and destroyed. The road was the only way across and after the KV-2 was destroyed, the Germans would still have to move the tank as well as the wrecked vehicles before resuming their advance.^[r]

The Germans first tried to use 105 mm howitzers to destroy the tank but were unable to return fire without being spotted by the tank. After discovering the ineffectiveness of the howitzers, the Germans tried four 50 mm anti-tank batteries, hitting the KV eight times. The Germans cheered but then the KV turned, destroying two batteries and damaging the others beyond use. The Germans eventually restored communication with the rear and ordered an 88 mm AA gun. The gun was used to engage the tank at 2,000 m (2,200 yd), then the gunners closed to 700 m (770 yd) to be sure of their aim. The KV-2 destroyed the gun with one shot. As night fell a lull began and German sappers tried to attach mines to the bottom of the KV. Hearing the breaking of twigs, the Germans fell back but realised that it was villagers bringing food to the tank crew and continued to move in. The mines were planted but only the tank tracks were damaged, which made no difference as the tank had been immobile since the first encounter.^[r]

The next morning, more AA guns were brought in and the German tank commander ordered his tanks to attack as decoys while the AA guns were being emplaced. The KV-2 did not fire on the tanks but was diverted from the guns, which hit the tank six times, disabling it. As German troops investigated, they noticed that despite being hit over 24 times, only two shells penetrated the hull, both fired from the last set of guns. A soldier banged on the hull and the turret began to swivel and the Germans scattered. One soldier tossed a hand grenade into the hole in the side of the hull and blew the roof hatch off. Inside the tank were the bodies of the six Soviet crewmen. The tank crew had delayed the advance of the 6th Panzer Division for over 24 hours, which influenced the defense of Leningrad, as Red Army reinforcements reached Raseiniai as well as Leningrad.^[r]

General Erhard Raus the Officer in Command of 6th Panzer Division's Kampfgruppe Raus, the unit held up by the lone vehicle, which he describes as a KV-1, described the events as follows. He said the vehicle was damaged by several shots from an 88 anti-tank gun firing at the vehicle from behind while it was distracted by Panzer 35(t) tanks from Panzer Battalion 65 and the crew were killed by grenades from a pioneer engineer unit who pushed the grenades through two holes made by the gun while the turret had started moving again, the other five or six shots having not apparently penetrated completely. The crew had remarkably only been apparently stunned by the shots which had entered the turret. Afterwards they were buried nearby with military honours by the German soldiers of the unit held up.

Conclusion of the battle

In the south, by 23 June, 11th Army commander Lieutenant-General Morozov ordered the units falling back to the old fortress town Kaunas on the Niemen to move on to Jonava some 30 mi (48 km) to the north-east. By the evening of 25 June, the Soviet 8th Army fell back towards Riga and the 11th towards Vilnius to the Desna. A breach gaped in the Soviet front from Ukmergė to Daugavpils. By 26 June, the 1st Panzer Division and 36th Motorised Infantry Division of the XLI Panzer Corps and following infantry divisions had cut through the rear of the Soviet mechanised corps and linked up. The Soviet 3rd Mechanised Corps had run out of fuel, and Gen. E.N. Solyankin's 2nd Tank Division was encircled and almost completely destroyed. In the encirclement, Solyankin was killed in action. The 5th Tank Division and 84th Motorised Division were severely depleted due to losses in vehicles and personnel.^[g] The 12th Mechanized Corps pulled out of the trap, but by now was very short of fuel and ammunition.^[h]

The Soviet Baltic Fleet was withdrawn from bases in Liepāja, Windau, and Riga by 26 June and LVI Panzer Corps dashed for the River Dvina and in a remarkable coup seized bridges near Dvinsk intact.

Aftermath

After the seizure of the Dvina bridges and the fall of Dvinsk, the leading formations of LVI Panzer Corps furiously set about enlarging the bridgehead. On 25 June, Marshal Semyon Timoshenko ordered Kuznetsov to organize a defense of the Western Dvina, by deploying the 8th Army on the right bank of the river from Riga to Livani while the 11th Army would defend Livani–Kraslava sector. Kuznetsov also decided to use Major-General Nikolai Berzarin's 27th Army. Berzarin was to pull his troops off the Hiiumaa and Saaremaa islands and out of Riga and bring them to Daugavpils. At the same time the Soviet high command (Stavka) released Major-General Dmitry Lelyushenko's 21st Mechanised Corps from the Moscow Military District to co-operate with the 27th Army; Lelyushenko had 98 tanks and 129 guns.

At 5:00 AM, on 28 June, Lelyushenko attacked upon Kuznetsov's orders in an attempt to destroy the German bridgehead near Daugavpils. Manstein halted on the Dvina but attacked on the next day, striking along the Daugavpils–Ostrov highway. At Riga on the afternoon of 29 June, the Germans crossed the railway bridge over the Dvina. On 30 June Soviet troops withdrew on the right bank of the river, and by 1 July were in retreat to Estonia. A priceless opportunity now offered itself to the Germans. An immediate drive forwards would make it almost impossible for the Soviets to defend Leningrad. However, it was not to be: orders received with disbelief by the tankers were to wait for the infantry to arrive. In the end the wait would last almost a week.

Kuznetsov was sacked by Timoshenko and the 8th Army commander, Major-General Pyotr Sobennikov, took over the front on 4 July. Timoshenko issued a directive on 29 June to the Northwestern Front stipulating that in the event of a withdrawal from the Daugava, the next river line, the Velikaya, was to be held and every effort made to get Soviet troops emplaced there. Despite this, the river Velikaya line fell rapidly on 8 July, with the rail and road bridges remaining intact. Pskov itself fell on the evening of 9 July. The 11th Army commander was therefore ordered to move to Dno. The crumbling of the Northwestern Front on the Velikaya and the German sweep to Luga were grave setbacks for the Soviets, and the 8th Army was being rammed inexorably towards the Gulf of Finland. But the German pause had given time for more troops to be rushed in to Siege of Leningrad, and the battle for the city would be long and hard.

References

Footnotes

• ^c Which were Kampfgruppe Von Seckendorff consisting of the 114th Motorized infantry Regiment, Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 57, one company of Panzerjäger Battalion 41 and Motorcycle Battalion 6 (morning).
• ^e Kampfgruppe Raus consisted of Panzer Regiment 11, one battalion of the 4th Motorized infantry Regiment, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 76th Artillery Regiment, one company of Panzer Engineer Battalion 57, one company from Panzerjäger Battalion 41, one battery of the 2nd Battalion Flak Regiment 411 and Motorcycle Battalion 6 (afternoon).
• ^f The tanks were eventually destroyed by batteries of 88mm flak guns and 100mm artillery guns employed in an anti-tank role.
• ^g On 11 July 1941 Col P Poluboiarov, Northwestern Front armoured directorate reported that the 3rd Mechanised Corps had 'completely perished' having only 400 men remaining who escaped encirclement with 2nd Tank Division and only 1 BT-7 tank. German Sources reported the destruction of more than 200 tanks, including 29 KV-1s, 150 guns and hundreds of trucks and other vehicles. The 5th Tank Division was at Yelnya by 4 July 1941 and consisted of 2,552 men and a total of 2 BT-7 tanks and four armoured cars. It was destroyed at the Battle of Białystok–Minsk.
• ^h Colonel Grinberg temporary commander of the 12th Mechanized Corps after the death of his corps' original commander Major General Shestopalov, reported on 29 July that the strength of his corps had fallen to under 17,000 men after the first two weeks of combat.
• ^I On entering the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa the 6th Panzer Division had a total of 245 tanks which consisted of 47 Panzer IIs, 155 Panzer 35(t)s, 30 Panzer IVs, 5 Panzerbef 35(t)s (command tanks) and 8 Panzerbefs.

Bibliography

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