Battlefield: Difference between revisions
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===Generalship in the choice of battlefield=== |
===Generalship in the choice of battlefield=== |
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In the 1820s, General Joseph Rogiat, of [[Napoleon Bonaparte]]'s ''[[Grande Armée]]'', spoke at great length of the circumstances that make for a good battlefield. He divided the battlefield in two: one favorable for attack and one for defense, and argued the greater the benefit of one over the other, the stronger a position was.<ref name="Rogniat">Joseph Rogniat (général de division), quoted in ''The United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine'' (1829), p. 160.</ref> He went on to say easy movement of troops to the front, and distribution of forces across the front, was also important, since this allowed support and reinforcement as needed. He mentions the high ground as a means of observing the enemy, and concealing friendly forces;<ref name="Rogniat">Joseph Rogniat (général de division), quoted in ''The United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine'' (1829), p. 160.</ref> while this has been mitigated by [[aerial reconnaissance]], improved communication ([[field telephone]] and [[radio]]), and [[indirect fire]], it remains important. (For instance, "hull down" firing positions for tanks were desired well into [[World War Two]].) |
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In the 1820s, General Joseph Rogiat, of the [[Grande Armée|Napoleonic army]], spoke at great length of the circumstances that make for a good battlefield: |
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Rogiat also discussed cover, in reference to exposure to cannon fire; in earlier times, it would have been to [[Sling (weapon)|slinger]]s (in Ancient Greek and Roman times) or [[archery|archer]]s (such as the Welsh [[longbow]]men or Mongol [[Mounted archery|horse archer]]s) from ancient times well into the 1400s, while slightly later, it would be to [[rifle]]men.<!-- See also: Bar-Kochva, Bezalel. The Seleucid Army. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976; Cartledge, Paul A. Sparta and Lakonia. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979; Chambers, James. The Devil's Horsemen. New York: Atheneum, 1985; Garlan, Yvon, translated by Janet Lloyd. War in the Ancient World. London: Chatto & Windus, 1975; Marshall, Robert. Storm from the East. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993; Pritchett, W. K. The Greek State at War, Part 1. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971; Seward, Desmond. The Hundred Years War: The English in France 1337-1453. New York: Atheneum, 1978.<ref name="Rogniat">Joseph Rogniat (général de division), quoted in ''The United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine'' (1829), p. 160.</ref> (Rogiat did not suggest switching from column to [[open order]] to compensate, and it would be almost a century before a technological solution was conceived.<ref>Dyer, Gwynn. War. New York: Crown Publishers, 1985; or Dupuy, Trevor N. 'The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980.</ref><!--This may be a bit OT.-->) |
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{{quote|The whole science of positions consists in choosing a field of battle favourable for the defenders, by forcing the assailants to fight upon one that is unfavourable to them. Hence, in the choice of a position, we ought to consider two distinct fields of battle, the one of the defenders, and the other of the assailants. The more the former is advantageous, and the latter disadvantageous, the greater is the strength of the position. |
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An advantageous field of battle, is that which admits of the troops moving freely and easily from the right to the left, and from the rear to the front, so that they may afford one another mutual assistance and support; which commands the surrounding ground within reach of cannon-shot, and before which the latter is completely exposed, at least, within reach of small shot and grape; which, without impeding the movements of the troops, presents woods, rocks, villages, &c. for supporting the wings, or any other weak part of the order of battle, and which affords cover for concealing the troops from the view and from the fire of the enemy, until they come into action.<ref name="Rogniat">Joseph Rogniat (général de division), quoted in ''The United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine'' (1829), p. 160.</ref>}} |
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Rogniat describes a "disadvantageous field of battle" as one: |
Rogniat describes a "disadvantageous field of battle" as one: |
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{{quote|which is everywhere seen and commanded from heights within cannon and musket shot, and which is encumbered with marshes, rivers, ravines, and defiles of every kind. The enemy moves upon it with difficulty, even in column; he cannot deploy for the contest, and is made to suffer under a shower of projectiles without being able to return evil for evil.<ref name="Rogniat"/>}} |
{{quote|which is everywhere seen and commanded from heights within cannon and musket shot, and which is encumbered with marshes, rivers, ravines, and defiles of every kind. The enemy moves upon it with difficulty, even in column; he cannot deploy for the contest, and is made to suffer under a shower of projectiles without being able to return evil for evil.<ref name="Rogniat"/>}} |
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This may be called an ideal defensive position, however. |
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{{quote|A position which combines these two kinds of fields of battle is doubly strong, both by its situation, and by the obstacles which cover it. But if it fulfils only one of these conditions, it ceases to be easy of defence. Suppose that a position, for instance, offers to the defenders a field of battle well situated, but admitting of easy access upon all points; the assailants, finding no obstacle to their deployment for the contest, will be able to force it in a tolerably short time. Suppose another position presents to the assailants a field of battle abounding with obstacles and defiles, but without offering at the same time, in the rear, favourable ground for the deployment of the defenders; these could then only act upon it with difficulty, and would be forced to fight the assailants in the defiles themselves, without any advantage. |
{{quote|A position which combines these two kinds of fields of battle is doubly strong, both by its situation, and by the obstacles which cover it. But if it fulfils only one of these conditions, it ceases to be easy of defence. Suppose that a position, for instance, offers to the defenders a field of battle well situated, but admitting of easy access upon all points; the assailants, finding no obstacle to their deployment for the contest, will be able to force it in a tolerably short time. Suppose another position presents to the assailants a field of battle abounding with obstacles and defiles, but without offering at the same time, in the rear, favourable ground for the deployment of the defenders; these could then only act upon it with difficulty, and would be forced to fight the assailants in the defiles themselves, without any advantage. |
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In general, the best positions are those, the flanks of which are inaccessible, and which command from their front a gently inclined ground, favourable for attack as well as defence; farther, if the lines lean on villages and woods, each of which forms, by its saliency, a sort of defensive bastion, the army becomes almost impregnable, without being reduced to inaction.<ref name="Rogniat"/>}} |
In general, the best positions are those, the flanks of which are inaccessible, and which command from their front a gently inclined ground, favourable for attack as well as defence; farther, if the lines lean on villages and woods, each of which forms, by its saliency, a sort of defensive bastion, the army becomes almost impregnable, without being reduced to inaction.<ref name="Rogniat"/>}} |
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Historically, military forces have sometimes trained using methods |
Historically, military forces have sometimes trained using methods suitable for a level battlefield, but not for the terrain in which they were likely to end up fighting. [[Mardonius]] illustrated the problem for the [[Ancient Greece|Ancient Greeks]], whose [[Phalanx|phalanges]] were ill-suited for combat except on level ground without trees, watercourses, ditches, or other obstacles that might break up its files,<ref>Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, Michael Whitby, ''The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare'' (2007), p. </ref>}}} a perfection rarely obtained.<!--Did this influence the development of the [[manipular legion]]?--> [[Ancient Rome|Rome]] had the same preference.<ref>Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, Michael Whitby, ''The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare'' (2007), p. </ref>}} |
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Crossing obstacles remains a problem. Even a seemingly open field, such as that faced by [[Pickett's charge|George Pickett]] at [[Battle of Gettysburg|Gettysburg]], was broken by fences which had to be climbed--while his division was constantly exposed to fire from the moment it left the trees.<!--That's in Dupuy, I think; maybe in Seymour, William. Yours to Reason Why: Decision in Battle. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.--> |
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On modern battlefields, introducing obstacles to slow an advance has risen to an art form: everything from [[Anti-tank trench|anti-tank ditch]]es to [[barbed wire]] to [[Dragon's teeth (fortification)|dragon's teeth]] to [[Booby trap|improvised device]]s,<!--like those on the beaches of Normandie 6 June '44--> have been employed, in addition to [[minefield]]s.{{cn|date=July 2017}} |
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The nature of the battlefield influences the tactics used; in Vietnam, heavy jungle favored ambush. Technology also influences the selection of the battlefield: the Vietnamese preference for ambush against a more sophisticated opponent was a function of less access to sophisticated technology, while in both Burma in World War Two, and in Vietnam, air supply played an important part in where battles took place. Some, such as [[Battle of Arnhem|Arnhem]] or [[Battle of A Sau|the A Sầu]], would not have happened at all, absent the development of aircraft and helicopters; others, such as [[Battle of Cambrai|Cambrai]], depended on the inception of [[tank]]s.{{cn|date=July 2017}}<!--Dupuy & Dyer can probably support this--> |
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As much as technology has changed, terrain still cannot be ignored, because it not only affects movement on the battlefield, but movement to and from it, and [[logistics]] are critical: a battlefield, in the industrial age, may be a railway line or a highway.<! <!-- Or a bomber or fighter base...-->, |
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{{quote|[[Mardonius]] demonstrates the lack of Greek strategic insight in choosing a battlefield. Indeed the laws of gravity and the [[phalanx]]'s bulk dictated avoidance of attacks uphill and the disadvantage of meeting a downhill charge. Yet a level field devoid of natural obstacles was rare on the mainland. Trees, rivulets, ditches and other obstacles disrupted the phalanx's continuity of files. ... Romans also preferred a level battlefield and [[Battle of Nemea|Nemea]], the largest Greek versus Greek battle of the fourth century, occurred on overgrown terrain.<ref>Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, Michael Whitby, ''The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare'' (2007), p. </ref>}} |
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==Historic battlefields== |
==Historic battlefields== |
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Revision as of 10:21, 9 July 2017
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A battlefield, battleground, or field of battle is the location of a present or historic battle involving ground warfare. Although the term implies that battles are typically fought in a field – an open stretch of level ground – it applies to any type of terrain on which a battle is fought. The term can also have legal significance, as various acts and treaties restrict certain belligerent conduct to an identified battlefield.
Modern military theory and doctrine has, with technological advances in warfare, evolved the understanding of a battlefield one defined by terrain to a more multifaceted perception of all of the factors impacting on the conduct of a battle and is conceptualised as the battlespace.
A battlefield is a place where ideals and loyalties are put to the test.[1]
Choice of battlefields
The occurrence of a battle at a particular location may be entirely accidental, if an encounter between hostile forces occurs with neither side having expected the encounter. Typically, however, the location is chosen deliberately, either by agreement of the two sides or, more commonly, by the commander of one side, who attempts to either initiate an attack on terrain favorable to the attack, or position forces on ground favorable to defense, if anticipating an attack.
Agreed battlefields
Although many battlefields arise in the course of military operations, there have been a number of occassions where formal conventions have ordained the nature and site of the battlefield. It has been suggested, on the basis of anthroplogical research, that ritual warfare involving battles on traditional "fighting grounds", bound by rules to minimise casualties, may have been common among early societies [2].
In the European Middle Ages, formal pre-arrangement of a battlefield occassionally occured. The Vikings had the concept of the "hazelled field", where an agreed site was marked out with hazel rods in advance of the battle.[3]
Formal arrangements by armies to meet one another on a certain day and date were a feature of Western Medieval warfare, often related to the conventions of siege warfare. This arrangement was known as a journée. Conventionally, the battlefield had to considered a fair one, not greatly advantaging one side or the other. Arrangements could be very specific about where the battle should take place. For example, at the siege of Grancey in 1434, it was agreed that the armies would meet at "the place above Guiot Rigoigne's house on the right side towards Sentenorges, where there are two trees".[4]
Generalship in the choice of battlefield
In the 1820s, General Joseph Rogiat, of Napoleon Bonaparte's Grande Armée, spoke at great length of the circumstances that make for a good battlefield. He divided the battlefield in two: one favorable for attack and one for defense, and argued the greater the benefit of one over the other, the stronger a position was.[5] He went on to say easy movement of troops to the front, and distribution of forces across the front, was also important, since this allowed support and reinforcement as needed. He mentions the high ground as a means of observing the enemy, and concealing friendly forces;[5] while this has been mitigated by aerial reconnaissance, improved communication (field telephone and radio), and indirect fire, it remains important. (For instance, "hull down" firing positions for tanks were desired well into World War Two.)
Rogiat also discussed cover, in reference to exposure to cannon fire; in earlier times, it would have been to slingers (in Ancient Greek and Roman times) or archers (such as the Welsh longbowmen or Mongol horse archers) from ancient times well into the 1400s, while slightly later, it would be to riflemen.)
Rogniat describes a "disadvantageous field of battle" as one:
which is everywhere seen and commanded from heights within cannon and musket shot, and which is encumbered with marshes, rivers, ravines, and defiles of every kind. The enemy moves upon it with difficulty, even in column; he cannot deploy for the contest, and is made to suffer under a shower of projectiles without being able to return evil for evil.[5]
This may be called an ideal defensive position, however.
He then advises that troops should be situated so that the ground they defend is favorable, while the ground through which the enemy must advance is unfavorable:
A position which combines these two kinds of fields of battle is doubly strong, both by its situation, and by the obstacles which cover it. But if it fulfils only one of these conditions, it ceases to be easy of defence. Suppose that a position, for instance, offers to the defenders a field of battle well situated, but admitting of easy access upon all points; the assailants, finding no obstacle to their deployment for the contest, will be able to force it in a tolerably short time. Suppose another position presents to the assailants a field of battle abounding with obstacles and defiles, but without offering at the same time, in the rear, favourable ground for the deployment of the defenders; these could then only act upon it with difficulty, and would be forced to fight the assailants in the defiles themselves, without any advantage. In general, the best positions are those, the flanks of which are inaccessible, and which command from their front a gently inclined ground, favourable for attack as well as defence; farther, if the lines lean on villages and woods, each of which forms, by its saliency, a sort of defensive bastion, the army becomes almost impregnable, without being reduced to inaction.[5]
Historically, military forces have sometimes trained using methods suitable for a level battlefield, but not for the terrain in which they were likely to end up fighting. Mardonius illustrated the problem for the Ancient Greeks, whose phalanges were ill-suited for combat except on level ground without trees, watercourses, ditches, or other obstacles that might break up its files,[6]}}} a perfection rarely obtained. Rome had the same preference.[7]}}
Crossing obstacles remains a problem. Even a seemingly open field, such as that faced by George Pickett at Gettysburg, was broken by fences which had to be climbed--while his division was constantly exposed to fire from the moment it left the trees.
On modern battlefields, introducing obstacles to slow an advance has risen to an art form: everything from anti-tank ditches to barbed wire to dragon's teeth to improvised devices, have been employed, in addition to minefields.[citation needed]
The nature of the battlefield influences the tactics used; in Vietnam, heavy jungle favored ambush. Technology also influences the selection of the battlefield: the Vietnamese preference for ambush against a more sophisticated opponent was a function of less access to sophisticated technology, while in both Burma in World War Two, and in Vietnam, air supply played an important part in where battles took place. Some, such as Arnhem or the A Sầu, would not have happened at all, absent the development of aircraft and helicopters; others, such as Cambrai, depended on the inception of tanks.[citation needed]
As much as technology has changed, terrain still cannot be ignored, because it not only affects movement on the battlefield, but movement to and from it, and logistics are critical: a battlefield, in the industrial age, may be a railway line or a highway.<! ,
Historic battlefields
The locations of ancient battles tend to be apocryphal. This information has been more reliably recorded since the time of the Norman conquest of England.[1]
It is not uncommon for a battle to be described in documentary sources, although whether such references are contemporary or reliable needs to be assessed with care.[1]
Many battlefields from specific historic battles are preserved as historic landmarks.[8]
The study area of a battlefield includes all places related to contributing to the battle event: where troops deployed and maneuvered before, during, and after the engagement; it is the maximum delineation of the historical site and provides more of the tactical context of a battle than does the core area. The core area of a battlefield is within the study area and includes only those places where the combat engagement and key associated actions and features were located; the core area includes, among other things, what often is described as "hallowed ground".[9]
A battlefield is typically the location of large numbers of deaths. Given the intensity of combat, it may not be possible to easily retrieve bodies from the battlefield leading to the observation that "[a] battlefield is a graveyard without the gravestones".[10]
Battles are usually named after some feature of the battlefield geography, such as the name of a town, forest or river, commonly prefixed "Battle of...".
References
- ^ a b c Veronica Fiorato, Anthea Boylston, Christopher Knüsel, Blood Red Roses: The Archaeology of a Mass Grave from the Battle of Towton AD 1461 (2007), p. 3.
- ^ Keegan, John (1993). A History of Warfare. London: Hutchinson. pp. 98–103. ISBN 0091745276.
- ^ Paddy, Griffith (1995). The Viking Art of War. London: Greenhill Books. p. 118. ISBN 1853672084.
- ^ Keen, Maurice (1965). The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. p. 129.
- ^ a b c d Joseph Rogniat (général de division), quoted in The United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine (1829), p. 160.
- ^ Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, Michael Whitby, The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (2007), p.
- ^ Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, Michael Whitby, The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (2007), p.
- ^ United States National Park Service, Wilson's Creek National Battlefield: Final General Management Plan (2003), p. 169.
- ^ Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report (1994), p. 54.
- ^ Richard Lusardi, quoted in Wilson's Creek National Battlefield, Draft General Management Plan (2003), p, 169.
See also
[[Category:Battlefields| ]]
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