Talk:Rated voting

Impossibility theorems

"Others, however, argue that this is not true, for instance because interpersonal comparisons of cardinal measures are impossible."

1. What does this have to do with Arrow's impossibility theorem not applying to range ballots?

2. Anyway, it's preferential ballots that are not interpersonally comparable, because they destroy information about distance. All these ballots:

A                           B C D
A B C                           D
A      B      C        D
A              B  C             D

are compressed into an equally spaced ballot of A > B > C > D.

"In any case, cardinal systems do fall under the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, and therefore any such system must be subject to strategic voting in some instances."

I've heard that the theorem only applies to ranked systems, but also that it doesn't matter because range systems can be re-interpreted as ranked systems and fail the theorem. Which is correct? 71.167.61.127 (talk) 17:01, 10 December 2016 (UTC)

Well obviously strategic voting would be an issue in cardinal voting systems, whether or not we say the GS theorem applies. If a candidate is your least favorite among the realistic candidates, you will always decrease the chance that he is elected by giving him the lowest possible rating and that would be the strategic thing to do, even if you actually think he would be okay. MathHisSci (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 11:22, 8 April 2017 (UTC)

Merge proposal

It does seem that a Ratings ballot and Cardinal voting have such a similar scope that they are best described on the same page. Klbrain (talk) 22:47, 25 July 2018 (UTC)

  Y Merger complete. Klbrain (talk) 21:59, 12 August 2018 (UTC)

Disapproval voting and negative assignment

I don't know what this paragraph means, so I'm moving it to talk page:

Other variants include disapproval voting options such as negative assignment, but typically out of the same absolute number of votes. That is, a -2 and a +8 add up to ten points, not six, because the absolute value of a negative vote is the same as positive.

It was added by an IP here: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cardinal_voting&diff=prev&oldid=633428976&diffmode=source

Cumulative voting seems to be a cardinal voting system

I'm not sure why Cumulative voting isn't mentioned in this article. A sentence in the Cumulative voting article says "Unlike choice voting where the numbers represent the order of a voter's ranking of candidates (i.e. they are ordinal numbers), in cumulative votes the numbers represent quantities (i.e. they are cardinal numbers)"... -- AnonMoos (talk) 00:50, 7 June 2019 (UTC)

"In any case, cardinal methods do fall under Gibbard's theorem, and therefore any such method must be subject to strategic voting in some instances."

Is there a single voting system that is not subject to strategic voting in some instances? What purpose does this sentence serve? Primecut (talk) 03:51, 10 August 2019 (UTC)

"The opposite is not true: Rankings cannot be converted to ratings, since ratings carry more information about strength of preference, which is destroyed when converting to rankings. "

I can trivially convert rankings to ratings. 1. Candidate A, 2. Candidate B, 3. Candidate C --> Candidate A: 3, Candidate B: 2, Candidate C: 1. Boom, I did it. Unsourced and clearly false statement btfo 69.113.166.178 (talk) 22:44, 5 July 2021 (UTC)