Battle of Gagra (1919): Difference between revisions
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== Background == |
== Background == |
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The [[Sochi]] district, which was annexed to [[Gagra District|Gagra]] in 1904 by Tsarist Russia, became a disputed territory between Southern Russia (under the [[White movement]]) and Georgia. After the Allies' victory in the [[First World War]], the Caucasus region came under the British sphere of influence due to the British-French treaty of December 1917. Both the [[White movement|Whites]] and the [[Georgia (country)|Georgians]] welcomed the arrival of British forces in the region. [[Anton Denikin]], a supporter of the Allies and the White Army, hoped that Britain would support the vision of a "united and indivisible Russia." |
The [[Sochi]] district, which was annexed to [[Gagra District|Gagra]] in 1904 by Tsarist Russia, became a disputed territory between Southern Russia (under the [[White movement]]) and Georgia. After the Allies' victory in the [[First World War]], the Caucasus region came under the British sphere of influence due to the British-French treaty of December 1917. Both the [[White movement|Whites]] and the [[Georgia (country)|Georgians]] welcomed the arrival of British forces in the region. [[Anton Denikin]], a supporter of the Allies and the White Army, hoped that Britain would support the vision of a "united and indivisible Russia." However, Georgia cited the principle of self-determination to justify its territorial claim over the region. Britain aimed to maintain the status quo in the region until Russia's future was decided at the Paris Peace Conference. The goal was to unite anti-Bolshevik forces against [[Bolshevism]]. The representatives sent by London to the Caucasus republics and to Denikin often acted as proxies for their respective governments. This lack of a clear political stance made London's policy appear inconsistent to the parties involved. In December 1918, Denikin capitalized on the Armenian-Georgian conflict and seized several villages in the Sochi district that were previously occupied by Georgia without any resistance. However, Britain supported the status quo, which dictated that Denikin should not advance further south. Denikin was upset that Britain was "disposing of Russian territory" without his consent and turning a blind eye to Georgia's alliance with Germany. Despite this, he disobeyed Britain and crossed the [[Loo (river)|Loo River]] on February 6. He was able to take the entire Sochi district in just four days and push Georgia back to the Bzif River. |
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Denikin never forgave Britain for siding with its enemies, and Georgia blamed Britain for allowing the Russians to attack, which undermined British authority. Although the parties understood that Britain wanted to maintain the status quo, it became clear that Britain would not take action to restore it if it was changed by force. The White Army and the [[People's Guard of Georgia]] faced each other on the Bzif River, with Britain placing its garrison along the riverbank. On April 9, General [[George Milne, 1st Baron Milne|Milne]], the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, requested that Georgia move its troops to the Bzif River line. However, British authority was already weakened at that time. |
Denikin never forgave Britain for siding with its enemies, and Georgia blamed Britain for allowing the Russians to attack, which undermined British authority. Although the parties understood that Britain wanted to maintain the status quo, it became clear that Britain would not take action to restore it if it was changed by force. The White Army and the [[People's Guard of Georgia]] faced each other on the Bzif River, with Britain placing its garrison along the riverbank. On April 9, General [[George Milne, 1st Baron Milne|Milne]], the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, requested that Georgia move its troops to the Bzif River line. However, British authority was already weakened at that time. |
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| Battle of Gagra (1919) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Sochi conflict | |||||||
.svg) Gagra district | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 Democratic Republic of Georgia |
 White movement | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Valiko Jugheli Giorgi Gedevanashvili |
Anton Denikin | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Minor casualties | 87-500 dead | ||||||
The Battle of Gagra was fought on April 16–19, 1919, between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the White Army. The battle resulted in a Georgian victory.
Background
The Sochi district, which was annexed to Gagra in 1904 by Tsarist Russia, became a disputed territory between Southern Russia (under the White movement) and Georgia. After the Allies' victory in the First World War, the Caucasus region came under the British sphere of influence due to the British-French treaty of December 1917. Both the Whites and the Georgians welcomed the arrival of British forces in the region. Anton Denikin, a supporter of the Allies and the White Army, hoped that Britain would support the vision of a "united and indivisible Russia." However, Georgia cited the principle of self-determination to justify its territorial claim over the region. Britain aimed to maintain the status quo in the region until Russia's future was decided at the Paris Peace Conference. The goal was to unite anti-Bolshevik forces against Bolshevism. The representatives sent by London to the Caucasus republics and to Denikin often acted as proxies for their respective governments. This lack of a clear political stance made London's policy appear inconsistent to the parties involved. In December 1918, Denikin capitalized on the Armenian-Georgian conflict and seized several villages in the Sochi district that were previously occupied by Georgia without any resistance. However, Britain supported the status quo, which dictated that Denikin should not advance further south. Denikin was upset that Britain was "disposing of Russian territory" without his consent and turning a blind eye to Georgia's alliance with Germany. Despite this, he disobeyed Britain and crossed the Loo River on February 6. He was able to take the entire Sochi district in just four days and push Georgia back to the Bzif River.
Denikin never forgave Britain for siding with its enemies, and Georgia blamed Britain for allowing the Russians to attack, which undermined British authority. Although the parties understood that Britain wanted to maintain the status quo, it became clear that Britain would not take action to restore it if it was changed by force. The White Army and the People's Guard of Georgia faced each other on the Bzif River, with Britain placing its garrison along the riverbank. On April 9, General Milne, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, requested that Georgia move its troops to the Bzif River line. However, British authority was already weakened at that time.
After capturing the Sochi district, the White Guards immediately began restoring the "pre-revolutionary order". This included returning lands to their previous owners, carrying out several mobilizations, organizing requisitions of goods, fodder, and transports, and conducting punitive operations. In response, local peasants in the Sochi district formed green armies, and a partisan movement developed. On April 12, 1919, 1,500 White Army soldiers carried out punitive operations against the local population in Sochi and Adler. In response, Georgia mobilized the regular army, 8 battalions of the People's Guard, Colonel Giorgi Ximshiashvili's Cavalry Division, and Colonel Kargareteli's 4th Artillery Battery on the Bzif River. They decided to launch an offensive operation in the direction of the Mekhadir River in the Gagra region. Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gegechkor sent letters regarding the operation to British Expeditionary Force representative General Thomson and, upon his advice, to General Milne. The operation received a positive response from General Thomson. Thomson believed that Georgia should not act without British consent, and they were given freedom of action if the White Army did not comply with Thomson's proposal to retreat within 48 hours. General Aleksandre Gedevanishvili, the commander of the Georgian Armed Forces, was the last to rely on Denikin to retreat to the Mekhadir River.
Battle
On April 16, the People's Guard and regular army units launched an attack on the Bzif River. The attack involved all three types of troops: infantry, artillery, and cavalry. To increase maneuvering space, the Georgians constructed a new bridge on the upper reaches of the Bzif River and forced the river. On April 17, at 1 o'clock, Giorgi Lomtadze's third battalion captured Gagra for the first time without any losses and took 500 prisoners. On April 18, at 9 AM, the People's Guard Division crossed the Mekhadir River. The White Army retreated near the village of Vesioloe. On April 19, Georgian units reached the Mzimti River and approached Adler. Along with the Georgian units' attack, the Green Army rebellion broke out in Sochi and Adler, behind the White Army. The Green Army and Georgian units acted in a coordinated manner. The White Army retreated.
Before the start of the second phase of the operation, both General Thomson and General Milne of the British command protested against Georgia. Thomson assessed the operation as a "hostile move" towards Britain. Thomson's change of attitude may have been due to the robbery and murder of a British captain and doctor in Tiflis. Additionally, in Akhalkalaki, a Georgian soldier shot a British lieutenant colonel, which Thomson strongly criticized in an official note. Georgia stopped advancing towards Sochi and Adler to avoid worsening the situation. Georgian forces withdrew to the Psou River. Denikin prepared the Black Sea troops to launch an offensive to fully capture Sochi and take the Sukhumi district. However, General Briggs, the British representative with Denikin, convinced him that negotiations could lead to Georgia agreeing to retreat. According to an alternate version, Denikin called off the offensive because he was unable to mobilize sufficient forces. This was due to the fact that the majority of his troops were engaged in fighting the Bolsheviks on the main front.
Negotiations between the government of Georgia and "South Russia" began in Tiflis on May 21, 1919. British Generals Briggs and Beach, who were British military representatives to Denikin, participated in these negotiations on behalf of Denikin's government. General Briggs advised Georgia that Britain would soon withdraw from the South Caucasus, and therefore it would be better for Georgia to sort out relations with Denikin's government. The negotiations ended without results on May 23.
On May 24, a second meeting was held with representatives of the Denikin government. General Beach warned that Denikin would attack if he did not retreat, but Noe Zhordania argued that such an attack would be seen as one with British assistance. Georgia refused to surrender Gagra.
Literature
- Kenez, Peter (2014). Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920
- University of California Press, pg. 202–212. ISBN 9780520327795
- A. Chachkhian, 1919 Gagri Offensive Operation and Tactical Analysis of Battles, Annals: Scientific Center for the Study of History, Ethnology, Religion and Propaganda, Publishing House "Universal". (11) Tbilisi. 2015.