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The "science of morality" describes the theory that morality can be prescribed scientifically, as well as possible scientific methodologies that might be involved. The theory is promoted by Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape and in related lectures in which Harris asserted that "morality should be considered an undeveloped branch of science" discerning what humans ought to do by looking at what is.^[1]^[2] Critics, such as Sean M. Carroll, argue that morality cannot be part of science.^[3]

The term "science of morality" is also sometimes used to describe the emergence of moral systems in different species. For a description of how moral intuitions have evolved in humans and other animals, see Moral psychology and the Evolution of morality.

A fact-value distinction has been traditionally used to argue that the scientific method cannot address "moral" questions beyond describing the norms of different civilizations. In contrast, some philosophers and scientists like John Dewey^[4] (and supporters of ethical naturalism, positivism, secular ethics in general, or scientism) have argued that the line between values and scientific facts is arbitrary and illusory; they suggest that the subject of morality can be re-conceptualized as a young or "budding" science^[5] spanning various fields to provide instructions for organizing society. In time, an emerging discipline of the science of morality could expand the demarcation of science along the same lines as the psychology of happiness. There are many methodological issues for a science of morality to address.

History

The idea that science could have much to say about morality is relatively new. Dewey suggested a pragmatic approach to ethics, not based on any revelations, but on empirical inquiry; complete with a process of falsifying hypotheses.^[4]

Sociologist Maria Ossowska thought that sociology was inextricably related to philosophical reflections on morality. She proposed that a moral science consist of: (a) analysis of existing social norms and their history, (b) the psychology of morality, of the individual's interaction with moral matters, and (c) the sociology of morality.^[6]

The ideas of paleontologist and science writer Stephen Jay Gould oppose the science of morality. He argued that science and religion occupy "non-overlapping magisteria". To Gould, science is concerned with questions of fact and theory, but not with meaning and morality - the magisteria of religion. In the same vein, Edward Teller proposed that Politics decides what is right, whereas Science decides what is true.^[7]

Predecessors

The science of morality is most readily justified according to the philosophy of ethical naturalism. Many arguments for or against the science of morality are leveled towards that philosophical view.

The science of morality also bears some resemblances to philosophically consequentialist systems like utilitarianism (more modern versions of which are advocated by philosophers like Peter Singer). Positivism and pragmatism are also philosophies related to the science. Sam Harris proposed that one is essentially asking a complex empirical and somewhat utilitarian question when they ask "what is good?"^[2] Harris suggests that this question might translate to something like "what are probably the best (and worst) ways for a group of individuals to meet each of their various basic needs, and preferably their wants as well, given the society's present composition and situation."

Harris adds, however, that the science of morality should not be limited by any particular philosophical moral system^[8]. He explains that the goals of this science mean carefully considering everything from emotions and thoughts to the actual actions and their consequences for all involved. Philosophical views like eliminative and Revisionary materialism warn that science may need to redefine or eliminate concepts associated with flourishing as research progresses.

Controversy

David Hume wrote about an "is–ought problem"; he was skeptical that one could reason from claims about what is to claims about what ought to be. Hume's is-ought problem suggests a fact-value distinction, the idea that the definition of values cannot rely on facts about reality. This idea was defended more explicitly by philosopher G.E. Moore (e.g. his open question argument) who said that one is committing a "naturalistic fallacy" if one defines values according to facts.

Promoters of a "science of morality" reject the fact-value distinction (i.e. do not recognize an "is-ought problem" or that one can commit a "naturalistic fallacy").^{[citation needed]} Advocates such as Sam Harris therefore see moral claims as being a certain kind of truth claim; moral claims concern truths about the flourishing of conscious creatures.^[2] Harris argues that "morality" is a budding science that seeks to provide naturalistic rules of conduct for human society^[5].

Sam Harris's contentions

The application of the scientific method to moral questions and claims requires operationalization during the empirical search for facts.^{[citation needed]}

Defining "morality"

File:12 Minutes to Heaven Teaser.png

An emotion has both objective and subjective elements

In Sam Harris's view, the first step for the so-called science of morality may not be a revelation or discovery, but rather to establish early working definitions (that will evolve with time).^[2] Operationally defining terms is an important part of science, as demonstrated by the attempts of positive psychology to address topics about which many are opinionated. In such areas of science that overlap with philosophy or religion, arguments over the supposed essence of a word sometimes stand in the way of progress. That is, discussions risk becoming arguments over what the definition of a word should be, rather than simply agreeing on other working definitions in order to facilitate communication.^[9]

In psychology in general, it is granted that subjective experiences very often correspond to objective facts (e.g. about the brain). For instance, clinical depression certainly has a subjective component (when feelings of depression are experienced by an individual) but it has also been operationally defined and objectively studied (e.g. described in terms of physical characteristics of the brain, resulting in a biology of depression).

Sam Harris claims that "moral" propositions and "values" are "concerned with the flourishing of conscious creatures in a society".^[5] He argues "Social morality exists to sustain cooperative social relationships, and morality can be objectively evaluated by that standard. If philosophers want to only talk about some bizarrely unnatural private morality, they are just changing the subject..."^[10]

When it comes to defining morality, Harris' main contention in The Moral Landscape is, first, that there are facts about the way that brain activity results in feelings of well-being or suffering. This includes facts about which patterns of thought and action tend to promote such neural events. Following that, Harris makes a pragmatic appeal to common sense, arguing that society should (and already largely does) make decisions based on at least trying to maximize people's flourishing. If this is the case, he says, it seems obvious that we should (and often do) define 'morality' in terms of well being as the day's science understands it^[11]. He argues that discussions that have no bearing on the so-called "flourishing of conscious creatures" would so simply not be moral discussions, once morality is defined this way^[5]. Of course, operationalizing terms related to morality or physics does not prevent alternative use outside the scientific community.^[8]

Disputed terms in science

Harris admits that there may be some disagreement over the exact definitions of happiness and suffering, concepts of great importance to the science of morality, but says that these disagreements should not be taken too seriously. Harris mentions that even a lack of firm agreement in the scientific community over terms like "life" or "health" has not prevented researchers from making progress. Furthermore, it is even less likely that a community's use of the term "healthy" in an unjustified manner would have any effect on the progress of scientists^[10].

In practice, this is thanks to the fact that researchers often establish and agree on other clear working definitions (the focus is to avoid debating words beyond necessity).^[9] Moreover, the usefulness of these scientific constructs can be subjected to tests of construct validity. This is one sense in which some definitions can be better than others. For instance, just as scientists have generally agreed on practical grounds of sorting "Earth's atmosphere" into 5 categories (i.e. layers), so too might they decide to sort "flourishing" practically into a number of categories (e.g. positive psychology is exploring the possibility that happiness comes in generally 3 varieties).

Harris also warns that the precise definition of "flourishing", like "health", may also change over time^[5]. Ancient civilizations, where life expectancies were around 25 years old, may not have expected we could some day consider healthy an individual living comfortably to over 80 years old. Likewise, humans are continuing to make strides in moral development, attaining new heights of cooperation and empathy, and discovering new horizons in the use of the word "flourishing" - the same way we have for the word "healthy".^[10] Jeremy Rifkin describes such key moral revolutions throughout human history in The Empathic Civilization, and predicts a new revolution in which we overcome our tribe focused empathy and extend it to others we may never meet.^[12]

Harris also stresses the importance of defending this definition since it is the first step to being able to make various important scientific and moral judgements. He argues that scientists frequently, and rightly, exclude individuals for not conforming to agreed-upon terms of discourse (e. g. young earth creationists). Harris then suggests that it is even more important that scientists exclude from empirical moral discussions those who are not interested in a society's conscious flourishing (e. g. psychopaths).^[8] If scientists were to accept Harris' definition of "moral", for example, any individual who opts to define "moral" as "that which pleases Leprechauns]]" would have no place in scientific discussions - since they would be rejecting scientific nomenclature.

"Moral facts"

Harris believes we must admit that the question of what normally leads to human flourishing has objective, scientific answers. Harris contends that certain beliefs, actions or legal systems may prove to lead reliably to human suffering (e.g. by resulting in dangerously inadequate access to food or health care). He mentions serial murder and acid throwing as examples of practices that are not moral gray areas. That is, these practices are very probably sub-optimal for a society's flourishing^[10]. Evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson describes how, while philosophers often identify the most challenging moral situations, there are still many more "moral no brainers".^[13]

In Harris's view, it may be the case that a science of morality leads us to multiple "moral peaks", optimal ethical systems, and Harris believes this would be a success. To Harris, this would mean identifying the more obviously sub-optimal ethical systems (and conversely, any consistent components of a flourishing society). Harris acknowledges that various philosophical or religious intuitions will probably be vindicated by science, and that may happen whether or not the beliefs are held for "justified" reasons.^[10]^[5]

Sam Harris does not believe humans will create a machine that can answer all moral questions, or even that we will arrive at a simple set of rules that encompasses all situations. He suggests that, although "never lose your Queen" may be an important general rule in the game of chess, there will be times where it is important to do exactly that and lose your Queen.^[10] Also, Harris intones, it may be that a majority is incorrect about how best to pursue their own flourishing. This claim is related to the concept in psychology of the illusion of introspection. Thus some groups or individuals, like the Taliban, have as little a place in serious discussions about morality as they do in discussions about string theory. Harris argues, "just as there is no such thing as Christian physics or Muslim algebra, there can be no Christian or Muslim morality." To Harris, as science advances, humans continually gain a more objective understanding of concepts relevant to "morality" and therefore flourishing, including happiness and suffering.^[2]

Personism proposes that we include non-humans, to some extent, in any conception of a moral society.^{[citation needed]}

Research

The science of morality should identify basic components required for human flourishing, drawing heavily on findings from positive psychology. For example, Abraham Maslow suggested a hierarchy of needs: basic physical survival, then social and self esteem needs, and lastly philosophical and self-actualization. Similarly, positive psychology's Martin E. P. Seligman and Christopher Peterson wrote the Character Strengths and Virtues book (CSV), which discusses their early research into human values by which to live.

Research looking for optimal ethical systems can draw on all the methods of science, especially those used by Positive psychology. While this might include obvious methods like asking people to self-report what they think they need to flourish in life - psychology has shown that people are often surprisingly incorrect on these matters. Some cases in point: having too many varieties of consumer goods actually creates consumer choice anxiety; when it comes to removing bandages, Dan Ariely's research suggests that "getting it over with as quickly as possible" may cause more negative memories than if one went slowly (with breaks) while being careful never to reach a 'peak' in pain; stress is not always harmful (such stress is called Eustress). While very careful use of self-report can still be illuminating (e.g. bogus pipeline techniques), in the end, unconscious methods of inquiry seem to be more promising. Some unconscious methods of data collection include implicit association tests (IAT) and neuroimaging. In these ways, science can further our understanding of what humans need to flourish, and what ways of organizing society provide the greatest hope for flourishing.

Nobel prize winner Eric Kandel and researcher Cynthia Fu describe their findings that depression can be diagnosed very accurately just by looking at fMRI brain scans.^[14] This is because researchers have made strides identifying neural correlates for, among other things, emotions. A doctor's second opinion would still be used, they explain. But the two researchers suggest that mental illnesses may someday be diagnosable by looking at such brain scans alone.

Extensive study of cooperation has shed some light on the objective (and subjective) advantages of teamwork and empathy.

Egalitarians point out the various adverse effects of the trickle up effect (when money flows from the poor to the rich) when it causes Economic inequality.^[15] Psychologist Daniel Gilbert also explains, in his book Stumbling on Happiness, why excessive luxury goods (over and above having basic needs met) does not lead as reliably to happiness as a good job and social network.

Implications

Philosopher Paul Kurtz coined the term "Eupraxophy" to refer to a type of scientific and philosophical approach to normative ethics. Kurtz believes that the careful, secular pursuit of normative rules is vital to society.

Harris elucidates:

[Some] believe nothing much turns on whether we find a universal foundation for morality. I disagree. Granted, the practical effects cannot be our reason for linking morality and science -- we have to form our beliefs about reality based on what we think is actually true. But the consequences of moral relativism have been disastrous. And science's failure to address the most important questions in human life has made it seem like little more than an incubator for technology. It has also given [blind] faith-based religion -- that great engine of ignorance and bigotry -- a nearly uncontested claim to being the only source of moral wisdom. This has been bad for everyone. What is more, it has been unnecessary -- because we can speak about the well-being of conscious creatures rationally, and in the context of science. I think it is time we tried.^[2]

Although Harris has also proposed that many philosophers are moral relativists and do not defend any particular values - at least one poll suggests that there are, in fact, twice as many moral realists.^[16]

Sean M. Carroll maintains that, although we would like it to be, morality is not a scientific domain.^[17]

Some philosophers worry that morality must be understood in relation to some sort of God in order to justify moral responsibility. That is, they question the validity of any secular ethics that conceive of morality without religion or God.

Utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer argued in his book, The Life You Can Save, that it is important for all conscious creatures for nations to have "cultures of giving".

Critics have suggested that a belief that some cultures are "wrong" or somehow less optimal could lead to paternalism. As a result, one nation may force their own culture upon another. On the other hand, if it is agreed that a culture is suffering unduly - it may be a good thing if the other cultures save them from themselves. Besides, this need not require force, as persuasion and example can be far more effective.

Criticism

To the extent that utilitarianism is a sort of science of morality, some critics^{[citation needed]} have suggested that the two will share many of the same challenges.^[18] For example, how exactly do we compare the well being of different people? And what about zero-sum games, where it does not seem either side can win? Supporters^{[citation needed]} might again propose that a difficulty or failure to identify the true best options in some situations (dilemmas) does not mean that there is no longer, in fact, a best option (nor does this invalidate other situations where the moral path is more obvious). Moreover, the science of morality need not deny that some situations may indeed be choosing between "the lesser of two evils" - where there are better choices, and yet optimal happiness is not nearly achieved.

No motivation

Critics^{[citation needed]} might propose that the science of morality fails to answer the question "even having defined good, why do it?", a prerequisite of any moral system. One response is to argue along the same lines as Albert Einstein when he said "Science has therefore been charged with undermining morality, but the charge is unjust. A man's ethical behavior should be based effectually on sympathy, education, and social ties and needs; no religious basis is necessary. Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hopes of reward after death."^[19] That is, humans possess abilities to appreciate suffering in others, and this empathy can be further developed by nurturing and practice. Thus, rather than necessarily making decisions based on egotism, a human may certainly be most motivated to altruistically focus on those drives that lead to improvements in the situations of others.

Undesirable pursuits of flourishing

Many criticisms of the science of morality revolve around the implications of calling "good" what allows a society to flourish.

An obvious criticism is the claim that a science of morality might produce an ethical system where everyone hedonistically pursues merely their own interests. The scientific moralist might respond that such a system is not "good" as defined above, since it is not optimal for the flourishing of everyone in society.

A more contemporary worry is that birth rates go down as education goes up. Detractors of a moral science propose that living humans may some day decide that they would not flourish by raising children, dooming the human race without moral grounds to continue the species. Scientific moralists might appeal to reasons it may be precautions for the living to have children. Others would grant that this would mean the end of the human race but that, if this unlikely situation obtained, it would clearly not be a "bad" thing.

It is highly possible that ignorance is, in fact, bliss. Still, scientific moralists would again reject ignorance as therefore "good" since it has very real risks to the individual, but even more to the flourishing of others.

Other Proponents

Prominent contemporary ethical naturalists include Peter Railton, Frank Jackson, and the so-called Cornell Realists: Nicholas Sturgeon, David O. Brink, and Richard Boyd.

Ronald A. Lindsay is a bioethicist, lawyer, and chief executive officer and senior research fellow of the Center for Inquiry. He likens discussions of morality, like discussions of the theory of evolution, to consist of arguments about details that are too often confused as arguments over basic tenets. In these moral discussions, he says, we often fail to go deeper than mere slogans. Lindsay says that morality is the practical enterprise of pursuing peace and happiness. He places great emphasis on the methodology of analyzing morality, and suggests that we: (a) gather the foundations on which we all agree, (b) identify the more culturally relative and relevant norms, and (c) analyze and create our moral system according to facts provided by science.^[20]

Richard Dawkins (friend and colleague of Sam Harris) had openly stated that science has little to say directly about morality, but has since said, about the science of morality as Harris presents it in The Moral Landscape, that it "changed all that for me" ^[21].

Patricia Churchland is a philosopher who supports eliminative materialism. To Churchland, the ideas of philosophers should be grounded in science, making them more like "theoretical" scientists. She cites known facts about early visual processing, explaining that valence is assigned to stimulus subconsciously; this process is seen in children and may have a large biological component. Churchland uses this an example of science limiting the scope of relevant philosophical theories.^[22]

The capability approach to economics, which takes seriously the measurement of human wellbeing, has a great deal in common with the science of morality. It has been explored by philosophers Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.

Other relevant domains

Biology

Evolutionary biology, The Evolution of Cooperation, Evolutionary ethics, Evolution of morality

Economics

Pareto efficiency, Welfare economics

Law

The Oakes Test

Mathematics

Game theory

Philosophy

Philosophy of Law, Morality

Psychology

Positive psychology

References

^ TED.com
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Sam Harris (May 7, 2010). "Toward a Science of Morality". Huffington Post. Retrieved 2010-06-14. In February, I spoke at the 2010 TED conference, where I briefly argued that morality should be considered an undeveloped branch of science. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
^ Sean Carroll (2010-05-04). "Science And Morality: You Can't Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'". NPR. Retrieved 2010-06-14. Casting morality as a maximization problem might seem overly restrictive at first glance, but the procedure can potentially account for a wide variety of approaches. A libertarian might want to maximize a feeling of personal freedom, while a traditional utilitarian might want to maximize some version of happiness. The point is simply that the goal of morality should be to create certain conditions that are, in principle, directly measurable by empirical means. ...Nevertheless, I want to argue that this program is simply not possible. ... Morality is not part of science, however much we would like it to be. There are a large number of arguments one could advance for in support of this claim, but I'll stick to three. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
^ ^a ^b http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-moral/
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f http://www.ted.com/talks/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_right.html
^ http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/6/3/311
^ http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5367/1200
^ ^a ^b ^c http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/morality10/morality10_index.html
^ ^a ^b Stanovich, K. E. (2007). How to Think Straight About Psychology. Boston: Pearson Education.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f http://www.centerforinquiry.net/blogs/entry/video_of_sam_harris_talking_the_moral_landscape_in_nyc/
^ The Moral Landscape, pg. 64, sample:"Notice that I do not mention morality in the preceding paragraph, and perhaps I need not...What would our world be like if we ceased to worry about "right" and "wrong", or "good" and "evil", and simply acted so as to maximize well-being, of ourselves and others? Would we lose anything important? And if important, wouldn't it be, be definition, a matter of someone's well-being?" (emphasis in original)
^ http://empathiccivilization.com/
^ http://www.centerforinquiry.net/centerstage/episodes/episode_35_why_secularism_and_humanism_need_evolutionary_theory_part_1
^ http://www.wnyc.org/shows/radiolab/episodes/2008/12/05
^ "Inequality: The Mother of All Evils?" (PDF). London: The Guardian. Retrieved 2010-01-16.
^ http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/books/review/Appiah-t.html?src=me
^ http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2010/03/29/sam-harris-responds/
^ http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/books/review/Appiah-t.html?_r=1&src=me
^ http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein
^ http://www.centerforinquiry.net/centerstage/episodes/episode_24_bioethics_and_public_policy_part_1
^ http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Landscape-Science-Determine-Values/dp/1439171211, I was one of those who had unthinkingly bought into the hectoring myth that science can say nothing about morals. To my surprise, The Moral Landscape has changed all that for me. It should change it for philosophers too. Philosophers of mind have already discovered that they can't duck the study of neuroscience, and the best of them have raised their game as a result..."
^ http://philosophybites.com/2010/06/pat-churchland-on-eliminative-materialism.html

@@ Line 55: / Line 55: @@
 ==== Disputed terms in science ====
-[[File:Ted Bundy headshot.jpg|thumb|left|100px|The scientific community does not take just any disagreement (even over definitions) seriously]] Harris admits that there may be some disagreement over the exact definitions of [[happiness]] and [[suffering]], concepts of great importance to the science of morality, but says that these disagreements should not be taken too seriously. Harris mentions that even a lack of firm agreement in the [[scientific community]] over terms like "life" or "health" has not prevented researchers from making progress. Furthermore, it is even less likely that a community's  use of the term "healthy" in an unjustified manner would have any effect on the progress of scientists<ref name=HarrisCFI1/>.
+Harris admits that there may be some disagreement over the exact definitions of [[happiness]] and [[suffering]], concepts of great importance to the science of morality, but says that these disagreements should not be taken too seriously. Harris mentions that even a lack of firm agreement in the [[scientific community]] over terms like "life" or "health" has not prevented researchers from making progress. Furthermore, it is even less likely that a community's  use of the term "healthy" in an unjustified manner would have any effect on the progress of scientists<ref name=HarrisCFI1/>.
 In practice, this is thanks to the fact that researchers often establish and agree on other clear working definitions (the focus is to avoid debating words beyond necessity).<ref name="Stanovich, K. E. 2007"/> Moreover, the usefulness of these scientific [[Construct (philosophy of science)|constructs]] can be subjected to tests of [[construct validity]]. This is one sense in which some definitions can be better than others. For instance, just as scientists have generally agreed on practical grounds of sorting "[[Atmosphere of Earth|Earth's atmosphere]]" into 5 categories (i.e. layers), so too might they decide to sort "flourishing" practically into a number of categories (e.g. [[positive psychology]] is exploring the possibility that happiness comes in generally 3 varieties).