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I'm concerned about the section on binding force, which seems to be nothing more than a description of challenges to the notion that morality has it. It looks to me as if several of the quotations listed could be removed. Certainly one by Foot and one by Mill seems to be enough. If there seems to be consensus on it, I'll trim down the existing section and add in something by Kant or someone else who argues that morality has binding force, even if we can't explain why it does. (I take this to in fact be the majority position among philosophers, even if they disagree about why. But I take it that's something for another time...)[[Special:Contributions/71.173.176.104|71.173.176.104]] ([[User talk:71.173.176.104|talk]]) 00:56, 8 March 2012 (UTC)
I'm concerned about the section on binding force, which seems to be nothing more than a description of challenges to the notion that morality has it. It looks to me as if several of the quotations listed could be removed. Certainly one by Foot and one by Mill seems to be enough. If there seems to be consensus on it, I'll trim down the existing section and add in something by Kant or someone else who argues that morality has binding force, even if we can't explain why it does. (I take this to in fact be the majority position among philosophers, even if they disagree about why. But I take it that's something for another time...)[[Special:Contributions/71.173.176.104|71.173.176.104]] ([[User talk:71.173.176.104|talk]]) 00:56, 8 March 2012 (UTC)


A bit more on this: Tesseract or others, you may want to revert some of what I've done. If so, the most recent is probably the only one that may be dubious in terms of content. I realize that I need to reread Foot's argument for this, because I've become increasingly unclear about which sense she has in mind for "bindingness": either (A) that people in fact act in the appropriate way morality demands, or (B) that people are in fact bound to act morally whether they like it or not. These are radically different possibilities, and my most recent edit may frame the matter too much as position (B), when her real target is position (A). (Though I think it's a B view she's taking. in arguing against "oughts from nowhere".) [[Special:Contributions/71.173.176.104|71.173.176.104]] ([[User talk:71.173.176.104|talk]]) 03:32, 8 March 2012 (UTC)

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Ethics

broken links

I'm not sure it's true that normative ethics doesn't care why something is wrong. Most normative ethical theories are along the lines of "things of the following sort are wrong: ...; this thing is of that sort; therefore, this thing is wrong." {A normative ethical theory that failed to provide any reasons for its pronouncements wouldn't be taken very seriously (even religion-based normative ethics provide "God so decreed it" as a "why"). -Delirium 07:18, Sep 11, 2003 (UTC)

Also the further reading link doesn't work.


Um, really old complaint that was never fixed- I'm changing it.

I also added a "Moral Theories Section" if anyone has additions- please add. Jsn4 08:17, 3 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]


Dead link removed...

The following link was removed because the page no longer exsists.

The button is now

I don't know if I've put this in the right place, but I don't see a button for starting a new comment.

Norm, Normal, Normalcy and some related words should include a couple of concepts. One is the statistical definition of normal, meaning "typical" or "modal," or in the greatest number (a plurality or majority.)

It should include a sociological concept relating to the most common practices or beliefs. Commonly, a thing is ethical or unethical in relation to the beliefs and preferences of the greatest number of people (in a region.) Strongly-held attitudes may be opposed by attitudes of other groups, having other standards which they consider normal.

Thus, heterosexuality is often called "normal" because it is the condition or practice or belief of the greatest number. Once a majority believe that homosexuality is not deviant or evil, then it would become "normal" in that sense. Similar statements could be made in regard to racial segregation vs. integration.

It is also statistically normal that people should die or age, because those are universal conditions.

Normal can also refer to perfection, as in a "normal kidney," meaning a kidney without defect. If most 50-year olds have defective vision, that would be statistically normal for them, and the 50-year-old with perfect vision would be statistically deviant, though his vision would also be "normal" with respect to the perfection definition.

Common speech may refer to norms as socially agreed standards, such that it is the norm to accept a certain practice. There is a command element involved, but a greater suggestion of agreement by the greatest number.


The word "norm" has at least two distinct meanings. You're talking about norms in sociology, whereas this article is referring to norms in philosophy. Steohawk (talk) 23:24, 5 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Self-referential or infinitely regressive?

Isn't "Descriptive ethics deal with what the population believes to be right and wrong, while normative ethics deal with what the population should believe to be right and wrong" a self-referential statement? The judgment of what should be believed to be right or wrong will have to be based on what is believed to be right or wrong. Unless the implication is that the person making the judgment of what the population should believe is removed, not a part of, that population. So say a philosopher looks at a certain society, and decides what they should believe is right or wrong. The philosopher bases this decision on their own belief of what is right or wrong. Then should some other philosopher, perhaps, decide what the society of which the philosopher is a member should believe is right or wrong? Isn't there, in this reading, a sort of infinite regression?--Thomaswoof 21:54, 11 June 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Slang Term

Removed "new 'it'" from the introductory sentence, as the term seemed too informal for encyclopedia prose.

Normative ethics needs a better definition

The first sentence was: "Normative ethics is the branch of philosophical ethics concerned with classifying actions as right and wrong." This definition actually belongs to consequentialism. I'm removing it. The second paragraph also began describing consequentialism. Now the first sentence begins "Normative ethics is the branch of philosophical ethics concerned with what people should believe to be right and wrong.." Still a mess, but at least it's more accurate. Chira (talk) 21:45, 23 May 2008 (UTC)[reply]

False Dilemma

This article presents a false dilemma. Most people believe that certain character traits, actions, and consequences may contain intrinsic value. However, this article seems to be written with the assumption that all ethical theories focus on only one of those three categories. Furthermore, no explanation is provided as to why this assumption is made. Steohawk (talk) 23:37, 5 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Consequentialist libertarianism

The Article previously stated under consequentialist theories "Consequentialist libertarianism - which holds that liberty should be maximized."

This is an improper place to list consequentialist libertarianism, as a consequentialist libertarian is someone who believes we should maximize liberty because it brings about the best results, or rather libertarianism maximizes utility. It is a justification of libertarianism, a political theory, justified with consequentialism(ie. utilitarianism), a normative theory. The normative theory is still just plain old consequentialism.

Moreover the definition doesn't seem to grasp this. It actually sounds a lot more like deontological libertarianism, which is the idea that maximizing liberty is the only thing that is morally correct, and that the consequences of maximizing liberty are irrelevant.

Dark567 (talk) 16:53, 11 February 2011 (UTC)[reply]

The outline of normative theories

From what source is the outline of normative theories adopted? Having read several authors in the field I've found no general consensus concerning this particular categorization. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.253.153.210 (talk) 22:32, 26 March 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Image problems

thumb|100pxHow do I link to http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shame.jpg? When I type in [[:File:Shame.jpg]]<!--Non free file removed by DASHBot--> it gives me the image on the right instead of the one from wikimedia commons.

Binding Force

Before addressing this issue, I should note that I made a few revisions to various segments. I'm not sure the degree to which they help. But the article overall stinks like a monkey, so I don't feel I could hurt it much either.

I'm concerned about the section on binding force, which seems to be nothing more than a description of challenges to the notion that morality has it. It looks to me as if several of the quotations listed could be removed. Certainly one by Foot and one by Mill seems to be enough. If there seems to be consensus on it, I'll trim down the existing section and add in something by Kant or someone else who argues that morality has binding force, even if we can't explain why it does. (I take this to in fact be the majority position among philosophers, even if they disagree about why. But I take it that's something for another time...)71.173.176.104 (talk) 00:56, 8 March 2012 (UTC)[reply]


A bit more on this: Tesseract or others, you may want to revert some of what I've done. If so, the most recent is probably the only one that may be dubious in terms of content. I realize that I need to reread Foot's argument for this, because I've become increasingly unclear about which sense she has in mind for "bindingness": either (A) that people in fact act in the appropriate way morality demands, or (B) that people are in fact bound to act morally whether they like it or not. These are radically different possibilities, and my most recent edit may frame the matter too much as position (B), when her real target is position (A). (Though I think it's a B view she's taking. in arguing against "oughts from nowhere".) 71.173.176.104 (talk) 03:32, 8 March 2012 (UTC)[reply]