Bali bombing 2002

Islam and Its Influence in Indonesia: Who Was Behind he Bali Bombings?

         Modern Indonesians are divided, sometimes deeply, by religion, 

         ethnicity or regionalism, and social class. From the moment that 

         independence was declared in 1945, religion has been a central 

         source of conflict in the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. 

                                                                                           (Liddle, p. 4)

         Five years after the ousting of General Suharto, religious groups of all descriptions in democratically ruled Indonesia are experiencing newfound freedom of expression (McCreedy, p.1). Indonesia, fourth largest country by population in the world, is home to the largest number of Muslims of any other country (Choi, p.11).   Indonesian Muslims are also among the world’s most moderate Muslims, and currently there is separation of church and state in the Indonesian government (McCreedy, p.1 Liddle, p.8). However, there are signs that Indonesian voters may be favorably inclined to consider voting for Islamist parties which support state implementation of Shar’ia law (McCreedy, p. 1). With lively and often acrimonious interactions, two “dynamic forces” have emerged in Indonesia. One is composed of Islamist political parties who push for the merging of state and Islam; and the other is the division of rich and poor according to political party (Liddle, p.5). R. William Liddle of Ohio State University goes on to say that the Nationalists in power have become identified as representing the upper and middle classes, while the Muslim parties are hoping to recruit the working class and the poor (Liddle, p.5). 

         Indonesian society, freed from the controlling fist of General Suharto, faces a serious problem: how to retain hard won democratic principles and maintain its moderate Muslim identity in the face of radical Islamist parties who are fighting to transform Indonesia into an Islamist state ruled by Shar’ia law (Alief, 14). The conflict between Indonesia’s moderate Muslims and those who would see Indonesia become an Islamist state threatens to prove the idea that Islam and democracy are incapable of co-existing (Alief, 17).

         Complicating matters, the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiyah is vying for power. Its ultimate goal is to transform Indonesia’s secular government into an “Islamic superstate” ruled by Shar'ia law (Kremmer, p.1). Jemaah Islamiyah is widely credited for having perpetrated the Bali bombing and is known as an organization which carries out terrorist attacks, particularly bombings (Cianflone et al, p.4). 

         Even though Indonesians are among the most moderate in the world, Liddle cites another national poll showing that 71% of Indonesian respondents support Shar’ia law and that it should be enforced by the state, opening the door for Islamist parties to gain political power (McCreedy, p.1). There have been a number of national polls which show mixed results on this question. When polled, only 30% of those participating believe that fasting should be mandatory during Ramadan 

(McCreedy, p.2). The Modernist Muslim movement holds that the Qur’an does not need to be interpreted for them by scholars or teachers. The Liberal movement further holds that the Qur’an should not be interpreted literally and that it should allow for modern circumstances. Indonesian society has been profoundly impacted by the attempted injection of religion into the political system. Jemaah Islamiyah, according to terrorism scholar Rohan Gunaratna, is of the mindset that devout Muslims can’t observe Islam in the proper way, while living in a non-Islamist state. In addition, Gunaratna states that Jemaah Islamiyah group wants no separation of politics and religion, and to live by Shar’ia law” (Millard, p.41).

         While there are many Indonesians who are frustrated by the absence of Shar’ia law, there are others are Modernist Muslims who value their Western-style educations and their freedom of speech (McCreedy, p.2). Mohamad Ihsan Alief is a founding member of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), which is the most vocal liberal Muslim organization in Indonesia (Alief, p.14) Alief notes that the coordinator of his organization, Abshar Abdalla, was targeted for fatwa by Indonesian Muslim clerics because they said he disrespected Muhammad and Islam. The clerics also asked the Indonesian courts to eliminate the entire Jaringan Islam Liberal movement, which the courts denied (Alief, p.16). The offending statement by Abdalla that caused so much uproar was that “reworking the necessary Islamic foundation for Indonesia’s democracy would be difficult, if not entirely impossible, without a radical reinterpretation” (Alief, p.14). Jaringan Islam Liberal is vocal about their concerns that free speech about Islam is threatened by the “radical and hard-line” Muslim groups which  will resort to violence to accomplish their goals (Alief, p.15). JIL is very concerned that these groups are pervasive everywhere in society, in all media, pushing their idea of the need for an Islamist state at every opportunity. Their message is tailored to appeal to the poor and disenfranchised who will consider alternatives to the currently ruling Nationalist party (Alief, p.15). Alief outlines the dilemma that to disband the radical Islamist parties is to repeat the heavy handed tactics of General Suharto; that to quiet the radical right would be just as bad as Suharto’s silencing of Nobel Peace Prize winning Indonesian writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer (Alief, p.16). Clearly, there are those Indonesians who are concerned that Islamic radical parties will hijack the traditionally moderate Muslim state of Indonesia. However, Alief also writes that those who are concerned that JIL will prevail in their attempt to change the moderate Islamic tradition of Indonesia are forgetting the strong influence of parents and grandparents of liberal Muslims and their lengthy fight against Suharto for a pluralistic, democratic Indonesia (Alief, p.16). Alief also exhorts Indonesians to keep in mind two important figures of the 70’s: the late Ahmad Wahib for his forceful statement of the principles of Islamic liberalism, and Nurcholish Madjid, especially for his timely appeal “Islam, yes; Islamic party, no” (Alief, p.16). These men, among others, defended their belief that a “democratic and plural Indonesia is as Islamic as so-called ‘Islamic’ countries” (Alief, p.16). The upside about the aforementioned fatwa issued on Abshar Abdalla is that it fueled a public debate which Alief believes came down on the side of the side of the Modernists. Alief is hopeful that the democratic pluralism currently in effect in Indonesia, which saved Abshar Abdalla (since the Indonesian clerics who accused him had to bring their charges to Indonesian courts) will survive and strengthen. By contrast, in the Islamist state of Egypt, liberal writer Faraj Fouda was killed after a fatwa was issued on him for his writings 

(Alief, p.16).

         On a more local level, Hindu-Muslim relations in Bali society are strained by Islamic issues, even though predominantly Hindu Bali has a four hundred year history of peaceful coexistence with Muslims (Hindu). After the bombings were attributed to Islamic radicals, Balinese Hindus harbored ill will toward Balinese Muslims (Hindu). However, Muslim activist Agus Bambang Prianto said: “Terrorists are criminals, while Islam is a religion. Those who know Islam understand this difference. Islam is a universal religion. Based on this, our Hindu brothers understand that terrorism should not be equaled to Islam” (Hindu). Apart from the bombing issue, there are Hindu/Islamic tensions in Bali because Balinese Hindus go to temples to celebrate holidays over 100 days of the year which gives them a major disadvantage in the workplace because Muslims are sometimes preferred by local businesses for this reason. (Hindu).

         Bali also has an interest in separation of church and state in Indonesia. Should Islamist law take over the region, any business serving alcohol or “encouraging” sexual promiscuity would not be allowed. Imam Samudra argues that local craft sellers, who benefit from the foot traffic in and out of such businesses, would also be “illegitimate” (Acharya, p.4). Needless to say, the elimination of businesses which cater to tourists would be lethal to the tourism economy that is vital to Bali. The actions of Islamist terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, specifically the Bali bombings, have also affected Indonesian society by the negative impact of Western society pronouncing Indonesia a “new-founded terrorist camp” (Alief, p.17). The almost immediate drop-off of tourism, especially in Bali, impoverished hundreds of thousands of people and caused a large number of students to dropout of school, either to help their families make up the lost income, or because tuition became unaffordable (Poverty).

         Indonesian women have much to lose should an Islamist party take hold in Indonesia. Currently, they enjoy many freedoms not accorded to women who live in other Muslim countries. Indonesian women do not have to be accompanied by men in public, wear veils or burkhas, and they are not considered to be “second class citizens” (Choi, p.14). Additionally, and in stark contrast to Islamic law, it is Indonesian women who have the power to initiate the process of divorce. Indonesian men are allowed to have only two wives, but even then the first wife must give her consent for that to happen (Choi, p.14).

                     Initially it was not clear who the perpetrators of the Bali bombing were. The American CIA was blamed for doing it in an effort to make Islam look bad (Howe, p.1). Al-Qaeda was a suspect. Bali natives also suggested that radical Muslims did it to gain support for an Islamist state which might offer greater protection against future attacks (Howe, p.1).

         However, upon examination of the evidence, the Bali bombing of 2002 was perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist group which is made up largely of Indonesian nationals who have definite ties to larger international terrorist organizations, specifically Al-Qaeda (Cianflone et al, p.4). 

                     Riduan Isamuddin, aka Hambali, is the personification of a strong link between Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. It is not known whether his primary involvement was with Al-Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah, but Hambali was known to belong to both groups, and to have had access to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who was one of  Osama bin Laden’s lieutenants (Ressa). 

         The 2002 arrest and subsequent interrogation of Omar al-Faruoq, a Kuwaiti citizen of Iraqi descent, and a senior agent of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, also revealed that Al-Qaeda was working hand in hand with Jemaah Islamiyah 

(Acharya, p.1). Several sources revealed that Al-Qaeda contributed somewhere between $30,000 and $74,000 to help finance the Bali bombing by paying for the actual explosive materials (Sydney, Moore, p.2). Al-Faruoq also shared that in accordance with Al-Qaeda strategies, Jemaah Islamiyah was focusing on “soft targets” with low security measures, as opposed to high profile, well defended sites such as embassies (Acharya, p.2). Jemaah Islamiyah had a series of failed attempts trying to attack ExxonMobil locations and the Dumai fueling station (Acharya, p.2).

         Bali was an attractive target to both Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah for many reasons. It was almost overqualified as a soft target because it had very relaxed visa requirements; “porous” borders, it was a well used hub of transportation; and gun controls were not a problem due to the government having a history of ignoring the 

trafficking of illegal goods of all kinds (Abuza). Additionally, Bali was a famous and favored tourism destination with visitors from all over the world so that an attack on it was likely to draw the intense scrutiny of the media, especially because victims were likely to be Western, and also because of the Western based businesses there

(Putra, p.92).

         From a computer seized during the arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah Imam Samudra during the Bali bombing investigation, authorities discovered a definitive list of the reasons Bali was selected by Jemaah Islamiyah (Four). The list is comprehensive and included the fact that Bali is an international destination for “imperialists, terrorists, oppressors” and those who would sully the virtue of Indonesian Muslim women; because of the widespread belief that Bali was a drug trafficking hub; because many businesses in Bali promote sex, especially sex outside marriage in clear violation of Muslim law; because of the “gangs of Jews” in certain parts of Bali who allegedly conspired against Islam; and mainly because Bali was a “soft target” with few effective or sophisticated security measures in place (Four).

         Many of the reasons stated by Samudra as being the motivations for Jemaah Islamiyah to choose Bali were also attractive to the publicly stated goals of Al-Qaeda. 

Imam Samudra also wrote a book titled I am Fighting for Terrorism in which he claims that the main target of the Bali bombing is “the United States and its allies, namely England, France, Australia, Germany, Belgium, China, India, and Orthodox Russia” (Acharya, 2). He again mentions revenge for Afghanistan and perhaps because most of the Bali victims were Australian, says that Australia was also targeted because of “their efforts to separate East Timor from Indonesia” (Acharya, p.2).

Bali may also have been appealing to Jemaah Islamiyah as a target because its population is largely Hindu so the attack was unlikely to kill very many Muslims (Acharya, p.2).

         Indonesia, as a Muslim country that currently has separation of church and state, faces many challenges in maintaining the status quo. Radical Muslim groups are pushing for an Islamist state and mandatory observance of Shar’ia law. Ironically, the political and religious freedoms in Indonesia allow for the presence of groups connected with international terrorism. Bali will continue to face particular challenges because it is an island of Hinduism in a sea of Islam, with greatly different mores and customs. Clearly, even though Jemaah Islamiyah is an Indonesian terrorist group, they worked with the blessing, knowledge, and financing of Al-Qaeda. Even barring Al-Qaeda involvement, Jemaah Islamiyah stated goals to damage governments, people and places far beyond Bali and Indonesia. The Bali bombing was definitely an act of global terrorism.

  Works Cited