Battle of Mount Handrin

Battle of Mount Handrin
	Part of the First Iraqi–Kurdish War
	; Mount Handrin In Rawandiz
Date	May 1966
Location	East of Rawandiz, Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan36°34′16.4″N 44°36′52.9″E / 36.571222°N 44.614694°E
Result	Kurdish victory
Belligerents
KDP; Supported by:; Iran ; Israel; United States (alleged)	Ba'athist Iraq Supported by:; United States
Commanders and leaders
Mustafa Barzani; Ahmed Barzani; Ali Askari; Ibrahim Ahmad;	Ahmed al-Bakr; Abdul Rahman Arif;
Strength
6,000-8000	25,0000
Casualties and losses
unknown	+4,000 killed or wounded ; 2 Entire Iraqi Brigades Destroyed

The Battle of Mount Handrin, fought in May 1966, is considered one of the most important battles of the First Iraqi-Kurdish War. The Kurdish Force led by Mustafa Barzani annihilated the Iraqi Army led by Abdul Rahman Arif. The Iraqi army suffered heavy casualties as two infantry brigades were destroyed. The Kurdish casualties were minimal.

Background

In November 1963, after considerable infighting among the civilian and military wings of the Ba'athists, they were ousted by Abdul Salam Arif in a coup. Then, after another failed offensive on Kurds, Arif declared a ceasefire in February 1964, which provoked a split among Kurdish urban radicals on one hand and Peshmerga forces, led by Barzani on the other. Barzani agreed to the ceasefire and fired the radicals from the party. Following the unexpected death of Arif, whereupon he was replaced by his brother, Abdul Rahman Arif, the Iraqi government launched a last-ditch effort to defeat the Kurds. This campaign failed in May 1966, when Barzani forces thoroughly defeated the Iraqi Army at the Battle of Mount Handrin, near Rawanduz. At this battle, it was said that the Kurds slaughtered an entire Iraqi brigade.^[4]^{[page needed]}^[5]^{[page needed]}

Battle

The Kurds had intelligence from the Israeli Mossad and military advisers from the IDF, the Kurds had a considerable advantage from the rough mountainous terrain and intelligence. The battle first began with an Iraqi frontal attack aiming to breakthrough and capture Rawandiz. As the battle raged on the Iraqis achieved their breakthrough but The Kurds had planned for that. As the bridgehead grew bigger 2 Iraqi brigades of the Iraqi 2nd Division (Iraq) were isolated and encircled as the Kurds did a Pincer Maneuver. The Iraqi brigades were completely destroyed and the Iraqis were forced to retreat.^[4]^{[page needed]}^[5]^{[page needed]}

References

^ Michael G. Lortz. (Chapter 1, Introduction). The Kurdish Warrior Tradition and the Importance of the Peshmerga. pp.39–42.
^ Wolfe-Hunnicutt, Brandon (2021). The Paranoid Style in American Diplomacy: Oil and Arab Nationalism in Iraq. Stanford University Press. p. 102. ISBN 978-1-5036-1382-9. Available documentation does not prove conclusively that the United States provided covert assistance to the Kurds in the fall of 1962, but the documents that have been declassified are certainly suggestive—especially in light of the general US policy orientation toward Iraq during this period.
^ Template:Https://almadapaper.net/sub/05-381/p10.htm
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f O'Ballance, Edgar (1973). The Kurdish Revolt, 1961–1970. London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 0-571-09905-X.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-3733-2.

[kurdishwarrior-1] Michael G. Lortz. (Chapter 1, Introduction). The Kurdish Warrior Tradition and the Importance of the Peshmerga. pp.39–42.

[2] Wolfe-Hunnicutt, Brandon (2021). The Paranoid Style in American Diplomacy: Oil and Arab Nationalism in Iraq. Stanford University Press. p. 102. ISBN 978-1-5036-1382-9. Available documentation does not prove conclusively that the United States provided covert assistance to the Kurds in the fall of 1962, but the documents that have been declassified are certainly suggestive—especially in light of the general US policy orientation toward Iraq during this period.

[3] Template:Https://almadapaper.net/sub/05-381/p10.htm

[O'Ballance-4] ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f O'Ballance, Edgar (1973). The Kurdish Revolt, 1961–1970. London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 0-571-09905-X.

[Pollack-5] ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-3733-2.

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