Battle of Gagra (1919)
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| Battle of Gagra (1919) | |||||||
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| Part of Sochi conflict | |||||||
.svg) Gagra district | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 Democratic Republic of Georgia |
 White movement | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Valiko Jugheli Giorgi Gedevanashvili |
Anton Denikin | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Minor casualties | 87-500 dead | ||||||
The Battle of Gagra was fought on April 16–19, 1919, between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the White Army. The battle resulted in a Georgian victory.
Background
The Sochi district, which was annexed to Gagra in 1904 by Tsarist Russia, became a disputed territory between Southern Russia (under the White movement) and Georgia. After the Allies' victory in the First World War, the Caucasus region came under the British sphere of influence due to the British-French treaty of December 1917. Both the Whites and the Georgians welcomed the arrival of British forces in the region. Anton Denikin, a supporter of the Allies and the White Army, hoped that Britain would support the vision of a "united and indivisible Russia." However, Georgia cited the principle of self-determination to justify its territorial claim over the region.
Initially, Britain did not side with either party, aiming to maintain the status quo in the region until Russia's future was decided at the Paris Peace Conference. Britain's priority at this stage was to unite anti-Bolshevik forces against Bolshevism. Despite London's attempt at neutrality, this lack of a clear political stance made its policy appear inconsistent to both parties involved. In December 1918, Denikin capitalized on the Armeno-Georgian War by seizing, without any resistance, several villages in the Sochi district that were previously occupied by Georgia. However, Britain continued to support the status quo and dictated that Denikin should not make any further advances to the south. Denikin was displeased that Britain was "disposing of Russian territory" without his consent and felt that the British were turning a blind eye to Georgia's recent alliance with Germany. He decided to ignore Britain's demands and proceeded to cross the Loo River on February 6, 1919. Denikin was able to capture the entire Sochi district in only four days, pushing Georgia back to the Bzif River.
Denikin believed that Britain had sided with the Georgians and never forgave them for this perceived offense. Meanwhile, Georgia blamed Britain for allowing the Russians to attack. As a result, British authority was undermined on both sides of the conflict. Although the parties understood that Britain desired to maintain the status quo, it became clear that Britain would not take action to restore it by force. The White Army and the People's Guard of Georgia faced each other on the Bzif River, while Britain placed its garrison along the riverbank. On April 9, 1919, General George Milne, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, requested that Georgia move its troops to the Bzif River line. However, due to Britain's inaction and the weakening of its authority by this time, Milne's requests carried little weight.
After capturing the Sochi district, the White Guards immediately began efforts to restore the "pre-revolutionary order." This included returning lands to their previous owners; carrying out several mobilizations; organizing requisitions of goods, fodder, and transports; and conducting punitive operations. In response, a partisan movement developed as local peasants in the Sochi district formed green armies. On April 12, 1919, a group of 1,500 White Army soldiers carried out punitive operations against the local populations of Sochi and Adler. Georgia reacted by mobilizing the regular army, eight battalions of the People's Guard, Colonel Giorgi Ximshiashvili's Cavalry Division, and Colonel Kargareteli's 4th Artillery Battery on the Bzif River. Georgian forces decided to launch an offensive operation toward the Mekhadir River in the Gagra region. Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gegechkor sent letters regarding the operation to General William Thomson, a representative of the British Expeditionary Force. Upon General Thomson's advice, Gegechkor also sent letters to General Milne. Georgia's planned offensive was met with a generally positive response from General Thomson, but he believed that Georgia should not act without British consent. Georgian forces were given freedom of action to launch their offensive if the White Army did not comply with General Thomson's request to retreat within 48 hours.
Battle
On April 16, 1919, the People's Guard and regular Georgian Army units launched an attack against the White Army on the Bzif River. The attack involved infantry, artillery, and cavalry units. To increase maneuvering space, the Georgians constructed a new bridge on the upper reaches of the Bzif River and forced the river. On April 17, at 1 o'clock, Giorgi Lomtadze's third battalion captured Gagra for the first time without any losses and took 500 prisoners. On April 18, at 9 AM, the People's Guard Division crossed the Mekhadir River. The White Army retreated near the village of Vesioloe. On April 19, Georgian units reached the Mzimti River and approached Adler. Along with the Georgian units' attack, the Green Army rebellion broke out in Sochi and Adler, behind the White Army. The Green Army and Georgian units acted in a coordinated manner. The White Army retreated.
Before the start of the second phase of the operation, both General Thomson and General Milne of the British command protested against Georgia. Thomson assessed the operation as a "hostile move" towards Britain. Thomson's change of attitude may have been due to the robbery and murder of a British captain and doctor in Tiflis. Additionally, in Akhalkalaki, a Georgian soldier shot a British lieutenant colonel, which Thomson strongly criticized in an official note. Georgia stopped advancing towards Sochi and Adler to avoid worsening the situation. Georgian forces withdrew to the Psou River. Denikin prepared the Black Sea troops to launch an offensive to fully capture Sochi and take the Sukhumi district. However, General Briggs, the British representative with Denikin, convinced him that negotiations could lead to Georgia agreeing to retreat. According to an alternate version, Denikin called off the offensive because he was unable to mobilize sufficient forces. This was due to the fact that the majority of his troops were engaged in fighting the Bolsheviks on the main front.
Negotiations between the government of Georgia and "South Russia" began in Tiflis on May 21, 1919. British Generals Briggs and Beach, who were British military representatives to Denikin, participated in these negotiations on behalf of Denikin's government. General Briggs advised Georgia that Britain would soon withdraw from the South Caucasus, and therefore it would be better for Georgia to sort out relations with Denikin's government. The negotiations ended without results on May 23.
On May 24, a second meeting was held with representatives of the Denikin government. General Beach warned that Denikin would attack if he did not retreat, but Noe Zhordania argued that such an attack would be seen as one with British assistance. Georgia refused to surrender Gagra.
Literature
- Kenez, Peter (2014). Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920
- University of California Press, pg. 202–212. ISBN 9780520327795
- A. Chachkhian, 1919 Gagri Offensive Operation and Tactical Analysis of Battles, Annals: Scientific Center for the Study of History, Ethnology, Religion and Propaganda, Publishing House "Universal". (11) Tbilisi. 2015.