Nix v. Hedden
| Nix vs. Hedden | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| File:SCOTUS seal.jpg Supreme Court of the United States | ||||
| Decided May 10, 1893 | ||||
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| Holding | ||||
| That a tomato is a vegetable, not a fruit. | ||||
| Case opinions | ||||
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Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893), was a case tried before the Supreme Court of the United States over whether a tomato was classified as a fruit or a vegetable. It was filed as an action by John Nix, John W. Nix, George W. Nix, and Frank W. Nix against Edward L. Hedden, collector of the port of New York, to recover back duties paid under protest.
The case
At the trial the plaintiff's counsel, after reading in evidence definitions of the words 'fruit' and 'vegetables' from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary, and the Imperial Dictionary, called two witnesses, who had been for 30 years in the business of selling fruit and vegetables, and asked them, after hearing these definitions, to say whether these words had 'any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from those read.'
One of the witnesses answered as follows: 'Well, it does not classify all things there, but they are correct as far as they go. It does not take all kinds of fruit or vegetables; it takes a portion of them. I think the words 'fruit' and 'vegetable' have the same meaning in trade to-day that they had on March 1, 1883. I understand that the term 'fruit' is applied in trade only to such plants or parts of plants as contain the seeds. There are more vegetables than those in the enumeration given in Webster's Dictionary under the term 'vegetable,' as 'cabbage, cauliflower, turnips, potatoes, peas, beans, and the like,' probably covered by the words 'and the like.'"
The other witness testified: "I don't think the term 'fruit' or the term 'vegetables' had, in March, 1883, and prior thereto, any special meaning in trade and commerce in this country different from that which I have read here from the dictionaries."
The plaintiff's counsel then read in evidence from the same dictionaries the definitions of the word 'tomato' (149 U.S. 304, 306). The defendant's counsel then read in evidence from Webster's Dictionary the definitions of the words 'pea', 'egg plant', 'cucumber', 'squash', and 'pepper'.
The plaintiff then read in evidence from Webster's and Worcester's dictionaries the definitions of 'potato', 'turnip', 'parsnip', 'cauliflower', 'cabbage', 'carrot', and 'bean'.
The decision
The court decided in favor of the defense and found that the tomato was classified as a vegetable, based on the ways in which it is used, and the popular perception to this end. Justice Gray, in his decision, memorably stated that:
"The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word 'fruit' as the seed of plants, or that part of plaints which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are 'fruit,' as distinguished from 'vegetables,' in common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act."
See also
- Carrot – defined to be a fruit in European Community law, for the purpose of jam classification