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Team B

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Template:TotallyDisputed Team B was a competitive analysis exercise commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1970s to analyze threats the Soviet Union posed to the security of the United States. Team B, approved by then Director of Central Intelligence George H. W. Bush, was comprised of "outside experts" who attempted to counter intelligence officials within the CIA known as Team A.[1] Team B concluded the National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union, generated yearly by the CIA, underestimated Soviet military power and misinterpreted Soviet strategic intentions. Its findings were leaked to the press in December 1976.[2]

The Team B reports became the intellectual foundation for the idea of "the window of vulnerability" and of the massive arms buildup that began toward the end of the Carter administration and accelerated under President Ronald Reagan.[3]

Creation

The organization chosen in the administration to challenge the CIA's analysis was the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). PFIAB's Team B was headed by Richard Pipes, a Harvard historian and specialist in Russian history, and Paul Nitze, who also helped to create the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), the objectives of which were to raise awareness about the Soviets' alleged nuclear dominance and to pressure the American leadership to close the gap.[4] Team B's members included Daniel O. Graham, Clare Booth Luce, William Van Cleave, Edward Teller,[5] John Connally, Thomas Wolf, Paul Wolfowitz.[citation needed]

In 1975 PFIAB members asked CIA Director William Colby to approve the initiative of producing comparative assessments of the Soviet threat. Colby refused, stating it was hard "to envisage how an ad hoc independent group of analysts could prepare a more thorough, comprehensive assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities than could the intelligence community."[4]

When George H. W. Bush became the Director of Central Intelligence in 1976 the PFIAB renewed its request for competitive threat assessments. Although his top analysts argued against such an undertaking, Bush checked with the White House, obtained a go-ahead, and by May 26 signed off on the experiment.[3]

A team of 16 "outside experts" were to take an independent look at highly classified data used by the intelligence community to assess Soviet strategic forces in the yearly National Intelligence Estimates.[3][6]

There were three teams; one studied Soviet low-altitude air defense capabilities, one examined Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) accuracy, and one investigated Soviet strategic policy and objectives.

The third team, chaired by Harvard University professor Richard Pipes, that ultimately received considerable publicity and is most commonly referred to as Team B.[3]

Assessments

Part One

  • Judgments of Soviet Strategic Objectives Underlying NIE's and their Shortcomings

The first section of the report dealt with the team's criticisms of the NIE's assessment of Soviet strategic objectives. It was the conclusion of the report, that the NIE was mostly wrong to view Soviet strategic actions as primarily a response to its history of being invaded and that the NIE ignored or misinterpreted evidence that most Soviet strategic actions were offensive rather than defensive in nature. The report also rejected the NIE's conclusion that as the Soviet Union grew more powerful and capable its foreign policy would also become less aggressive.[7]

Part Two

  • A critique of the NIE interpretation of certain Soviet Strategic Developments

The second section of the report was primarily a criticism of the NIE's conclusions regarding Soviet strategic weapons programs, and how they are integrated into conventional Soviet forces and what impacts they have on Soviet strategic goals and plans. The report argued that the NIE underestimated the threat posed by Soviet strategic weapons programs, and that the development and deployment of several new weapons platforms and advancements in existing technologies would drastically alter the advantages that the United States and NATO had over the Warsaw Pact. The report cited these specific areas to reinforce its assessment:

  • Soviet ICBM and SLBM Programs: The report cited the recent development of Soviet MIRV missile technology, coupled with a rapid modernization of ICBM and SLBM targeting capabilities to argue that the NIE was underestimating the impact of the sophistication, effectiveness and threat of numerical superiority that the Soviet strategic missile program was posing.[8]
  • Economic Factors: The NIE viewed Soviet military expenditures as being limited to economic activity in a similar manner as in the west. The report also took exception to this conclusion, arguing that, in retrospect, prior estimates of Soviet military budgets were far from accurate. They cited the 1970 NIE's estimate of the Soviet military budget as being only half of its actual value, and that this number was still being used as a baseline for current estimates. Using these numbers, the report concluded, greatly underestimated the resources available to the Soviet military and consequentially, underestimated potential capability, The report argued that the Soviets did not have the same financial constraints as the West, Guns vs. Butter, because as a dictatorship, the Soviet Union was less accountable for its budget.[9]
  • Civil Defense: Both the NIE and the Team B report noted that the level of sophistication, scope and expansion of nuclear civil defense was unmatched. And although the Soviet hardening of military and governmental facilities was covered by the NIE the report argued that this was a significant factor in their determination that the Soviets strategic planning was more focused on an offensive nuclear war rather than a defensive stance or deterrence.[10]
  • Mobile Missiles: The report also complained that the NIE did not adequately address the issues surrounding the planned Soviet deployment of the SS-X-16 mobile missile system. The SS-X-16, deployed as the SS-16 was the first mobile intercontinental ballistic missile deployed by the Soviet Union. Because it was built off the SS-20 platform (an intermediate range nuclear missile), it was argued that the SS-20 could be quickly and covertly converted into the longer range SS-16 in times of crisis, and would be a backdoor around the SALT I Treaty.[11]
  • Backfire Bomber: The recent deployment, and capabilities of the Tupolev Tu-22M, designated the “Backfire” by NATO, was also addressed. As with the mobile ICBS, the NIE was said to have underestimated the current and potential performance of the Backfire, and as such, is designated it as a short range bomber similar to the F-111, in capabilities. The report argued that the potential of the bomber, both in range and armaments, meant that it was more appropriate to classify the bomber as a long range strategic platform, thereby impacting the total Soviet strategic nuclear threat.[12]
  • Anti Satellite Capability: The report argued that there was stronger evidence than presented by the NIE of a Soviet intent to develop Anti Satellite Capability and that despite the NIE judgment contrary, the Soviets were combining directed energy research to this end.[13]
  • Anti-Submarine Warfare: The report argued that despite the NIE's assessment in its 10 year forecast that the Soviet Navy was not aggressively developing more accurate ASW detection tools and would not be able to deploy new more advanced ASW capabilities in the next 10 years, the evidence in the NIE suggested that they had significantly ramped up ASW R&D, including non acoustic methods of detection. The report cautioned that to determine the real extent of Soviet ASW development would require significantly more research and access to classified materials, as the US Navy would not release its data to either Team B, or the CIA, they stressed that the probability of advanced Soviet ASW research was greater than zero, as the NIE implied it was.[14]
  • Anti-Ballistic Missiles: Although the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, put a halt to further development and deployment of most ABM technology, there were exceptions for ABM systems surrounding Moscow and the Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. The report argued that since the NIE conceded that Soviet ABM research and development was continuing at a pace similar in size and scope it was before the ABM Treaty in 1972, it was likely that Soviet ABM technology was greater than the NIE concluded it was.[15]

Criticism

According to Dr. Anne Cahn (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977-1980), Team B's analysis of weapons systems was later proven false. "I would say that all of it was fantasy... if you go through most of Team B's specific allegations about weapons systems, and you just examine them one by one, they were all wrong."[16] The CIA director at the time, George H. W. Bush, concluded that the Team B approach set "in motion a process that lends itself to manipulation for purposes other than estimative accuracy."[17] Brookings Institute Scholar Raymond Garthoff concurred, writing that in "retrospect, and with the Team B report and records now largely declassified, it is possible to see that virtually all of Team B's criticisms... proved to be wrong. On several important specific points it wrongly criticized and 'corrected' the official estimates, always in the direction of enlarging the impression of danger and threat."[18]

Paul Warnke, an official at the ACDA at the time of the Team B, wrote, "Whatever might be said for evaluation of strategic capabilities by a group of outside experts, the impracticality of achieving useful results by 'independent' analysis of strategic objectives should have been self-evident. Moreover, the futility of the Team B enterprise was assured by the selection of the panel's members. Rather than including a diversity of views ... the Strategic Objectives Panel was composed entirely of individuals who made careers of viewing the Soviet menace with alarm."[19] Time Magazine editor Strobe Talbott wrote in 1990, "Bush allowed a panel of outsiders, deliberately stacked with hard-liners, to second-guess the agency's findings. Not surprisingly, the result was a depiction of Soviet intentions and capabilities that seemed extreme at the time and looks ludicrous in retrospect.[20] Richard Pipes has offered analysis to the contrary,[1] and later said, "We dealt with one problem only: What is the Soviet strategy for nuclear weapons? Team B was appointed to look at the evidence and to see if we could conclude that the actual Soviet strategy is different from ours. It's now demonstrated totally, completely, that it was."[21]

References

  1. ^ a b Pipes, Richard (1986). "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth". Commentary Magazine. 82 (4). {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |month= and |coauthors= (help)
  2. ^ Fitzgerald, Frances (2001). Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War. p. 83.
  3. ^ a b c d Cahn, Anne Hessing (April 1993). "Team B: The trillion-dollar experiment". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 49 (03): 22, 24–27.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
  4. ^ a b "Anatomy of a Neo-Conservative White House". Canadian Dimension. 39 (03): 46. May 1, 2005.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
  5. ^ Sanders, Jerry Wayne (1983). Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment. p. 226.
  6. ^ Tanenhaus, Sam (November 2, 2003). "The Mind Of The Administration A Continuing Series On The Thinkers Who Have Shaped The Bush Administration's View Of The World". The Boston Globe.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link)"At times, Team B performed logical somersaults that eerily foreshadowed Bush administration statements on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. Just because superweapons like a "non-acoustic anti-submarine system" couldn't be found, Pipes's report argued, that didn't mean the Soviets couldn't build one, "even if they appeared to lack the technical know-how."
  7. ^ Team B Report. Page 15.
  8. ^ Team B Report. Page 21.
  9. ^ Team B Report. Page 23.
  10. ^ Team B Report. Page 26.
  11. ^ Team B Report. Page 27.
  12. ^ Team B Report. Page 28.
  13. ^ Team B Report. Page 30.
  14. ^ Team B Report. Pages 30-34.
  15. ^ Team B Report. Pages 35-37.
  16. ^ Thom Hartmann (December 7, 2004). "Hyping Terror For Fun, Profit - And Power" (HTML). Commondreams.org. Retrieved April 23. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  17. ^ Goodman, Melvin A. (November 19, 2004). "Righting the CIA". The Baltimore Sun.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
  18. ^ Jeff Stein (2005). "Bush team sought to snuff CIA doubts" (HTML). SFGate. Retrieved September 17. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  19. ^ Warnke, Paul C. (January/February 1999). "The B Team: Paul C. Warnke reviews Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA: Cahn, Anne Hessing". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 55 (01): 70. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  20. ^ Talbott, Strobe (Oct. 14, 1991). "America Abroad The Case Against Gates". TIME Magazine. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  21. ^ Sam Tanenhaus (2003). "The hard-liner" (HTML). The Boston Globe. Retrieved September 17. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
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