Talk:Compatibilism and incompatibilism

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Ill Logic

I'm really trying to understand compatibilism, but it just doesn't make sense to me. The core sentence from the article (I think):

"Whilst a compatibilist will not try to deny that whatever choice you make will have been predetermined since the beginning of time, they will argue that this choice that you make is an example of free will because no one is forcing you to make whatever choice you make."

This surely is a contradiction! I'm not being forced in my choice? If history X predetermines choice A, then choice A is forced by history X. Does belief in compatibilism require one to give up logic? Because, if so, I'd rather start praying to the flying spaghetti monster.

Compatibilists differentiate between something being causally necessitated by the laws of nature, and somoen being compelled to do something by someone else. They believe you are free if you are not compelled, and that you are casually necessitated, and that that is not compulsion, so you are still free.1Z 12:40, 30 March 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you. Your wording is more clear than the article. It seems that compatibilists indeed stress a difference between necessitation and compulsion. I believe the distinction is ultimately imaginary though. this paper basically sums up how I would argue this matter. <signing this and previous comment with my newly created account> Astarica 11:49, 1 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Also:

"Further, according to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires."

Does Hume, with his early 18th century knowledge, not realize that "some different beliefs or desires" would just as well be part of the collection of "exactly the same inner and outer circumstances" and likewise result from predetermined cause? Astarica 11:49, 1 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Just a note

This article sucks. Determinism is true or false, it doesn't exist or fail to exist. KSchutte 20:29, 11 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

this comment sucks Thorsmitersaw —Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.78.145.1 (talk) 14:31, 25 February 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Free Will Example

The example involving someone holding a gun to a reader's head is not only very unencyclopedia-like, but it is also a very poor example of a situation that lacks a free will element. Just because a choice would most likely result in the chooser's death (such as defying the gunman in this case), does not mean that it is not a valid choice. Free will is entirely present in this scenario, and a better example is needed. VoidTalker 17:24, 6 March 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Compatiblists have traditionally taken this kind of situation to define all there is about FW and the lack thereof. I am not convinced myself, but it is notable.1Z 13:02, 3 March 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Are they not just "choosing not to die". How it this "forced"? And why does it require other people to be "forced". This whole thing seems to be a giant argument by definition (bait/switch). Voice-of-All 03:50, 9 November 2007 (UTC)[reply]

TBD

There is too much emphasis on Hume. Kant probably needs separate treatment.1Z 19:24, 1 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Dilemma of Determinism. Vaguely written. Merge with pessimism?1Z 19:36, 1 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

For What It's Worth

I see this a little differently. Of course, I can't insert my personal opinions as original research, but is there some pre-existing other philospher whose opinions I can insert?

Basically: I think that incompatibilism is entailed by dualism. In dualism, I have a "soul" that drives my body around (although how that happens is an akward problem for dualists). If my body acts as it does - including the things I say, the things I type - as a result of a chain of physical causes, then my "soul" isn't really in the driver's seat at all.

But I am not a dualist. My body = My self. It is incoherent to say "my hormones made me do it", or "my neural connections made me do it", because those things are me. The way that this body responds to sensory input, conditioned by its prior history, and by its genetic history, as encoded in the connections in the brain - these things are what I am. Self-reflective philosophising included.

Thus, my actions are not "forced", they arise in out of me being who/what I am in response to the environment I am in. If tat ain't free will, what is?

Who can I quote, to add this POV in?

Paul Murray (talk) 02:33, 5 July 2008 (UTC)[reply]