Talk:Naturalism (philosophy)

Merged info

This article contains material from the former methodological naturalism which now redirects here. Let's try to describe naturalism as a whole and not splinter into small separatist factions. The only bit that didn't make it over here was a discussion of Philip Johnson's appropriation of the term which is not notable from the standpoint that he is neither a scientist, a philosopher of science, nor an arbiter of what is a subject here at wikipedia. Joshuaschroeder 15:24, 6 September 2005 (UTC)

There are (at least) two versions of methodological naturalism The simpler version requires only that hypotheses generate predictions that can be (and are) tested. It does not restrict explanations to "natural" causes, i.e., it does not exclude a priori the supernatureal. W.V. Quine advocated this kind of naturalism:

"If I saw indirect explanatory benefit in positing sensibilia, possibilia, spirits, a Creator, I would joyfully accord them scientific status too, on a par with such avowedly scientific posits as quarks and black holes. (From Naturalism; or, Living within One's Means, Dialectica 49 (1990); also available in Quintessence, R.F. Gibson, editor)

The alternative version adds the restriction that hypotheses that postulate supernatural entities are forbidden. Barbara Forrest in Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connection (PDF) writes that she agrees with Paul Kurtz when he writes:

"First, naturalism is committed to a methodological principle within the context of scientific inquiry; i.e., all hypotheses and events are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events. To introduce a supernatural or transcendental cause within science is to depart from naturalistic explanations. On this ground, to invoke an intelligent designer or creator is inadmissible. . . ."

The current article sometimes assumes one of these versions and sometimes the other. It is worthwhile clarifying the distinction, especially since religious criticisms of naturalism assume the second version is the relevant version and not the first.

I don't know how scientists are supposed to distinguish between natural and supernatural hypotheses. In practice, the supernatural seems to refer vaguely to mankind's religions and myths and not to some more explicit criteria. People have sought to test the validity of some supernatural claims, e.g., whether some houses have ghosts. People have also sought to measure the effectiveness of prayer. So far I know, no one has ever confirmed a supernatural hypothesis. But that does not mean that they never will or that they are forbidden to try. Ivar Y 00:50, 28 September 2005 (UTC)

Supernatural seems to refer to explanations that are external to the natural world. A supernatural hypothesis would necessarily have no evidence for it, only evidence against it (such as discovery of a natural cause). This makes belief in the supernatural external to science. Joshuaschroeder 13:10, 28 September 2005 (UTC)

This is a definition of supernatural that provides no guidance for scientists. The only way for scientists to determine whether some idea is supernatural (and, hence, forbidden) is to treat the idea as a potentially valid scientific hypothesis and see if there is some way to confirm it. If scientists can confirm it, then that idea is scientific even if that idea involves a god or a ghost or whatever. Put another way, scientists can confirm that some things are natural (even, potentially, a god). They have no way to confirm that some things are supernatural (as defined above).

The Catholic encyclopedia -- see External links -- says that God is supernatural because God created the natural world and, hence, must be above the natural. However, if God is the Creator, what prevented God from installing evidence in his creation that, in fact, He exists? Why can't God be both a supernatural being and a "natural cause"? When Phillip Johnson complains that scientists are wrong to arbitrarily reject ideas deemed supernatural (in particular, to reject Johnson's God), he has a point.

I'm suggesting that statements like the following need to be rewritten:

"Any method of inquiry or investigation or any procedure for gaining knowledge that limits itself to natural, physical, and material approaches and explanations can be described as naturalist."

"The first [i.e., methodological naturalism] refers only to the application of the scientific method to science that assumes that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes."

If there is "no higher tribunal for truth than natural science," then the description of that tribunal should not suggest that science can lead only to ontological naturalism (i.e., atheism).

Thoughtful scientists don't reject the supernatural a priori. Rather, they require that hypotheses, whether natural or supernatural, be testable. Ivar Y 08:14, 29 September 2005 (UTC)

Just because the Catholic encyclopedia defines God as supernatural doesn't make a God that acts in the universe supernatural. That is, according to the definitions provided, if the evidence leads inexorably to a phenonmenon that can be called "God", this phenomenon will be a natural phenomenon. Joshuaschroeder 13:14, 29 September 2005 (UTC)

What do you mean by supernatural? Contradicting the "laws of nature"? Not accessible to science? Markus Schmaus

The latter definition. The former could be said to apply to certain physical paradoxes such as the GZK paradox or the Pioneer anomaly -- clearly not supernatural. Joshuaschroeder 13:30, 30 September 2005 (UTC)

I absolutely agree with Ivar Y. As I see it, the first version actually describes naturalism, a philosphy I would subscribe, while the second version is how opponents of naturalism try to describe it. In fact, the second definition only makes sense under the assumption, that the supernatural and natural are distinct, which is a supernaturalistic assumption.

Is the supernatural external to science? Well, by the definition of supernatural it is. There are various views of what supernatural is, but it mostly comes down to something which is not accessible for science. Scientific method on the other hand, doesn't refer to supernatural at all and all it does is to require hypotheses to be testable, that is they have consequences, which infulence myself, I might see them, I might feel them, they might kill me. So if the supernatural has any impact on myself, it is not external to science.

Proponents of the supernatural define it as not accessible for science, but simultaniously assume that it has an impact on life. They conclude that science is limited, as it has no access to some phenomena influencing our lifes. Please note, that this conclusion is not reached by looking at science and does not depend on what science actually is. In fact it is wrong as science does not know any such limitation and hence at least one of the assumption has to be wrong as well. But rather than accepting this, one of the proponents, Philip Johnson, tried to redefine science by calling it "methodological naturalism". Markus Schmaus 15:16, 29 September 2005 (UTC)

Source needed

I removed the following from the page today because it did not have supporting documentation:

These groups have been known to argue that the philosophy is necessarily ontological and even a religion itself.

If you know of a source, please provide it and add this back into the page. Thanks. Swmeyer 13:34, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

ID=creationism

Regarding this change to this statement:

Common critics of naturalism are creationists who claim that their religious perspectives are not respected by the current practices and theories of science, including proponents of intelligent design who hold that there are phenomena that cannot be explained by "undirected processes" inherent to the naturalist conception of reality.

While it is possible to be a creationist and a proponent of ID, they are not mutually exclusive. Please consider this from one of ID's biggest critics, Ronald Numbers:

Except for the fact that both of them oppose evolution, they have nothing in common.

He discusses ID more here. --Swmeyer 19:41, 6 October 2005 (UTC)