Adams v. Howerton

Richard Frank Adams, et. al., v. Joseph D. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036. (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982) is a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that held that the term "spouse" refers to an opposite sex partner for the purposes of immigration law and that this definition meets rational basis review. It predated the Defense of Marriage Act by fourteen years in defining marriage as a union of man and a woman with respect to immigration law.

Case History

In 1975, Richard Frank Adams, an American citizen, and Anthony Corbett Sullivan, an alien from Australia, were one of several same-sex couples that received marriage licenses from the clerk of Boulder County, Colorado. Adams then petitioned the Immigration and Naturalization Service for classification of Sullivan as an immediate relative of Adams, on the basis that they were married under Colorado law. The petition was initially denied, with a letter stating that "[Adams and Sullivan] have failed to establish that a bona fide marital relationship can exist between two faggots." A revised letter was later sent, explaining that "[a] marriage between two males is invalid for immigration purposes and cannot be considered a bona fide marital relationship since neither party to the marriage can perform the female functions in marriage." After the INS petition was ultimately denied, they filed suit against the INS in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that their marriage was valid under both Colorado law and immigration law, and if it was not, it violated the Fifth Amendment's substantive due process and equal protection components.

The district court rejected the plaintiffs' claims, noting that "Congress in its immigration statutes is not obligated to follow the law of the place where the marriage was contracted". The court also held that under Colorado law that marriage is a union of "a man and a woman", agreeing with the state's attorney general's opinion, and also noting that "[t]he Colorado statutes don't specifically allow, nor do they specifically prohibit, marriages between persons of the same sex." It also held that "[t]he legal protection and special status afforded to marriage (being defined as an union of persons of different sex) has historically, as stated in the above quotation from Singer [v. Hara, 11 Wn.App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. of Appeal 1974)], been rationalized as being for the purpose of encouraging the propagation of the race."

Regarding the constitutional claims, it held that if federal law governs, then "the constitutional challenge is rejected as insubstantial", because "Congress has virtually plenary power in immigration matters and is not bound by otherwise applicable equal protection requirements". If state law governs, the court held that "the Colorado state law which rejects a purported marriage between persons of the same sex does not violate the due process or the equal protection clause of the federal constitution", on the basis that the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 34 L.E.2d 65, 93 S Ct 37 (1972), "is of paramount importance because a state court judgment prohibiting two people of the same sex from marrying each other was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court on various constitutional grounds, including due process and equal protection. The High Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. Such a dismissal is an important adjudication on the merits." The court rejected the counterargument "that some persons are allowed to marry and their union is given full recognition and constitutional protection even though the above stated justification—procreation—is not possible" on the basis that "if the classification of the group who may validly marry is overinclusive, it does not affect the validity of the classification"

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds. They decided that it was unnecessary for them to determine if the Adams-Sullivan union qualified as a marriage under Colorado law. They noted that it was clear that "Congress did not intend the mere validity of a marriage under state law to be controlling" and that "even though two persons contract a marriage valid under state law and are recognized as spouses by that state, they are not necessarily spouses for purposes of section 201(b)." They then held that "[t]he term marriage ordinarily contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman" (Internal quotations and citations omitted) and that "[t]he term spouse commonly refers to one of the parties in a marital relationship so defined. Congress has not indicated an intent to enlarge the ordinary meaning of those words. In the absence of such a congressional directive, it would be inappropriate for us to expand the meaning of the term spouse for immigration purposes" (Internal quotions and citations omitted) and as such, "Congress intended that only partners in heterosexual marriages be considered spouses under section 201(b)."

In reviewing the constitutionality of the law, they rejected the plaintiffs' claim that strict scrutiny was required, on the basis that "Congress has almost plenary power to admit or exclude aliens". They then held that "Congress's decision to confer spouse status under section 201(b) only upon the parties to heterosexual marriages has a rational basis and therefore comports with the due process clause and its equal protection requirements. There is no occasion to consider in this case whether some lesser standard of review [than rational basis] should apply." and that "[p]erhaps" Congress's justification "is because homosexual marriages never produce offspring, because they are not recognized in most, if in any, of the states, or because they violate traditional and often prevailing societal mores. In any event, having found that Congress rationally intended to deny preferential status to the spouses of such marriages, we need not further "probe and test the justifications for the legislative decision."

The plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which denied the petition.