Kolender v. Lawson
| Kolender v. Lawson | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued November 8, 1982 Decided May 2, 1983 | |
| Full case name | Kolender, Chief of Police of San Diego, et al. v. Edward Lawson |
| Citations | 461 U.S. 352 (more) 75 L. Ed.2d 903, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983) |
| Case history | |
| Prior | 658 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981) |
| Holding | |
| A law requiring persons who loiter or wander on the streets to present identification and to account for their presence when requested by a police officer is unconstitutional. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | O'Connor, joined by Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens |
| Concurrence | Brennan |
| Dissent | White, joined by Rehnquist |
| Laws applied | |
| California Penal Code §647(e) | |
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the constitutionality of laws that allow police to demand that “loiterers” and “wanderers” provide identification.
Facts
Edward Lawson was a law-abiding black man of unusual deportment (he wore his hair in long dreadlocks). Lawson was frequently subjected to police questioning and harassment in San Diego County, California where he lived when as a pedestrian he walked in so-called "white neighborhoods." He was detained or arrested approximately 15 times within 18 months, was prosecuted twice, and was convicted once (the second charge was dismissed).
Lawson challenged California Penal Code §647(e),[1] which required persons who loiter or wander on the streets to identify themselves and account for their presence when requested by a peace officer to do so. A California appellate court, in People v. Solomon (1973), 33 Cal. App.3d 429, had construed the law to require “credible and reliable” identification that carries a “reasonable assurance” of its authenticity.[2]
Issue
 | This article may be confusing or unclear to readers. |
Was the California statute unconstitutionally vague?
Conclusion
Using the construction of the California appellate court in Solomon, the Court held that the law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave excessive discretion to the police (in the absence of probable cause to arrest) whether to stop and interrogate a suspect or leave him alone.[3] The Court hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement.
Prior History
The Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (1981). The Ninth Circuit had additionally held that Penal Code §647(e) violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures because it “subverts the probable cause requirement” by authorizing arrest for conduct that is no more than suspicious. “Vagrancy statutes cannot turn otherwise innocent conduct into a crime.” Id. at 1367.
The Ninth Circuit also noted that “police knowledge of the identity of an individual they have deemed ‘suspicious’ grants the police unfettered discretion to initiate or continue the investigation of the person long after the detention has ended. Information concerning the stop, the arrest and the individual’s identity may become part of a large scale data bank.” Id. at 1368.
Because the U.S. Supreme Court were able to resolve Kolender on the issue of vagueness, they did not decide the Fourth Amendment issue.
Subsequent History
Kolender was cited in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), as an example of a “stop and identify” statute the Court had voided on vagueness grounds. In Hiibel, the Court held that a Nevada law[4] requiring persons detained upon reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime to identify themselves to a peace officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures or the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self incrimination. Unlike California Penal Code §647(e) as construed in Solomon, the Nevada statute was apparently interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court as requiring only that persons detained state their names.[5]
California Penal Code §647(e) was repealed in 2008 at the request of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.[6]
- ^
California Penal Code §647(e) read, in relevant part,
- “Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: . . . (e) who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence when requested by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification.”
- ^ In People v. Solomon (1973), the Court construed § 647(e) as requiring that a person detained under that statute’s authority produce “credible and reliable identification . . . carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself.” (33 Cal.App.3d 429, 439). The California Supreme Court denied review. Both the Ninth Circuit (658 F.2d 1362, 1364–1365, n. 3) and the U.S. Supreme Court (461 U.S. 352, 356, n. 4) used this construction in voiding § 647(e) for vagueness.
- ^
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, noted that the law
- “... provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with [the law]”, conferring on police “virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.”
- ^
Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) §171.123(3) provides that:
- “The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.”
- ^ See Hiibel v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 868, at 875.
- ^ California Penal Code §647(e) was repealed by Ch. 302, Stats. 2007 (SB 425, Margett), at the request of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. The analysis on 11 June 2007 by the California Assembly Committee on Public Safety noted that “The provision has served no purpose other than to cause confusion since 1983”.
Notes
See also
External links
- Text of Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) is available from: Findlaw Justia
- Oyez Oral Argument