Enaction (philosophy)
 | The topic of this article may not meet Wikipedia's general notability guideline. (April 2014) |
An editor has nominated this article for deletion. You are welcome to participate in the deletion discussion, which will decide whether or not to retain it. |
 | It has been suggested that this article be merged into Enactivism. (Discuss) Proposed since April 2014. |
Enaction is seen as central to our cognition and perception [1] It is one of a wider set of post-cartesian, anti-dualist theories of the mind. It opposes the separation of the mind from the body, holding that consciousness is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artefacts, their environment, and their interactions. The theory also sees an essential role for feelings, emotions and affect: "perceiving requires not only the ability to probe and explore the world...it also requires exercise of the ability" making motivation intrinsic to our cognitive processes.[2]
References
- ^
Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525.
{{cite book}}:|editor=has generic name (help) On-line version here. - ^ Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. p. 79. ISBN 0262014556.
Further reading
- Robert A. Wilson, and Lucia Foglia (July 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Embodied cognition". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition).
{{cite web}}:|editor=has generic name (help) - Monica Cowart. "Embodied cognition". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Joe Lau, Max Deutsch (Jan 22, 2014). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Externalism About Mental Content". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition).
{{cite web}}:|editor=has generic name (help) - Basil Smith. "Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embodied, enacted and extended". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
External links
- Pietro Morasso (2005). "Consciousness as the emergent property of the interaction between brain, body, & environment: the crucial role of haptic perception" (PDF). Slides related to a chapter on haptic perception (recognition through touch): Pietro Morasso (2007). "Chapter 14: The crucial role of haptic perception". In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti, eds (ed.). Artificial Consciousness. Academic. pp. 234–255. ISBN 978-1845400705.
{{cite book}}:|editor=has generic name (help)