Tool and die strike of 1939

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The Tool and Die Strike of 1939, also known as the “Strategy Strike”, was an attempt by the United Auto Workers Union (UAW) to be recognized as the sole representative for General Motors workers. In addition to representation rights, the UAW, working jointly with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), sought to resolve existing grievances of skilled workers.

Background

The UAW was founded in May 1935 in Detroit Michigan, the same city in which the General Motors Company was headquartered. In 1939, the organization had limited experience in negotiations, but had found some success in previous strikes. The Flint Sit-Down Strike, which took place from December 30, 1936 thorough February 1937 in Flint, Michigan, led to the first National UAW-CIO-GM agreement. This agreement, reached on February 11, 1937, recognized the UAW as the sole representative for GM employees, provided the employees were union members for a period of at least six months. The Flint strike and the ensuing agreement are seen as the beginning of increased legitimacy for the UAW.[1]

Beginning in May 1939, the UAW-CIO General Motors Department was placed under the control of Walter Reuther. Reuther had been involved in both negotiations and strikes prior, having been the president of Local 174, which represented autoworkers in Detroit.[2] The UAW had been experiencing infighting at the time, described as “internecine factionalism that pitted communists against conservatives.”[3] Reuther believed that for the UAW to gain recognition and legitimacy, the organization had to be entirely rebuilt. In addition, he concluded that the UAW would need to demonstrate that it was not only a disciplined, responsible organization, but that it significant power under its control.[4] The UAW faced additional obstacles, and Reuther learned after assuming his new role that only six percent of all production workers were paying dues and, in Flint, only 6,000 out of 42,000 workers were paying dues. These statistics led GM to question union membership, and in turn withdraw its recognition of the UAW-CIO, effectively nullifying the 1937 agreement.[5]

For the 25 years following its formation in 1908, General Motors Company (GM) hadn't participated in any major negotiations with labor unions. This inexperience is viewed by some as major factor in how the company reacted to changes in political climate and the increasing role of organized labor.[6] Headquartered in Detroit, Michigan, GM had already established itself as a multinational automaker by the 1930s. In 1939, the year of the strike, GM had a successful business year; car and truck production was increased by one-third and market penetration stood at more than 43 percent.

GM was also believed to be the employer of the UAW’s “largest single bloc of potential members and the key to union revival."[7] Reuther decided to use both the strength and growth of the industry to the union's advantage. Reuther organized tool and die makers, representing the skilled workers GM relied on in production of the 1940 models. Skilled workers were particularly loyal to the CIO and UAW due to the onset of the Great Depression and they often viewed these unions as a way to protect the integrity of their craft.[8]

The framework for negotiations was formed prior the the strike. The UAW aimed for a new structure at GM which would ensure “orderly and responsive consideration of collective bargaining objectives, conduct of negotiations, and coordination of tactics on grievances." The strike also sought a work week of 30 hours, cessation of pay docking for workers, and formal reinstation of shop steward systems. Additionally, workers desired a greater role in determining production standards.[9] Success in these negotiations would advance the UAW's ultimate goal of representation and legitimacy.

The Strike

On July 2, 1939 the Tool and Die strike plan was approved by the UAW executive board. The strike itself was put into action on the 5th of July. The stoppage began when Reuther called out 800 workers of the Fisher No. 21(Fisher Body) shop which was located on the west side of Detroit. The following day, men from four other GM facilities in Detroit walked out, including the largest tool and die shop in the world, Fisher No. 23. On July 7, other walk-outs started occurring in the Fisher No. 47 shop and in the Fleetwood and Ternstedt divisions. By July 10, shops in Cleveland and Saginaw were shut down. These rapid, strategic movements caused some workers to get laid off, but GM’s fall production schedule started to crumble.[10]

On July 27, 1939, the strike started leaning towards the radical spectrum with the help of Reuther. The GM headquarters was surrounded with picket lines of 12,000 workers. On July 30, Reuther reached out through other forms of media; over the radio, he denounced the GM-Dupont connection and tried to disclose the enormous salaries of Alfred Sloan and William Knudsen. This information was censored by the radio company.

Since 1937, 435 strikes were originated due to union factionalism and instability. GM knew that these types of outbreaks could no longer continue and that the issues at hand had to be dealt with. Shortly after the radio incident, GM offered to recognize the UAW-CIO “as an exclusive bargaining agent for those plants, 41 in all, where only CIO had shop committees.”[11] On August 4, 1939, GM agreed to a slightly higher wage structure for skilled workers to stop the movement from escalating. It wasn’t until April 1940 that the UAW was able to confirm its petition with the National Labor Relations Board and vote. This was the largest election which contained 134,000 votes to represent the 200,000 GM workers. Of those votes, the UAW-CIO took 68 percent, which annihilated the American Federation of Labor. This meant that the union finally won sole representation.[12]

On June 24, 1940, the UAW-GM contract was formed and became the first national contract that settled accommodations between a corporation and the UAW. It contained a company–wide wage standard and set up regulations and a structure of representation. Reuther finally felt triumphant; the negotiations were met, and the UAW was glued back together after having suffered so many political divides.[13]

The Aftermath & Historical Significance

The aftermath of this event should be considered a representation of its historical significance. The strike of 1939 was the rebirth of the UAW, for it showed the strategy, tactics, discipline, cooperation, and support a movement needs in order for it to become effective and for a union to become united. This strike was the catalyst of the relationship between the UAW and General Motors; other strikes would follow, including the 1946 National UAW-GM Strike, which led to the June, 1948 UAW-GM National Agreement. These types of strikes, elections, and negotiations continued until the final UAW-GM National Agreement of 1958. The UAW was persistent and fought for what the workers deserved. As Reuther had said, they “had power under control.”[14] Due to the union's ability to become united during the strike of 1939, even in the 21st century, the United Auto Workers is a strong force to be reckoned with and continues to provide support to auto workers.

Further reading

"Strike Ordered at Auto Plants by Homer Martin." Daily Times 9 June 1939, Web. 18 May. 2013. http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1996&dat=19390609&id=t6kiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=m68FAAAAIBAJ&pg=3661,1977058

Babson, Stever. Working Detroit. New York: Adams Books, 1984. eBook. http://books.google.com/books?id=_2J3YzdEgOAC&pg=PA99&lpg=PA99&dq=UAW+and+tool+and+die+strike+1939&source=bl&ots=zjNfcwtbyI&sig=mRa704uT7ffdhMdOanu7vYA7VEY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=dMKbUZjHMIm8iwK48IDQBQ&sqi=2&ved=0CFIQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=UAW%20and%20tool%20and%20die%20strike%201939&f=true

References

  1. ^ Bak, Richard (September 2008). "(Frank) Murphy's Law". Hour Detroit. Retrieved June 9, 2012.
  2. ^ http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/laborhall/1990_reuther.htm
  3. ^ Weir, Robert (2004). Workers In America: A Historical Encyclopedia. ebook page=678. {{cite book}}: Missing pipe in: |publisher= (help)
  4. ^ Lichtenstein, Nelson (1995). Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Harper Collins Publishers. p. 136.
  5. ^ Lichtenstein, Nelson (1995). Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Harper Collins Publishers. p. 132.
  6. ^ Sloan, Alfred (1963). My Years With General Motors. New York: Double Day Publishing. pp. 405–406.
  7. ^ Lichtenstein, Nelson (1995). Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Harper Collins Publishers. p. 134,135.
  8. ^ Lichtenstein, Nelson (1995). Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Harper Collins Publishers. p. 136.
  9. ^ Barnard, John (2004). American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers During the Reuther Years,1935-1970. Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press. Ebook. p. 142.
  10. ^ Lichtenstein, Nelson (1995). Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Harper Collins Publishers. p. 136.
  11. ^ Lichtenstein, Nelson (1995). Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Harper Collins Publishers. p. 137.
  12. ^ Lichtenstein, Nelson (1995). Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Harper Collins Publishers. p. 138.
  13. ^ Lichtenstein, Nelson (1995). Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Harper Collins Publishers. p. 140.
  14. ^ Lichtenstein, Nelson (1995). Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit. Harper Collins Publishers. p. 133.
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