Quadratic voting
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Quadratic voting is a collective decision-making procedure, where participants cast their preference and intensity of preference for each decision (as opposed to a simple for or against decision)[1].
According to its authors Steven P. Lalley and E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic voting is proven to achieve the greatest possible good for the greatest number of group members[2]. It addresses issues of voting paradox and majority-rule.
Based on market principles, each voter is endowed with a budget of “voice credits” that they may spend influencing the outcome of a range of decisions. If a participant has a strong preference for or against a particular decision, additional votes can be allocated. A vote pricing rule determines the cost of additional votes, whereby each vote increasingly becomes more expensive.
| Number of votes | “Voice Credit” cost |
|---|---|
| 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 4 |
| 3 | 9 |
| 4 | 16 |
| 5 | 25 |
References
- ^ Lalley, Steven; Weyl, E. Glen (2017-12-24). "Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy". Rochester, NY. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2003531.
{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires|journal=(help) - ^ "Quadratic Voting". collectivedecisionengines.com. Retrieved 2018-05-22.
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