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STRIDE model

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STRIDE is a model of threats developed by Praerit Garg and Loren_Kohnfelder at Microsoft[1] for identifying computer security threats.[2] It provides a mnemonic for security threats in six categories.[3]

The threats are:

The STRIDE was initially created as part of the process of threat modelling. STRIDE is a model of threats, used to help reason and find threats to a system. It is used in conjunction with a model of the target system that can be constructed in parallel. This includes a full breakdown of processes, data stores, data flows and trust boundaries.[4]

Today it is often used by security experts to help answer the question "what can go wrong in this system we're working on?"

Each threats is a violation of a desirable property for a system:

Threat Desired property
Spoofing Authenticity
Tampering Integrity
Repudiation Non-repudiability
Information disclosure Confidentiality
Denial of Service Availability
Elevation of Privilege Authorization

Notes on the threats

Repudiation is unusual because it's a threat when viewed from a security perspective, and a desirable property of some privacy systems, for example, Goldberg's "Off the Record" messaging system. This is a useful demonstration of the tension that security design analysis must sometimes grapple with.

Elevation of Privilege is often called escalation of privilege, or privilege escalation. They are synonymous.

See also

References

  1. ^ Shostack, Adam. ""The Threats To Our Products"". Microsoft SDL Blog. Microsoft. Retrieved 18 August 2018.
  2. ^ Kohnfelder, Loren; Garg, Praerit (April 1, 1999). "The threats to our products". Microsoft Interface. Retrieved 18 August 2018.
  3. ^ "The STRIDE Threat Model". Microsoft. Microsoft.
  4. ^ Shostack (2014). Threat Modeling: Designing for Security. Wiley. pp. 61–64. ISBN 978-1118809990.