September 11 attacks: Difference between revisions

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 A variety of scholarship has also focused on bin Laden's overall strategy as a motive for the attacks. For instance, correspondent [[Peter Bergen]] argues that the attacks were part of a plan to cause the United States to increase its military and cultural presence in the Middle East, thereby forcing Muslims to confront the "evils" of a non-Muslim government and establish conservative Islamic governments in the region.<ref name="Bergen2">{{cite book |last=Bergen |first=Peter |title=The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader |publisher=Free Press |year=2006 |location=New York |pages=p. 229 |id=ISBN 0-7432-7891-7}}</ref> Michael Scott Doran, correspondent for ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'', further emphasizes the "mythic" use of the term "spectacular" in bin Laden's response to the attacks, explaining that he was attempting to provoke a visceral reaction in the Middle East and ensure that Muslim citizens would react as violently as possible to an increase in U.S. involvement in their region.<ref>{{cite book |last=Doran |first=Michael Scott |title=Understanding the War on Terror |publisher=Norton |year=2005 |location=New York |pages=pp. 72-75 |id=ISBN 0-87609-347-0}}</ref>
+===CIA preparation and tracking===
+The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] had been dealing with [[al-Qaeda]] as a terrorist threat since at least the mid-1990s.  In 1996 it had set up the [[Bin Laden Issue Station]] to track the Qaeda leader and, thanks to two Qaeda defectors, the unit began to produce more detailed data on al-Qaeda.
+In the winter of 1998-9 (in parallel with the beginning of Qaeda's own plan) [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] chief [[George Tenet]] birthed a new strategy to deal with the organization. During 1999 he developed and inaugurated [[George Tenet#The Plan|a grand Plan]] for the organization.  Amongst other things, it sought to penetrate the ranks of al-Qaeda.  From that time intelligence-collection efforts increased significantly.   "By 9/11", said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human [reporting] networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan". (But this excluded Bin Laden's inner circle itself.)<ref>[[Steve Coll]], ''[[Ghost Wars]]'' (Penguin, 2005 edn), pp.436-7, 451-2, 455, 456, 466-72, 485, 646 note 42, 654 note7; ''9/11 Commission Report'', [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch11.pdf chapter 11], p.357 ([http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch11.htm HTML version]); ibid., [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch4.pdf chapter 4], p.142-3 ([http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch4.htm HTML version]); cf. ibid, [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch6.pdf chapter 6], p.204 ([http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch6.htm HTML version]); [http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/1011702tenet.html Tenet statement to the Joint Inquiry on 9/11, Oct. 17, 2002]; Tenet, ''At The Center Of The Storm'', pp.119, 120.</ref><ref>See also [http://www.geocities.com/libertystrikesback/ptop.html#plan "The 'Plan' and the 'Planes Operation' (1999)]</ref>
+The CIA also experimented with a small reconnaissance drone, the [[MQ-1 Predator|Predator]], running a series of flights over Bin Laden's Afghan headquarters in fall 2000.<ref>Coll, ''Ghost Wars'', pp.527, 532; ''9/11 Commission Report'', [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch6.pdf chapter 6], pp.189-90 ([http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch6.htm HTML version])</ref>  This encouraged [[Counterterrorist Center|counterterror]] chief [[Cofer Black]] and others to push for a missile-armed version to try to assasinate Bin Laden and other Qaeda leaders.  Tenet advised cautiously at the long-awaited Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of [[September 4]], [[2001]].  After the meeting the go-ahead was given for weapons-capable drones.<ref>Coll, ''Ghost Wars'', pp.580-1; [http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/tenet_statement.pdf Tenet statement to the 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004], pp.15, 16; Barton Gellman, "[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060900885_pf.html A Strategy's Cautious Evolution]", ''Washington Post'', Jan. 20, 2002, p.A01; ''9/11 Commission Report'', [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch6.pdf chapter 6], pp.210-14 ([http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch6.htm HTML version]); ibid, [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Notes.pdf Notes], p.513, note 258 (see note 255) ([http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Notes.htm HTML version])</ref>
+In 2001 Tenet also set up a [[Strategic Assessments Branch]] for in-depth study of al-Qaeda, and apparently to "develop targeting strategies".  Due to difficulties in finding personnel, the chief of the branch only took up his job on [[September 10]], [[2001]].<ref>[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/part3.pdf Joint Inquiry Final Report, Part Three], p.387; ''9/11 Commission Report'', [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch11.pdf chapter 11], p.342 ([http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch11.htm HTML version])</ref>
 ==Aftermath==